The American
Political Science Review

VOL. L SEPTEMBER, 1956 NO. 3

WOODROW WILSON AS LEGISLATIVE LEADER AND ADMINISTRATOR*

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
Columbia University

A portrayal of Woodrow Wilson's legislative leadership and administive methods has more uses than as a reminder of achievements durably impressive in themselves. His practice partly answered his own unresolved thinking about the presidency; in turn it implied theories that serve as foils in looking at later developments. The centennial of Wilson's birth is a fitting time to recount the story drawing on memoirs that accumulated after his death. The emphasis may well be on domestic policy in view of the greater attention that has been given to Wilson's role in war and peace.

I

First we must examine the prior development of Wilson's thinking about the presidency. Our concern is the working conception of the office of American elected chief executives that he had come to hold by the time of his full entrance into public life.

As a college senior Wilson wrote on "Cabinet Government in the United States."[1] He deplored, as real cause of solicitude and doubt, "the absorption of all power by a legislature which is practically irresponsible for its acts." What would be the remedy for government "practically carried on by irresponsible committees"? The remedy would be Cabinet government, meaning "simply to give to the heads of the

---

* A discussion of certain points in this paper appears in the report of *Lectures and Seminar at the University of Chicago, Jan. 30–Feb. 3, 1956 in Celebration of the Centennial of Woodrow Wilson*, pp. 267–93.

[1] *International Review*, Aug. 1879, Vol. 7, pp. 146–163. The text is given in R. S. Baker and W. E. Dodd, ed., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. College and State.* (New York, Vol. 1, pp. 19–42). Also republished in booklet form with an introductory chapter by Thomas K. Finletter. (Stamford, Conn, 1947.) The Wilson centennial has been marked by the publication of a volume of selections from his speeches and writings, edited by August Heckscher, *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson,* (New York, 1956).

Executive departments—the members of the Cabinet—seats in Congress, with the privilege of the initiative in legislation and some part of the unbounded privileges now commanded by the Standing Committees." At the time, milder versions of this general idea were in the air. In 1864 a select committee of the House of Representatives under the chairmanship of George H. Pendleton of Ohio reported his bill "to provide that the heads of Executive Departments may occupy seats on the floor of the House of Representatives."[2] Part of the original rationale was the argument that the executive branch had too many personal influences in Congress; then as later men disputed whether the effect of the proposed arrangement would strengthen or weaken the chief executive. In 1879, Mr. Pendleton, by then a Senator, introduced a bill to provide "that principal officers in each of the Executive Departments may occupy seats on the floor of the Senate and House of Representatives." In 1881 he succeeded in his motion to have it referred to a select committee of ten members, by whom it was favorably viewed.[3] Meanwhile Gamaliel Bradford notably was calling attention to this type of proposal; his plea was echoed, for example, in an article in 1873 on the question "Shall the Cabinet have seats in Congress?"[4] But Wilson in his own essay in 1879 warned the advocates that they deceived themselves if they did not recognize that the system would involve cabinet resignation. He suggested that "whether or not the presidential term should, under such a change of conditions, be lengthened would be one of several practical questions which would attend the adoption of a system of this sort."

The same belief that the defects in the American structure were not self-adjusting and the same remedy, without a precise formula, marked Wilson's writings in the early Eighties. In an essay in 1884 he declared roundly: "Committee government is too clumsy and too clandestine a system to last . . . English precedent and the world's fashion must be followed in the institution of Cabinet Government in the United States."[5] His first book, *Congressional Government,* completed in 1884 and published in 1885, was less imperative; it was proposive only by implication. "I am pointing out facts," he wrote, "diagnosing, not prescribing remedies."[6] The preface announced that the purpose of the book was to reveal the contrast between two principal types of government: "administration by semi-independent executive agents who obey the dictation of a legislature to which they are not responsible, and administration by executive agents who are the accredited leaders and accountable servants of a legislature virtually supreme in all things." The depth of the desired reorganization was indicated by the remark that "the Constitution is not honored by blind worship." The direction of change was indicated by pointing to the need to apply "with the unhesitating courage of conviction all thoroughly-tested or well-considered expedients necessary to make self-government among us a straightforward thing of simple method, single unstinted power, and clear responsibility".[7]

---

[2] H.R. 214. 38th Congress, H. Rept. 43, April 6, 1864. For discussion March 3, 1865, see *Congressional Globe*, 38th Congress, 2nd Sess., new series no. 88, *App.*, pp. 103–108. The bill provided that, in addition to giving department heads the right to attend at any time and "to participate in matters relative to the business of their departments," they must come twice a week "to give information in reply to questions which may be propounded to them under the rules of the House." Pendleton himself said: "If I believed that it would increase the power of the Executive I would abandon it at once."

[3] S. 227; 46th Congress, 1st Sess., discussed in an interchange between Senators Pendleton and Morrill on April 28, 1879, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 9, pp. 966–74; reported favorably by a select committee of ten on February 4, 1881, 46th Congress, 3rd Sess., Vol. 11, p. 1201, S. Rept. 837. Reintroduced without result as S. 307 in the 47th Congress, 1st Sess., Vol. 13, p. 53, Dec. 8, 1881.

[4] *Nation*, April 3, 1873, Vol. 16, pp. 233–34. "Mr. Bradford," it said, "thinks that the true way is to give cabinet ministers seats in Congress. His idea is that by this means we can secure what is so much needed, 'national representation'." See Arthur S. Link, *Wilson, The Road to the White House.* (Princeton, 1947), p. 17.

In 1893, in an article in the *Review of Reviews* on "Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet," Wilson was saying: "What we need is harmonious, consistent, responsible party government instead of a wide dispersion of function and responsibility; and we can get it only by connecting the President as closely as may be with his party in Congress. The natural connecting link is the cabinet."[8] A few years later, in a talk before the Virginia Bar Association in 1897, Wilson asked: "Should we not, on the one hand, give the individual leaders of opinion in Congress a better chance to have an intimate part in determining who should be President, and the President, on the other hand, a better chance to approve himself a statesman, and his advisers capable men of affairs, in the guidance of Congress?"[9] Only the second part of the question seemed to be covered by his answer: "This will be done when the Executive is given an authoritative initiative in the Houses."

Significantly, Wilson was now talking about the presidency in terms of "the nationalization of the motive power of the government, to offset the economic sectionalization of the country." For, he argued, the great structural defect was "that Congress is the motive power in the government and yet has in it nowhere any representative of the nation as a whole."

---

[5] "Committee or Cabinet Government," *Overland Monthly,* Jan. 1884, series 2, Vol. 3, pp. 17–33. The essay is given in Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.,* Vol. 1, pp. 95–129.

[6] *Congressional Government.* (Boston, 1885), p. 315. A new preface was written for the fifteenth impression in 1900 and an introduction by Ray Stannard Baker for the impression of 1925.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 332.

[8] *Review of Reviews,* April 1893, Vol. 7, pp. 286–97; reprinted in Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.,* Vol. 1, pp. 198–222.

[9] *Leaderless Government.* (Richmond, 1897.) Reprinted in Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.,* Vol. 1, pp. 336–59.

The final stage in a considerable shift of emphasis and outlook on the presidency can be seen in the new prefatory note to the fifteenth edition of *Congressional Government* in 1900 and forcefully in a magazine article two years later. "Once more," wrote Wilson, "it is our place among the nations that we think of; once more our Presidents are our leaders!"[10]

The lectures in 1907 that were published in the next year as *Constitutional Government in the United States* were Wilson's last academic formulation. The book repeats the view that the war with Spain and related changes had altered the balance of the parts in American government. "Foreign questions became leading questions again, as they had been in the first days of the government, and in them the President was of necessity leader."[11] What is needed in the presidency, more than actual experience, Wilson argued, is some one "who will be and will seem to the country in some sort an embodiment of the character and purpose it wishes its government to have."[12]

Especially important in appraising Wilson's outlook on the relative nature of legislative and administrative responsibilities was his declaration that "it is therefore becoming more and more true, as the business of the government becomes more complex and extended, that the President is becoming more and more a political and less and less an executive officer." Wilson summarized it this way: "His executive powers are in commission, while his political powers more and more center and accumulate upon him and are in their very nature personal and inalienable."[13] As a corollary he believed that under a self-reliant President "the cabinet is an executive, not a political body."[14]

Such a political role for the President involves the problem of telescoped relations to party and to nation. The President, Wilson declared in *Constitutional Government*, "cannot escape being the leader of his party except by incapacity and lack of personal force, because he is at once the choice of the party and of the nation."[15] He went on to say:

---

[10] "The Ideals of America," *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec. 1902, Vol. 90, pp. 721–34. Reprinted in Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 416–42.

[11] *Constitutional Government in the United States.* (New York, 1908), p. 59.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 66–67.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

"No one else represents the people as a whole, exercising a national choice; and inasmuch as his strictly executive duties are in fact subordinated, so far at any rate as all detail is concerned, the President represents not so much the party's governing efficiency as its controlling ideals and principles. . . . He can dominate his party by being spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of the country, by giving direction to opinion, by giving the country at once the information and the statements of policy which will enable it to form its judgments alike of parties and of men."

Wilson himself, at this stage in his writing, left choices open and the issues of relationship somewhat blurred. The President, he indicated, "may be both the leader of his party and the leader of the nation, or he may be one or the other. If he lead the nation, his party can hardly resist him. His office is anything he has the sagacity and force to make it."[16] We shall return to this problem of party and nation when we trace Wilson's own choices in office and the working theory implicit in his statements to Congress and to the country.

While he was Governor of New Jersey and already a possible presidential candidate, Wilson remarked in an address before the Commercial Club of Portland, Oregon: "The whole country, since it cannot decipher the methods of its legislation, is clamoring for leadership; and a new role, which to many persons seems a little less than unconstitutional, is thrust upon our executives. The people are impatient of a President or a governor who will not formulate a policy and insist upon its adoption. They are impatient of a governor who will not exercise energetic leadership, who will not make his appeals directly to public opinion and insist that the dictates of public opinion be carried out in definite legal reforms of his own suggestion." It was indeed a prospectus typical of the times; Charles Evans Hughes in New York was talking and acting in these terms. Wilson's own state leadership helped to make it typical.

On the eve of entering the White House, Wilson dealt with the presidency in a public letter to A. Mitchell Palmer.[17] The purpose was to sidetrack a proposed amendment for a single six-year presidential term. This proposal had been endorsed by the Democratic platform and a resolution of amendment had passed the Senate on February 1, 1913.[18] In opposing it, Wilson pointed to what he believed was the transitional condition and the still uncertain destination of the presidency. Such uncertainty, he argued, made any early constitutional amendment undesirable. "I must speak with absolute freedom and candor in this matter, or not speak at all," Wilson wrote, "and it seems to me that the present position of the Presidency in our actual system, as we use it, is quite abnormal and must lead eventually to something very different." Why, he asked, should the President, who is expected to be the leader of the party and spokesman of policy, be responsible to no one for four years, let alone six? "Sooner or later, it would seem, he must be made answerable to opinion in a somewhat more informal and intimate fashion—answerable, it may be, to the Houses whom he seeks to lead, either personally or through a Cabinet, as well as to the people for whom they speak." He added: "But this is a matter to be worked out—as it inevitably will be—in some natural American way which we cannot yet even predict."

---

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[17] The text appeared in the daily press of Feb. 6, 1913. It is given in Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 21–26.

[18] *Congressional Record*, 62d Congress, 3d sess., Vol. 49, p. 2420.

To speak in these vague terms in February 1913 was probably both tactical and honest. It bulwarked the argument that the presidency was in unresolved transition while, equally unresolved for Wilson, it retained elements of his earlier preoccupation. It left Wilson free to emphasize what was immediate and practical: that the President "is expected by the Nation to be the leader of his party as well as the Chief Executive Officer of the Government, and the country will take no excuses from him." This assumption was the basis for the crucial point in the argument. "The present fact," Wilson wrote, "is that the President is held responsible for what happens in Washington in every large matter, and so long as he is commanded to lead he is surely entitled to a certain amount of power—all the power he can get from the support and convictions and opinions of his fellow countrymen; and he ought to be suffered to use that power against his opponents until his work is done." Limiting the President to a single six-year term, he argued, would seriously embarrass the fighting power of a President who is a true spokesman for the people.

II

In such passages we were given a working plan on the eve of its memorable application. Thereafter we can glean only the barest hints of Wilson's later thinking about constitutional change. There is little to offset the verdict that as man of action he helped history to pronounce: namely, that the practice of presidential leadership reduced the possibility of using the presidency as a passive pinion for evoking legislatively responsible cabinets.

As for clues to Wilson's later thinking about responsibility, it is true that on November 5, 1916, before the election, he wrote to Secretary Lansing that, if Hughes was elected, he proposed to appoint him Secretary of State and then to resign along with the Vice President so that Hughes could become President without delay. "All my life long," Wilson wrote to Lansing, "I have advocated some such responsible government for the United States as other constitutional systems afford as of course, and as such action on my part would inaugurate, at least by example. Responsible government means government by those whom the people trust, and trust at the time of decision and action. The whole country has long perceived, without knowing how to remedy, the extreme disadvantage of having to live for four months after an election under a party whose guidance had been rejected at the polls."[19] But President Wilson was speaking here of a special aspect of the problem of responsibility. The Twentieth Amendment has eased this angle of the problem by shortening the interregnum.

On the question of President Wilson's ultimate views about political responsibility through a cabinet, David F. Houston reported that "after he went to Washington, I never heard him refer to the proposal."[20] Houston added his guess that "Wilson had never really thought through this problem which interested him for so many years." Houston did not believe that Woodrow Wilson quite realized how far his own successful practice of his immediate working code had helped to remove the dilemma by closing the doors on any other course for the presidency.

Against this glancing evidence must be put the equally slight clue given by Colonel House's dictated diary note about a dinner conversation with the President on April 29, 1917.[21]

"The President," House recorded, "declared his intention of writing some things which were on his mind, after he retired from office. . . . He said he had no notion of writing about his administration, but expressed a desire to write one book which he has long had in mind and which he thought might have some influence for good. . . . He talked of the proposed book and its contents. I thought that if he would bring out clearly the necessity for a more responsive form of government, and the necessity for having Cabinet members sit in the House of Representatives, it would be worth while. He agreed that if the Cabinet officers sat in the House, the outcome would be that the President would have to take his material for the Cabinet from Congress. This, in the end, would give the Cabinet more power, and would have the further effect of bringing into Congress the best talent in the country. It would eventuate in something like the British system." But what we have quoted is Colonel House, self-consciously leading; it is not Woodrow Wilson speaking directly. Moreover, so far as the report goes and is accurate, it merely says that the President "agreed" about the consequences likely to follow the imagined first step. It does not necessarily commit the President to belief in these ultimate consequences.

---

[19] Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters.* (Garden City, 1927–1939), Vol. 6, p. 292–93. Baker remarks: "There is no doubt that he would have carried out his purpose of resigning in case Hughes had been elected." p. 293.

[20] David F. Houston, *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet.* (Garden City, 1926), Vol. 2, p. 198.

[21] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.* Arranged as a Narrative by Charles Seymour. (Boston, 1928), Vol. 3, p. 47.

As for Wilson's later plans for writing, we have Edith Wilson's word that, in the course of comparing various places to live after leaving the White House, "eventually Washington was decided on for these reasons, mainly: (1) the Library of Congress afforded the facilities which my husband wished to use while writing a book he had long had in mind; and (2) it was home to me."[22] But of the imagined content of such a book we have only the further comment that "this book which Mr. Wilson wanted to write was on the subject of Government" and that, tragically, only one page of it was ever written. This was a dedicatory page written in the White House in 1921 and handed to Mrs. Wilson with the smiling remark, as she recalled it: "I have written the dedication to the book on Government for which I have been preparing all my life and which now I will have leisure to do." Only one published article, however, came from him before his death—an essay in the *Atlantic Monthly* of August, 1923, on "the Road Away from Revolution."[23]

III

A more practical issue was the way Wilson as President conceived and dealt with the interfused, double representative roles of the office. Undoubtedly his inaugural address stated the core of his thought about the instrumental relation of majority processes and party rule to the changing national consensus. "The success of a party," he said on March 4, 1913, "means little except when the Nation is using the party for a large and definite purpose. No one can mistake the purpose for which the Nation now seeks to use the Democratic Party. It seeks to use it to interpret a change in its own plans and point of view."[24] The same conception was reflected in a magazine article—an interview, perhaps, it should be called—that appeared on March 8. "I am bidden," he said, "to interpret as well as I can the purposes of the people of the United States, and to act, in so far as my purpose determines the action, through the instrumentality of persons who likewise represent that choice." He drew the conclusion: " . . . I shall not be acting in a partisan spirit when I nominate progressives—and only progressives. I shall be acting as a representative of the people of this great country."[25]

---

[22] Edith Bolling Wilson, *My Memoir.* (Indianapolis, 1939), p. 308.

[23] The text is given in Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 536–39. In this essay he wrote: "Everyone who has an intelligent knowledge of social forces must know that great and widespread reactions like that which is now unquestionably manifesting itself against capitalism do not occur without cause or provocation; and before we commit ourselves irrevocably to an attitude of hostility to this movement of the time, we ought frankly to put to ourselves the question, Is the capitalistic system unimpeachable? which is another way of asking, Have capitalists generally used their power for the benefit of the countries in which their capital is employed and for the benefit of their fellow men?"

[24] The text of the address is given in Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 1–6.

We shall have occasion in examining Wilson's legislative methods to note the importance of his decision to work with the regular leaders and officers of the Democratic Party in Congress. This crucial choice of tactics was qualified but not renounced in such statements as his remark in a Jackson Day talk in January, 1915, "that politics in this country does not depend any longer upon the regular members of either party."[26] He contended that the Democratic Party was two-thirds "progressive," the Republican Party one-third "progressive." In the spring of 1916 he said at a Jefferson Day banquet: "Party politics, my friends, sometimes plays too large a part in the United States. . . .This country demands service which is essentially and fundamentally nonpartisan." He added that he was referring as much to domestic as to foreign affairs. "For in saying non-partisan I do not mean merely as between parties and political organizations, but also and more fundamentally as between classes and interests."[27]

Later, in the congressional campaign of 1918, the President's appeal for the return of a Democratic majority seemed to project something long and deep in his thinking about party responsibility. The recollections of his cabinet associates indicate that they understood his appeal would be couched in terms of support for his policies.[28] Colonel House, however, noted in his diary on September 24: ". . . The President spoke of politics in general and expressed an earnest desire that a Democratic Congress should be elected. He said that he intended making a speech or writing a letter about two weeks before the elections, asking the people to return a Democratic House."[29] The diary entry added: "I did not express any opinion as to the wisdom of this." On October 25, when the President's statement was issued and before the election, House did confide to his diary that he was "greatly disturbed by the President's appeal" and that "I am sorry now I did not discuss it with him to a finish."[30] It is true the President's statement on October 25 sought to avoid the charge that he was complaining of lack of support of the war.[31] "I have no thought," he said, "of suggesting that any political party is paramount in matters of patriotism." But his appeal was frankly in terms of party. He went on to say that "the leaders of the minority in the present Congress have unquestionably been prowar, but they have been anti-administration." He charged that they had been constantly seeking "to take the choice of policy and the conduct of the war out of my hands and put it under the control of instrumentalities of their own choosing." Pleading that "this is no time either for divided counsel or for divided leadership," the President said to the voters: "If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Representatives." It should be noted that the President based this appeal largely on the importance of being unembarrassed by divided counsel and controls. There was no commitment to stop striving when he added: "I am your servant and will accept your judgment without cavil, but my power to administer the great trust assigned me by the Constitution would be seriously impaired should your judgment be adverse, and I must frankly tell you so because so many critical issues depend upon your verdict."

---

[25] *Collier's Weekly*, March 8, 1913, Vol. 50, p. 8. Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 27–30.

[26] Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

[27] Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 144.

[28] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 8, pp. 513–14.

[29] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. 4, p. 68.

Writing later in a personal letter, Wilson said of his action: "I have no idea that the President is sacrosanct in any way, and being the leader of the country and under our system necessarily the leader of a party, he certainly ought not to be rendered dumb on a point of taste at a critical moment."[32]

Woodrow Wilson himself recognized the relation of the moving consensus of cumulative thinking and agitation to the legislative dynamic of party action and executive leadership within and through a party. In a letter to an intimate friend on April 23, 1911, toward the close of the fruitful New Jersey legislative session of Wilson's first year as governor, he had written that it was "just a bit of natural history. I came to the office in the fullness of time, when opinion was ripe on all these matters, when both parties were committed to these reforms, and by merely standing fast, by never losing sight of the business for an hour,

[30] Tumulty's account indicates the President's impression after the original conversation was "that he and Colonel House had finally agreed that the thing to do was frankly to come out without preliminaries of any kind and boldly ask for the election of a Democratic Congress." *Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him.* (Garden City, 1921), p. 326.

[31] The text is given in Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, Vol.1, pp. 286–287.

[32] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 8, p. 552.

but keeping up all sorts of (legitimate) pressure *all the time*, kept the mighty forces from being diverted or blocked at any point."[33] Governor Wilson's contemporary view of himself was echoed by Arthur S. Link as historian: "He succeeded because he marshaled into a coherent unit the force of public opinion, because he was a competent party leader, but above all because the necessary fundamental agitation had already been accomplished by other men."[34]

To say that Woodrow Wilson learned his politics in New Jersey (as he said) and revealed there his methods of leadership in their relation to a critical stage in the maturing of agreement does not deny important differences in the depth of controversy on state and national issues. Moreover, important and bitter choices remain even when there is general agreement that something must be done about some long-discussed matter—currency, say. Harvesting—even if it were no more than that—is not the least nor the least chancy of the skills of husbandry.[35]

In foreign affairs things were reversed; he sowed but he did not contrive to harvest.

IV

It is timely to pass to a closer examination of the methods of legislative leadership followed by President Wilson and to note his staff equipment for a role which, as has been said, he viewed as distinctively political. Later (having noted some of his working habits) we shall turn to the administrative views and methods of the man who in 1887 wrote a pioneering essay on the importance of administration and its study in the modern state.

"Woodrow Wilson," Lawrence Chamberlain has remarked, "was the first President to develop systematically the legislative powers of his office. Coming in a period of peace and prosperity, his first administration offered an unusually favorable climate in which to test the theory of presidential synthesis and he was equipped by training, experience, and purpose to develop his concept of the office to its fullest."[36] This statement is doubtless true-both in point of Wilson's historic contribution in the development of legislative leadership and also in point of the relative importance of domestic statutory policy in 1913 and 1914.

---

[33] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 170.

[34] *Wilson, The Road to the White House.* (Princeton, 1947), p. 272.

[35] In domestic affairs, the war lacking, the dynamic of progressivism was hardly exhausted although William Diamond, *The Economic Thought of Woodrow Wilson* (Baltimore, 1943), p. 126, remarks that "With the passage of the Clayton Act, the New Freedom had reached its climax. . . . " I think we may discount Wilson's indication in the autumn of 1914 that the economic program was practically complete and that much that remained was for the states to do. See Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, p. 198. See also Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era.* (New York, 1954.)

[36] L. H. Chamberlain, *The President, Congress, and Legislation.* (New York, 1946), p. 17.

It does not diminish the importance of the events of the early years to note Ray Stannard Baker's comment, which indeed Wilson whimsically anticipated in an off-hand remark before he took the oath of office, after a campaign in which foreign affairs were hardly mentioned. Baker remarked: "such was the irony of fate that from the cabinet meeting on March 7th until Congress assembled in April—and long afterwards—Wilson's attention was largely absorbed by the clamorous problems of Mexico, China, Japan, Panama, the Philippine Islands, Nicaragua."[37] Along the same line, David Houston, Secretary of Agriculture, in a notation on May 20, 1913, about cabinet meetings, wrote: "Somebody pointed out that all our discussions, or nearly all, had been over foreign matters; that domestic problems of importance such as the tariff and currency were never raised by the President. Lane, in particular, was critical. I pointed out that the President had evidently and of necessity given his thoughts primarily to pressing foreign questions, that he regarded this as his particular field, one in respect to which he had unusual powers and responsibilities, that he was evidently depending upon the heads of departments initially to handle domestic economic questions each in his particular field, and that he complimented us by presenting many matters for discussion and advice while some heads of departments did not."[38] Colonel House, of course, saw it from a different perspective. He dictated a grumbling note for his diary on June 24, 1915: "To my mind, the President has never appreciated the importance of our foreign policy and has laid undue emphasis upon domestic affairs. I thoroughly approved this up to the end of the special session of Congress, when the tariff, banking, and such other measures were involved. . . ."[39]

The methods by which the President advanced the domestic legislative program were of course varied. Nevertheless it is possible to identify certain main characteristics.

(1) President Wilson used his legislative influence selectively. He pushed one measure at a time. But the pressure kept coming. While the special session that met on April 7, 1913, was concentrating on the tariff, the House committees generally were not organized. Nevertheless the Committee on Banking and Currency was chosen so that Carter

---

[37] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 56.

[38] David F. Houston, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 67–68.

[39] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. 1, p. 177.

Glass (busy with a preliminary draft even before the election) could go ahead as duly constituted chairman. The tariff bill was not ready for signature until October but in late June the President addressed Congress on the need for banking legislation. In the field of antitrust, House hearings began in December, with the ground already laid in conversations with the Democratic leaders.[40] A presidential message in January indicated the five points for legislative action.

Overlapping selective pressure of this sort was an effective though partial answer to Wilson's long-standing complaint. "Legislation is conglomerate," he had written in 1885.[41] "The absence of any concert of action amongst the Committees leaves legislation with scarcely any trace of determinate party courses. No two schemes pull together."

(2) The President's legislative approach was studiously collaborative. In addressing Congress about the tariff on April 8, 1913, he opened by saying that the President should not be viewed as "a mere department of the Government hailing Congress from some isolated island of jealous power . . . that he is a human being trying to cooperate with other human beings in a common service." The President added that "after this pleasant experience I shall feel quite normal in all our dealings with one another."[42]

There were hazards in going to the Hill. As President-elect Wilson asked Josephus Daniels: "Did you ever hear of a President occupying a room in the Capitol called 'the President's Room'? What would be thought of it, if, instead of asking Senators with whom I wished to consult to call at the White House, I should occupy that room for such conferences?"[43] Daniels did not think the Senators would like it and he recalled later that Senator Simmons exclaimed: "My God . . . tell him not to do it. It would be resented by the Senators." But the favorable reaction to the personal delivery of his tariff message prompted the President to meet next day in the President's Room.

Ray Stannard Baker records illustratively the frequent and varied nature of the President's congressional contacts. "He was constantly receiving delegations of senators at the White House and he often visited the President's room at the Capitol. We have an account of one instance, June 12th, when he inquired for twenty-one senators, only seven of whom could be found. . . . On June 18th he was again at the Capitol conferring with twenty-three different Senators. He asked to have a special telephone put in so that he might, on occasion, reach senators quickly and directly from the White House."[44]

---

[40] Chamberlain, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[41] *Congressional Government*, p. 325.

[42] Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 32.

[43] Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era, Years of Peace 1910–1917.* (Chapel Hill, 1944) pp. 99–100.

(3) The President's legislative approach was frankly through party as the instrument for the reshaped purposes of the nation. In his tariff message he said: "I have called the Congress together in extraordinary session because a duty was laid upon the party now in power at the recent elections which it ought to perform promptly." In his message in June on banking legislation he said: "I have come to you, as the head of the Government and the responsible leader of the party in power, to urge action, now while there is time to serve the country deliberately and as we should, in a clear air of common counsel." Factional rifts reflecting different viewpoints within the party were clearly in sight on all the major early and outstanding legislative undertakings—the tariff, currency, and antitrust. "Nevertheless"—to quote John M. Blum's summary of a choice that was in fact many-sided— "in keeping with his theories of government, and on the advice of Burleson and Daniels, Wilson decided to work through his party rather than to attempt to construct a progressive coalition. The implementation of this decision called for the recognition of each important Democratic faction in the assignment of political largess. This worrisome task fell largely to Postmaster General Burleson, Secretaries Bryan and McAdoo, and Tumulty. . . ."[45]

(4) In seeking results through party, not coalition, the President chose to work with the regularly constituted party leaders and organs. The crucial demonstration of this tactic and its success was in bowing to seniority and accepting Senator Simmons as chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Originally, facing protective tendencies in certain Southern and Western Democrats, the President had thought that an effort should be made to sidetrack Simmons in favor of a more militantly low-tariff chairman. He yielded to the counsel of Daniels and others, however, and gained in Simmons an unusually effective supporter in defending the reductions. Another example came during the war when the President relied on the help of Claude Kitchin who in 1914 replaced Oscar Underwood as Democratic floor leader in the House. Kitchin voted against the declaration of war and indeed (as Alex M. Arnett put it, in the mood of revisionist history writing in the Thirties) was "able, in fact, to lead a majority of his colleagues *almost* to the point of blocking the President's tragic course."[46] After hostilities began, however, Arnett notes, "Kitchin never questioned his duty to do

---

[44] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 123.

[45] *Tumulty and the Wilson Era.* (Boston, 1951), p. 69.

[46] Alex M. Arnett, *Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies.* (Boston, 1937), p. viii.

all in his power, consistent with his principles, to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion."[47] Nothing came of the rumor that the President would throw his influence against Kitchin's reelection as floor leader. He was indeed approved unanimously by the Democratic caucus. On the President's side there was doubtless a favorable carry-over from his earlier attitude as described by Arnett: "Although their personal contacts were infrequent, Wilson was cordial toward Kitchin when they met, respected his judgment, and admired his sincerity."[48]

On the debit side, to be sure, a consequence of working through the regular party machinery was to deepen Southern influence. John Blum reminds us of Tumulty's growing concern about this condition. He concludes that "by 1917 it was too late to overcome the Southern predominance in Congress and in party councils."[49]

(5) The use of the caucus was a further feature of the plan of working through party, not coalition. On the tariff measure, a caucus of House Democratics in April, "after tumultuous debate,"[50] voted to support the bill and on the following day it was reported by the Ways and Means Committee, passing in the following month with only five Democrats against it. On the Senate side, where the majority in the chamber was a scant seven, the President was at first unsuccessful in his attempt to secure caucus endorsement. Later, however, the first Democratic senatorial caucus or party "conference" in many years discussed the tariff bill more than a fortnight and, in making it a party measure, substantially defended the integrity of the House bill. The currency bill was debated "behind closed doors"[51] in the House Democratic caucus for two days in September; the measure passed the House later that month by 287 to 85. In this caucus the administration bill had to face the dissident views of so potent a Democrat as the chairman of the Rules Committee. In securing overwhelming caucus support for a middle degree of central guidance in the proposed reserve system, the administration had Bryan's aid, especially after it was agreed that the Federal Reserve Board should be wholly public in membership, not partly banker-chosen.[52]

---

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[49] Blum, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[50] Chamberlain, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 319.

[52] Mrs. Bryan wrote in her diary in the spring of 1913: "One thing which pleases me is the constantly increasing cordiality between the President and Mr. Bryan. They work together so well. Will finds him so firm and courageous and so truly progressive." *The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan.* By Himself and his Wife Mary Baird Bryan. (Philadelphia, 1925), p. 350.

In view of the President's public statement of his gratification at the action of the House committee and the caucus in handling the currency bill, it is a bit puzzling to read Carter Glass' recollections about the use of the caucus in pushing the currency bill in the Senate after a divided committee had reported the measure without recommendation. Glass recalled that Wilson was at first "disposed to assert vigorously his established aversion to 'rule by caucus.' " Glass' account goes on to emphasize the indispensability of caucus action. Had he persisted in his attitude, Glass writes, "there might have been no reform of the currency for years . . . the practical politicians finally convinced the President that there must be a caucus or abandonment of all hope for legislation."[53] So a "conference" was held and the President, Glass adds, "did the cleverest kind of work among the Senators in healing differences and imparting a new and militant spirit to the whole movement." As to the initial reluctance about a Senate caucus thus strangely attributed by Glass to the President, it is true that Wilson had always extolled open debate. In his first book he had discussed the caucus as a corrective of legislative incoherence but observed: "the fact that makes this defense of the caucus not altogether conclusive is that it is shielded from all responsibility by its sneaking privacy."[54] However it is doubtful whether these tentative scruples (conceived in his earlier writings against the background of an imagined main alternative) had much weight against the necessities and methods of 1913.

(6) Essential in the President's tactics was the well-timed public appeal. When the tariff bill faced a crucial test in the Senate hearings, Wilson, apparently without consulting either Cabinet or congressmen, gave to the press on May 26 his statement against rampant lobbies that could be offset only by an alert public opinion.

(7) The President was willing to fight for legislative proposals. In connection with the movement for merchant fleet development begun in 1914, Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo recalled that "when I saw the President again, he was strongly in favor of the plan that I had submitted. He handed me back the draft of the bill and said, with a smile, 'We'll have to fight for it, won't we?' "[55] McAdoo adds that when he replied, "We certainly shall," the President said, "Well, then, let's fight." The fight lasted eighteen months.

But against this evidence of mood and manner may be put the sort of tone in Wilson's letter to Secretary of War Lindley Garrison on January 17, 1916, before the latter's resignation. The President wrote: "I am not irrevocably or dogmatically committed to any one plan of providing the nation with such a reserve, and am cordially willing to discuss alternative proposals."[56] He added: "Any other position on my part would indicate an attitude toward the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives which I should in no circumstances feel at liberty to assume. It would never be proper or possible for me to say to any committee of the House of Representatives that, so far as my participation in legislation was concerned, they would have to take my plan or none."

---

[53] Carter Glass, *An Adventure in Constructive Finance.* (Garden City, 1927), p. 195.

[54] *Congressional Government,* pp. 328–29.

[55] William Gibbs McAdoo, *Crowded Years.* (Boston, 1931), p. 296.

(8) President Wilson's intervention in the legislative handling of particular measures was characteristically limited. During the debate on the tariff John Sharp Williams told the Senate that the President had actively concerned himself with decisions on two items only. One was clearly sugar, where firmness was needed against protective pressures from Louisiana and Colorado. Moreover, on other bills the President allowed leeway for permissive language that seemed unlikely to disturb the substantial policy the administration was advocating. Carter Glass recalled how they agreed to such a provision in the Federal Reserve Act. His account reports the President saying: ". . . if we can hold to the substance of the thing and give the other fellow the shadow, why not do it, if thereby we may save our bill?"[57]

Generally speaking, it may be said that in legislative leadership it was Woodrow Wilson's theory and practice, within a selective strategy in identifying certain policies for active support, to supply, not draftsmanship, but rather a stream of influence, public and personal, while he stood ready to aid in defending or adjusting a few crucial points. Illustratively, Henry Parker Willis, in his detailed story of the Federal Reserve Act, remarks in summary: "President Wilson's service to the country, important and absolutely fundamental as it was, had nothing to do with the development of any essential features of the measure and his most important effect upon its content was seen in the change made for the purpose of satisfying the Bryan element in the administration and in Congress." Willis added: "This statement in no wise underestimates the importance of President Wilson's service in connection with the adoption of the law—indeed it could never have become an act without his steady, persistent, and insistent support of it."[58]

---

[56] Houston, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 172.

[57] Glass, *op. cit.*, p. 125. As to this incident, Paul M. Warburg noted: "He threw Glass into consternation when he bought the support of the Bryan-Owen wing by permitting Federal Reserve notes to be issued as the obligation of the United States, but in doing so, in his own words, he 'surrendered the shadow but saved the substance.'" *The Federal Reserve System: Its Origin and Growth.* (New York, 1930), Vol. 1, p. 422.

[58] *The Federal Reserve System: Legislation, Organization and Operation.* (New York, 1923), pp. 531–32.

V

The institutional staffing of the presidency under Woodrow Wilson reflected little of the innovation that he brought to the use of the office. The simplicity of the formal arrangements was indeed in line with his stress upon a political role that was inherently individual. The presidency was in transition but it remained for later administrations to witness the installation and development of apparatus for an office that, in conjunction with the times, Wilson so notably helped to remake. His own use of limited equipment was shaped to his working habits.

The routines of the presidency were left to Rudolph Forster, chief clerk under many prior Presidents, and to Irwin H. (Ike) Hoover, veteran White House usher.[59] "Assisting Forster were Thomas Brahany, his second in command, a head correspondence clerk, a head letter clerk, the chief of the telegraph and telephone systems, and a core of stenographers and filing clerks."[60]

Joseph P. Tumulty, Secretary to the President, was a different kind of pivot. His role projected traditional arrangements as well as an habituated personal relationship. Tumulty's post was indeed in course of transition. John Blum, in his appreciative and informing account of Tumulty's important contribution, points out that "Tumulty was the last man to carry this load alone. Today his duties are divided among almost a dozen men. He served longer and under more trying conditions than had Lamont, Cortelyou, or Loeb, his illustrious predecessors."[61] Blum adds that Tumulty's "capacity for hard work and his solid, often extraordinary achievements, moreover, can be appreciated fully only in the light of his extensive ex-officio activities in Democratic politics and as an adviser on the Administration's domestic and foreign policies."

Wilson had encountered Tumulty, progressive Democrat, in the 1910 New Jersey campaign. He welcomed his company on a speaking tour. As Governor-elect he was receptive when, at the prompting of James Kerney, editor of the Trenton *Evening News*, a former governor suggested that he make Tumulty his secretary.[62] Kerney himself later paraphrased Wilson's remark about the sense of need that guided the choice: "It was absolutely necessary that I should be associated with some one, if possible, who was more familiar with the intimate course of politics in the State than I myself. . . ."[63] As President-elect, Wilson seems never to have considered any one else for Secretary. Then as later he disregarded cavil about Tumulty's religious affiliation. Colonel House asked Tumulty how many letters were coming in hostile to Tumulty for the post of Secretary. He answered that there had been five or six hundred and also indicated that he had given this information (but not all the letters themselves) to the President-elect.[64] Only in 1916 did Wilson's relationship to Tumulty waver. At that time the incipient break seems to have reached the stage of a proferred appointment to the Board of General Appraisers—causing Tumulty surprise and consternation—while Colonel House started to make a canvass for a replacement in the post of Secretary.[65] If there was some lessening of confidence after this break was avoided, the change was a matter of degree into which many factors entered.

---

[59] See Irwin H. Hoover, *Forty-two Years in the White House.* (Boston, 1934.)

[60] Blum, *op. cit.*, p. 58. We are indebted to Mr. Blum for much information drawn from some of the participants, from Joseph P. Tumulty's papers, and other sources. Tumulty's own book, *op. cit.*, illuminates the operating procedures only indirectly.

[61] Blum, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

[62] Blum. *op. cit.*, p. 26.

The screening of candidates is of the essence of politics. Appointments strike so deeply into administration, however, that, if for no other reason than Tumulty's devolved responsibilities in patronage, one must qualify the generalization that as Secretary he served the political rather than the managerial side of the presidency.

Within the official circle there were compromises to engineer. Josephus Daniels' recollections illustrate a phase of Tumulty's job by telling of his service when it seemed that Bryan might resign from the Cabinet if the provisions of the currency bill went too far against his principles. "It was largely through the good offices of Tumulty," Daniels remembered, "that conferences between Bryan, Glass, Owen, and McAdoo resulted in giving the appointment of all members of the board to the President, eliminating banker selection of part of the members. . . ."[66]

Another phase of Tumulty's job was partly summarized in the remark of Edward Hurley, head of one of the war agencies. "Joseph P. Tumulty," he wrote, "was the weather-vane of the Wilson administration."[67] He gave much time to analyzing opinion in the country. John Blum tells that "every day his staff clipped the leading newspapers and magazines from all over the country, arranged the clippings topically, and pasted them on long sheets of yellow paper. Every evening Tumulty took this 'Yellow Journal' home, studied it carefully, evaluated the importance of every item, and, when appropriate, wrote memoranda based on his findings to Wilson or to a responsible department head."[68]

---

[63] James Kerney, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson.* (New York, 1926), p. 84.

[64] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* Vol. 1, p. 99.

[65] Blum, *op. cit.,* pp. 120–22.

[66] Daniels, *op. cit.,* p. 227.

[67] Edward N. Hurley, *The Bridge to France.* (Philadelphia, 1927), p. 317.

[68] Blum, *op. cit.,* p. 61.

In addition, among other ways, Tumulty was helped in gauging reactions in particular situations by the comments of journalists and the like who in effect often served as political scouts.

The other side was the informing and forming of opinion. Here lay the President's chief and certainly his ultimate weapon. The compression of his style was sometimes a handicap. Tumulty could serve as a coach on communicability. The President is reported to have told Ida M. Tarbell: "When it is especially important that I be understood, I try (the speech) on Tumulty, who has a very extraordinary appreciation of how a thing will 'get over the footlights.' He is the most valuable audience I have."[69]

Such assistance was the more important because of Wilson's embarrassments in dealing with newspapermen. He came before the time of radio and television; that was indeed ironic in view of the importance of direct public appeal in his leadership and the fact that temperamentally—as Ray Stannard Baker said—"he could be more intimate and confidential with five thousand people than with one."[70] Wilson broke ground by establishing the custom of biweekly press conferences. They were attended by a hundred or more reporters.[71] Later, however, these regular conferences were dropped. More and more press relations were left to Tumulty.

George Creel, in charge of wartime public information, was prompted by newspapermen to ask the President to renew the conferences. Wilson flatly refused. He said that he had "prepared for the conferences as carefully as for a Cabinet meeting and discussed questions of the day frankly and fully." He observed that "many men of brilliant ability were in the group, but I soon discovered that the interest of the majority was in the trivial and the personal. In the middle of an exposition of policy I would be asked about the sheep on the White House lawn . . ."[72] In any case he objected to what he called "conjectural journalism." One observer of Wilson's political development—an editor himself and Tumulty's collaborator in New Jersey—ventured the estimate that "for the major portion of his two terms in the White House he was seen less by newspaper people and confided less in them than any President since Cleveland or Harrison."[73]

---

[69] Blum. *op. cit.*, p. 60.

[70] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, p. 265.

[71] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 229. "Previous to this time the press had had no formal status at the White House. . . . Wilson established and regularized the custom of meeting all the correspondents twice a week."

[72] George Creel, *Rebel At Large.* (New York, 1947), p. 233.

[73] Kerney, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

VI

In surveying Wilson's working habits, we note at once his preference for written communications in his conduct of the presidency. This preference had been shown as governor; it deepened as the pressure increased. His stress on policy leadership led him to overcome it in legislative contacts but in administration he followed it. The method of the memorandum applied even to his relations with Tumulty. Tumulty's office was next to the President's in the west wing of the White House; he alone had free access. "He could come and go as he chose, but the President preferred to do business in writing. Tumulty therefore submitted his most significant suggestions in memoranda to which Wilson often appended a simple 'Okeh' or 'No'."[74] Moreover the written word suited Wilson's dealings with House, his volunteer confidential adviser, since House was more often at his apartment in New York or abroad than in Washington.

Creel, a sympathetic observer, saw in such procedure evidence of the President's cool analysis of his physical limitations, the magnitude of his task, and the need for quiet consideration. "Instead of the 'open door'," Creel wrote later, "interviews were confined to those of official importance, and personal approaches increasingly gave way to the submission of memoranda. In the quiet of his study at night, every suggestion received the painstaking attention of the President, but even this larger efficiency failed to soothe wounded vanities."[75]

In 1918, when David Lawrence asked for permission to watch the President through the course of a day in order to write about his executive work, the President replied that "I can't for the life of me think it out in any way that would be striking or effective. . . . The day seldom sounds impressive when summed up, because most of the questions which I have decided come to me in the form of memoranda to which I reply in writing. My interviews and consultations are chiefly with people who need not have taken my time, and lead to nothing except the gratification on the part of those who see me that they have had their say."[76] Of course there was the other side voiced by McAdoo when he wrote retrospectively about Wilson: "He was inclined, because, I think, of an innate and unsuspected shyness, to withhold himself too much from contact with people whom it was important for him to know and whose coöperation was highly desirable in the conduct of public business."[77] As McAdoo saw it, the President "had an incurable distaste for professional politicians; he did not understand their ways and did not wish to learn."[78] Ray Stannard Baker gives a different turn to this judgment about Wilson, admitting that "he was to learn in the hard school of experience that the best men were not always outside of politics: that training in public life, if the man was true at the core, often fitted him far better for important positions than the inexperienced 'good man'."[79]

---

[74] Blum, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[75] Creel, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

[76] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 8, p. 25.

[77] McAdoo, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

Certainly Woodrow Wilson—disciplined, comprehending, and terse—suffered bores sadly. House recorded in his diary that he gave the following advice to T. W. Gregory when the latter was about to become Attorney General. "Never to go into long-winded arguments upon any subject, but to state his position in brief terms and never repeat. That when he and the President agreed upon a matter, never to give him reasons for so agreeing, as the President was too busy to listen to unimportant details. I was sure he would always be able to see the President whenever necessary if he did not burden him with unimportant and unnecessary verbiage."[80]

As a further comment on the President's ways of doing things, House noted in the late autumn of 1914: "The President is efficient in his manner of working. For instance, when we were discussing his message to the people concerning the Belgian Relief funds he said, 'Now let us decide what points are best to cover.' He took a telegraph blank having lines on it, and began to take down in shorthand the different points, he making some suggestions and I making others. There were about five points to be covered, and he asked me to think if that were all. When we concluded there was nothing more, he called his stenographer and dictated the message in full."[81] In passing, one notes the way one of Wilson's daughters described the preparation of some state papers: "first writing the substance on a single sheet of paper, partly in script and partly in shorthand, then again entirely in shorthand, making the final copy himself on his own typewriter on small sheets of thick paper. There were usually a few corrections, made in his fine, neat writing between the lines."[82] House closed his diary comment with the judgment: "He has one of the best ordered minds I have ever come in contact with, although he is always complaining of forgetfulness." The latter characteristic is mentioned by Arthur Link: "He had a notoriously bad memory for details. All of his friends testify to this fact."[83]

---

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 523.

[79] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 35.

[80] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. 1, p. 142.

[81] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

[82] Eleanor Wilson McAdoo (in collaboration with Margaret Y. Gaffey), *The Woodrow Wilsons.* (New York, 1937), p. 246.

But on the side of memory and habits of follow-up, Newton D. Baker gave a somewhat different impression in a letter to his biographer. "I took to the President only the things that seemed to me to involve some departure in policy," Baker recalled.[84] "I never troubled him with the details of the department. He had the most orderly mind I have ever known. He sorted things out in the order of their importance. Things never got lost in his mind but lay there until it was time to act." Doubtless here the reliance on written communication helped. Baker went on to say: "Since he wanted things written out I sent him written reports. I would outline something I thought it wise to do. Then, one day, he would speak to me at Cabinet meeting, or send for me, and say: 'has anything happened in that matter?' I realized that once I told him a thing he knew it. I deliberately thought a thing into its most compact form, and when he wanted details he asked for them."

As for the degree of Wilson's interest in detailed facts, it is probable that his inclination never ran that way. Edith Gittings Reid, who knew him when he was at the Johns Hopkins University, recalled his reaction to his work with Professor Herbert B. Adams. "Facts, facts, facts!" exclaimed Wilson. "What do I care about his facts? What I want to know is what he does with them."[85] It should be added, parenthetically, that Adams saw him as a "promising horse" and gave Wilson scope; not only a fellowship but also a part-time lectureship at Johns Hopkins were soon forthcoming.[86]

As President of the United States Wilson did confess his regret that he had so little time for study. He wrote about a certain suggestion on currency reform: "The greatest embarrassment of my political career has been that active duties seem to deprive me absolutely of time for careful investigation. I seem almost obliged to form conclusions from impressions instead of from study, but I intend to go much more thoroughly into this matter before saying anything about it . . ."[87] The limits of "expert" guidance from practical men, however, were illustrated by the fact that the bit of self-analysis just quoted appears in House's published papers close to a letter from House to an editor friend including the comment: "The bankers, sad to relate, know next to nothing about it, and none of them agrees as to what is best."[88]

---

[83] Link, *Wilson, The Road to the White House,* p. 70.

[84] Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker. America at War.* (New York, 1931), Vol. 1, p. 371.

[85] *Woodrow Wilson. The Caricature, the Myth, and the Man.* (London and New York), 1934, p. 37.

[86] The Seminar records of May 8, 1884, when Wilson's thesis was presented, alluded to *Congressional Government* as a phase of the study of institutions and noted: "Mr. Wilson's work is better than anything in that line that has been done heretofore in the Seminary." William Diamond, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[87] Reid, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

Throughout his presidency, in practicing a type of leadership that depended peculiarly upon his public papers, Wilson's approach and method were strongly marked by the qualities indicated in an early letter to David Houston. "Please do not expect me to use the matter in my statements at great length or in the form in which you give it," he wrote.[89] "I cannot deal with questions in that way. I want all the facts and interpretations of them I can get. I shall try to digest them—to get my thought permeated with them; and then I shall try to paint a word picture. I do not like to speak for over twenty or thirty minutes."

VII

Wilson's attitudes in building and using the cabinet were aspects of his theory of his office as well as his working habits. Despite what he had written in 1908, the trend of his thought joined with felt necessities to emphasize the political role of the cabinet in party synthesis. Charles Seymour, summarizing the papers that tell of an early meeting of the President-elect with House, states that "before Wilson left, he and House drew up a tentative list for cabinet positions and discussed the best means to satisfy those who, by their work in the campaign, felt that they had earned proper rewards. It was already agreed that Mr. Bryan must be given his choice of positions."[90] House, a little later, thought that the President-elect might be viewing the appointments a bit too casually; the choice of Garrison was perhaps an example. House sounded a warning against loading the cabinet with party irregulars since the President's reputation would "rest entirely upon the big constructive measures he was able to get through Congress; and in order to get them through he had to be on more or less good terms with that body."[91] As a matter of fact, three of the cabinet members were drawn directly from Congress, notably Postmaster General Burleson of Texas. A party long out of power (despite the congressional victories of 1910) was handicapped. McAdoo, who as co-manager of the presidential campaign shared in the selections and who was so long a cabinet associate, remarked later: "The weak point of the Wilson Cabinet, it seemed to me, was not in the essential qualities of ability, knowledge, and initiative, but in the matter of political prestige."[92]

---

[88] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* Vol. 1, p. 164.

[89] Houston, *op. cit.,* Vol. 1, p. 20.

[90] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* Vol. 1, p. 88.

[91] *Ibid.,* Vol. 1, p. 103.

We are concerned here with the cabinet as council, not with the President's relations to the cabinet members individually in carrying out his theory of administration through a departmental system. Since no minutes were taken, our knowledge of the scope and method of cabinet consultation rests on fragmentary memoir material including fugitive diary entries and letters. Jonathan Daniels has said of his father's diary jottings at the time: "He recorded the punch lines of Wilson's jokes which the President seemed sometimes to use not to point his discussions with the Cabinet, but as barriers against discussion."[93] Certain of the participants did attempt to put down some descriptions of standard cabinet procedure as they remembered it. Josephus Daniels, for example, summed up the President's methods as follows: "His plan from the first was to present some matter or matters about which he desired what he was fond of calling 'common counsel' and after he had received the reaction of Cabinet members, his practice was to call on each member to present any question that concerned departmental policies, for debate and exchange of views."[94] Daniels also mentioned Wilson's practice of alternation: "At one Cabinet meeting he would begin with the Secretary of State, and at the next the Secretary of Labor would be called upon first." As for the nature of the decisions in Cabinet, Daniels stated broadly: "He never took a vote, pursuing a course, as he often said, more like a Quaker meeting, in which after full discussion the President would say, 'It seems to me the sense of the meeting is so and so,' and the policy thus ascertained would be the program of the administration. Usually he found himself in harmony with a majority. He wished in all important decisions to know the views of his associates."

This somewhat idealized statement raises questions about the extent of Wilson's departures from the norm.[95] It is enough to say that, as throughout our history, group consultation in the cabinet was not consistent. But one must discount the complaints like those of Franklin K.

---

[92] McAdoo, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

[93] *The End of Innocence.* (Philadelphia and New York), 1954, p. 18.

[94] Josephus Daniels, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 137. On the same point, William C. Redfield, Secretary of Commerce, wrote: "If the President had matters of importance, he would state them and discussion followed. This concluded, he would ask each Secretary in order if there was business he desired to place before the Cabinet." *With Congress and Cabinet.* (Garden City, 1924), p. 67.

[95] In mid-1913 House is said to have relayed to the President the indignation of the Cabinet members because meetings had been cut to one a week; in December the bi-weekly meetings were resumed. Arthur D. Howden Smith, *Mr. House of Texas.* (New York, 1940), p. 94.

Lane in his letters about the very intermittent cabinet discussion of the war while it was going on, as when he wrote on March 1, 1918, "Yesterday, at Cabinet meeting, we had the first real talk on the war in weeks, yes, in months!" and then spluttered on March 12, "Nothing talked of at Cabinet that would interest a nation, a family, or a child."[96] It should be remembered that already much of the interchange with the President was taking place in his weekly meetings with the heads of the emergency agencies and the Secretaries of War and Navy—the "war cabinet" as it was popularly called. Besides, allowance must be made for Lane's probably irked sense of being a bit out of things, reflected in his comment in March to Walter Hines Page: "My office is a sort of place of last resort for those who are discouraged elsewhere, for Washington is no longer a city of set routine and fixed habit."[97] Lane himself, back in 1913, had apparently been the cause of a rebuke in the Cabinet about leakage of information. Houston brought up the matter and (as McAdoo wrote the story later) "Upon hearing Houston's remark, the President took advantage of the opportunity to repeat, quite pointedly, what he had said at the first Cabinet meeting about the confidential nature of our discussions. He said that he wanted to advise with the Cabinet freely and fully, but that he could not do so unless the rule of confidence was kept inviolate."[98] During the war it was perhaps Lane whom the President had in mind when he told George Creel that (as Creel phrased it): ". . . he dines out every night and is the life of the party. As a result, his mind has been given over to anecdotes and chitchat, and it takes him an hour to come to the matter in hand."[99]

VIII

Wilson the administrator is implicit in much that has been quoted. It remains to look more particularly for the assumptions on which he acted and in their light to note the practice of those years.

One finds in Wilson's writings little direct generalization about the administrative side of government after he published the prescient essay on "The Study of Administration," in 1887 while he was at his first full-time teaching post.[100] Emblematically, Saul Padover's little anthology of Wilson's sayings, which on most matters draws passages from many stages of Wilson's life, quotes only from the 1887 essay under the heading "administration."[101]

---

[96] *The Letters of Franklin K. Lane.* Edited by A. W. Lane and L. H. Wall. (Boston, 1922), pp. 266, 267. Later Lane commented on November 1, 1918: "At last week's Cabinet we talked of Austria—again we talked like a Cabinet." *Ibid.*, p. 296. Houston in his reminiscences said: "Generally speaking, after we entered the war, there were few new matters of broad policy which had to be discussed in Cabinet meeting until the fall of 1918." *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 301.

[97] *The Letters of Franklin K. Lane*, p. 274.

[98] McAdoo, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

[99] Creel, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[100] *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1887, Vol. 2, pp. 197–222. The text is given in

Wilson in 1887 identified in executive power what was to be the generally accepted focal point of administrative study, agitation, and progress in the three decades that followed. He deplored the fact that the English race had long and successfully "studied the art of curbing executive power to the constant neglect of the art of perfecting executive methods." He alluded to the growing complexity of the tasks of government. He declared that "large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions of responsibility." He pointed out that "administration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to public opinion" and public opinion must be the "authoritative critic." The methods of control, however, must learn to separate the essentials of liberty from its incidents. "The ideal for us," he wrote, "is a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately connected with the popular thought, by means of elections and constant public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or class spirit quite out of the question." Since in all governments the legitimate ends of administration are the same, we should not be frightened at looking into foreign systems for suggestions.

In these affirmations of 1887, the core idea of executive integration was present but the structural and procedural corollaries were not worked out. The essay was a contribution to perspective, as well as exhortation, in declaring that "the science of administration is the latest fruit of that study of the science of politics which was begun twenty-two hundred years ago." Administration, Wilson wrote, is "the executive, the operative, the most visible side of government, and is of course as old as government itself." But the science of administration "is a birth of our century, almost of our own generation." Such a science, he declared, is needed "to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and to set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle." Civil service reform should be viewed "as but a prelude to a fuller administrative reform."

Wilson's preoccupation was always with political leadership. Increasingly he emphasized the role of the elective chief executive in such

---

Baker and Dodd, *The Public Papers . . . College and State,* Vol. 1, pp. 130–158. The essay was reprinted in the *Political Science Quarterly,* Dec. 1941, Vol. 56, pp. 481–506, along with a note by Lindsay Rogers, pp. 507–14. Dwight Waldo has noted: "This essay has received much attention in recent years because much of it seems so modern it could have been written yesterday. It seems not to have exerted much influence, even attracted much attention, for many years." *The Administrative State.* (New York, 1948), p. 26 n.

[101] *Wilson's Ideals.* Edited by Saul K. Padover. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, pp. 30–38.

leadership. This emphasis helps to explain why he did not elaborate the postulates and prescriptions of a science of administration. But his assumptions about political leadership dictated his working theory of executive organization and devolution. It was the simple and cogent theory of reliance upon the heads of departments.

(1) Wilson's application of the theory was fairly consistent. It was the more thorough because of the President's absorption in state papers and foreign policy. In carrying out his theory of devolution Wilson consciously avoided discussing the affairs of other agencies when dealing with a single department head. Early in the first administration House described and endorsed this restraint. "I told Page," he wrote, "the President consulted with the individual members of his Cabinet about their departments, but he did not consult with them on matters affecting their colleagues, and I thought he was right."[102] House added: "If he did this, he would soon have every Cabinet officer meddling with the affairs of the others, and there would be general dissatisfaction." Later, reminiscing about the President's wartime practice, Hurley wrote that, although "I found him ready and willing to receive suggestions," the President "was very much opposed to having one member of the Cabinet interfere with the work which came under the head of another; and to receiving suggestions as to how another man's department should be conducted."[103] Hurley, too, thought the President was right, noting also that an interchange was possible in the so-called "war cabinet." One sees that the net effect of such scruples helped agency morale. Its incidental effect probably increased the compartmentalization of the system.

Houston, with opportunity to observe from two cabinet posts, commented on the degree to which the President relied upon his subordinates in other fields than foreign affairs. He qualified his praise of Wilson's practice by suggesting that devolution does not mean inattention. Houston phrased his estimate as follows: "It is good administration for a chief to select the right sort of subordinates and then to trust them, but he must and will, if he possesses administrative ability of the highest order, be alert to know their problems; to be aware of the extent to which they handle them properly and to get rid of them if they do not do so. Because of this defect, Mr. Wilson was not an administrator of the first rank, but, as an administrator, I should say that he was superior to Lincoln."[104]

(2) Wilson's emphasis upon the departmental system inclined him against the expansion of presidential staff. This negative attitude can

---

[102] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* Vol. 1, p. 128.

[103] Edward N. Hurley, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[104] Houston, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 169.

be traced in various directions. For example, the Bureau of Efficiency, though created by statute in 1916 as an independent agency separate from the Civil Service Commission, was never fully drawn into the executive orbit; its informal senatorial link was never broken. Another example was the fact, as we shall note in tracing budgetary reform, that the stress was for some time on congressional committee reorganization, not executive staffing.

It is true that in the later stage of the war an outstanding bit of staff work was provided by the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics. It was organized early in June 1918 in response to the President's request in a letter to Bernard Baruch for the creation of an organization that would provide "a conspectus of all the present war activities and upon that base a periodical checking up of the actual operations and results." This unit operated as an agency directly under the President though reporting through Bernard Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board. It was headed by Edwin F. Gay, who also headed and coordinated the planning and statistical divisions of the War Industries Board, the Shipping Board, and the War Trade Board. It included a central statistical clearing house. Altogether, from its apex in the presidency outward, this complex of reporting and control services involved the work of about a thousand employees.[105]

Summarizing on the point of executive staff, we may say that Wilson's avowed wish to proceed through departmental heads, who in their fields would also be the President's chief advisers, showed a sound instinct against short-circuiting at the top. Only in foreign affairs where several special and on the whole regrettable conditions entered did such short-circuiting occur through Colonel House. To some extent, no doubt, the relative disregard of the State Department reflected Wilson's sense of foreign policy as peculiarly the President's personal responsibility. Regardless of results, I think, the relationship to House stands as a dubious pattern for Presidents.

We are not pronouncing against the institutional developments in the Executive Office of the President that have taken place since Wilson's time. Some needs that were felt then and partly met presaged later forms of clearance under the President. For instance, on the question of haphazard speaking by the heads of departments, House reported late in 1913: "The President was pleased when I told him I had spoken to a sufficient number of the Cabinet to ensure the adoption of my suggestion that no speeches should be made in the future without his consent, and only when he thought the occasion demanded it."[106]

---

[105] The National Archives, *Handbook of Federal World War Agencies and Their Records, 1917–1921* (1942), pp. 64–65.

[106] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* Vol. 1, p. 138.

(3) The President's belief in action through a departmental system did not prevent the increase of permanent independent commissions. The administrative issue about departures from hierarchy does not seem to have been raised and decided in broad theoretical terms. Special circumstances were in play in connection with each of the entities created in a period of innovative zest.

In the case of the Federal Reserve Board it should be noted that the final arrangment was integrative in the double sense that the board was to be wholly public and that it was to contain two *ex officio* members. Furthermore there is evidence that Wilson on at least one occasion was prepared to remove members of the Board if it went ahead with its rumored intention in 1915 to abolish four of the reserve banks. Carter Glass, writing twelve years later, declared: "There can be no possible doubt that the Board would have been summarily reorganized by the President under his power of removal had it taken next day the action which was contemplated." The President, Glass said, looked to the law and "wholly concurred in the view that such action by the Board would constitute an intolerable usurpation of power, without either textual or implied legal sanction."[107] Glass added that he knew of no other time when Wilson approached the point of executive intervention with the affairs of the Federal Reserve Board. On the contrary, members of the Board had complained to him of the President's indifference to the Board. Glass recalled that when he mentioned this complaint to the President, Wilson said that he "wanted the Board to feel perfectly free to pursue its course within the law without a particle of constraint or restraint from the Executive."[108] The President added: "The very moment that I should attempt to establish close relations with the Board, that moment I would be accused of trying to bring political pressure to bear."

(4) When it came to war organization, it was deemed impossible to stay within the regular departmental frame. The President's inclinations ran toward simplicity: "We are in danger of creating too much machinery,"[109] he wrote in April 1917. Nevertheless he was ready to see

---

[107] Glass, *op. cit.*, pp. 270–71. Robert E. Cushman, *The Independent Regulatory Commissions*, (New York, 1941), p. 681, mentions the instance cited by Glass but does not offer other support for the following generalization: "President Wilson made plain his attitude towards the independent commissions on more than one occasion. . . . There is no doubt that Wilson with his 'prime minister' theory of the nature of the Presidential office felt that he was entitled to impress his policies on the independent commissions and to expect their conformity to those policies."

[108] Glass, *op. cit.*, p. 272. Houston in his recollections made the general observation: "He respected the independence of such bodies as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Service, the Federal Trade, and the Tariff Commissions." *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 189.

[109] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, p. 14.

a positive virtue in separating the temporary controls. In these terms the public statement in May when the food control law was passed extolled the intention "to draw a sharp line of distinction between the normal activities of the Government represented in the Department of Agriculture in reference to food production, conservation, and marketing on the one hand and the emergency activities necessitated by the war in reference to the regulation of food distribution and consumption on the other."[110]

Meanwhile a matrix was at hand in the Council of National Defence and its Advisory Commission. The President himself had helped by a modest request in his message of December 1915 to give an impetus to the statutory creation of the Council in the following year, when pressure came also from two voluntary movements to mobilize the country's resources. After war was declared Congress placed one hundred million dollars at the President's disposal for national security and defence. In 1918, when asking for another flexible emergency fund of half the size, the President told the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee: "I have used considerable sums for the maintenance of the Food Administration, the Fuel Administration, and the War Trade Board, and for the maintenance of the proper agencies for the allocation of labor. . . . "[111] He pointed out that as soon as these agencies had been "thoroughly organized," their support had been shifted to regular appropriations.

The final step in the maturing of the war machinery was the consolidation of Bernard Baruch's position as chairman of the reconstituted War Industries Board—a designation which in the face of some opposition on the ground that Baruch was a speculator, not production expert, showed the President's instinct for chancy action under stress.[112] In a different setting and in another way he had sounded this note in his secret talk to officers of the fleet on August 11, 1917. "Please leave out of your vocabulary altogether the word 'prudent'," he said. He pointed out that "nobody ever before conducted a war like this and therefore nobody can pretend to be a professional in a war like this."[113]

(5) Wilson fought to keep control of the war organization. The hazards he saw were of two kinds: a congressional committee on the conduct of the War and statutory action to inject a small, plenary war cabinet.

---

[110] Baker and Dodd, *The Public Papers. . . War and Peace,* Vol. 1, p. 42.

[111] *Ibid.* p. 213.

[112] Blum, *op. cit.*, p. 142. Carter Field, *Bernard Baruch, Park Bench Statesman.* (New York, 1944). See also Bernard M. Baruch, *American Industry in the War. A Report of the War Industries Board.* (New York, 1941).

[113] Baker and Dodd, *The Public Papers . . . War and Peace,* Vol. 1, pp. 82–88.

As to the first, his objections were set forth in letters to Senator Owen in August and to Senator Simmons in September 1917. To the latter he wrote that "an additional authority put alongside of me in this already tremendous task of directing the administrative activities of the Government is just the thing which would create confusion and make any task twice as complex as it is."[114] And in May of the following year when it was proposed to authorize the Senate Military Affairs Committee to be in effect a committee on the conduct of the war, the President wrote that "I deem it my duty to say that I would regard the passage of this resolution as a direct vote of want of confidence in the administration."[115] He declared roundly: "Such activities on the part of a particular committee of the Senate as this resolution would look forward to would constitute nothing less than an attempt to take over the conduct of the war, or at the least so superintend and direct and participate in the executive conduct of it as to interfere in the most serious way with the action of the constituted executive."

The second attack, led by Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, took the form of a bill introduced early in 1918 to create a war cabinet of "three distinguished citizens of demonstrated executive ability," to be appointed by the President and Senate and to be supervised only by the President and to be in full control of the conduct of the war.[116] About this same time the President wrote to House: "It is the *Junkertum* trying to creep in under cover of the patriotic feeling of the moment. They will not get in. They have now no examples of happy or successful coalition to point to. The nominal coalition in England is a Tory Cabinet such as they are eager to get a foothold for here."[117] And from another angle of objection, the President wrote to the head of the United States Chamber of Commerce: "The faith that some people put in machinery is child-like and touching, but the machinery does not do the task; particularly is it impossible to do it if new and inexperienced elements are introduced."[118]

(6) The successful countering of these measures secured the passage in May of the administration-sponsored Overman Act. It authorized the President "to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary, including any functions, duties, and powers hitherto by law conferred upon any executive department, commission, bureau, agency, office, or officer, in such manner as in his judgment shall seem best fitted to carry out the purposes of this act. . . ."

---

[114] Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

[115] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 8, p. 143.

[116] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, p. 485.

[117] Josephus Daniels, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 285.

[118] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, p. 503.

While the bill was awaiting floor consideration after a favorable report, the President wrote to Senator Overman. "Senator after Senator has appealed to me most earnestly to 'cut the red tape.' I am asking for the scissors."[119] The act by its terms was geared to war needs and the war period. The leeway it allowed was used by the President in that spirit. Nevertheless as a technique the precedent had general bearing.

Apart from this limited emergency approach to executive rearrangement, the Wilson administration did not push for any general administrative reorganization. To be sure, the President in his regular message of 1914 spoke of the piecemeal growth that had been characteristic of the government and said: "I think it is generally agreed that there should be a systematic reorganization and reassemblying of its parts." But it was consonant with Wilson's policies that he should add the warning: "the people of the United States do not wish to curtail the activities of this Government; they wish, rather, to enlarge them." Such an appeal, though it might be in terms of truest efficiency, was not likely to seem exigent. Finally, under interregnum conditions of 1920, a measure for a joint congressional body on administrative reorganization went into effect without the President's signature.

(7) As for personnel, Wilson took for granted the ideals of career service. He came to the Presidency aware of the burdens of the appointing process. "The mere task of making appointments to office, which the Constitution imposes upon the President," he wrote in 1908, "has come near to breaking some of our Presidents down, because it is a never-ending task in a civil service not yet put upon a professional footing, confused with short terms of office, always forming and dissolving."[120] He sought at the outset to refuse himself to see applicants; the responsibility must be devolved. But, as Ray Stannard Baker summed it up, "First and last the business of appointments was Wilson's greatest burden. It was often near to overwhelming him."[121]

As a politician he must compromise. Burleson, according to Ray Stannard Baker's account, asked the President to clear certain postmaster appointments. Wilson asked to see the entire list. Burleson sent over the documents relating to two score of pending appointments—letters, recommendations, petitions, protests. Burleson, we are told, contended that the President "would not need to yield his position. All that he needed to do was to adopt a policy of harmony and observe the laws of human nature." The argument went on for two hours. The President kept the papers another week. When the conference was resumed he said he would not appoint the man recommended by a certain congressman. Burleson explained the facts and, in Baker's words, "all of the complicated elements of politics in a democracy were bound up in this one trivial appointment." The President said: "I will appoint him."[122] This was not the end but it was a new marker on the difficult and shadowy border zone where the administrator, in the name of political leadership, became the practical politician.

---

[119] *Ibid.*, Vol. 8, p. 41.

[120] *Constitutional Government in the United States*, p. 79.

[121] Baker, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 53.

(8) It remains to consider budgetary reform in the Wilson administration. In January 1913 the President-elect wrote rather loosely to Senator Tillman. "Ever since I was a youngster I have been deeply interested in our methods of financial administration. Ever since then I have insisted upon the absolute necessity of a carefully considered and wisely planned budget, and one of the objects I shall have most in mind when I get to Washington will be conferences with my legislative colleagues there with a view to bringing some budget system into existence."[123]

But what kind? The President was seeking to collaborate through party with a Congress that had disregarded, even rebuffed, President Taft's attempt to submit a budget. Congressional leaders, if they acted at all even under the changed political situation, were likely to stress a strengthened reassemblage of the scattered committee jurisdiction over appropriation bills. In December 1914 the President's second annual message indicated that the time was at hand for more attention to administrative reform. "Our program of legislation with regard to the regulation of business is now virtually complete,"[124] he said, and he then mentioned "two topics, much discussed out of doors." One was government expenditures, not so much in keeping them down as in making sure that the money went for approved objects and "is being applied with good business sense and management." These were "large and general standards," as the President said; they were not a plan.

In 1915 a committee of the Democratic caucus—still concentrating upon control at the legislative end—concluded that action in that Congress would be impracticable. Significantly, the Democratic Platform of 1916 confined its plank on economy to the machinery in Congress. It favored a return by the House of Representatives to its former practice of initiating and preparing all appropriation bills through a single committee, "as a practicable step toward a budget system." The President's message in December 1917 did not go beyond this feature.

In December 1919 the President's regular message expressed the hope that "Congress will bring to a conclusion at this session legislation looking to the establishment of a budget system." It declared that "the burden of preparing the budget must, in the nature of the case, if the work is to be properly done and responsibility concentrated instead of divided, rest upon the executive." The message also approved a single committee in each House. It urged as not less important a type of audit that would go beyond questions of mere legality and consider whether the money had been spent wisely, economically, and effectively. "The auditors," said the message, "shall be highly trained officials with permanent tenure in the Treasury Department, free of obligation to or motives of consideration for this or any subsequent administration," reporting their findings to Congress and to the Secretary of the Treasury. Naturally, much of the debate in these years turned on the question of audit as a legislative prerogative.

---

[122] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[123] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

[124] Baker and Dodd, *The Public Papers . . . The New Democracy*, Vol. 1, pp. 222–23.

Meanwhile consideration in Congress had quickened. On February 28, 1919, before the end of the Democratically controlled Congress, the House approved a provision for a joint commission on financial methods.[125] It was adopted as an amendment to a deficiency bill that did not pass the Senate. The upper chamber had been considering a joint resolution for a commission to report a budget plan. This measure passed on February 28, 1919[126] but was not acted on in the House. It is interesting that some proponents were still saying that Cabinet members should defend the budget before Congress.[127] Later in 1919 a budget bill was worked out by select committees in both chambers. It was vetoed by the President on Houston's recommendation because the provision permitting the removal of the Comptroller General only by concurrent resolution was deemed to be an unconstitutional invasion of executive power. The attempt to pass the bill over the veto failed.[128]

Thus Woodrow Wilson lost the chance to claim as an achievement of his presidency the statute that laid the basis for the modern Executive Office of the President.

Never again could the presidency shrink enough to fit a lesser man. Only by degrees would the institutional elements of the office grow to fit its tasks. Amid the machinery, Woodrow Wilson's record remains a reminder of what is inalienably personal and the stature needed in expressing the purpose of a people.

---

[125] 65th Congress, Third Session, H.R.16187. *Congressional Record,* Vol. 57, p. 4623.

[126] 65th Congress, S. J. Res. 121, *Congressional Record.* Vol. 57, p. 4532.

[127] See F. A. Cleveland and Arthur E. Buck, *The Budget and Responsible Government.* (New York, 1920), pp. 361, 375.

[128] Houston, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 85. 66th Congress, 2nd sess., H. Doc. 805; *Congressional Record,* Vol. 59, p. 8613, June 4, 1920.

CIVILIAN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
Harvard University

"Civilian control of the military is a basic principle of the American Constitution"; so runs the commonplace. It is the thesis of this article that the cliché could hardly be more inaccurate, for actually the American Constitution in the twentieth century obstructs the achievement of civilian control. It is well known that civil supremacy was a major concern of the Framers. They provided for it in the only form in which they knew it. But civilian control in the eighteenth century is very different from civilian control in the twentieth century: the Constitution which was expertly designed to provide for it then, for this very reason, frustrates it now. In presenting this thesis, it is necessary: (1) to show how the meaning of civilian control has changed over the intervening years; (2) to describe the Framers' concept and show how it was embodied in the Constitution; and (3) to demonstrate how the provisions which they thought would guarantee it impair its effectiveness today.

I. CIVILIAN CONTROL IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

The late eighteenth century knew two general types of military force.[1] The standing army was an institution of the European monarchy. Enlisted men were recruited for long periods of service from the worst elements of society through a mixture of bribery and coercion. Officers, on the other hand, were drawn from the aristocratic classes. On the continent, birth and social status determined eligibility for commissions. In England the purchase system prevailed: military commissions were only open to those who had sizeable independent means. A sharp line thus divided the officers from the enlisted men. The latter were an outcaste group with few ties to civil society; the officers were drawn from the same groups which furnished the social and political leadership of the country. The standing army was essentially an aristocratic institution, and the eighteenth century could not conceive of it otherwise.

The alternative to the standing army was the citizen militia. England had a long militia tradition, but it had also been a long time since the English county militia had ever resembled an effective military force. In America, on the other hand, the militia units of the various colonies played a not unimportant role in maintaining the security of the colonies and protecting the settlements against Indian attacks. The militia tradition, moreover, received renewed vigor in the "minute man" companies of the Revolution. Unlike the standing army, the militia was essentially a democratic institution, with officers and enlisted men drawn from the common body of citizens. Indeed, in many militia units the officers were elected. Neither officers nor enlisted men were divorced from society; their military duties were simply one aspect of their role as free men in a free society.

---

[1] This discussion is purely in terms of land forces because it was these which gave rise to the issues of civilian control. What is said here about the eighteenth century standing army, however, could also apply, with slight modification, to the eighteenth century navy.

Both systems provided for civilian control, and through essentially the same method, that is, by insuring that the military leadership of the armies reflected the same interests, values, and outlook as the political leadership of society. The organization of the armed forces depended upon the political constitution of society: there were no universal principles of military organization good for all societies. In an aristocratic society, the armed forces were aristocratically organized: the lower classes were excluded from officership. In a democratic society, the armed forces were democratically organized: commissions were open to all and officers were chosen by election from the ranks or by appointment by democratically elected legislatures. Throughout the struggles in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century between the Old Regime and the bourgeois liberal elements, the supporters of the former strove to preserve the existing standing armies while the latter advocated some form of national militia or *Landwehr*. No clear distinction existed between what was political and what was military. Military and political leadership merged, sharing a common origin and outlook. In one sense, civil-military relations did not exist because military institutions were not yet differentiated from the other institutions of the state and society. Group conflicts in the political arena were paralleled by conflicts among the representatives of the same groups in the military arena. Civilian control in this sense may be described as *subjective*.[2]

In the nineteenth century subjective civilian control became obsolete. The mass armies of the French revolutionary and American civil wars, the growth of population, the development of technology, the beginnings of industrialism, and the rise of urbanism—all contributed to increased functional specialization and division of labor. Armies and navies became complex organisms embodying hundreds of different specialties. Thereby the need for still another specialist arose: the expert in coordinating and directing all these diverse parts to their assigned goal. No longer was it generally possible to master this skill while still remaining competent in other fields. No longer could the European amateur aristocrat and the American Jacksonian citizen soldier direct armies as a part-time pastime. Military science and military leadership emerged as a distinct area of human knowledge and endeavor, to be mastered only by sustained and concentrated effort. Officership became an exclusive role, defined by skill rather than by social status or popularity. In short, officership was professionalized. The professional skill of the officer became, in Harold Lasswell's phrase, "the management of violence," and his professional responsibility became the military security of his client, society.

This change forced nation after nation to alter the character of its officer corps. Entrance was opened to all social classes on the basis of merit and education. Promotion was based upon professional qualification measured by experience and ability. Unskilled outsiders were gradually excluded from positions of military command. Educational institutions such as Sandhurst and West Point for the preliminary training of officers were established in the first part of the century. The proliferation of advanced military schools, staff and war colleges followed. Military staffs developed to apply professional knowledge to the direction of military operations. The officer corps thus became an autonomous professional body with its own distinctive skills, standards, organization, esprit, and sense of professional responsibility to the state which it served. Military institutions no longer reflected the political principles dominant in society. Instead, they reflected occupational imperatives springing from the nature of the military function.[3]

---

[2] On the differences between subjective and objective civilian control, see this author's "Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement," in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (eds.), *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Method* (Glencoe, 1956), pp. 379–85.

✓ The same change drastically altered the nature of civilian control. Actually, by differentiating the role of the officer from other social roles, it created the modern problem of civil-military relations. The soldier becomes the professional military adviser to the political leaders. In acquiring a distinct area of professional competence, however, he also acquires an incompetence in areas outside that field. Civilian control thus depends upon the extent to which the military leaders adhere to their roles as professional advisers. Civilian control is undermined if they stray outside the military sphere or if the civilians make it impossible for them to discharge their professional responsibilities. The professional military officer obeys the state not because he shares the outlook and values of its leadership, but simply because it is his professional responsibility to obey. This *objective civilian control* is the form required by the conditions of modern western society. It is directly opposed to the subjective control prevalent in the eighteenth century. Subjective control achieved its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. Subjective control presupposed military participation in politics; objective control requires military abstention from politics. Most of the countries of Europe, North America, and the British Commonwealth have achieved some degree of objective control; subjective control still prevails in much of Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Subjective control is furthered by constitutional forms and governmental institutions which mix political and military responsibilities and which disperse control over military affairs among a number of governmental agencies. Objective control is furthered by forms and institutions which clearly delimit political and military responsibilities and which place control over military affairs in a single recognized legitimate authority.

---

[3] For fuller treatment of the professional character of modern officership, see chaps. 1 and 2 of this author's forthcoming volume, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, to be published early in 1957 by the Harvard University Press.

II. THE FRAMERS AND CIVILIAN CONTROL

For the purposes of objective civilian control the American Constitution was drafted at just the wrong time in history. Twenty-five years or more later, its clauses about military affairs might well have been written very differently. For with all their political wisdom and insight the Framers, with a few exceptions, did not foresee the emergence of military professionalism and objective civilian control. Their ideas on military officership, military forces, and governmental organization with respect to military affairs all reflected a subjective theory of civilian control.

Military Officership. The Constitution does not envisage a separate class of persons exclusively devoted to military leadership. "I am not acquainted with the military profession," George Mason proclaimed at the Virginia ratifying convention, and except for Hamilton, Pinckney, and a few others he spoke for all the Framers. Military officership was the attribute of any man of affairs. Many members of the Federal Convention had held military rank during the Revolution; Washington was only the most obvious of the soldier-statesmen. They combined in their own persons military and political talents much as the samurai founders of modern Japan also combined them a hundred years later. Echoing Blackstone, Washington believed that when he "assumed the soldier" he "did not lay aside the citizen. . . ." And Jefferson similarly condemned the distinction "between the civil and military, which it is for the happiness of both to obliterate."[4]

These views were clearly revealed in the ineligibility and incompatibility clauses of Article I, Section 6:

> No Senator or Representatives shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person holding any Office under the United States shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

The Convention almost unanimously supported the second clause of this paragraph making legislative office incompatible with judicial or executive (including military) office. This helped to enforce the separation of powers. It reflected the necessity of keeping the legislature distinct from the executive rather than the desirability of keeping the political distinct from the military. Attention at the Convention centered on the first clause of the paragraph. As reported from the Committee of Detail, this clause proposed to make members of the legislature ineligible for appointment to any national office during the time for which they were elected. Opinions on the desirability of permitting legislators to assume civil office varied and were finally resolved by compromise. There was, however, a universal belief that Senators and Representatives should be eligible for appointment to a military office. "Exclude the officers of the army & navy," said Gouveneur Morris, "and you form a band having a different interest from & opposed to the civil power: you stimulate them to despise & reproach those 'talking Lords who dare not face the foe.' " What would occur, he inquired, in the

---

[4] See P. F. Boller, Jr., "Washington and Civilian Supremacy," *Southwest Review*, Vol. 39, pp. 10–12 (Winter, 1954); *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Washington, Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association ed., 20 vols., 1905), IV, 218; William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (Oxford, 3rd ed., 4 vols., 1768), I, 407, 413–14.

> case of a war, and the Citizen the most capable of conducting it, happening to be a member of the Legislature. What might have been the consequence of such a regulation at the commencement, or even in the Course of the late contest for our liberties.

Others such as John Randolph who favored the general ineligibility of legislators for executive office also recognized that military talent might well exist in Congress; they supported an exception with respect to military office. Consequently, the final draft applied incompatibility to both civil and military office but the eligibility limitations only to civil office. Subsequently in the Virginia convention Madison defended the eligibility provisions concerning civil office by citing the absence of any such restrictions upon appointment to military office. His argument, together with the lack of any opposition to legislative eligibility to military office in the ratification debates, indicates how widespread was the acceptance of this Cincinnatus theory of military leadership.[5]

Military Forces. The Framers' concept of nonprofessional officership could have been embodied in either a standing army or a citizen militia. The distance of the United States from Europe, however, made a permanent military force seem unnecessary except for small frontier garrisons to deal with the Indians. Consequently the Framers generally agreed that a citizen militia was the only form of military force suitable for the new republic. It embodied the democratic principle that defense of the nation was the responsibility of every citizen. The distinction between officers and enlisted men was minimized and did not correspond to any sharp social cleavage.

Preference for the militia was almost universal throughout the states. "There was not a member in the federal Convention," John Randolph remarked with only slight exaggeration, "who did not feel indignation" at the prospect of a standing army. The ratifying conventions were even more strongly opposed to regular military forces. Nonetheless, they approved a Constitution which, while barring standing armies to the states, gave the national government unlimited power to maintain a military force, the only restriction being that no appropriations for this purpose could be made for more than two years. The reasons for this apparent anomaly were twofold. First, it was generally recognized that the national government would have to maintain some sort of permanent force along the frontier. Secondly, there was always the possibility that a standing army might be necessary in an emergency. But the hope and expectation were that this emergency would never occur and that the power would never be utilized. Few provisions in the Constitution were agreed to with more reluctance; some delegates most vehemently against standing forces refused to sign the Constitution. Criticism of this unrestricted congressional power was widespread in the state conventions. A number of states proposed requiring an extraordinary majority in Congress for the maintenance of such a force or adding amendments declaring the militia to be "the natural defence of a free state" and standing armies in peace "dangerous to liberty."[6]

---

[5] See Max Farrand (ed.), *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* (New Haven, 4 vols., 1911–1937), I, 380, II, 287–90; Jonathan Elliott (ed.), *The Debates in the Several Conventions* (Washington, 4 vols., 1836,) III, 372–73. For the few instances in which the clause has been invoked in practice, see *Hind's Precedents of the House of Representatives* (Washington, 1907), chap. XVI, and *Cannon's Precedents* (Washington, 1935), chap. 16.

The preference for the militia had two important results for future civilian control. First, it assigned a major place in the American military scheme to a force which could never be professionally officered or subjected to effective control. At the ~~time, of course,~~ professional officers were just as rare in standing armies as they were in citizen militias. The former, however, because they were composed of full-time soliders, could eventually evolve into a disciplined body of professionals. This was impossible in a part-time militia force. Secondly, the expectation that the militia would be the main reliance for defense made the Framers relatively unconcerned with devising institutional techniques to control military forces in being. In part, this was the result of the feeling that such devices were doomed to fail; to a larger extent, it reflected the view that they were unnecessary. The republic would be defended by its loyal citizen soldiers. Civilian supremacy would be maintained by eliminating a distinct military force.

Governmental Organization. The Framers' concept of civilian control was to control the uses to which military forces might be put rather than to control the military per se. They were more afraid of military power in the hands of political officials than of political power in the hands of military officers. Unable to visualize a distinct military class, the Framers could not fear such a class. But there was need to fear the concentration of authority over the military in any single governmental institution. As conservatives the Framers wanted to divide power, including power over the armed forces. The national government if it monopolized military power would be a threat to the states; the President if he had sole control over the armed forces would be a threat to the Congress. Consequently, the Framers identified civilian control with the fragmentation of authority over the military. The issue of the relative desirability of a militia versus a standing army was subordinate to the issues of the relative power of the states and the nation, the executive and the legislature, over the military forces, whatever their character. Those who wished a strong national government had no hesitancy in arguing: (1) that continuation of the Articles of Confederation would mean standing armies in every state; (2) that the proposed national government necessarily had to have the power to raise a standing army; and (3) that to avoid the necessity of exercising this power, the national government ought also be able to organize and discipline the militia. The states righters, contrariwise, argued that it was unnecessary for the national government to have a standing army and that, in any case, the states ought to have exclusive control over the militia in order to protect themselves against the standing army of the national government.[7]

---

[6] Farrand, *Records*, II, 326, 329–30, 563, 640, III, 207; Elliott, *Debates*, I, 326, 328, 335, II, 77–80, 136–37, III, 381, 660, IV, 244; Charles Warren, *The Making of the Constitution* (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 474, 483; James Madison, No. 41, *The Federalist* (Modern Library ed.), pp. 262–63.

The fragmentation of authority over military affairs had paradoxical results. The very aspects of the Constitution which the Framers and later commentators have cited as establishing civilian control are in fact those which hinder its realization: civilian control would be more easily achieved in the twentieth century if the Framers had been less eager to achieve it in the eighteenth century. Objective civilian control is maximized if the military are limited in scope to professional matters and relegated to a subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian head. The military clauses of the Constitution, however, provide for almost exactly the opposite. They divide civilian responsibility for military affairs and thereby foster the direct access of the professional military authorities to the highest levels of government:

(1) Within the total federal system of government, the militia clauses divide control over the militia between the state and national governments.

(2) Within the national government, the separation of powers divides control of the national military forces between Congress and the President.

(3) Within the executive branch of the national government, the Commander in Chief clause tends to divide control over the military between the President and departmental secretaries.

These latter two provisions reflect the distribution of military powers in the British government in the eighteenth century. The similarity, however, turned into a fundamental difference in the course of a century and a half. The evolution of British government centralized all authority over the military in the Cabinet, and the British constitution today provides for effective objective civilian control. The American Constitution, however, remains frozen in the eighteenth century pattern. The centrifugal politics of this country and the written, inflexible character of the Constitution combined to obstruct changes similar to those in Great Britain. American lack of concern with military affairs, furthermore, left the constitutional structure almost unsupplemented by statutory enactments. Prior to the twentieth century the only significant additions to the constitutional institutions were the office of the Secretary of War created in 1789 and the office of the Secretary of the Navy created in 1798. For most of American history, the Constitution and little else determined the legal structure of American civil-military relations.

III. THE MILITIA CLAUSES AND MILITARY FEDERALISM: THE EMPIRE WITHIN AN EMPIRE

The militia clauses of the Constitution hamper civilian control in two ways.

---

[7] Farrand, *Records*, I, 465, II, 385; No. 8, *The Federalist*, pp. 42–43; Elliott, *Debates*, II, 520–21, III, 169, 378, 410–11. Patrick Henry said of the nationalist claim: "This argument destroys itself. It demands a power, and denies the probability of its exercise."

First, they give constitutional sanction to a semimilitary force which can never be completely subordinated to military discipline nor completely removed from political entanglements. Secondly, they give constitutional sanction to a division of control over the militia between state and national governments which necessarily involves the militia in the conflicting interests of the federal system. This unique combination of characteristics—part civilian and part military, part state and part national—tends to make the militia independent of the policy-making institutions of government.

The Framers had good reasons to prefer a militia force to a regular army. But there was little rational justification for splitting up the control of this force. As Madison said, this control "did not seem in its nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities." Politics if not logic, however, forced the Framers, Madison included, to support dual control. Some, such as Hamilton, wanted complete control in the United States. Others wished for the national government to be completely excluded from authority over the militia. The clash of these two viewpoints produced a variety of compromise suggestions. In the end, the balance of political forces produced the following militia clauses:

> The Congress shall have Power . . .
>
> To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
>
> To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. . . . The President shall be Commander-in-Chief . . . of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. . . .

In addition, of course, Congress also has the authority to "raise and support armies" under the army clause.[8] The exercise of these powers falls historically into two periods. From 1792 to 1903, the militia was under state control in time of peace and dual control in time of war. After 1903 the militia was under dual control in time of peace and national control in time of war.

State control existed in peacetime throughout the nineteenth century because Congress in the Militia Act of 1792, the basic legislation in this field until 1903, abdicated its powers under the militia clauses and provided neither for effective federal supervision nor for effective federal support. Consequently, the militia remained purely state forces when not in the active service of the United States. When in such service, however, the dual control of the militia clauses resulted in constant confusion and bickering over the purposes for which the militia might be used and over the appointment of officers. In 1812, for instance, when the President called out the militia, the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut asserted that they and not he had the right to decide whether the circumstances justified the call. Later in the war militia forces on the Niagara frontier refused on constitutional grounds to enter Canada to support regular American troops fighting there. In the Spanish American War militia units likewise refused to serve outside the United States.

---

[8] Farrand, *Records*, II, 136, 168, 182, 330, 385, II, 332; Elliott, *Debates*, III, 382, IV, 422–24.

The President was constitutional Commander in Chief of the militia while it was in federal service. Yet how could he function in this capacity when his officers, in war as in peace, were appointed by state governors? In the War of 1812 state governors challenged the authority of the President to subordinate militia units to the command of Regular Army general officers. State officials removed their troops from national service as they saw fit and upset the lines of command by appointing militia officers to higher rank than the regular officers to whom the militia units were theoretically subordinate. In the Civil War the states appointed the regimental officers of the militia and of the national volunteers assigned to the states while the President appointed the general officers. The Act of April 22, 1898 providing for the Volunteer Army for the Spanish American War reproduced this division of authority.[9]

Dual control in war did not survive the nineteenth century. The militia has fought the twentieth century wars of the United States as an exclusively national force under the army clause. Nor did the system of purely state control in time of peace extend past 1903. Dual control under the militia clauses became a reality when Congress passed the Dick Act of that year. The effects of these changes were twofold. The military importance of the militia in time of war was enhanced because it now had the wherewithal to become an effective military body. The political power of the militia in time of peace was enhanced because it was placed between the two competing authorities. Objective civilian control of the militia, which in the nineteenth century was difficult in time of war, became in the twentieth century virtually impossible in time of peace. The militia clauses are thus the constitutional base for a potent political organization: the National Guard and its spokesman, the National Guard Association. It is generally recognized that constitutions are created by political forces. But constitutions likewise create or impel the creation of political interests, and this is the case with the militia clauses and the National Guard.

The National Guard Association was formed in 1878 by a group of militia officers for the primary purpose of getting Congress to act under the militia clauses. It was designed to "present a united front" for joint control.[10] Its founders wished the national government to supply money, instruction, standards, and a certain measure of supervision to the state militia. The Regular Army was opposed because it did not think the militia could be an effective national force. The dual control advocates, however, won their first victory in

---

[9] See Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1912), pp. 100–103; F. B. Wiener, "The Militia Clause of the Constitution," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 54, pp. 192–93 (December, 1940); Leonard D. White, *The Jeffersonians* (New York, 1951), pp. 540–41. *Cf.* Washington's revolutionary difficulties, James B. Scott, *The Militia* (S. Doc. 695, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 1917), pp. 25–26.

[10] F. P. Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 5, pp. 73–86, 152–170, at pp. 162–63 (Summer, Fall, 1941). Aside from these brief articles and a few law review pieces, little scholarly work has been done on the National Guard and the National Guard Association.

1903 and subsequently strengthened and maintained their position despite the continuing hostility of the Regular Army. Throughout its existence the Guard has recognized its dependence upon the militia clauses and has stoutly defended its dual status. Guard officers maintain that these clauses embody the true sentiments of the Framers on military policy. Constitutional "dual control" is opposed to central control and to exclusive state control. The latter is impractical because the states will not carry the entire cost of the Guard and the former is unconstitutional because, according to the Guard, the army clause only gives Congress the power to maintain a standing army not to keep a federal militia. For the Guard, dual control in peace means that the national government should supply the funds and the know-how while the states supply the command and direction. The Association has consistently sought more federal money for Guard activities but has resolutely opposed extensions of of federal control. In 1949, for instance, the Association demanded increased federal aid for armories and construction, a uniform clothing allowance for National Guard officers, and the franking privilege for National Guard mail. At the same time it vigorously condemned further federal control over the Guard, describing the 1948 Gray Board recommendation for a single national reserve force as "unconstitutional, un-American . . . contrary to our concept and philosophy of life . . . ill-advised and illegal. . . ." Upon the constitutional base of the militia clauses, the National Guard has created a political force of formidable proportions. As the president of the Association frankly and accurately proclaimed, the Guard is an "empire within an empire."[11] Within its sphere of interest its word is law, or becomes law very quickly. The extent of this power, and the ways in which the militia clauses contribute to it, may be seen in (1) its legal status; (2) its constitutional symbolism; (3) its official representation in state and national governments; (4) the status of the National Guard Association; and (5) the influence of the Guard with Congress.

Legal Status. The efforts of the Association to enhance the Guard's dual status have put the latter in a unique legal position. The National Guard is one organization but it has a double existence. As the "National Guard of the several states and territories" it is organized under the militia clause and has the mission of preserving law and order within the states under the orders of the state authorities. In this capacity it may be "called forth" by the President under the appropriate authority of Congress for the limited constitutional purposes of executing the laws of the United States, suppressing insurrection, and repelling invasions. If this were its only status, the Guard would be constitutionally incapable of participating as an organization in a foreign war. In 1917, without authority permitting overseas service, its members were drafted as groups of individuals into the national army, and Guard organization was disrupted. As a result, in 1933 the Association secured the passage of an act which makes the Guard as the "National Guard of the United States" a reserve component of the Army of the United States under the army clause. In this capacity its mission is to furnish units for all types of military operations anywhere in the world. As the National Guard of the United States, the Guard may be "ordered" to active service by the President after Congress has declared the existence of a national emergency. The Guard has the best of two worlds. Its status under the militia clause protects it against federal control in peacetime. Its status under the army clause insures it of an institutional and prominent role in wartime.

---

[11] *Official Proceedings of the Natl. Guard Assoc., 66th Annual Convention, 1944*, pp. 28–29, 44; *1948*, pp. 111, 242–44, 254–55; *1949*, pp. 202–210. For the Gray Board recommendations, see Committee on Civilian Components, *Reserve Forces for National Security* (Washington, 1948), pp. 9–24.

Constitutional Symbolism. As a militia under dual control, the Guard identifies itself with two venerated constitutional symbols: the Citizen-Soldier and States Rights. Guardsmen are "amateur soldiers," citizens first and soldiers second in the Minute Man tradition. "In the future as in the past," the Association declared in 1944, "and based upon sound tradition, long experience, and this Nation's fundamental law, the citizen-soldier must be the major dependence of the Nation in time of war . . . ." The federal reserves, however, can likewise claim to be citizen soldiers. But only the Guard can also invoke the banner of States Rights. Our "organizations," claimed President Walsh, "belong to the States and are merely loaned to the Federal Government in wartime." The Guard wants the "Federal system adhered to" in the military establishment. The Guard can thus expect the support of the state governments against the national government. In 1943, for instance, the Conference of Governors urged continued dual status for the Guard in the postwar period, and in 1948 the Executive Committee of the Conference joined the Guard in denouncing the Gray Board Report. Its state affiliations enhance the political influence of the Guard relative to that of the reserve associations of the national forces. In 1954 the Reserve Officers Association had 60,000 members and the NGA 34,000. The ROA normally has had more money and a larger staff than the NGA. Nonetheless, without a secure base of operations in the states, the ROA has not equaled the NGA in political influence. In 1946 the president of the ROA himself described his organization as the "younger brother" of the National Guard Association and admitted with reference to political influence that "The National Guard has much of what we the Reserves have not had."[12]

State and National Representation. The position of the Guard is strengthened by its official foothold in both the state and national governments. The heads of the Guard in the states are the adjutants general appointed by the governors. These officials represent the Guard within the state governments and are linked nationally through the Adjutants General Association which is a "corollary" organization of the NGA. The Guard is represented in the Department of the Army by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau who under the National Defense Act of 1920 must be a Guardsman and by the National Guard members of the joint General Staff committees which, under the same act, must consider all policies affecting the Guard. These national representatives have kept the NGA informed of what transpires within the Army and the War Department. The Guard has regularly insisted that it be included at an early stage in the preparation of War Department policies which might affect it. Exclusion of the Guard in the development of policy has usually meant opposition by the NGA when the programs are submitted to Congress.[13]

---

[12] *Statement of Policy Adopted by the Natl. Guard Assn. and the Adjutants General Assn. in Joint Convention*, Baltimore, May 4, 1944, pp. 1, 4; *Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1944*, p. 100; *1945*, pp. 65–66; *1946*, pp. 114–15; *1948*, p. 65; Public Administration Clearing House, *Public Administration Organizations, 1954* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 102, 119.

The National Guard Association. The NGA occupies an ambiguous position on the borderline between a private association and a public body. Legally it is simply a voluntary organization of National Guard Officers. Nonetheless, it considers itself to be "the authorized Representative of the National Guard of the United States." It is also closely tied in with the official state and national representation of the Guard. In 1948 when only 42% of Guard officers belonged to the NGA, the Association declared it to be the responsibility of the adjutants general "to insist that every National Guard Officer be a member of the National Guard Association." To this end it urged the states to require each new Guard officer to fill out an NGA membership application prior to appearing before the official Examining Board. Through such techniques, the NGA by 1953 achieved a 99% membership among Guard officers. As a private association the NGA carries on public relations activities, publishes the monthly *National Guardsman,* and represents the Guard with respect to a wide variety of legislation. At one point in the debate over the Selective Service Act of 1948, for example, when it looked as if the Guard viewpoint would not prevail, the Association brought members from thirty-four states to Washington to lobby with their congressmen. In two days they were eminently successful in getting Congress to adopt the National Guard position. In President Walsh's words, the great virtue of the NGA is that it is

> the only agency on which the National Guard can rely to protect its interests, for the Association is free and untrammeled and it does not have to conform to any particular pattern nor is it bound within the narrow limits of channels of communication or the chain of command.[14]

Influence with Congress. In the final analysis the influence of the Guard boils down to its influence with Congress. The fate of the militia is legally in the hands of Congress. NGA officers, however, assert that "we should settle the future of the National Guard." To this end it must settle the actions of Congress on National Guard affairs. For half a century it has been astoundingly successful in doing exactly this. The local roots of the Guard, its appeals to States Rights and the Citizen Soldier, its support from the state governments, its lobbying and pressure tactics, have made it a power on Capitol Hill. "Congress," in the words of President Walsh, "has ever been our refuge and our strength."

The record of National Guard success with Congress begins with the Dick

---

[13] *Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1943,* pp. 89, 93–96; *1945,* pp. 50–55.

[14] *Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1945,* p. 47; *1946,* p. 43; *1948,* pp. 34, 66, 80–81; *1950,* pp. 264–65; *1953,* pp. 288–90.

Act of 1903. Representative Dick himself was a former president of the National Guard Association. In 1908 the Association secured the passage of the second Dick Act strengthening federal support of the Guard. In 1916 the Guard "threw every ounce of its energy into an effort to defeat" the Continental Army plan of the General Staff. It was successful, and the National Defense Act of that year was in line with its views. The position of the Guard was greatly strengthened four years later by the National Defense Act of 1920, which the Guard described as "a great achievement and a great victory." In passing the 1933 act making the Guard a reserve component of the Army in peace as well as war "Congress saw eye to eye with the proposals submitted by the National Guard. . . ." Throughout the twenties and thirties, the NGA successfully devoted its efforts to increasing the appropriations of the Guard from $13,000,000 in 1920 to $72,000,000 in 1941. In 1940 when the Selective Training and Service Bill as originally introduced did not secure the interests of the Guard, the Association had inserted into it the "National Guard protective clause" which declared it to be "essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defense of this nation be at all times maintained and assured." In 1946 the Guard fought efforts by the War Department to set up a large Organized Reserve Corps which the Guard viewed as a "competing" and "parallel" organization. A War Department recommendation for a $40,000,000 appropriation for the ORC was eliminated by Congress at the insistence of the National Guard. The Guard had no difficulty, however, in getting funds for itself. For Fiscal Year 1949 the Budget Bureau recommended $195,000,000 for the Guard. The NGA did not think this enough and got the economy-minded 80th Congress to appropriate $290,000,000. In 1948 the Association was also successful in having its views written into the Selective Service Act and in blocking the legislative recommendations of the Gray Board. In 1954 when an Assistant Secretary of Defense suggested that the Guard should be used only for Home Guard and civil defense functions, President Walsh confidently picked up the challenge: "If they want war, let it begin here."[15]

The record shows that Congress has indeed given, in Mr. Walsh's phrase, "generous support" to the Guard. Continuing his reflections on the 80th Congress, the president went on to wonder if

> any organization has been so successful in the legislative field in so brief a period as the National Guard Association. It is indeed a great accomplishment to have attained all the major legislative objectives of this Association.

Two years later the NGA Legislative Committee reported that the Association had "been phenomenally successful in obtaining the enactment of legislation essential to its well-being and development."[16] So long as the Guard retains its jealously protected dual status, this will continue. Ensconced behind the militia clauses this premier military lobby effectively dominates the proceedings of Congress concerning it. And it is the Constitution which underwrites its slogan that "There will always be a National Guard."

---

[15] *Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1943,* pp. 56, 67, 88; *1944,* pp. 44, 53, 55, 58, 65, 69, 73, 74; *1945,* p. 56; *1946,* pp. 28–32; *1948,* pp. 47–49, 57, 91–92; *1953,* p. 28; *Time,* LXIII (Mar. 1, 1954), 18.

[16] *Proceedings, NGA Convention, 1948,* pp. 33–34; *1950,* p. 245.

IV. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: DUAL CONTROL OVER THE NATIONAL FORCES

In many respects the most significant aspect of the separation of powers is not the division of power between President and Congress, but the effects of this division upon the power of other groups. The existence of two coordinate bodies means that the power of each vis-à-vis other groups is less than it would be if either possessed full sovereign authority. The principal beneficiaries have been organized interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and the military services. The separation of powers is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible force, drawing military leaders into political conflicts. Consequently, it has been a major hindrance to the development of military professionalism and objective civilian control in the United States.

With few modifications the Framers reproduced in the Constitution the division of authority over the military which prevailed in England and the colonies in the middle of the eighteenth century, "The purse & the sword," said George Mason, "ought never to get into the same hands [whether Legislative or Executive]." The President inherited the powers of the English king, Congress the powers of the English Parliament. The executive authority of the President, Hamilton stated in *The Federalist*, "will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York." The Framers did, however, make one major adjustment in favor of the legislature. In granting Congress the war power they altered British practice and established a significant precedent in the evolution of representative government. The result was that Congress was given the power

> To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
>
> To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than Two Years;
>
> To provide and maintain a Navy;
>
> To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. . . . And
>
> To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

And the President was made "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . ."[17]

---

[17] For discussion of royal and parliamentary authority, see Blackstone, *Commentaries*, I, 257–58, 262, 412–13; J. S. Omond, *Parliament and the Army, 1642–1904* (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 7–8; John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London, 13 vols., 1899–1930), II, 568. The Framers at first adopted in toto the language of the basic English statute, 13 Car. II, c. 6 (1661), but then realized that they could not make the President like the King commander in chief of the militia in peace as well as war. See Farrand, *Records*, I, 139–140, II, 185, 426–27; No. 69, *The Federalist*, p. 448. For the continuing debate as to whether the war power was properly legislative or executive, see Farrand,

The general intent of the Framers in making this division of power is clear. Problems arise, however, from the nature of the grant of presidential power. This clause is unique in the Constitution in granting authority in the form of an *office* rather than in the form of a *function*. The President is not given the function "to command the Army and Navy"; he is given the office of "Commander in Chief." This difference in form is of considerable importance, for it left undefined the specific powers and functions. This eased the approval of the Constitution in the ratifying conventions, but it gave subsequent generations something to argue about.

The powers of the Commander in Chief might range from the extremely broad power to conduct war to a narrowly restricted power of military command. They certainly exclude all powers specifically assigned to Congress or the states, and they probably include all purely military powers not so assigned. But does the office possess nonmilitary powers as well? The Framers themselves seemed to hold conflicting opinions on this point. The Supreme Court in 1850, however, declared that the duty and power of the President as Commander in Chief were "purely military," and denied the similarity between the presidential authority and the royal prerogative.[18] So long as the Commander in Chief power was interpreted as purely military, it remained, in Professor Corwin's phrase, "the forgotten clause" of the Constitution. In the Civil War and in World War II, however, Lincoln and Roosevelt used the clause to justify an extraordinarily broad range of nonmilitary presidential actions largely legislative in nature. The justification of these actions by the Commander in Chief clause was persuasive, however, only because John Rutledge defined that power as an office rather than a function. It could be argued that the office of Commander in Chief possesses authority to seize a strike-bound war plant. It would be harder to argue that the function of commanding the Army and Navy implied such authority. The Commander in Chief clause, in other words, has been of relatively little direct use in securing civilian control over the military. Indeed, in one respect it has been directly detrimental to such control. But because it was phrased as an office rather than a function, it has been of great use to the President in expanding his power at the expense of Congress. This, in turn, has broadened the area of conflict between these two institutions and, consequently, if indirectly, has further impeded civilian control by increasing the likelihood that military leaders will be drawn into political controversy.[19]

Records, I, 64–66; Alexander Hamilton, *Works* (New York, 12 vols., Federal ed., 1904), IV, 145–46; James Madison, *Writings* (New York, 9 vols., 1900–10), VI, 145; Clarence A. Berdahl, *War Powers of the Executive in the United States* (Univ. of Illinois, 1921), p. 79. Cf. W. W. Crosskey, *Politics and the Constitution* (Chicago, 2 vols., 1953), I, 422–28.

[18] Fleming *v.* Page, 9 How. 603, 615, 618 (1850). The powers of the British King as general of the kingdom extended to many nonmilitary areas. Blackstone, *Commentaries*, I, 262ff. For the views of Framers on the Commander in Chief power, see Farrand, *Records*, I, 244, 292, II, 145, 319, 426–27, III, 624; Elliott, *Debates*, IV, 114; *The Federalist*, pp. 448, 482.

[19] For the boundaries between presidential and congressional military powers, see

The President has exercised his powers with respect to military affairs through the appointment of military personnel, the issuance of executive orders and commands, and reliance upon the instrumentality of the civilian secretary. Congressional weapons include statutes, appropriations, and investigations. These devices have normally been wielded in the name of Congress by the military and naval affairs committees, the appropriations committees, and special wartime investigating committees. On occasion both sides have found it necessary or expedient to appeal to the military for support of their plans or to seize upon and push military plans for purposes of their own. The involvement of the national officer corps in politics consequently has been less consistent and more sporadic in nature than the involvement of the militia officer corps. The division of authority between two separate governments demanded a permanent political spokesman for the interests of the militia. The division of authority between two branches of the same government led to the transitory involvement of individuals and cliques of officers in controversies over military policy and, most particularly, over the force levels of the armed services.

Prior to 1940 the pattern of national politics respecting the strength of military forces tended to obscure the extent of military political participation. The executive was usually more favorably inclined towards a larger military establishment than was Congress. Congress had less immediate contact with foreign dangers and was under greater popular pressure to cut spending. In addition, the easiest way to assert congressional authority in the budget process was simply to reduce executive requests. Thus, the institutional jealousy of the two branches, even apart from constituent pressure, tended to make Congress less favorable to military appropriations. In some cases, to be sure, the General Board of the Navy found a more favorable audience for its recommendations in the Congress than in the executive branch. But, generally, the military leaders appeared before congressional committees to support the President's program. Military involvement in politics on the side of Congress tends to be conspicuous and dramatic; on the side of the President it tends to be subtler and less obvious. Undoubtedly, some administrations used popular officers to rally congressional support for their military proposals. But it is extremely difficult to draw the line between the soldier giving professional advice to Congress as to what the country needs for its defense and the soldier lobbying with Congress for the administration. The two roles are distinct in theory but blended in practice.

In the post-World War II period, on the other hand, the increased importance of national defense issues and the greater concern of Congress with them has caused the legislature to insist upon an independent review of military force levels. On occasion Congress has voted more money for a particular service or

---

Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York, 1948), chap. vi; Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2 (1866); Berdahl, *War Powers, passim;* Howard White, *Executive Influence in Determining Military Policy in the United States* (Urbana, 1924), chap. iii.

activity than was recommended by the President.[20] Congress can only play an independent role, however, if it has access to the same professional military advice available to the President. With respect to the military budget in particular, congressmen argue that their constitutional responsibilities demand that they be able to compare the purely "military" recommendations of the Joint Chiefs with the President's budget "compounded of a number of extra-military considerations. . . ."[21] The legal milestone marking the shift from the prewar pattern was the provision in the National Security Act of 1949 permitting a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to Congress "on his own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper."[22] This was the first statute in American history authorizing a professional military chief to present his views directly to Congress. While it did not make the Chiefs of Staff the principal military advisers to Congress as it did with respect to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, it nonetheless freed them from the legal restrictions of the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act. This legal authorization, however, can become inoperative unless there are political means of protecting the military chiefs against pressure or retaliation from the executive branch. After the dismissal in 1949 of Admiral Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, following his participation in the B-36 hearings, the House Armed Services Committee warned that any further "intimidation" of this nature would lead it to "ask the Congress to exercise its constitutional power of redress."[23] The "constitutional power," however, is one which it is easier for Congress to assert than to exercise. Few effective devices are available to it to protect military officers against executive action.

The vulnerability of the chiefs places a tremendous burden upon them as to whether to speak up or to remain silent. What is the proper professional behavior when called before a congressional committee and invited to criticize the President's recommendations? How strong should be the doubts and disagreements of a Chief with the President's policy before he takes the initiative in criticizing it before Congress? The annual psychic crisis of the Chiefs of Staff before the congressional appropriations committees has become an enduring phenomenon. If the military chief accepts and defends the President's policies, he is subordinating his own professional judgment, denying to Congress the advice to which it may constitutionally claim to be entitled, and becoming the political spokesman of an Administration policy. If the military chief expresses his professional opinions to Congress, he is publicly criticizing his Commander in Chief and furnishing ammunition to the latter's political enemies.

---

[20] The most notable instances have been the increase in National Guard funds mentioned above, a 1946 increase in research and development funds, the extra money voted for the 70-group Air Force in 1948 and 1949, the increase in Marine Corps appropriations in 1955 and in Air Force appropriations in 1956. In three of these instances, the President directed that the additional funds be impounded: a clearly unconstitutional action, as I think, arrogating to the President an item veto over appropriations bills. See J. D. Williams, The Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget, ICP Case Series: No. 28 (University, Alabama, 1955). Congress, however, has yet to develop legal or political means of forcing the President to spend funds it appropriates. See *Cong. Record*, Vol. 95, p. 14922 (Oct. 18, 1949); H. Rept. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 309–311 (1950); House Committee on Armed Services, *Unification and Strategy*, H. Doc. 600, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 49–50 (1950); Hearings before House Armed Services Committee on National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 97–99, 300–301 (1949); Hearings before House Committee on Appropriations on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 50–62 (1950).

[21] Carl Vinson, *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 95, p. 3540 (March 30, 1949).

[22] Sec. 202 (c) (6), National Security Act, 63 Stat. 578 (1949).

[23] H. Doc. 600, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 10–12, 45, 52.

There is no easy way out of the dilemma. Military leaders in the post-war period have varied from more or less active campaigning against presidential policies (the admirals with respect to unification and the B-36 controversy) to the defense of presidential policies which ran counter to their professional judgment (General Bradley with respect to the Fiscal 1951 budget). A middle course, however, appears to be the most desirable one. The military chief has the professional duty to speak frankly to both President and Congress. General Ridgway's behavior under Senate questioning in 1954 and 1955 reflected an effort to find the proper path. In both cases, the general emphasized his acceptance of higher level executive decisions fixing the size of the Army which obviously did not accord with his own judgment. In 1954 he gave his own views in executive session; in 1955 he presented in public his military opinion on the desirable strength of his service.[24] With respect to any significant issue of military policy, however, the national officers inevitably tend to be drawn into the legislative-executive struggle on one side or the other. The separation of powers makes it impossible for American officers ever to be at ease in their professionalism.

V. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF CLAUSE: THE POLITICAL-MILITARY HIERARCHY

One major function of the Commander in Chief clause has been to justify the exercise of broad Presidential powers in times of national emergency. A second principal function has been to complicate the achievement of civilian control in the executive branch. Just as the separation of powers is a standing invitation to military leaders to make an end run around the President to Congress, the Commander in Chief clause is a standing invitation to make an end run around the civilian secretary to the President.

The Commander in Chief clause is the outstanding example of the Framers' mixing of political and military functions. The same thinking which permitted them to envision Senators becoming generals in war also permitted them to accept a civilian President as military Commander in Chief. In most societies from primitive nomadic tribes down to their own time, it had been customary for the chief of state also to be the chief military commander. This had been true of the Greek city state, the Roman republic, and the European national monarchies; it was to be true of Napoleonic France. Virtually all the state constitutions at the time made the governor commander in chief of the militia. Military command was as much a function of the chief executive as the appointment of administrative officials or the negotiation of alliances. It was only natural for the Framers to assign this role to the President. He was to be a republican Soldier-President patterned upon the Royal Warrior of the European states.

---

[24] Hearings before Senate Committee on Appropriations on Dept. of Defense Appropriation Bill for 1955, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 43–44 (1954); Hearings before Senate Committee on Appropriations on Dept. of Defense Appropriation Bill for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 211–12, 215–19 (1955).

The extent to which the Framers expected the President to exercise military functions may be seen in their failure to curb his authority personally to lead troops on the field of battle. Such a restriction was contained in the New Jersey plan and had the support of Hamilton. The Convention, however, explicitly rejected these attempts to limit his authority. Some criticisms of this power were voiced in state conventions but there, too, efforts to curtail it were unsuccessful. The intention and the expectation of the Framers and of the people was that the President could, if he so desired, assume personal command in the field. Early presidents did not hesitate to do so. Washington led the troops called out to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion. James Madison took a direct hand in organizing the ineffectual defense of Washington in 1814. During the Mexican War President Polk, although he did not command the army in the field, nonetheless personally formulated the military strategy of the war and participated in a wide range of exclusively military matters. The last instance of a President directly exercising military functions was Lincoln's participation in the direction of the Union armies in the spring of 1862. The President personally determined the plan of operations, and through his War Orders directed the movement of troop units. It was not until Grant took over in Virginia that presidential participation in military affairs came to an end. No subsequent President essayed the direction of military operations, although Theodore Roosevelt in World War I argued conversely that his previous experience as Commander in Chief proved his competence to command a division in France.[25]

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, no real distinction existed in the United States between political and military competence. Just as successful generals made popular presidential candidates, so any man of affairs was capable of command. The exercise of his military functions by the President created no logical difficulties. There was a single, clear political-military hierarchy running from the President through the Secretaries of War and the Navy to the uniformed commanders. Political and military responsibilities and abilities were mixed all along the line. The President frequently had previous military experience; the Secretary of War almost always had. The top generals, on the other hand, were usually involved in politics. The organization of the service departments, consequently, was little different from that of any other department.

This unified hierarchy began to break up as the military function became professionalized. The President was no longer qualified to exercise military

[25] See Farrand, *Records*, I, 244, III, 217–18, 624. IV, 53; Elliott, *Debates*, II, 408, 412, 522–523, III, 59–60, 496–98; Leonard D. White, *The Jeffersonians*, p. 220, and *The Jacksonians* (New York, 1954), pp. 51–57; Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War* (New York, 1941), pp. 146–47.

command, and even if he were qualified by previous training, he could not devote time to this function without abandoning his political responsibilities. The political functions of the Presidency became incompatible with the military functions of the Commander in Chief. Nor were the civilian politicians appointed Secretaries of War and the Navy competent to exercise military command; they were usually lawyers. On the other hand, the emergence of the military profession produced officers whose experience had been exclusively military, who were quite different types from the politician secretaries, and who were technically qualified to command. The constitutional presumption that the President exercised command still remained, however, and complicated the relations among President, secretary, and military chief. The military chief was military, the secretary political, and the President political and military. One might assume that the secretary, with his duty to represent the interests of his department, would be more military in outlook, if not in capability, than the President with his broader interests and responsibilities. The Constitution, however, reversed this relationship, and obscured the clarity of the hierarchy. Did the chain of command go up through the secretary, a civilian politician, to the President? Or were there two lines of authority emanating from the Presidency: a political-administrative line to the secretary and a military command line directly to the highest professional officer? These issues have beclouded American military organization down to the present day.

Three different types of civil-military organizational relations have existed among the President, secretary, and military chief. The *balanced pattern* assigns to the President a purely political function: the decision of the highest policy issues and the general supervision of the military establishment. Beneath him the secretary, also a purely political figure, is responsible for the entire military organization. Below the secretary, the hierarchy divides into military and administrative components. The highest professional officer is the leading military adviser to the secretary and normally has command of the military forces. He is subordinate to the secretary who is subordinate to the President, but neither of the two civilian officials exercise military command, which stops at the level of the military chief. Also subordinate to the secretary are administrative officials (civilian or military) who direct the nonmilitary supply, logistical, and financial activities of the department.

This balanced pattern of organization tends to maximize military professionalism and civilian control.[26] Civilian and military responsibilities are clearly distinguished, and the latter, on paper at least, are clearly subordinated to the former. The President and the secretary handle political matters; the military chief military matters; and the staff or bureau chiefs administrative matters. The scope of the authority of the professional military chief is limited to the military realm by the administrative bureaus, and the level of his authority, subordinate to the secretary, does not often involve him in overt political decisions. Administrative and military interests are balanced by the secretary under the authority of the President. English civil-military relations have been organized along comparable lines since the last half of the nineteenth century. Between 1794 and 1870 the War Office administered the civilian affairs of the army, and the Commander in Chief, directly under the sovereign, was responsible for military command and discipline. In 1870, however, the Cabinet insisted that the military chief be subordinated to the Secretary of State for War. A fully balanced scheme was achieved with the abolition of the post of Commander in Chief in 1895 and the subsequent creation of the office of Chief of the Imperial Staff. The same system also existed at the Admiralty. This organization was possible only because the sovereign consented, however reluctantly, to have his role as first general and admiral become, in Bagehot's phrase, a "dignified" part of the constitution. The "efficient" hierarchy of control ran from Parliament to Cabinet to Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and then to the military chief and the administrative bureaus of the War Office. In the United States, however, no President has permitted his constitutional functions as Commander in Chief to atrophy. These remain efficient and not dignified. Consequently, the balanced pattern of organization has been difficult to achieve and even more difficult to maintain. In American government the Navy Department alone since 1915 has attempted to organize itself along these "balanced" lines. Only with great difficulty has it maintained this organization against the pressures of the Chiefs of Naval Operations either to expand their authority over the bureaus or to establish a direct line of responsibility to the President.[27] American civil-military relations almost inevitably tend in the direction of other arrangements which tend to weaken military professionalism and civilian control.

---

[26] The theoretical rationale of the balanced pattern was developed in A. T. Mahan, "The Principles of Naval Administration," *Naval Administration and Warfare* (Boston, 1908), pp. 3–48, and Spenser Wilkinson, Preface to the 2d edition of *The Brain of an Army* (London, 1913). Mahan's essay and Wilkinson's preface are brilliant analyses of executive military organization and are basic to an understanding of the subject.

The *coordinate scheme* involves the separation of military and administrative functions immediately below the President. The secretary is limited to nonmilitary administrative duties, and the military chief discharges his military functions directly under the President. The chain of administration goes from President to Secretary to bureau chiefs; the chain of command from President to military chief to the military forces. This accords with constitutional theory and keeps civilians, except the President, out of the military hierarchy. It tends, however, to undermine civilian control. The scope of the authority of the military chief is limited to military matters, but the level of his authority with direct access to the President involves him in political issues. The President is normally too busy with other affairs to devote sufficient attention to the interrelation of political and military policies, and the military chief consequently has to make political decisions. His direct access to the President also encourages the latter to try his hand at military affairs and to intervene in professional military planning and command where he has no special competence. The Army and the War Department were organized on a coordinate basis from 1821 to 1903. The Secretary of War was responsible for fiscal and administrative matters and supervised the activities of the staff departments. The Commanding General of the Army, on the other hand, was independent of the Secretary and directly responsible to the President for the military command and discipline of the Army. The result was continuous friction erupting at times into violent acrimony between the Secretary and the Commanding General.

---

[27] See U. S. Navy Dept., *Naval Administration: Selected Documents on Navy Department Organization, 1915–1940, passim;* R. E. Coontz, *From the Mississippi to the Sea* (Philadelphia, 1930), p. 400; Ernest J. King and Walter Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (New York, 1952), pp. 261 ff., 471–478; Paul Y. Hammond, "The Secretaryships of War and the Navy: A Study of Civilian Control of the Military" (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1953), pp. 223–246, 293–305.

The *vertical pattern* solves the problem of the Commander in Chief clause in a different manner, but one equally inconsistent with civilian control. In this scheme the secretary and the military chief have identical supervisory responsibilities. The administrative bureau heads are subordinated to the professional military chief, and the professional military chief is subordinated to the secretary who is in turn responsible to the President. Since the President is still Commander in Chief, and some connection must exist between him and the rest of the military hierarchy, the secretary is given a place in the military chain of command and is described as the President's deputy commander in chief or in some similar terms. The military chief, however, is given control over all the activities of the department under the secretary, the specifically military command and planning functions being delegated down the hierarchy to a subordinate of the military chief's on the same level as the administrative chiefs of bureaus. This prevents the military chief from achieving direct access to the President because his responsibilities are identical with those of the secretary. He can claim no peculiar relation to the President. On the other hand, he supervises all the activities of the department below the secretary and, by reason of long familiarity with the establishment, may be able to reduce the transient secretary to a figurehead. By combining in his own person political and administrative responsibilities, as well as functions of military command, the military chief transgresses beyond his competence. He sacrifices higher level for broader scope which is equally damaging to his professional status. Also, the extension of the constitutional myth so that not only the President but also the secretary is assumed to exercise military command violates the facts of reality. Since 1903, the General Staff system of the Army has closely approximated the vertical pattern of civil-military relations.

The National Security Act of 1947 raised the problem of executive civil-military relations from the single service level to the central defense level. The Act itself was a compromise, not clearly and definitively establishing any one of the three patterns of civil-military relations. Elements of the coordinate system, however, existed in those provisions of the Act which made the Joint Chiefs of Staff the "principal military advisers" to the President and to the National Security Council and which placed the Chiefs under the "authority and direction" of the President as well as the Secretary. In actual practice the Joint Chiefs organization at times tended to view itself as a semi-autonomous corporate body not wholly subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. In addition, in both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was more than just a professional military adviser. He played a key role in the formulation and advocacy of national policy. It is still too early to say finally which of the three patterns of civil-military relations the Department of Defense will approximate. But it is clear that the constitutional hindrances to the achievement of the balanced system have not been entirely overcome.

VI. CIVILIAN CONTROL AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

Objective civilian control has at times existed in the United States. It has been, however, the product of geographical isolation and the international balance of power which permitted the virtual elimination of standing military forces and the exclusion of the military from political power. Civilian control in this sense has been so effective that Americans have called it a fundamental principle of their system of government. But they have been deluding themselves in ascribing to the Constitution a virtue of geography. Objective civilian control in the United States has been extra-constitutional, a part of our political tradition but not of our constitutional tradition. Civilian control has, in a sense, been like the party system. The Framers did not foresee the rise of popular democracy; consequently, they did not provide for political parties. They did not foresee the rise of the military profession; consequently, they did not provide for objective civilian control. Neither is contemplated in the Constitution, yet both have been called into existence by nonconstitutional forces. The Constitution has contributed its share to obstructing the growth of a strong party system such as exists in Great Britain. It has also contributed its share to obstructing effective civilian control such as exists in Great Britain. The restraints of a written constitution have proved effective against some of the most powerful functional imperatives.

The question thus arises: To what extent is it possible, short of amending the Constitution, to provide for objective civilian control in the existing framework? The difficulties are constant but they are not all of equal strength. The extent to which the Commander in Chief clause operates to damage civilian control largely depends upon the individuals who occupy that office. It adds nothing and detracts much from military professionalism and civilian control. The British Prime Minister who is not Commander in Chief and has no military functions has more effective control over his military forces than does the American President. The principal positive use of the clause has been to expand presidential power against Congress in nonmilitary areas. If the clause can come to be viewed primarily in this nonmilitary sense, and if presidents would exercise constitutional self-restraint so as to make their military command of the armed forces as honorific as that of the king of England, this obstacle to civilian control would be removed, and a balanced pattern of executive organization be made workable.

The militia clauses directly hamper the development of military professionalism in only one segment of the armed forces. Conceivably, of course, Congress could abolish dual control over the militia. But in the face of the political strength of the National Guard this hardly seems likely. And, given the existing situation, it probably would not even be desirable. The more appropriate course is to make the best of the situation of military federalism. The existence of the Guard will necessarily prevent the development of a strong and ready national reserve organization. The Constitution has made the Guard into a powerful political force, and it is not inconceivable that this political strength may make the Guard into an effective military organization. At the end of 1954, the Army and Air National Guard had almost 400,000 men on drill pay status—twice the number of the Army and Air Force Reserves. At the beginning of 1956 Guard ground forces consisted of twenty-one infantry divisions, six armored divisions, nine regimental combat teams, nine armored cavalry regiments, 123 antiaircraft battalions, seventy-four field artillery battalions, and miscellaneous other units. The Air National Guard was organized into twenty-seven combat wings. The readiness of the Guard was at a higher level than ever before in its history. Many of the antiaircraft units and interceptor squadrons were participating in the air defense of the nation on a semiactive alert status.[28] By its very nature the National Guard can never be brought fully within objective civilian control. But it may still be possible to create a respectable reserve force within the existing constitutional and political framework.

The real constitutional stumbling block to objective civilian control is the separation of powers. This is the essence of the American system of government, and its impact is felt throughout the armed forces. Short of fundamental constitutional change, the separation of powers cannot be altered. Indeed, it is highly questionable even if such change were possible, whether it would be worth the price. There are values other than civilian control and military professionalism, and these were the values the Framers had in mind when they wrote the Constitution. Foreign countries may have more effective systems of civilian control but no country has as effective a system of restraints upon arbitrary political power or such a unique balance of executive unity and legislative diversity. Inevitably, both military officers attempting to adhere to professional standards and civilian secretaries attempting to exercise civilian control look with envy to the cabinet system. Such a system, however, is not for the United States. Within the framework of the separation of powers, institutional adjustments can be made which will reduce its deleterious effects upon civilian control. But it will never be possible to eliminate these effects completely. A lesser measure of objective civilian control and lower standards of military professionalism are the continuing prices the American people will have to pay for the other benefits of their constitutional system.

---

[28] Secretary of Defense, *Semiannual Report, July 1 to December 31, 1954*, p. 58; *New York Times*, January 13, 1956, p. 6; *New York Herald Tribune*, November 22, 1953, p. 1. November 20. 1955, Sec. 2, p. 3.

NEWTON D. BAKER ON EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE IN MILITARY LEGISLATION

[The following letter from Professor White's files was offered to the *Review*, by a happy coincidence, just in time to be read in conjunction with the two preceding papers. It was written, as the text shows, in response to the receipt of a copy of his book (Urbana, *University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, Vol. XII, nos. 1 and 2). Mr. Baker was then in the private practice of law in Cleveland. MAN. ED.]

May 8, 1925

Dr. Howard White,
Ohio Wesleyan University,
Delaware, Ohio.

My dear Dr. White:

I have received and read with great interest your monograph on "Executive Influence in Determining Military Policy in the United States."

With the period covered by Parts 1 and 2, I cannot profess any intimate familiarity. From 1861 on, however, I have had occasion to study the problem and feel that I am on familiar ground as I read your comments.

Two conflicts are age-old in the question of American military policy,—first, that between the organized militia of the several states and the regular army, and second, that between the bureau chiefs and any centralized staff control. With the second of these conflicts Secretary Root dealt comprehensively and, in my judgment, demonstrated himself to be the greatest Secretary of War the country has ever had. From the time of the passage of the General Staff Bill, however, until now, the efforts of the bureau chiefs to secure independence have been persistent, and during my administration of the War Department they nearly succeeded, but for a decision which I made on legal grounds interpreting an act which the Congress probably intended to have the effect of an entering wedge against the General Staff.

The fact is that legislative determinations of military policy are more profoundly influenced by military men than they are by the executive directly, or by spontaneous legislative impulse. Nearly every member of the House and Senate committees on military affairs, and many other representatives and senators, have pet soldiers with whom they confer and whom they regard as counsellors who will steer them clear of all the vices of opinion which they attribute to the General Staff and to the executive informed by the General Staff. Ambitious young majors and captains make the social acquaintance of senators and representatives and so impress them with their military knowledge, and thereafter the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, when they urge military legislation, find themselves facing measures and suggestions offered by members of the committees, but drawn by these ambitious and intelligent young men, which are often excellent, but more often are unconsciously influenced by bureau or arm ambition.

The worst form of this conflict arises from the presence in Washington of large numbers of retired officers who, having nothing else to do, seek to run the War Department and the army by the use of the social vehicle, and are constantly trying to restore the army to what it was in their day, having the common human belief that the Golden Age is always in the past. The most powerful influence in military affairs in Washington during the first three years of my residence there was General Ainsworth, former Adjutant General, a retired officer and an intimate friend and counsellor of Mr. Hay. I never saw General Ainsworth, but I felt his presence at every turn, and so nearly as I could discover, he was a man of great talents, but wedded to old army methods and old bureau methods and having very pronounced likes and dislikes in the army.

When I went to Washington, Secretary Garrison had resigned, and the President had accepted the Hay-Chamberlain compromise. I found it possible to exert but little influence on that bill and my acceptance of it was merely the acceptance of a *fait accompli*. It was the product of the attrition of the national guard lobby upon the regular army lobby, and I have always believed it was probably as effective a compromise as could have been hoped for. The use I made of it was to bring about the immediate federalization of the national guard, and the disturbance on the Mexican frontier gave us an opportunity to train the federalized militia in a way that constituted our most important preparation for the later European conflict. Fortunately, we were able to get the militia pretty nearly to war strength before April, 1917, and were therefore able to have the new army built consistently on the Draft Law without a protracted period of volunteering, which would have greatly complicated the operation of the draft.

You may be interested in the history of the Draft Law. My belief is that the suggestion came from General Leonard Wood. It came to me through Major General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff, some time in January, 1917. General Scott urged that it was the democratic and effective, if not necessary, way to raise armies on a large scale, and told me that he had discussed it with General Wood, who agreed with him about it. I immediately examined the history of the Civil War draft and the British experience in the World War, and came to the conclusion that the draft was necessary to prevent the disorganization of the industries upon which the war depended, and the continuity of other vital governmental operations and grave social injustices and disturbances. In addition to this, it seemed to me to assert the obligation of national defense in the only way consistent with fundamental democratic theory. Having reached this conclusion, I took the matter up with the President. We discussed it perhaps for an hour, at the end of which time he told me that he was satisfied that my conclusion was right and that I should start immediately to prepare a suitable law and that if we actually came to war, he would ask draft legislation in his war message to Congress. I called General Enoch Crowder, then Judge Advocate General, to my office and asked him to prepare the law. General Crowder is a brilliant and accomplished lawyer and a thoroughly informed student of military history. He expressed grave doubts that such a law would be accepted by Congress or the country. I told him that question was decided and that he should prepare the draft. This he did in cooperation with me. For several weeks we discussed, daily, difficulties and policies which arose as the law was being drafted. Finally, when the President read his war message, he did include a request to the Congress to enact a draft and promised that a suitable law would be presented. On the same afternoon, General Crowder and I took the draft to the Congress and started discussing it with the committees. In the Senate the difficulty was not great. In the House it was *very* great. The President did use his influence to the limit to get the bill through and I spent weeks considering and rejecting compromises suggested by members of Congress, with the result that the bill was enacted substantially as presented.

I, of course, note the contrast you draw between the President's unwillingness to press the continental army of Mr. Garrison, and the vigor with which he fought for the Selective Service Law. In the one case, the President was merely cooperating with the Congress in the determination of a permanent military policy; in the other, as Commander-in-Chief, in the presence of actual major war, he was demanding fight instruments to accomplish an urgent purpose. This, I think, accounts for the difference in his point of view and action.

Cordially yours,
(Signed) Newton D. Baker
Newton D. Baker

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

BENNETT M. RICH AND PHILIP H. BURCH, JR.
Rutgers University

The dual status of the National Guard as a component of the national defense establishment and as a military force under state control has long been an object of Congressional and military concern, and lately has drawn some scholarly attention. It has not been generally appreciated, however, that without benefit of legislation or much public notice the domestic function of the Guard has been subtly and radically transformed during the past decade. From an embodiment of force it has become largely an instrument of rescue and relief. The change appears to be bringing a welcome increase in local prestige to this sometimes neglected and often controversial organization. But it suggests a serious problem in case an atomic attack should result in the mobilization of the Guard into national military service just at a time when its new domestic services are most urgently needed at home.

Prior to World War II, governors called upon the National Guard to perform a variety of policing activities, such as the suppression of race riots and the control of labor disputes. Particularly during the depression, the Guard was called out to combat local disturbances and to curb labor-management conflicts. Lapses of gubernatorial discretion in this period were not infrequent.

The preservation of law and order of course remains a Guard function, though the instances are few within recent years. Prison riots have provided some occasions. In 1954, to take a more unusual example, the murder of the prospective State Attorney General resulted in a proclamation of martial law at Phenix City, Alabama. Local law enforcement authorities were replaced by Guardsmen who for 214 days assumed responsibility for the managment of municipal affairs.[1] In October, 1955, the National Guard was called out to put down the violence which erupted during a labor-management dispute at New Castle, Indiana.[2] Widespread rioting at the time of the February, 1956, national stock car races at Daytona Beach, Florida, led to the mobilization of local Guard units.[3] Notwithstanding these and other cases of law enforcement duty, the policing function has been progressively overshadowed by the development of the state military bodies as community service organizations.

Since 1945, indeed, recourse to the National Guard for police work has fallen off so drastically that such an event today elicits considerable controversy. State executives have become increasingly cautious about summoning the Guard in the name of maintaining the peace. Their present reluctance is due in part to the accelerated growth of the regular state police forces within the last two decades. In mid-1938 the total strength of all state police organizations was a mere 8,413.[4] Two states, Nevada and Wisconsin, had fewer than a dozen men each. As of June 30, 1953, on the other hand, the national total had risen to 21,632,[5] almost as many as New York City maintains. Other factors are the growth of a prosperous economy, the stabilization of labor-management relations, and the hostility of labor unions to National Guard intervention in industrial disputes. Outbreaks of overt racial antagonism such as frequently led to the mobilization of the Guard during the 1920's and 1930's have also fallen off sharply. In spite of recent tensions over the segregation issue, racial conflicts had not, until the Clinton, Tennessee incident in August, 1956, been of such magnitude as to compel any governor to order units of the Guard into action.

---

[1] U. S. *Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1955* (Washington, 1956), p. 8.

[2] *New York Times*, October 11, 1955, p. 1.

[3] *New York Herald Tribune*, February 27, 1956, p. 1.

[4] *The Book of the States 1939–40* (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1939), p. 133. Florida had no state police organization until 1939, and many states restricted their police to highway patrol.

National Guard assistance to stricken communities has increased perceptibly during the last three decades. Between World War I and Pearl Harbor, this was, as a rule, viewed with skepticism. The prevalent attitude during the early twenties was aptly expressed by the officer in charge of National Guard affairs in the First Corps area:

> Investigations and reports, [he declared] . . . indicate that this (community service) duty is most demoralizing to the morale of the National Guard. It has stopped recruiting and has no military value as instruction. It is, however, of splendid value to the citizen and has furnished ample protection to life and property.[6]

The frequency of National Guard community service work rose from an annual national average of four instances in the early twenties to nine at the close of the decade.[7] The trend did not increase appreciably during the 1930's. Since World War II, however, the yearly incidence of Guard aid to the community has doubled. Recognition of its growing importance was reflected rather belatedly in the annual reports of the National Guard Bureau after 1948, under the heading "Service to the State and Community."

The service trend has been most pronounced in connection with floods. Previously, National Guard activity in flood-damaged areas was, in general, limited to the prevention of looting. The devastating floods along the Ohio Valley in the spring of 1936 afforded numerous illustrations.[8] In New England too, state troops were place on patrol duty in practically every major community along the Connecticut and Merrimack Rivers. When flood waters again inundated the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys in 1937, thousands of Guardsmen were mobilized in four different states to protect abandoned homes and stores from pillage.[9]

---

[5] *Ibid.*, 1954–55, pp. 282–283.

[6] U.S. *Annual Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau, 1922* (Washington: 1922), p. 43.

[7] These figures of Guard duty are approximations. The annual reports of the National Guard Bureau relating to the use of state military forces " . . . are very general in character, are lacking in detailed information, and are not regarded as either complete or authoritative. . . . " U.S. *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 1936* (Washington: 1936), p. 16. In addition, the content of these reports has varied greatly over the last thirty years. Some accounts contain an elaborate description of National Guard state activity, while others do not carry a single line on the subject. This absence of uniform reporting standards still persists.

[8] E.g., *New York Times*, March 21, 1936, p. 7.

[9] *Ibid.*, January 28, 1937, p. 16.

The character of the National Guard's community service has altered markedly in the last decade.[10] The former emphasis on patrol duty has shifted to more extensive participation in the evacuation of flood victims, the establishment of relief centers, and the provision of emergency medical supplies and treatment. The National Guard today also employs its technical skills and equipment during and after an emergency. In addition to its manpower, it has at its disposal aircraft, communications systems, and amphibious and heavy equipment vehicles. Forest fires and serious storms furnish another type of occasion for help. In addition to actual fire-fighting, Guard units now supply food and shelter to the homeless and provide communications services to fire-fighters. A common form of National Guard assistance to communities ravaged by hurricanes or tornadoes is the establishment of field kitchens for the hungry and the utilization of local armories for housing the temporarily displaced. Air National Guard units from Louisiana and California flew in emergency supplies to aid local detachments on the scene in relief and reconstruction work following the famous Texas City explosion of April, 1947; this was an unusual example of interstate cooperation.

National Guard community services have not been confined solely to major disasters. Mercy flights frequently include the transportation of desperately ill persons to distant hospitals and the carrying of rare serums to meet special emergencies. The Guard has often been called upon to assist in searches for lost or marooned persons, escaped criminals, and possible victims of accident or foul play. During a drought in the New Orleans area in 1950, Guardsmen car-

---

[10] A survey entitled *Participation of National Guard Units in Post-War Civil Emergencies* was prepared in October, 1953, by Ruthrauff and Ryan, Inc., a research agency, for the National Guard Bureau. According to this report, the incidence of Guard state activity from 1947 to 1953 was as follows:

Type of Activity	*Number of Instances*	*Per Cent*
Floods	115	29.7
Windstorms	59	15.2
Search for lost persons	55	14.2
Fires and Explosions in cities	24	6.2
Forest fires	23	5.9
Transportation of ill or injured persons and medical supplies	23	5.9
Snowstorms	20	5.2
Traffic and crowd control	15	3.9
Aircraft and train wrecks	14	3.6
Strike duty	8	2.1
Search for escaped prisoners and prison riot control	6	1.6
All other	25	6.5
Total	387	100.0

For an earlier, though incomplete, compilation of National Guard action during the 1918–1947 period, see pp. 180–181 of *Reserve Forces for National Security*, Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Civilian Components (Washington: 1948). For a detailed list of National Guard state action from 1934 to 1935, see 80 *Congressional Record*, 2069–2081. Current illustrations will be found in the annual reports of the National Guard Bureau, 1947 to 1954.

ried in over a quarter of a million gallons of water for drinking and cooking purposes. In the middle of a severe winter the Minnesota National Guard transported much-needed provisions to Indians isolated in the northern part of the state. At the request of the United States Forest Service in 1954, an Idaho unit fired high-explosive shells into the base of great over-hanging slabs of snow to eliminate the possibility of an avalanche in Sun Valley. In order to reduce the death toll over the 1954 Labor Day weekend, 682 Michigan Guardsmen were called out on a volunteer basis.[11] Connecticut followed suit on Memorial Day, 1956.

This sort of record of community service in recent years is an important factor in the increased prestige which the Guard has come to enjoy. The role of the individual members has been in large measure reversed. Guardsmen now are called upon principally to help their neighbors, in marked contrast with their former all too frequent duty of being arrayed, in battle garb, against the people of their own communities.

How far this trend will go depends in part upon appropriate recognition by state and federal officials of its value. State use of the Guard may easily be abused. Individual Guardsmen are being asked as volunteers in some states to bear burdens which should be shared by the entire citizenry. Community service action by the Guard is often not officially authorized, for to do so would entail the expenditure of state funds. In an emergency, individual units may be ordered into action on a volunteer basis by their local commanding officers. The state headquarters has little recourse but to condone this. Fighting a fire or a flood would seem to offer practical training, especially in combatting an atomic attack, but this duty is not recognized for training purposes by the federal authorities, and consequently no federal payments accrue. If both the state and the nation benefit from the Guardsman's action, it can be argued that both levels of government should share in the costs.

The community service function of the Guard raises questions concerning future policy. For example, is the civilian defense and disaster control effort being slowed by state reliance upon the Guard? In previous decades the Guard was sometimes used as an inexpensive substitute for a state police. There is a danger that today the Guard may be considered an inexpensive substitute for a civilian defense and disaster control organization.

A more basic question is whether the community assistance activities should be assumed by other agencies. As a component of the Ready Reserve the National Guard is subject to immediate mobilization and assignment whenever the armed forces of the nation are needed. In World Wars I and II virtually the entire Guard was utilized. In the Korean incident selected units were mobilized for national purposes. Almost certainly, any war emergency would deprive the states of their military units. Their principal resource against disaster would suddenly disappear.

Initial steps toward the provision of alternative sources of trained manpower have taken two forms. One is through legislative authorization for civil defense forces to operate in the event of disaster.[12] However, in most states the civil defense forces are not sufficiently organized, trained or equipped to cope with a disaster of any magnitude. They would be hopelessly, indeed dangerously, inadequate in the event of civil disorder.

---

[11] John W. Lederle and Robert H. Pealy, "'Halo' over Michigan Drivers," *State Government*, XXVII (December, 1954), 252–254.

A second alternative is to organize additional state military forces. In 1955 Congress was persuaded to enact legislation authorizing this.[13] The argument of its proponents was summed up by the Assistant Secretary of the Army:

> Present law prohibits peacetime State military forces other than the National Guard. Therefore, State Militia, needed to perform internal security or civil-defense missions when the National Guard is ordered away in Federal service, cannot be organized and maintained now. Such forces should be made ready before any emergency when their immediate availability could be decisive.[14]

The 1955 act does nothing more than authorize additional state military forces. The federal government assumes no responsibility. The entire cost of organizing and training a second body of troops thus would rest upon the individual states, though the federal government might, of course, distribute surplus equipment as was done for State Guard units in World War II.

Thus far, the new legislation has produced no significant results. Governors and state legislatures are preoccupied with meeting public demands for schools, highways, and other services. In most states, a request for funds to set up a substitute military organization would have low priority. The recent act therefore offers little hope for those seeking additional protection against disaster. Indeed, authorizing the states to organize new military forces, unrestrained by federal standards of training and discipline, has opened the door to possible new risks if the authority were suddenly invoked in a time of panic.

A better alternative might simply provide for the enlargement of the Guard with a mutual federal-state understanding that, in the event of Guard mobilization for national purposes, a small percentage of each state's total manpower and equipment would be retained for local emergencies. To hold back perhaps ten or fifteen percent of the troops would negate to some degree the present theory that each state's force constitutes an integral part of the whole defense system. But some adjustments would have to be made under existing conditions. From an enlarged Guard, a reserve could be drawn which would more than suffice in the event of minor civil disorder. Such a body would also provide the trained and disciplined nucleus essential for the support of civilian defense and disaster control agencies.

---

[12] As of mid-1955 forty-one states had passed enabling legislation. *The Book of the States 1956–57*. (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1956), p. 348.

[13] 69 Stat. 686.

[14] Statement of Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Army, in *Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate*, 84 Cong. 1 sess. on H.R. 7289, July 28, 1955 (Washington: 1955), p. 6.

ONE-PARTY POLITICS AND THE VOTER*

WARREN E. MILLER
University of California (*Berkeley*)

The existence of one-party systems of politics within the larger framework of the democratic society merits an increased share of the attention of students of American politics. For too long the common conception has been that one-party politics is a problem unique to the Southern states. This misconception persists even though systematic studies such as the monumental work of V. O. Key and Alexander Heard have illustrated that the politics of the so-called Solid South is in many respects the politics of the nation.[1]

As a case in point, an examination of the composition of contemporary legislative delegations indicates that monopolistic control of elective offices is clearly not the exclusive province of the Southern Democrats. In 1955, three out of every four state legislative bodies or congressional delegations were so completely dominated by a single political party that that party controlled more than 66 per cent of the members of the group. Excluding the 15 Border and Southern states, fully half of the remaining 33 state legislatures were controlled by one party holding at least two out of every three seats; in only six states was the controlling margin below 55 per cent. Within the same group of non-Border, non-Southern states, 25 of the 33 congressional delegations were dominated by one party controlling two-thirds or more of the delegation members; only four delegations were so evenly divided as to give the majority party less than 55 per cent of the members.

Perhaps somewhat more familiar to students of political statistics is the knowledge that over three-fourths of all congressional districts can be classified as relatively safe districts in which a candidate representing the majority party can count on receiving at least 55 per cent of the two-party vote for his office.[2]

The following discussion will suggest that fundamentally important aspects of the political process may be discovered if attention is focused on the phenomenon of single-party dominance of politics. In an attempt to illustrate one version of the "proper" focusing of attention, the discussion will be addressed to the task of describing some of the effects, or some aspects of the impact, which single-party dominance has on the political behavior of the individual voter.

---

* This analysis is based in large part on data from a national sample survey conducted by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, under the sponsorship of the Political Behavior Committee of the Social Science Research Council. While the author is grateful to the Center and the Committee for access to the data, neither the Center nor the Committee bears any responsibility for this analysis. The author is also indebted to Joseph Humorestok, University of California, for his most valuable assistance in planning the analysis of data on which this discussion is based, and to Angus Campbell, Director of the Survey Research Center, for his critical appraisal of and contribution to the subsequent interpretations.

[1] V. O. Key, Jr. and Alexander Heard, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York 1949). See also V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1953), pp. 224–31, and *American State Politics* (New York, 1956).

[2] Malcolm Moos, *Politics, Presidents, and Coattails* (Baltimore, 1952), pp. 24–29.

In the general case, the phenomenon with which we are concerned may be said to be the relative extent of single-party dominance of politics. However, the process of concretizing this statement forces us to make at least two tentative, restrictive assumptions before proceeding with an analysis of the phenomenon. Inasmuch as "dominance" can be found at many different levels of politics (precinct, ward, city, county, congressional district, state, regional) and with respect to almost as many different levels of government (city, township, county, state, or nation), we will have to define the limits of our initial investigation in a rather arbitrary fashion. The major independent variable as we shall treat it will be the relative one-party dominance which obtains in the two-party vote division among voters of a single county. The particular vote division selected for study will be that found among the votes cast for President in 1952.[3] The assumption that dominance within the *county* is a meaningful form or locus of dominance will be supported in the discussion which follows. The question of whether dominance on other levels may be more meaningful must be tested by an independent investigation. Similarly, the assumption that the vote for President is, in fact, the vote most pertinent for most people in defining political dominance must, in an independent context, also be tested.

The counties to be studied, 72 in number, are further defined for us by the availability of relevant and crucial data. They are the counties included in the Survey Research Center sample of the adult citizens of the United States as that sample was selected for the SRC study of the 1952 presidential election.[4] Because of the rather unique nature of the two-party competition in the South in 1952, an additional 23 counties representing the 15 Border and Southern states are not included in the present analysis, but are reserved for a subsequent and separate investigation.[5]

---

[3] The time base selected for study is also more or less arbitrarily chosen. The entire analysis reported here was also carried out using the average division in votes cast for President over the years 1936–1948. The pervasiveness of the swing to the Republican presidential candidate in 1952 resulted in a relatively even shift of from 10 to 15 percentage points, from the 1936–1948 average, in most of the areas with which we shall be concerned. Consequently, the two analyses (one using the period 1936–1948 as a base, the other using the one year, 1952) are completely parallel with respect to most major findings. The final selection of 1952 as the base year followed from two major considerations. (1) The analysis is not centrally concerned with problems of historical trend or development. The assumption that significant trends did—or, indeed, did not—precede the 1952 election constitutes an assumption that lies outside the framework of the analysis. Although the historical or developmental context of the analysis is, for the most part, ignored in this discussion, it clearly calls for careful examination as a separate enterprise. (2) All of the survey data used in the analysis pertain to the election of 1952 and have been validated only for that election.

[4] With the exception of the county election data, all of the data presented in this discussion were produced by the SRC study. A full description of that study, and of the data reported here, may be found in the volume *The Voter Decides*, by A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and W. E. Miller (Evanston, 1954). It should be noted that this investigation of one-party dominance was not anticipated in the design of the SRC study. Many of the apparent inadequacies in the data should be interpreted with this in mind.

Throughout the analysis, persons residing in the 72 counties are studied not as residents of particular counties but as persons who have experienced one of four different types of one-party dominance. The counties, and thus the persons in the sample, are subdivided into four categories ranging from one group representing the most pro-Democratic counties in the nation (outside of the South), through two intermediate groups of counties, to a group at the other extreme representing the most pro-Republican counties. We are not particularly interested in what happens in the "pure-type" Democratic counties or in "Republican" counties as these categories might be defined by some absolute norm. We are interested, rather, in what happens to voters who live in counties that are more, or less, predominantly Democratic (or more, or less, predominantly Republican) than other counties with which they can be compared. Consequently, attention is not focused on any one or two categories of counties. Instead, the analysis emphasizes the relationships which are found to inhere in the continuum of *relative* partisan dominance.[6]

---

[5] Preliminary investigation of the Southern and Border state data indicated substantial discontinuities between them and the data representing the rest of the nation.

[6] This is an important consideration which governs the categorization of counties. As can be seen in Table I, the "most Republican" counties were in 1952 more extremely pro-Republican than the "most Democratic" counties were comparably pro-Democratic. If the 1936–1948 average were used, instead of the data for 1952, the situation would be reversed (without seriously rearranging the counties), with few or no counties being as extremely pro-Republican as their most pro-Democratic opposite numbers. The difficulty of attempting to decide what *absolute* standards are sufficient to define "extremely Republican" or "extremely Democratic" under two such different situations as represented by the 1936–1948 period and the one year 1952 is avoided, without adjusting or otherwise violating the data, by the use of the *relative* "most Republican" and "most Democratic" designations.

Tables II, III, and IV, and the exploratory analyses on which they are based, provide an empirical justification for talking about counties as being distributed on a continuum of greater-to-lesser Democratic (or Republican) dominance. Adoption of a fixed breaking point to define one-party control would seem to imply a discontinuity, or at least curvilinearity, in relationships which, in fact, has not been observed in these data. One might assume, for example, that a partisan division as extreme as 70–30 would indicate a qualitatively different situation from that indicated by any more evenly balanced division, such as 65–35, 58–42, 51–49. One might assume further that once the 70–30 point was reached,



FIG. 1

The subsequent discussion will be divided into three parts. We will first attempt to validate the simultaneous use of aggregate election data and individual survey data. We will next study the effects which single-party dominance has on relationships between each of three motivational variables and the voting behavior which is associated with them. Finally, attention will be given to the problem of discovering segments of theory which will satisfactorily knit together all of the relevant data.

I

The first two tables of data to be presented give us no new substantive information. They merely serve as a means of demonstrating the validity of the survey sample and of the basic process of studying individual motivation and behavior with the aid of aggregate election data. These tables illustrate the close relationship found to exist between the official county election data and the individual data gathered in the sample survey of the national population. Those deviations which can be observed in the relationships are all well within the limits of probable sampling error. Table I indicates that, as should be expected from an adequate sample, reported individual behavior varies directly with the aggregate data of which the individual reports are but small samples.

In the major analysis of the SRC study, a good deal of attention was given to demonstrating that selected motivations were highly related to voting behavior. Inasmuch as the data were collected in a survey of the national population, they were individual rather than aggregate or group data. The

---

more extreme divisions would not alter the essentially "one-party" nature of the situation. If this set of assumptions were to be verified, one would then expect a general case of relationships involving party dominance and any other related factor to be something like that in Figure 1. In Figure 1, of course, co-variation between party dominance and Factor "X" is found only in the middle of the two-party vote range and disappears when either party gains complete control. In all relevant instances in the analysis with which this discussion is concerned, the observed relationships were of the general type where co-variation extended in an apparently linear fashion from one extreme of partisan dominance to the



FIG. 2

other as in Figure 2. There was no indication that a real breaking point did in fact exist near either end of the dominance continuum. Consequently, the use of the concept of a continuum of relative dominance not only provides *a* needed solution to the methodological problem involved, but also appears to provide *the* solution most compatible with the relevant data. This is not, of course, intended to constitute an argument that all relationships involving party dominance are linear, nor that they are necessarily continuous.

TABLE I. REPORTED VOTE FOR PRESIDENT AMONG RESIDENTS OF FOUR GROUPS OF COUNTIES

Partisan Dominance, in Terms of Democratic % of Two-Party Vote for President, 1952, by County	Respondents' Reported Vote for President			
	Democratic	Republican	Non-Voter	Total
20%–30%* ("Most Republican")	48 (26%)	140 (74%)	28	216
31%–40%	93 (35%)	169 (65%)	57	319
41%–50%	138 (44%)	173 (56%)	67	378
51%–60%† ("Most Democratic")	104 (51%)	101 (49%)	42	247
				1,160‡

* Includes 27 cases from two counties with Democratic proportions of 18% and 19%.

† Includes 9 cases from one county having a 62% Democratic vote.

‡ Fourteen cases where the vote of the respondent is unknown are excluded from this and all other tables.

data described three different types of reaction to political phenomena. The types were designated as Party Identification, Issue Orientation, and Candidate Orientation. Each of these variables was operationally defined so that the intensity and direction (partisanship) of each motivation possessed by a person could be inferred from the data relevant to that person.

TABLE II. INCIDENCE OF POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS* AMONG RESIDENTS OF FOUR GROUPS OF COUNTIES

Partisan Dominance Democratic % by County	Motivations Associated with Political Preference									Total
	Party Identification			Issue Partisanship			Candidate Partisanship			
	Demo.	Neut.	Rep.	Demo.	Neut.	Rep.	Demo.	Neut.	Rep.	
20%–30%	71 (45%)	59	86 (55%)	57 (38%)	67	92 (62%)	22 (18%)	96	98 (82%)	216
31%–40%	110 (49%)	95	114 (51%)	102 (47%)	102	115 (53%)	46 (23%)	118	155 (77%)	319
41%–50%	163 (60%)	105	110 (40%)	135 (52%)	119	124 (48%)	74 (32%)	149	155 (68%)	378
51%–60%	128 (66%)	54	65 (34%)	97 (61%)	89	61 (39%)	55 (42%)	117	75 (58%)	247
										1,160

* For a description of the definitions and meaning of these motivations, see Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *The Voter Decides*, Part II.

Table II is perhaps the more important of the first two tables in that it demonstrates that the incidence of the sample of individual motivations related to the presidential vote varies appropriately with variations in a total count of the aggregate voting behavior of the counties. As the Democratic proportion of the two-party vote within the county increases, reading from top to bottom in Table II, so the incidence of motivations associated with the Democratic vote undergoes an increase relative to the incidence of pro-Republican motivations.[7]

II

Having established the congruence of the two sets of data being used, we can next turn to the major analytic considerations. The addition of Tables I and II to previously published data establishes that each of three variables is positively and to a significant extent associated with the other two. In *The Voter Decides* it was demonstrated that individual motivations are positively and significantly associated with individual voting behavior. We have observed (in Table I) that individual data relating to voting behavior are appropriately associated with aggregate data also related to voting behavior. We have also observed (in Table II) the existence of the expected relationship between individual motivational data and aggregate voting data. The next question concerns the possibility that, despite the uniform consistency of these relationships, the degree of association between individual motivational data and individual voting data may somehow be affected by variations in the variable *measured* or "indicated" by the aggregate voting data. Does a variation in one of three interrelated factors influence or otherwise affect the interrelationship of the other two? We shall explore two sets of data in an attempt to answer this question. In the first instance, we shall utilize the four categories of partisan dominance to examine the *two-party vote division within a single category of motivation*. In the second instance, we shall also utilize the four categories of party dominance, but we shall be concerned with what at first glance seems to be no more than the mirror image of the first set of relationships, namely, the *incidence of each motivational factor within single categories of voting behavior*. In other words, we shall first study the voting behavior of persons with selected motivations and we shall then turn around and study the motivations of selected groups of voters.

Before examining the first set of data, two of the logical possibilities might be noted. We could expect either that (1) the relationship between individual motivations and behavior would be affected by the political environment provided by the county or that (2) it would be independent of variation in the political complexion of the county. If the former obtains, the data will demonstrate that the voting behavior of persons sharing a particular motivation is not uniform but varies with some regularity in accord with, if not in response to, the variation in the two-party division within the county. If, on the other hand, the motivation-behavior relationship is independent of the political environment supplied by the county, persons who have a given motivation and who reside in one group of counties should divide their votes in the same manner as other persons who possess the same motivation but who live in a different group of counties.

---

[7] Inasmuch as the individual vote-motivation relationships have been established elsewhere (see *The Voter Decides*, Chs. 7–9), Table II indicates that these relationships are so high that they persist even when one variable (voting behavior) is only indirectly reflected by the two-party division of all voters in the counties in which the possessors of these motivations being measured reside.

When we utilize the four categories of partisan dominance within the counties to provide four different circumstances for studying the vote division within a single category of motivations, it becomes apparent that some factor associated with the partisan dominance which prevails in the counties does affect the motivation-vote relationship. As an example we may look at the voting behavior of persons exhibiting Democratic Issue Partisanship. The proportion of individuals who voted for Stevenson in each of the four groups varied consistently, with Stevenson receiving least support from persons of Democratic issue persuasion who resided in the "most Republican" counties and most support from residents of the "most Democratic" counties. This is expressed in Table III by numerical entries which indicate that Stevenson enjoyed a *margin* of 52 out of every 100 person who were Democratic Issue Partisans in the extreme Democratic counties (specifically, out of each 100 members of the adult citizenry, 69 voted for Stevenson, 17 voted for Eisenhower, and 14 did not vote at all), against a margin of only one person out of every 100 Democratic Issue Partisans in the extreme Republican counties (where 44 voted for Stevenson, 43 voted for Eisenhower, and 13 were nonvoters).[8] Table III presents a summary of the data showing the relationship

TABLE III. THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF PERSONS WITH SELECTED MOTIVATIONS, AS RELATED TO COUNTY ENVIRONMENT

Partisan Dominance Democratic % by County	Motivations Associated with Political Preferences*								
	Vote of Party Identifiers			Vote of Issue Partisans			Vote of Candidate Partisans		
	Demo.	Neut.	Rep.	Demo.	Neut.	Rep.	Demo.	Neut.	Rep.
20%–30%	18*	−46	−90	1	−37	−74	−9	−21	−71
31%–40%	33	−16	−85	5	−17	−64	41	1	−62
41%–50%	52	−26	−84	33	−5	−60	42	11	−54
51%–60%	48	−22	−72	52	−15	−56	47	11	−48

* The entry in each cell is an index of voting partisanship. It is derived by subtracting the proportion of Republican *voters* from the proportion of Democratic *voters*. An index of 100 would indicate that all persons *voted Democratic,* while an index of −100 would indicate 100 per cent *Republican voters.*

---

[8] Because of the complexity of the data involved, the relative margin of support (or opposition) will be used throughout the analysis as a summary index of the distributions being examined.

between the division of votes cast for President and the county environment, for persons exhibiting all three types of each of the three different motivational factors.

In Table III it can be seen that in every one of the 18 possible comparisons among persons exhibiting a pro-Republican motivation, but living in different categories of counties, the same impact of the partisan complexion of the county is demonstrated. The more pro-Republican the county, the larger the proportion of Eisenhower voters among persons with a common motivation predisposing to an Eisenhower (or Republican) vote. In 17 out of 18 comparisons, the same effect of the county environment can be noted for relationships involving pro-Democratic motivations. (The one exception involves the two bottom categories under Democratic Party Identifiers.) The chances are infinitesimally small that two such *patterns* of consistent relationships would occur by chance. Moreover, in most instances the differences between the extremes are large enough to warrant confidence at the one per cent level that such *individual differences* are not merely the result of sampling error.[9]

Neither the patterns nor the absoute differences are quite as striking for the various groups of "neutral" persons. Nevertheless, the impact of county environment on these groups is quite unmistakable and is consistent, in 14 out of 18 comparisons, with the findings relative to the motivated groupings. The systematic analysis of the neutral or non-partisan persons lies outside the present discussion. It might be noted, however, that "neutrality," as indicated by the measures of the three motivational variables, includes both indecision or conflict and lack of involvement. Unresolved conflict and lack of involvement both could be expected to produce a blurred perception of political phenomena or a reduced degree of sensitivity to the political environment, and either of these phenomena, in turn, might well explain the variations in question.

[9] An extension of the analysis indicates that the uniformity of the three motivation-vote relationships is not merely the result of the fact that each motivational factor is correlated with each of the other two as well as with the vote. First, the voting behavior of persons with different motivational patterns was examined. Persons possessing strong pro-Democratic motivations (pro-Democratic on all three factors or pro-Democratic on two and neutral on one) voted more heavily Democratic in extreme Democratic counties (with a Voting Partisanship Index of +70) than in extreme Republican counties (where their Vote Index dropped to +36). Similarly, persons exhibiting mildly pro-Democratic motivations (pro-Democratic on one factor and neutral on two, or pro-Democratic on two and pro-Republican on one) varied consistently from a +43 Vote Index in Democratic territory to +24 in Republican country. The comparable data for persons with Republican motivations showed the same pattern of consistent relationships.

In a second test, each segment of Table III was reproduced, but with the second and third motivational factors controlled. Although the number of comparisons was limited because of insufficient cases in many cells, this procedure again supported the thesis that each relationship observed in Table III exists independently of the other two factors. It should also be noted that the functional relationship between the county vote and the individual vote raises the possibility that the persistence of this relationship under the controlled conditions depicted in Table III is artifactual. Although this possibility cannot be denied with certainty, the preponderance of judgments obtained from statisticians on this point supported the presumption that the findings were, in fact, not spurious.

The most basic conclusion to be drawn from Table III is that the minority party suffers, as the majority party profits, from the lack of balance in the county division of partisan strength. The minority party not only has fewer persons possessing or exhibiting motivations supporting it (see Table II), and consequently fewer persons voting for its leading candidate than does the majority party (see Table I), but also receives smaller dividends from its supporting motivations. Conversely, the ratio of motivations to votes is much lower among majority party supporters.

The observed relationship is at least superficially similar to that noted by Schattschneider and others with respect to voting strength and success in electing candidates in two-party competition.[10] Just as the minority party seldom elects its "fair share" of candidates for office, so in the phenomenon with which we are concerned the minority fails to receive its "fair share" of votes if the relative incidence of supporting motivations is used as the criterion of fairness.

This finding may have more than incidental relevance for the understanding of the effectiveness of campaign activities. There is a strong suggestion that minority party campaigning is, perhaps to a larger extent than has been suspected, a discouraging, uphill battle. Given the very fact of minority status, one can expect that local organizational activity is at a minimum. Moreover, the situation seems to be one in which even if the "message" of the minority party can be conveyed to the voters (whether through organizational activity or through effective use of the mass media of communication), the results will be less than satisfactory. With proportionally less activity, or at least with proportionally less success in implanting the proper motivations, the majority party can hope for greater returns at the polls from its efforts than can the minority strategists. A corollary of this may be that, given a choice of action and limited resources, campaign activities will produce maximum results if concentrated in areas of strength rather than in areas of weakness. The notion that a party can do better by attempting to win votes in territory monopolized by the other party than by reworking friendly territory should at least be subject to modification. Unless there are virtually no additional votes available in one's own territory, effort expended there may well produce larger dividends than if the same effort is devoted to gaining converts from enemy territory.[11]

A second, and perhaps more important, implication relates to the persistence of one-party politics. Since this analysis does not, at this point, deal directly with the development or evolution of the political structure, we are limited to speculation concerning tides and trends in politics. The above finding does suggest, however, that if—through whatever course of events—one-party dominance becomes established in a county, its very existence works against a redressing of the political balance and a revival of two-party competition. Much further investigation is needed before this suggestion, or hypothesis, can be established as a working description of this aspect of American politics. However, given the extent to which one-party politics dominates the local political scene of today, the testing of the hypothesis would appear to deserve high priority. It may be that, barring the intervention of events of major social or economic importance, the second party in local politics fights not for eventual primacy and dominance but merely to avoid extinction as a real political force. Demonstration that this is the case would provide crucial information relevant to a re-evaluation of the theories of democratic representation as well as to a reappraisal of the significance of federalism in American politics.

---

[10] Elmer E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), pp. 74–80.

[11] This suggestion is made without benefit of insight into the nature of the effects which county environment may have on the evolution of political motivations. Although this is a fit subject for further study, we are here concerned only with the subsequent problem: given motivating factors, however developed, what effect does county environment have on the relationship between them and individual voting behavior?

Before attempting additional statements of the implications of this finding, we must consider the second instance in which the effect of single-party dominance in the county is noticed in the motivation-vote relationship. Up to this point we have been looking at the voting behavior of persons with a particular political motivation. We may also turn the data around and look at the motivations of persons with a particular, reported kind of voting behavior.[12]

Given the data observed in Table III, it would still be quite possible to find any one of three relationships obtaining between variations in the political environment furnished by the county and variations in the incidence of motivations within groups of Democratic and Republican voters. It might be discovered, for example, that all four groups of Democratic voters, regardless of county environment, display the same "amount" of identification with party, adherence to party-line on issues, or support for party candidate. It might also be, and this perhaps a bit more in line with traditional expectations and speculation, that the less support a party's voters receive from their county environment, the more they behave like beleaguered and outnumbered intruders in hostile territory. From this latter base we would perhaps intuitively expect that voters whose party has something less than unanimous support in their county might, both logically and within the mathematical limits of the data, show more in-group feeling, more homogeneity with respect to partisan motivations, than would fellow members of their party who reside in counties in which their party is more dominant. Conversely, the third possible relationship, and the one which in fact tends to predominate, would find more heterogeneity, or less unity and less homogeneity, among voters who receive less reinforcement from their county environment. In Table IV it can be seen, for example, that in line with this third possibility, each 100 Democratic voters in the extreme Democratic counties boasted 19 more Stevenson supporters, as measured by Candidate

---

[12] It should be noted that the presence of a relatively large number of persons with no observed partisanship, relative to any one motivational factor, and the existence of a sizable group of non-voters allows these two ways of studying the vote-motivation relationship to produce results which are complementary but which have quite different implications. See note 9, above.

Partisanship, than Eisenhower supporters, while Democratic voters in the most Republican counties were split exactly 50-50 in their preference for the two candidates.

TABLE IV. THE MOTIVATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED GROUPS OF VOTERS, AS RELATED TO COUNTY ENVIRONMENT

Democratic % by County	Motivations Associated with Political Preferences*								
	Party Identification of Voter			Issue Partisanship of Voter			Candidate Partisanship of Voter		
	Demo.	Non-Vote	Rep.	Demo.	Non-Vote	Rep.	Demo.	Non-Vote	Rep.
20%–30%	79	−4	−37	33	7	−38	0	−29	−49
31%–40%	66	12	−43	25	17	−27	9	−18	−63
41%–50%	75	34	−42	40	30	−37	13	−4	−55
51%–60%	73	48	−33	57	5	−25	19	5	−42

* The entry in each cell is an index of motivational partisanship. It is derived by subtracting the proportion of persons with a pro-Republican *motivation* from the proportion with pro-Democratic *motivation*. An index of 100 would indicate that all persons in the group exhibited a *pro-Democratic motivation*, while an index of −100 would indicate unanimous *pro-Republican motivation*.

The general finding for both Republican and Democratic voters, with respect to Issue Partisanship and Candidate Partisanship, is that minority voters demonstrate *less unity or homogeneity* and more heterogeneity than do their majority counterparts.[13] These findings do not hold, however, with respect to Party Identification.[14] No significant relationship exists between county environment and Party Identification, either for Democratic or for Republican voters.

Insofar as the Democratic voters are concerned, the data related to all three factors are clear and unambiguous. It will be noted, however, that there are three deviations in Table IV in the data on issues and candidates. One of these, the relatively low pro-Eisenhower motivation found among Republican voters in most Republican counties (indicated by a Candidate Partisanship Index of −49), is large enough to warrant brief comment.

It might be thought that these Republican voters included a relatively greater proportion of Taft supporters than were to be found among Republican voters in less predominantly Republican counties. However, shortly before the election all respondents were asked whether they would have preferred some other nominee, and the eventual Republican voters in the extreme Republican counties indicated no greater preference for Senator Taft, nor any less satisfaction with Eisenhower, than did the other three groups of Republican voters.

---

[13] Hereafter, when intra-party comparisons of groups of voters are made, the terms minority and majority will be used. The discrimination will be made only on the base of lesser and greater support from county environment. Thus, Democratic voters in counties voting 41–50 per cent Democratic will be minority voters when compared to Democratic voters in the 51–60 per cent Democratic category, and they will be majority voters when compared to Democratic voters in counties voting 31–40 per cent Democratic.

[14] For either Issue or Candidate Partisanship, the probability is less than one out of 100 that the observed relationship occurred by chance. For Party Identification, the combined data for both Democratic and Republican voters approach a completely random distribution. Out of 12 possible comparisons, six conform to the pattern observed for Issue and Candidate Partisanship and six run directly counter to that pattern.

It is also possible that intra-party factionalism may be responsible for a part of the ambiguity in the data. It might be hypothesized that factionalism tends to develop when one party is so dominant as to be able to afford the luxury of internal dissension or when the opposition party is so hopelessly outmanned as to reduce interest in the local two-party competition. In the absence of real competition, partisans of both persuasions may become so preoccupied with internal conflict as to give the impression that they are, in fact, less than completely devoted to their respective parties.[15] This hypothesis would, of course, be most clearly sustained if the indicators of the partisanship of groups of voters indicated great homogeneity for *both* parties in evenly divided counties and, at the same time, indicated least homogeneity for the dominant as well as the subordinate party in the extreme counties. In terms of the 1952 election, the extreme counties (outside the South) were pro-Republican; the most pro-Democratic counties were, in fact, relatively evenly divided. A positive test of the suggested role of factionalism should find, therefore, maximum homogeneity for both parties in the "most Democratic" counties and maximum heterogeneity among voters of both parties in the "most Republican" counties. Such was, most unmistakably, *not* the case. Consequently, we are limited to concluding that factionalism (1) may reduce the magnitude of some relationships and (2) may be responsible for some of the discrepancies and aberrations in other instances.[16]

It should also be pointed out that the deviations may be chance phenomena which occur as a function of the sampling process and do not necessarily, therefore, represent evidence contradicting the basic findings. In any event, none of the three deviations noted in Table IV provides sufficient grounds for dismissing the remaining consistencies with respect to Issue and Candidate Partisanship as not meriting further attention. Rather, we may conclude that the data clearly indicate minority group heterogeneity with respect to the two motivations involved.[17]

---

[15] V. O. Key, Jr., "The Direct Primary and Party Structure: A Study of State Legislative Nominations," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 1–26 (March, 1954).

[16] Another possible explanation might be thought to lie in the distribution of 1948 Truman supporters who voted Republican in 1952. Some 10 or 11 per cent of the residents in each group of counties are to be found in this category of 1948–1952 switchers. Removing them from the columns of Republican voters does not, however, greatly change the entries in Table IV and does not eliminate the aberrations.

[17] Because our concern is with understanding the behavior of voters, we shall not examine in detail those data in Table IV pertaining to non-voters. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the non-voters appear to be extremely sensitive to their political environment; with but one deviation they reflect in all three motivations the relative impact of the postulated differences in environment.

Turning to the third factor being examined, the evidence indicates a uniformly high sense of Democratic Party Identification among Democrats, regardless of the county environment in which they find themselves. The level of identification is somewhat lower for Republican voters, but it also appears to be quite uniformly pro-Republican. The data suggest, then, that, of the motivational factors under investigation, Party Identification shows the greatest resistance to the assault of the countering majority forces of county environment.

A review of the major tables indicates two broad conclusions. Table III demonstrates that persons exhibiting partisan motivations, either Democratic or Republican, give their respective parties less frequent support at the polls if they live in a community where those motivations are in the minority than they do if they live in a community where their points of view are in the majority. Table IV illustrates that minority voters show markedly less evidence of supporting or reinforcing Issue and Candidate Partisanship than do their majority counterparts, but they do *not* show any less evidence of identification with the party they support at the polls. There is no support for the notion that the minority voter reacts to his minority status by accentuating his devotion to his party and to its leaders and policies. Instead, the minority voter appears to do no more than match the sense of identification with party which the majority voter expresses, and he actually shows less evidence of commitment to the candidates and issues which he supports with his vote.

III

While these conclusions seem to constitute a new and possibly useful description of the role of single-party dominance in American politics, they also provide a series of new challenges. A corollary of the second conclusion, in particular, challenges the student of politics to pursue the implications of the findings, particularly with reference to the nature of change in two-party political competition over time. In the absence of some fifth factor which contributes to partisan motivation and which is distributed in such a manner as to offset the impact of the community environment and the accompanying diminution of vote-supporting Candidate and Issue Partisanship, the explanation which the data provide for the votes cast by minority voter groups seems clearly less adequate than that offered for the voting behavior of majority groups. Despite (or because of) the lack of relationship between Party Identification and county environment, when variations in voting are controlled as in Table IV, it is apparent that when all the motivational factors are considered together, minority voters exhibit significantly fewer "supporting" motivations (motivations which are consistent with and which may be held to "explain" their voting behavior) than do majority voters.[18] The interpretations which may be advanced to accommodate this finding are many.

---

[18] If one were to assume that under most circumstances Party Identification, too, gives less support to minority voters than to majority voters, the problem of explaining the minority vote would, of course, only be accentuated.

First, one may consider the notion that it only looks as though we have an authentic photograph of the Indian rope trick: when the next frame is developed we will find that the minority voters were not suspended in mid-air but were really in the process of plunging to earth. Somewhat more formally, it can be suggested that minority voters constitute groups significantly less stable than those composed of their majority counterparts. We may have observed them at a time when they had lost some of the motivational underpinnings of their accustomed political behavior, but before this loss was manifested in an actual change in the behavior itself. At the risk of suggesting an unduly simple and overly mechanical model for the analysis, it may well be that as the motivation-to-vote ratio is decreased, the subsequent behavior becomes less predictable, less stable, and more equivocal. Inasmuch as the groups of voters were defined in terms of a portion of that subsequent behavior, the validation of this thesis depends on utilizing other indicators of instability.

A number of preliminary tests were conducted in an attempt to assess the relative stability of minority voter groups. Three aspects of voting behavior were examined: time of arriving at final vote decision, consideration given to voting for the other candidate, and extent of ticket splitting. These items were presumed to be crude indicators of individual voters' indecision and vacillation.[19] A careful scrutiny of their incidence among the groups of voters did not disclose any evidence of disproportionate instability in the 1952 election on the part of minority voters, either Democratic or Republican.[20]

A fourth attempt to test for instability by referring to reports of previous voting behavior produced conflicting and consequently ambiguous findings. An examination of the respondents' reported 1948 voting behavior disclosed that, in 1952, 32 per cent of the reported Truman voters in extreme Democratic counties (extreme majority Democrats) either did not vote or else voted for Eisenhower. The proportion of defecting, i.e., unstable, Truman voters increased steadily to 33, 36, and finally to 49 per cent in extreme Republican counties. On the other hand, this pattern of higher instability and defection among minority groups did not hold for the Dewey voters of 1948; moving from extreme Republican counties to extreme Democratic counties, the proportion of defectors in 1952 held constant at nine or 10 per cent.

---

[19] For discussions of the use of these items as indicators of instability see Morris Janowitz and Warren E. Miller, "The Index of Political Predisposition in the 1948 Election," *Journal of Politics* Vol. 14, pp. 710–27 (June, 1952), and also *The Voter Decides*, pp. 17–26. It should be noted that the absence of supporting partisanship is not the same as absence of the motivational factor. Of the two dimensions measured for each factor, intensity or strength and direction or partisanship, we are concerned only with the latter.

[20] It is, of course, conceivable that we are observing a rather unique threshold-contingency relationship between motivational factors and behavior. If an individual's motivation is sufficient to produce a vote, it is also sufficient to produce the entire range of behaviors open to citizens; the addition of motivational factors, as in the case of the majority voters, does not produce any additional variance in behavior. Such an explanation is less than satisfactory on theoretical grounds and runs counter to observed relationships involving the same data. See *The Voter Decides*, Chs. 10, 11.

These first attempts to interpret the data by documenting a part of the dynamic nature of American politics were thus less than spectacularly successful. It is apparent, however, that less ambiguous indicators of instability, combined with panel-derived records of voting behavior over time, are needed to provide a satisfactory test of the utility of this particular line of speculation.

A second study of the theme of political change involves shifting from a concern with voting behavior to further consideration of Party Identification. It seems clear that for voters who were in the minority in their home communities, Party Identification in 1952 performed a relatively more important function in guiding their political behavior than it did for their fellow partisans who were in the majority in their respective communities (relative, that is, to the other motivational factors examined). Moreover, it does seem evident that, of the three factors, Party Identification is most likely to endure and persist unchanged over time. Candidate and Issue Partisanship of necessity depend for much of their existence on the quadrennial redefinition of the issues of political battle and on the selection of new champions. The parties, however, live from election to election as among the most durable of our political institutions. This aspect of American politics facilitates the carry-over of identification with a party to a greater extent than it permits reaffirmation of personal allegiances or crystallization of ideology.

However, it is less than clear that Party Identification will, through time, be able to sustain the loyalty and maintain the support of the minority party members for their party, given the relative absence of reinforcement from the other motivations which we have studied. It is quite possible that Party Identification is only somewhat more resistant to environmental influences than are the other partisan motivations. Examination of the respondents' recall of changes in Party identification indicated that in 1952 one out of five persons had a sense of identification, or of independence, which differed from a prior partisan identification which they remembered. The reported changes constituted a net loss for the Democratic party of some six per cent of the electorate, distributed uniformly in all four categories of counties. However, when these changes were computed as a proportion of the total number of persons who were currently identified with a given party *or* who had at some earlier time been identified with that party, the findings paralleled those involving 1948–1952 changes in voting behavior. The Republican losses were not related to party dominance; the Democractic losses were apparently quite clearly related. Some 35 per cent of one-time Democratic identifiers in extreme Republican counties now, in 1952, called themselves Independents or Republicans; the Democratic losses in heavily Democratic counties were only slightly over 20 per cent.

On the other hand, an investigation of changes in identification among the *voters* of 1952, disclosed a very different situation. To maximize reliability, the data for both Democratic and Republican voters were combined, and the voters were categorized on a majority-minority dichotomy (instead of on four degrees of difference in partisan dominance). Among minority voters there were 75 persons whose identification had changed in favor of the party they supported at the polls, compared with only 28 persons who were now less closely identified with their voting party than they had been, a ratio of 2.7 to 1. Among majority voters, the ratio was 84 to 44 or 1.9 to 1. This provided some small evidence, that, contrary to the above indications, more change in Party Identification may take place in defiance of the community environment than takes place in accord with that environment.

Pending further study of Party Identification, it may be profitable to explore other theories of political behavior which may be applied to our present problem. One such possible explanation of the data we have examined would seem to be provided by a theory of persistence of one-party dominance advanced by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee in their analysis of voting behavior in Elmira, New York. The authors of *Voting* suggest that:

> "the stability of a [political] preference . . . varies with the chances of social support for it. And the chances of social support for given political choices, in turn, vary with the distribution of such preferences in the particular segment of the community. Within a given group, then, the political majority holds the informal social pressures to stay a majority. . . . The circumstances that produce an unequal distribution of political preferences within a group also produce an unintended means of maintaining the inequality—namely, unequal chances for social support of unpopular views in the group. . . . An example illustrates the arithmetic of this result. Take a group of 100 people with 80 holding a preference and 20 not holding it. Suppose the subsequent rates of change were exactly proportionate to the chances of each type being matched in social discussion with a randomly chosen friend holding the opposite view. Then the majority would lose at only one-fourth the rate of the minority, say, 10 per cent versus 40 per cent defection from each. This would seem discouraging to individual proponents of the unpopular view and satisfying to the stable popular majority, but, in fact, each would have exchanged the same *number* (i.e., 8 adherents) with the other. Thus they would remain the *same* in size."[21]

The relevance of this statement to our present problem is quite clear. Unfortunately, the statement reflects the single community context of its origin in that it does posit an absence of change in the aggregate division of strength between major and minor parties within a community. Election statistics demonstrate, of course, that change does occur within many communities in each election, and the present analysis has been forced to deal with the nation-wide sum of these changes which took place between 1948 and 1952.[22] However, the *Voting* statement *is* directed at analyzing the unequal division of strength with which we are confronted and it is specifically concerned with the fate of minority party voters in one-party communities. Furthermore, this theory might be thought to hold great promise precisely because it does add to our construction a new, non-motivational concept of the process of social (or political) change. There are, however, major obstacles to be overcome once the attempted application of the theory to our data is undertaken. In the first place, if the assumed randomness of person-to-person interaction is granted (although the Elmira data repeatedly demonstrate that interaction in matters political is anything but random), the theory of major party-minor party exchange of personnel apparently rests on an assumed randomness of the *results* of interaction. In the hypothetical example given, 16 "interactions" are said to produce eight defections from major to minor party and eight defections from minor to major. Unfortunately for our present purposes, however, this seems to assume, in turn, that major and minor party members possess equal degrees of partisanship, whereas our problem exists precisely because minority partisanship apparently does not equal majority party partisanship. It would not seem reasonable to expect an even 8–8 division if the major party adherents were strongly partisan and the minor party adherents only mildly convinced of their own partisanship. Rather, the results of interaction between major and minor party adherents would seem to be a function of the strength of partisanship as well as of the opportunity for interaction. This would seem to be particularly true in the situation in question. Our differences in intensity of partisanship are to be found in precisely those areas which presumably form the basis for political interaction and discussion, namely, considerations of governmental policy and the personal characteristics of the candidates.

---

[21] B. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), p. 126 and note 2, pp. 126–27.

[22] The authors of *Voting* were, of course, aware that external events do alter the equilibrium which they posit in their analysis.

One difficulty with using some of our data to amend the *Voting* theory lies, of course, in the fact that the combined results of change proportionate to opportunity for interaction and change proportionate to strength of partisanship may not produce the stable, unchanging aggregate majority-minority division of the vote which the theory was originally intended to explain. Any majority-minority differential in strength of partisanship might be expected to produce an erosion in the numerical strength of the party with weaker partisans. Inasmuch as we have observed that minority party voters do tend to be weaker partisans than do majority party adherents, we might now expect their number to diminish rather steadily. As we have noted, however, the data of the SRC study did not support the hypothesis that such erosion was in progress in the Fall of 1952.

This line of reasoning is closely related to a second major implication of the one-party dominance thesis as originally presented in *Voting*. It would seem to follow from the example reproduced from *Voting* that the minor party groups would, over a relatively short period of time, come to be composed largely of former major party members.[23] The implication of the *Voting* theory would seem to be, for example, that Democratic voters in the extreme Democratic counties should count a smaller proportion of former Republicans in their midst (as 80 Democrats become 72 Democrats and eight Republicans after one exchange of personnel) than would Democratic voters in extreme Republican counties (when 20 Democrats become 12 Democrats and eight Republicans). Data on voters' reported party regularity in previous elections gave no support to the expectation that there would be such dilution or disproportionate heterogeneity on the part of minority party adherents in our sample of the national population.

---

[23] Even if it were assumed that all inter-party exchange was provided by the same relatively small group of changers who circulate, election-to-election, from one party to the other, still we should find at any one point in time that minor party members were relatively more heterogeneous in terms of previous political affiliation and experience, than their counterparts who were fortunate enough to reside in predominantly friendly territory.

It is, however, quite possible that the rates of exchange and the rapidity with which new party members shed all evidence of past allegiance proceed much faster than we have anticipated. (The numerous assumptions which have been made about the rate of change and the accompanying characteristics of change should serve to point up the pressing need for continued research in this area of politics.) It is consequently possible that the suggestions advanced by Berelson and his associates can be sustained as the basis for a theory of one-party politics if some notion of non-random, aggregate change is accepted.

In the meantime, however, prudence calls for at least a minimal respect for the accretions of relevant data. Giving such data the benefit of the doubt in this instance, we may summarize the attempt to apply the *Voting* theory of persistent one-party dominance as follows: the assumed randomness of interaction must be rejected (on the basis of data presented in *Voting* as well as data to be found in the SRC study) and the assumed randomness of the results of interaction should be rejected (on the basis of the observed differential in majority-minority partisanship). Moreover, our attempts to tamper with the *Voting* theory produced theoretical implications which, in turn, were also denied by the data.

Finally, it should be noted that a return to tentative acceptance of the notion that Party Identification plays a crucial role in sustaining minority voters carries with it some important implications for the other bits of theory which have been discussed. In the first place, a serious question is raised about an original assumption of this analysis. The assumption was that the qualitative differences distinguishing the motivational factors from each other could be ignored in the study of one-party politics, in favor of emphasizing the strong commonality of their relationship to political behavior. This assumption was proved incorrect early in the analysis and subsequent attempts to reintroduce it in terms of a probability theory of the role of motivations also met with defeat. Instead it is clear that, for many purposes, the interaction of motivational factors must be analyzed in such a fashion as to allow for wide variations in the essential meanings which can be attached to the different combinations of the factors.[24]

A second and closely related implication of our examination of one alternative hypothesis which might reconcile our data may be stated as the observation that probability theories applied to the nature and results of face-to-face interaction in the political process must be greatly modified if they are to overcome the obstacles discovered in this investigation. If the data of our analysis are at all typical of the data relevant to this aspect of politics, it would seem that they demand such substantial modifications of the specific probability theory advanced in *Voting* as to minimize appreciably the value of that theory. It should be noted, however, that a major part of the problem may well be related to the attempt to utilize a theory of face-to-face, personal interaction to explain data pertaining to national phenomena and secondary group identification.

---

[24] It might be noted in passing that serious attention could not be given this admonition in the current analysis because of the restricted size of the sample. Early efforts to analyze the various *patterns* of motivation which might be associated with varying states of one-party dominance were abandoned when it became obvious that the number of cases in crucial cells too frequently diminished beyond the point of no return.

A third implication of the theorizing about Party Identification relates to the need for a further understanding of the nature and role of group identification in general and of Party Identification in particular. If we are correct in concluding that an identification with a secondary group has, under certain conditions, more meaning for the individual than have many more immediate, proximate pressures, it behooves us to give increased attention to delineating the nature of the historical and political conditions under which this is true.

SUMMARY

One-party dominance of politics militates against the effectiveness of minor party motivations in producing minor party votes and increases the effectiveness of major party motivations in producing voting support for the major party. This may result in facilitating majority party campaign accomplishments and in limiting the effectiveness of minority campaigning. It may also bear responsibility for sustaining one-party political systems and working against eventual equalization of party competition at the level of local political units.

One-party dominance of politics is associated with divisiveness, lack of unity, and a significantly high degree of heterogeneity among rank and file minor party voters with respect to felt partisanship for candidates and issues.

The incidence of Party Identification does not vary with changes in political environment, at least insofar as minority voters are concerned. It appears to be the one factor of those examined which sustains the minor party vote, independent of the partisan complexion of the local political environment. Any diminution of the role of Party Identification in voting behavior might well result in a lack of unity and cohesiveness among minority voters which could, in turn, lead to a persistent erosion of minority party strength. Were this to occur, it could be expected that the already high degree of single-party dominance of American politics would be accentuated to a perhaps dangerous extent.

VERBAL SHIFTS IN THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: A CONTENT ANALYSIS

JAMES W. PROTHRO
Florida State University

I. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS

The resurgence of conservatism may be described as the most significant postwar development in American thought. "No intellectual phenomenon has been more surprising in recent years," Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., concedes, "than the revival in the United States of conservatism as a respectable social philosophy."[1] No longer can one lament, as Alpheus T. Mason did in 1948, that "conservatism, once more than respectable political theology (especially among the educated), now carries overtones of reaction well nigh as discrediting as the rabidities attributed to communism."[2] Intellectual spokesmen are now, on the contrary, making a concerted effort to revisit and revitalize the conservative point of view.[3]

Although most of this "egg head" element in the conservative camp may be, and has been,[4] dismissed as expressing an anachronistic yearning for the anti-commercial traditions evolved in British feudalism, the business leaders whom they neglect have themselves been revising and actively selling a conservatism that appears to be more closely related to the realities of the American social situation. Russell Davenport and the editors of *Fortune* have turned to business rather than to a nonexistent American aristocracy for leadership in meeting the the mass demands for economic security.[5] Contemporary business spokesmen may be no more enthusiastic than their predecessors in the 1920's about the "Welfare State," but their opposition seems more clearly focused on the state as the agent for its realization than on the goal of mass welfare and security as such. That these business spokesmen, unlike the academic "New Conservatives," have a real role in the Eisenhower administration is plain.[6]

---

[1] "The New Conservatism: Politics of Nostalgia," *The Reporter*, Vol. 12, p. 9 (June 16, 1955).

[2] *The Democratic Process: Lectures on the American Liberal Tradition* (New London, 1948), p. 32.

[3] See *e.g.*, Francis Wilson, *Case for Conservatism* (Seattle, 1951); Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana* (Chicago, 1953); Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York, 1955); and Peter Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Revolt* (New York, 1949). The current appeal of conservatism among academicians is perhaps best attested by the fact that critics of the "New Conservatives" now argue, not against the defects of their conservatism, but that they are really liberals without knowing it. See Bernard Crick, "The Strange Quest for an American Conservatism," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 17, pp. 359–76 (July, 1955).

[4] See Schlesinger, *op. cit.* The most conspicuous exception to this charge is Professor Rossiter, who holds that "the full conservative tradition, a graft on feudalism, simply will not flourish on this soil." "Toward an American Conservatism," *Yale Review*, Vol. XLIV, p. 357 (Spring 1955).

[5] *U.S.A., The Permanent Revolution* (New York, 1951). And see Clarence B. Randall, *A Creed for Free Enterprise* (Boston, 1952).

[6] A. A. Berle, Jr., "Businessmen in Government: the New Administration," *The Reporter*, Vol. 8, pp. 8–12 (February 2, 1953).

It is not surprising, then, that the old individualistic dogmas seem to be in similar process of modification in the hands of the political leadership of American conservatism. President Eisenhower's incomplete search, despite the assistance of some of the country's most efficient advertising men, for an appropriate slogan to describe his public philosophy—with "progressive moderation" being replaced by the equally equivocal "dynamic conservatism"—reflects at least an uneasiness about the appeal of Hoover-style Republicanism. The apparent contrast between this emerging point of view and that of pre-New Deal conservative spokesmen[7] suggests the importance of systematic analyses of shifts in conservative thought as a problem for students of American political theory. Specifically, it suggests the hypothesis which this article will attempt to examine. The New Deal, it is submitted, involved the addition of a permanent increment to the main body of the American tradition, establishing beyond effective challenge the concept of government responsibility for alleviating mass economic distress, on the assumption that such distress stems from impersonal forces beyond the control of the individual rather than from personal deficiencies. On the basis of this fundamental assumption, it is hypothesized that *one evidence of such a change will be found in the failure of politically successful spokesmen for the conservative point of view to reject the basic political appeals of the New Deal.* It is further hypothesized that *the apparent reluctance with which this shift was made,* under pressure of the general acceptance of New Deal appeals, *will be reflected in a retention of many symbols of pre-New Deal style.*

This two-fold hypothesis could be tested in a variety of ways, one promising possibility being the examination of changing voting behavior in Congress. Another appropriate method, and that which will be followed in this study, is the analysis of important policy pronouncements from the supreme headquarters of American politics—the office of the president. Although the vote is clearly a more crucial indicator of political attitudes than purely verbal behavior, the difficulty of aligning congressmen into conservative and liberal groups, the unquestioned pre-eminence of the president as party leader, and the great weight attached to his considered promises and recommendations on policy all appear to support this as an appropriate approach to the hypothesis presented.

II. METHOD

The method of content analysis for this problem is chosen in the hope that the hypothesis is formulated with sufficient precision to permit the application of quantitative methods to a field of political science that has been perhaps the least responsive to refinements in methodology. The materials selected for analysis are the first acceptance speeches, inaugural addresses, and state of the union messages of presidents Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower. Roosevelt and Truman were chosen because of their association with the New Deal, Hoover and Eisenhower because of their leadership of the conservative party in the immediate pre- and post-New Deal periods. In keeping with the hypothesis, the political appeals and symbols of the two Democrats should differ (in the same direction) from those of Hoover, whereas Eisenhower should endorse or at least fail to reject the New Deal appeals while offering symbols more like Hoover's.

---

[7] See the author's *The Dollar Decade: Business Ideas in the 1920's* (Baton Rouge, 1954), especially pp. 209–21.

The addresses picked to reflect the policy orientations of the presidents may be more easily explained in terms of their importance and comparability than their number. Each appears to represent the most important statement involving a particular type of appeal, the acceptance address oriented to the party, the inaugural to the general public, and the State of the Union Message to the congress. In addition to the time-consuming nature of content analysis, two factors explain the decision not to add more speeches. First, it would be impossible to make additions without destroying the balance among the three types of audience orientation: two more campaign and state of the union messages could have been added but at the cost of under-representing the type of general appeal to the nation found only in the inaugural. Although three speeches from each president seem at first glance too few for this argument to hold, it will be seen, in the second place, that the nature of the units of analysis is such as to offer a universe of considerable magnitude without going beyond these singularly important sources.

The first category chosen for the analysis, of the "what is said" or substance type,[8] is the *political appeal*, which is utilized to classify the subject matter of the different political arguments, proofs, or themes offered by the presidents. For this category the thematic paragraph is the recording unit—"the smallest body of content in which the appearance of a reference is counted"—and the paragraph is the context unit—"the largest body of content that may be examined in characterizing a recording unit."[9]

A second category is the *demand symbol*, which is considered in terms of its direction as well as its substance; for this category the single word or term is the recording unit and the paragraph the context unit. Adopting Harold Lasswell's definition, demand symbols are taken to be the "meaning events" in a medium of communication which "refer to objects of preference or determination, or are utilized in expressing preference or determination."[10] The meaning events thus excluded are *identification* symbols, which are here defined as neutral references to persons or groups, *e.g.*, "we Americans," or "Russia," and *acceptance* symbols, which "are objects of reference in acceptance statements, or are utilized in making the reference," *i.e.*, those which reflect "matter-of-fact assumptions about the shape of events in the past, present, and future."[11]

---

[8] For the types of categories employed, and on content analysis in general, see Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1952).

[9] Harold D. Lasswell, *Analyzing the Content of Mass Communication: A Brief Introduction* (Washington, 1942), p. 16.

[10] "Describing the Contents of Communications," in *Propaganda, Communications, and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide*, ed. Bruce L. Smith, Harold D. Lasswell, and Ralph D. Casey (Princeton, 1946), p. 85.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 82.

Operating with these definitions, the same word or expression may, of course, be counted differently in different contexts. As Lasswell puts its, " . . . when 'national unity' or 'social security' are objects of preference or determination, they count as demand symbols; when only acceptance statements are made about them, they are acceptance symbols."[12] Demand symbols alone are considered in this study because the hypothesis focuses attention on attitudes rather than cognition.

Although analysis in terms of these two categories should suffice for the examination of the hypothesis, a third category has been added to help account for the influence of changes in world conditions on the political appeals and symbols employed. This is a simple category for the classification of subject matter in terms of its international or domestic orientation; the paragraph serves as both the recording and context unit.

The procedures followed will be more completely reported in the presentation of the findings, but the question of validity and the procedures for testing reliability should be noted here as a final methodological problem. The demand symbols and international-domestic subject matter categories appear to offer little difficulty on the score of validity. They present the simple problem of counting the occurrence of symbols (and their synonyms) and of paragraphs devoted to international or domestic subject matter. In such cases, "there is no doubt about the validity of the analysis," according to Bernard Berelson. "The instrument measures what it is intended to measure. . . . In other words, in cases in which there is high agreement on the definitions of the relevant categories, there is little difficulty in achieving validity in content analysis."[13] In the identification of political appeals, however, the clarity of the basic definitions may not be so great and the problem of validity less easily dismissed. Although the attempt will be made to define the political appeals precisely, the validity of this category evidently depends on the clarity of these definitions.

For the problem of reliability, generally recognized checks are available. Two kinds of consistency are held necessary to establish the reliability of analysis of communication content: "1) consistency among analysts—that is, different coders should produce the same results when they apply the same set of categories to the same content; and 2) consistency through time—that is, a single coder or a group of coders should produce the same results when they apply the same set of categories to the same content but at different times."[14] In practice, such checks are reported in only one out of every five or six studies and most of these have been applied to relatively simple types of content analysis. "The reliability of a list of symbols," Berelson submits, "may be high, but the reliability of a complex . . . analysis is another matter."[15]

With this caveat in mind, the author repeated his coding of political appeals after an interval of several months, and induced a colleague to apply this same category to a readily available portion of the content. The author also repeated his analysis in terms of demand symbols, but because of the extremely high degree of reliability found, abandoned it half way along. Since the international-domestic subject matter category is the simplest of all (and not central to the hypothesis), its reliability was not checked.

---

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[13] Berelson, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

III. FINDINGS

The coding of political appeals was from a universe of 814 paragraphs, of which 648 were thematic and 166 unclassifiable, either because they contained more than one political appeal or because they contained none.[16] Since this study centers on the major appeals of the presidents, in each case the six themes appearing most frequently have been selected. These leading appeals total 496 and represent 77% of all the thematic paragraphs.

The interpretation of Table I is reserved for the concluding section, but the

TABLE I. LEADING POLITICAL APPEALS OF FOUR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR INCIDENCE AS THEMATIC PARAGRAPHS IN TWO CODINGS OF THREE MAJOR ADDRESSES

President	Political Appeal	First Coding	Second Coding
Hoover	Government Aid	44	41
	Economy, Efficiency	25	24
	Bright Realities	21	20
	Peace	17	17
	Law Enforcement	16	13
	Community Cooperation	14	9
Roosevelt	Government Aid	19	19
	Government Regulation	18	13
	Progress	18	15
	Class	7	7
	Economic Unity	5	8
	Social Optimism	5	4
Truman	Peace	63	55
	Government Aids	32	33
	Dark Realities	27	26
	Party	23	24
	Government Regulation	19	18
	Class	13	13
Eisenhower	Peace	23	22
	Party	22	19
	National Power	18	19
	Economy, Efficiency	16	12
	Government Aid	16	15
	Dark Realities	15	9

---

[16] The respective number of thematic and non-thematic paragraphs for each president were: Hoover, 176, 62; Roosevelt, 96, 26; Truman, 205, 19; Eisenhower, 171, 59.

indicators used in coding these categories need definition here. Most of the fourteen categories in the table are, it is hoped, virtually self-explanatory; they are used here with the following meanings:

Government Aid: appeals to the wisdom or necessity of government intervention in the economy designed to promote the interests of special or general groups.
Economy, Efficiency: arguments in favor of reducing government expenses or increasing government efficiency by such devices as administrative reorganization.
Bright Realities: references to conditions regarded as highly desirable and gratifying to Americans in general, *e.g.*, a high general level of prosperity, mass satisfaction with the contemporary state of affairs.
Peace: communications stressing the importance of achieving or sustaining a condition of peace among nations; included in this category are arguments in favor of such means to peace as United States leadership in world affairs and mechanisms of international cooperation.
Law Enforcement: appeals to the public to respect the law and promises to lead in its enforcement with impartiality and vigor.
Community Cooperation: praise of existing cooperation both within private groups and between such groups and the government and assurances of its encouragement as a device of "self-government" free from "governmental restraints."
Government Regulation: arguments stressing the wisdom or necessity of government intervention in the economy designed to regulate the behavior of special groups in the general interest.
Progress: references to progress as a viable ideal, as evidenced either by improvements in process of being made or foreseeable in the future.
Class: appeals to differences of interest between different classes, specifically between "ordinary citizens" and the "privileged few."
Economic Unity: the contention that domestic groups are economically interdependent to such an extent that no one group can prosper alone.
Social Optimism: the theme that man's difficulties result not from his own deficiencies but from impersonal forces that he is competent to alter.
Dark Realities: references to conditions regarded as highly undesirable and as deprivations by Americans in general, *e.g.*, threats of military aggression.
Party: praise of one's own political party or condemnation of the opposing party.
National Power: arguments stressing the importance of maximizing the military and economic strength of the United States.

These same categories were applied to the same materials at a later date, and chi square values were computed as a measure of reliability. Examination of Table I for the differences in the incidence of thematic paragraphs with the six leading political appeals of the four presidents in the first and second codings

TABLE II. INCIDENCE OF SIX POLITICAL APPEALS OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AS RECORDED BY TWO CODERS OF THE SAME MATERIALS

Political Appeal	First Coder	Second Coder
Government Aid	19	21
Government Regulation	18	16
Progress	18	16
Class	7	7
Economic Unity	5	5
Social Optimism	5	9

TABLE III. LEADING DEMAND SYMBOLS OF FOUR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR INCIDENCE IN THREE MAJOR ADDRESSES*

President	Symbols	Frequency
Hoover	Law	35
	Peace	28
	Opportunity	23
	Progress	21
	Fundamental Principles	19
	Cooperation	16
	Tariff	16
	Prosperity	15
	–Crime	14
	Freedom	10
Roosevelt	Employment	22
	Action	15
	–Profit	12
	–Surpluses	12
	Economic Security	10
	–Money Changers	9
	Progress	9
	Candor	8
	–Traditions	8
	Planning	7
Truman	Peace	21
	Freedom	19
	Prosperity	17
	Equality	13
	–Privileged Few	12
	Economic Security	11
	Ordinary People	11
	Democracy	9
	–Republican Party	9
	–Communism	8
Eisenhower	Freedom	41
	Power	25
	Faith	21
	Peace	16
	National Security	14
	–Controls	11
	God	11
	Initiative	11
	Productivity	11
	–Aggression	10

* Negative symbols are designated by a minus sign preceding the symbol; all other symbols are positive.

reveals a relatively high degree of reliability in each case. Some confidence that the differences are not derived from consistent errors on the part of the author appears warranted, moreover, by the results reported in Table II. The errors of the second coder[17] tend to be of no greater magnitude than those of the author. The chi square value in this case is 1.4, the same as that obtained from the author's codings of the Roosevelt materials.

The coding of demand symbols, with the single word or term as the recording unit, was from a universe of 49,755 words, with a total of 1,541 symbols.[18] In the interest of focusing on major emphases, the ten symbols appearing most frequently in the materials from each president have been selected. These symbols and their incidence are reported in Table III.

The second coding of demand symbols, applied only to the Roosevelt and Eisenhower materials, manifests the high level of reliability that is expected for such a clear-cut category. The chi square values computed from it are, for the Roosevelt content, 0.1, and for the Eisenhower content, 0.9. The probability that values this large would occur from chance variation alone is greater than .99 in both cases.

The international-domestic subject matter findings summarized in Table IV

TABLE IV. INTERNATIONAL-DOMESTIC SUBJECT MATTER BY PARAGRAPH INCIDENCE IN THREE MAJOR ADDRESSES OF FOUR PRESIDENTS

Subject Matter	Hoover		Roosevelt		Truman		Eisenhower	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
International	31	13	5	4	78	35	85	37
Domestic	182	76	109	89	127	56	108	47
Unclassifiable	25	11	8	7	19	9	37	16
Total	238	100	122	100	224	100	230	100

---

[17] The author is indebted to Penrose B. Jackson for his willingness to serve as second coder.

[18]

DEMAND SYMBOLS DATA FROM PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

President	Total No. of Words	Total No. of Symbols	Percent of Symbolism*	Incidence of Ten Leading Symbols	Degree of Concentration of Symbols**
Hoover	22,581	540	2.4%	197	36%
Roosevelt	8,499	281	3.3%	112	40%
Truman	8,226	382	4.6%	130	34%
Eisenhower	10,449	338	3.2%	171	51%
Total or Mean	49,755	1,541	3.4%	610	40%

* This figure is obtained by dividing column 2 by column 1.

** This figure is obtained by dividing column 4 by column 2.

are recorded on the same paragraph basis that was employed in the political appeals category.

IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of the findings on political appeals shows that the peculiar themes of the New Deal—the only two not characteristic of Hoover but common to Roosevelt and Truman—were arguments stressing the necessity of government regulation and the existence of class distinctions. Roosevelt's appeals to progress, economic unity, and social optimism dropped from prominence in the Truman content with the substitution of an international military crisis for the former domestic economic crisis. The reflection of this situational change is found not only in the tremendous increase in the amount of attention devoted to international problems, but also in the emergence of peace as the leading appeal of Truman.

The crucial problem for the first part of our hypothesis—that acceptance of the New Deal will be evinced by the failure of conservative political leadership to reject its basic political appeals—is the relationship of Eisenhower's appeals to those of Roosevelt and Truman. Neither government regulation nor class appears as a leading Eisenhower appeal. Indeed, the only themes not stressed by Hoover which Eisenhower has in common with a New Deal president are two appeals that he shares with Truman, dark realities and party. The focus on international problems in both cases as the dark realities and the fact that party appeals are not identified with the New Deal eliminate these similarities as supports for the hypothesis.

If the second part of the hypothesis be valid, however—that conservative acceptance of the New Deal is occurring only reluctantly, with a retention of earlier styles of symbols—frequent positive emphasis of New Deal appeals is hardly to be expected from Eisenhower. And there is one important difference between the appeals of Hoover and Eisenhower relevant to New Deal influences. Hoover's appeal to community cooperation, which strongly emphasizes the non-regulatory role of government, disappears from the arguments of Eisenhower no less than from those of Roosevelt and Truman. The fact that positive rejection of this central feature of the New Deal was a leading pre-Roosevelt conservative appeal but disappears from the prominent themes of Eisenhower lends some support to the hypothesis. That Eisenhower failed to repudiate the New Deal appeals, especially when they had been embodied in law, would by itself be only a weak support for the hypothesis. But when this is coupled with Hoover's recurrent attacks on such arguments, it does appear to confirm the postulate that the basic tenets of the New Deal can no longer be frontally attacked by the top conservative political leadership.

The quality of the change represented by this quantitatively established difference may be given greater meaning by a pair of quotations. "The larger purpose of our economic thought should be to establish more firmly stability and security of business and employment and thereby remove poverty still further from our borders," Hoover submits. "Our people have in recent years developed a new-found capacity for cooperation among themselves to effect high purposes in public welfare. It is an advance toward the highest conception of self-government. Self-government does not and should not imply the use of political agencies alone. Progress is born of cooperation in the community—not from governmental restraints."[19] Eisenhower's route to the same end sounds somewhat different: "This administration is profoundly aware of two great needs born of our living in a complex industrial economy. First, the individual citizen must have safeguards against personal disaster inflicted by forces beyond his control; second, the welfare of the people demands effective and economical performance by the Government of certain indispensable social services."[20] This "profound awareness" on the part of a Republican president of great needs demanding government intervention may, in terms of this analysis, be regarded as a progeny of the New Deal.

Whatever the basis of analysis, the findings on demand symbols serve to align the presidents into two contrasting pairs—the symbols of Roosevelt and Truman being clearly differentiated in every examination from those of Hoover and Eisenhower.[21] This is, of course, exactly in keeping with what one would expect from the hypothesis.

Considering first the relative emphasis on negative as opposed to positive symbols, one finds the presidents ranked in descending order of "negative symbolism" as follows: Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Hoover. Four of Roosevelt's leading ten symbols (profit, surpluses, money changers, and traditions) and three of Truman's (privileged few, Republican Party, and Communism) are negative, as compared with two for Eisenhower (controls and aggression) and one for Hoover (crime). The more frequently critical attitude of the New Deal presidents appears to be a function of their liberalism; the more nearly exclusive use of positive symbols by Hoover and Eisenhower logically appears, contrariwise, to be a product of their conservatism. This interpretation is, of course, an inference rather suggested than demanded by the content. What has been demonstrated is covariation between party identification and direction of symbolism, and this supports the hypothesis.

When classed in terms of generality versus specificity, the demand symbols of Hoover and Eisenhower are again differentiated from those of Roosevelt and Truman. Nine of the ten leading symbols of both Hoover and Eisenhower are highly generalized (the respective exceptions being tariff and a negative symbol, controls), but this is true of only three of Roosevelt's (progress, candor, and a negative symbol, traditions) and five of Truman's (peace, freedom, prosperity, democracy, and a negative symbol, Communism). The symbolism of both Republican presidents, we conclude, characteristically manifests a much higher level of generality than that of the two Democrats.

---

[19] "Inaugural Address," in *Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States: From George Washington 1789 to Harry S. Truman 1949*, House Document No. 540, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 215–24.

[20] "The State of the Union—Address by the President of the United States," *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, pp. 748–53 (February 2, 1953).

[21] Two themes specially stressed by Hoover, cooperation and law enforcement, may be partly attributed to factors only tangential to a liberal-conservative alignment: his Quaker background and his concern for prohibition enforcement.

Examination in terms of status quo versus reformist orientation shows similarly striking results. Eight of Roosevelt's leading symbols (employment, action, economic security, planning, and four negative symbols, profit, surpluses, money changers, traditions) and five of Truman's (equality, ordinary people, economic security, and two negative symbols, privileged few and Republican Party) carry reformist connotations. This can be said of none of those emphasized by Hoover or Eisenhower. Equally extreme is the contrast found in the fact that none of the leading symbols of Roosevelt or Truman carry implications of dedication to the status quo, as compared with five for Hoover (law, fundamental principles, opportunity, cooperation, and tariff) and four for Eisenhower (faith, initiative, productivity, and a negative symbol, controls). Again the presidents place themselves squarely in opposed camps in terms of a New Deal-conservative dichotomy.

The generality-specificity and the status quo-reformist classifications might be subsumed under a more general distinction labelled middle class versus working class symbolism. So combined, they leave Hoover and Eisenhower with ten middle class symbols each, and Roosevelt and Truman with two and five, respectively.[22] Other bases of classification might well be devised to order the data on symbols, but the consistency of the results already presented suggests, that, whatever the basis of analysis, Hoover and Eisenhower will be found together in a classification opposed to that of Roosevelt and Truman.

It may be noted that in every case, within their common classifications, Roosevelt occupies a more extreme position than Truman and, in the other direction, Hoover a more extreme position than Eisenhower, whenever the two are not identical. One might conclude from this, first, that increasing international responsibilities and general acceptance of the New Deal have decreased the frequency of New Deal-style symbols and, second, that Eisenhower is not so extremely different from the Democratic presidents in symbol style as Hoover. This is submitted as a tentative hypothesis for further investigation.

On the basis of the analysis of both the political appeal and the demand symbol categories, we conclude that both facets of the hypothesis have been validated. As judged by analysis of the leading policy pronouncements of Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower immediately before, during, and after their assumption of office, it may be held: (1) that the chief post-New Deal political spokesman for the conservative point of view, in contrast to his pre-New Deal counterpart, failed to reject the basic political appeals of the New Deal; and (2) that the reluctance with which this shift was made is reflected in a retention of symbols of pre-New Deal style. It is hardly necessary to add that this conclusion, like the data from which it emerges, is strictly limited to verbal behavior on the part of conservative leadership. The fact that the essential features of the New Deal can no longer be frontally assaulted by a Republican president does not preclude the possibility of such flank attacks as budgetary reductions for New Deal agencies or the vesting of administrative responsibility for New Deal functions in opponents of the programs.

---

[22] The middle class symbols for Roosevelt are progress and candor, for Truman peace, freedom, prosperity, democracy, and a negative symbol, Communism.

Going beyond the limited data of this study, it may be added that this verbal reformation of conservative political leadership appears highly similar to the post-Jacksonian change in conservative pronouncements that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., describes as "The Whig Counterreformation."[23] Frank rejections of such Jacksonian dogmas as the right of every adult white male to vote disappeared once these people were granted the suffrage, just as Hoover's frequent denunication of government regulation in the mass interest has disappeared from prominence in Eisenhower's verbalization. Moving even farther from our data, it may be asked if the fate of the Jacksonian symbols may hold a portent for the future. Robert McCloskey has ably explained the fashion in which these slogans were drained of their original implications and imbued with conservative connotations.[24] Should the parallel be maintained, one may speculate that there will eventually be a conservative adoption of New Deal symbols accompanied by a transformation of their meaning.

This possibility is given a certain immediacy by Clinton Rossiter's recent exhortation to conservatives that they " . . . should give us a definition of liberty that is positive and all-embracing, not negative and narrow. In the new conservative dictionary, *liberty* will be defined with the help of words like *opportunity, creativity, productivity,* and *security.*"[25] If such New Deal symbols as "security" become the property of conservatives in their attempt to adjust to the loss of appeal of Hoover-style symbols, will the "new conservative dictionary" still give them their New Deal meanings? One might assume that the new usage of security would suggest the type of "Welfare Capitalism" urged by *Fortune* magazine[26] rather than the "Welfare State." If the academic "New Conservative" can make himself heard in political circles, it may be possible to reformulate these conjectures as testable hypotheses in the relatively near future. It is probably not an accident that some Republicans have taken to describing their views as "Jeffersonian."

V. CONCLUDING NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Although the possibilities and limitations of content analysis have long been familiar in the social sciences, its novelty in normative political theory, the one field of political science where it is perhaps most appropriate, warrants appending a methodological note to the substantive conclusions and speculations presented above. In the first place, Bernard Berelson's insistence on the crucial character of the categories in content analysis may be underlined: "Content analysis stands or falls by its categories," he warns. "Particular studies have been productive to the extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted to the problem and to the content. . . . Although competent performance in other parts of the analytic process is also necessary, the formulation and the definition of appropriate categories take on central importance. Since the categories contain the substance of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than its system of categories."[27] Had either demand symbols or political appeals been used alone in this study, an incorrect or incomplete conclusion would necessarily have emerged. Analysis of demand symbols by themselves would have incorrectly suggested that no verbal changes of significance had taken place; use of political appeals alone would have revealed the nature of the shift, but without detecting its incomplete or reluctant character.

---

[23] *The Age of Jackson* (Boston, 1947), pp. 267–82.

[24] *American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951).

[25] "Toward an American Conservatism," *loc. cit.*, p. 361. Emphasis his.

[26] See Davenport, *op. cit.*

Berelson's warning applies equally to definitions within a single broad category. At the outset, it was planned in this analysis to use "government intervention" as a category to comprise all thematic paragraphs arguing the necessity of an active government role in the economy. Had this category not been divided, there would have been no distinction between government aid and government regulation in the coding, which would have made it difficult not only to see any clear difference between Hoover and his New Deal successors but also to understand his non-interventionist theme of community cooperation. On the negative side, it is now clear that the government aid category should have been differentiated still further. The promotional measures recommended by Hoover were almost exclusively devoted to such general or business-oriented programs as river and highway development, waterpower projects, conservation, airline and shipping subsidies, business research services, and tariff increases. "The government," he frankly declared, "can be of invaluable aid in the promotion of business."[28] For Eisenhower no less than Roosevelt and Truman, these promotional themes tend to be replaced or overshadowed by appeals to promotion of the economic needs of the great majority. Without categories designed to reveal it, however, this important distinction can be presented only as an impression, not as a conclusion.

More generally, it may be said that the anticipated advantage of arriving at conclusions with a measure of confidence and some assurance of objectivity and reliability appears to have been realized. The hypothesis validated in this study might have been advanced and more engagingly argued as a pre-determined conclusion with the "proof" selected by the not-so-random method of searching for supporting data. In this case, however, the area of agreement could be expected to extend no further than to those who (on the basis of their own impressionistic observations) agree with the thesis or who are overwhelmed by the literary quality of the presentation. With such positive, if modest, advantages available, it is difficult to understand the intolerant spirit in which people classified as political scientists can reject the scientific method in toto, as in cavalier references to "the all too typical methodological perfections and political irrelevancies that crown the scientific study of politics."[29] As applied even to such a garden-variety scientific method as content analysis, such a comment is doubly inaccurate: content analysis could appear as "methodological perfection" only in contrast to the most primitive method; it has no more inherent tendency to issue in "political irrelevancies" than the impressionistic methods. The method of content analysis is certainly not appropriate for many basic problems of political theory, but for the limited sort of problem considered here it does seem to offer some possibility of the greater precision which makes for cumulative research efforts.

---

[27] Berelson, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[28] "Address of Acceptance," in *The New Day Campaign Speeches of Herbert Hoover, 1928* (Stanford University, 1928), pp. 9–44.

The data of this study are not in conformity, for example, with what one would expect from William Carleton's contention that there has been a post-New Deal "Triumph of the Moderates."[30] Since the evidence in support of his argument was submitted with no explanation of the rationale behind its collection, however, the contrasting conclusions are difficult to compare. In terms of the materials examined here, it would appear to be correct to speak of a triumph of the moderates only with the important qualification that there has been a general shift to the left. The "conservative" Eisenhower would have sounded "liberal" in 1932; at the highest level of leadership a verbal revolution has taken place in American conservatism.

---

[29] Bernard Crick, "The Strange Quest for an American Conservatism," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 17, pp. 359–60 (July 1955). The gratuitous character of this remark, in an article re-labelling most of our professed "New Conservatives" as liberals, suggests the interesting possibility that methodological and political conservatism may be positively correlated. This condition might, indeed, be logically expected from persons at either extreme of the ideological spectrum since they would presumably be committed to politics as a vehicle for the realization of their values rather than as a subject for objective analysis. To argue that no political science is possible is a perfect rationalization for the pursuit of artistic polemics rather than scientific inquiry.

[30] William G. Carleton, "The Triumph of the Moderates," *Harper's*, Vol. 210, pp. 31–37 (April 1955).

COMMENTARY ON PROTHRO'S CONTENT ANALYSIS

HOWARD B. WHITE
New School for Social Research

James W. Prothro's hypothesis is that, while there has been a resurgence of "conservatism" in American political theory and practice, the actual intervention of the New Deal between the conservative government of Hoover and the conservative government of Eisenhower makes the complete rejection of New Deal appeals by a conservative administration difficult, if not impossible. There can be little quarrel with that thesis itself. Once given the assumptions that "conservatism" is an adequate frame of reference, that Hoover and Eisenhower may in some understandable way be classed as "conservatives," and that, since the administration did in fact reluctantly accept certain New Deal symbols, they were necessarily obliged to do so, there is some question as to whether the thesis is not obvious. Prothro, however, gives serious reasons for buttressing "impressions" with precision, and presents a careful content analysis which strengthens his argument and should serve to enhance our understanding of current political trends.

His presentation, however, raises at least three meaningful questions: whether "conservatism" is an adequate frame of reference for the discussion of political ideas, whether content analysis is a sound method for distinguishing political ideas, and whether, and under what conditions, it is useful to give scientific precision to "impressions." In exploring these questions I do not propose to pick a quarrel with Prothro. Differences will come out in the discussion, but the larger problems relate to the general study of political theory, and the exploration may at times take me far from the specific questions raised in Prothro's scholarly paper. I fully sympathize with the author's impatience with those who reject the scientific method on purely aesthetic grounds. By all means let us seek precision, as far as that can be had, on all levels of investigation.

I.

The question whether "conservatism" is a suitable frame of reference for the study of what Prothro calls "normative political theory" takes us far beyond any single application of that frame. He himself says that the "resurgence of conservatism may be described as the most significant post-war development in American thought." (p. 726) Whether this is in fact so is not the same question as whether it is a suitable frame of reference, but the answer to the second question is clearly and radically affected by the answer to the first. Prothro himself, it seems to me, rests his case not simply on the "meaningfulness" of the content but also on the meaningfulness of the frame of reference. I, however, do not think that the "resurgence of conservatism" is "the most significant post-war development in American thought." I even suspect that, by definition, it cannot be. Prothro makes a distinction between the academic "New Conservatives," who may possibly "be dismissed" and the business leaders who seem to him to be "selling a conservatism" . . . "more closely related to the realities of the

American social situation." I do not think, however, that significance in political thought can be measured by the role a group of men play in a particular administration, particularly if we can accept the judgment of James Reston that this administration "is not one of originators and thinkers."[1] The significance of any body of thought cannot rest solely on the political position or the number of its adherents, particularly when measured over a very few years, but on whether or not they are right; or at least on the claim they make to inquire into the most important political questions. Since some at least of the proponents of the "New Conservatism" associate that with "aristocracy" and the "aristocratic spirit," the democratic standard of numbers could not, on their own terms, indicate their significance.[2] Indeed, Clinton Rossiter says that the most important "element in the Conservative mood is the aristocratic spirit" and adds that the Conservative "is moved almost to tears by *noblesse oblige*." If so, the interpretation of Samuel Lubell that the nation is "struggling to give effective voice and force to (its) conservatism"[3] is largely irrelevant. When a successful political movement in modern America is brought to power by a voting population that is moved almost to tears by *noblesse oblige*, we shall have radically to revise our analyses of voting behavior.

It is to those whom Prothro calls the academic "new Conservatives" that we must look for the significance of conservatism in post-war American thought and as a frame of reference. Obviously no thorough examination of neo-conservative arguments can be conducted here. It must suffice to say that some of those who made this contribution to American political thought have consciously and deliberately limited its philosophic significance, as they are, I believe, obliged to do. If, as Rossiter claims, the first part of the Conservative's mission is the defense of the established order, its defense must take precedence over its understanding.[4] Rossiter does not, I believe, mean that he would defend any established order regardless of its injustices. Generally Rossiter and other New Conservatives seem to restrict conservatism to a particular period of history (roughly since Burke) and to a particular framework of constitution (roughly liberal constitutional government).[5] But the very defense of just this order assumes a superiority which non-loyal, philosophical inquiry cannot assume. Neo-conservatism, I think, assumes a starting point where philosophical speculation (and therefore "significant political thought") may conceivably end but cannot begin. It happens that many conservatives share in the search for natural right, but, insofar as they are genuinely conservative, they must be ready, for all or for most practical purposes, to accept the old as the good. I do not say that there is anything wrong politically with such an acceptance. It is, however, fundamentally unspeculative, as Rossiter grants,[6] and it is therefore fundamentally unphilosophical, even anti-philosophical.

---

[1] *New York Times*, August 3, 1956, p. 7.

[2] Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago, 1953); pp. 9–10, 54 ff.; Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York, 1956), pp. 50–51, 166–68, and *passim;* Rossiter, "Toward an American Conservatism" in 44 *Yale Review* (Spring 1955), especially p. 362, in which the "bold conservative thinker" must try "describing the process through which plutocracy may become aristocracy." Rossiter understands that that is no easy task.

[3] *Conservatism in America*, p. 50; Lubell: *Revolt of the Moderates* (New York 1956), pp. 3–4.

[4] *Op. cit.* 52.

[5] Rossiter, *op. cit.*, pp. 10, 16; *Yale Review*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 356–7; Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff., 423; Peter Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited* (New York 1949), also stresses the modern historical period, while paying tribute to pre-modern roots.

What the New Conservatives have taken from Burke, whom they so resolutely admire, is less the Burkean debt to Aristotle than the Burkean departure from Aristotle: the tendency to abhor dangerous speculation rather than to present it in a prudent setting, and to substitute a conventional aristocracy for the natural, non-conventional aristocracy of the classics. Burke's natural aristocracy is, I think, almost the opposite of Aristotle's.[7] I make the comparison not to pre-judge the case in favor of Aristotle but to suggest a certain relation between philosophy and history.

Conservatism cannot be, I think, a sufficient frame of reference for "normative political theory" because it is fundamentally historical rather than philosophical. That does not deny that it may be very sound politics, at least at times. Nowhere is that clearer than in the treatment, in some of the works of New Conservatives, of the role of religion in western society. They hold religion, particularly Christianity, as an essentially conservative force. Yet that very fact suggests that they may be, as Viereck says of Metternich, "less concerned with the supernatural aspects of Catholicism than with its function as a political and cultural stabilizer." I do not mean that the canon of Conservative thought "that a Divine Intent rules society as well as conscience" is held merely because the churches are buttresses of tradition, an assumption sometimes questionable. I certainly do not mean to question the depth and earnestness of their convictions. My point is simply that the doctrine which sees religion as a part of history is perfectly compatible with Burke's description of religion as a "prejudice."[8] When Rossiter says that the Conservative might be happier under an established church, but honors "his nation's traditional solution to the problem of church and state," he says what may well be common sense, but his method of analysis and the focus of his interest are fundamentally different from those of the old theologians. They could not have looked upon religion in this way, any more than old sceptics could have been content with the assertion of Kirk that "men who will not acknowledge the author of their being have no sanction for truth."[9] The most significant movements of thought, religious or sceptical, are built on inquiry, not on tradition.

---

[6] Rossiter, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 231; Kirk, *op. cit.*, opening; cf. Viereck, *op. cit.*, p. 6, where he speaks of the "nostalgia for the permanent beneath the flux." Nostalgia is not search. Note also Reston's article cited above.

[7] On the importance of Burke see Kirk, *passim*, esp. Ch. 2; Viereck, 83 ff.; Rossiter, pp. 16, 44; when Kirk speaks of the aristocracy "inextricably interwoven with the fabric of every civilized society," he refers (p. 55) to Burke, who describes a "class of legitimate presumptions, which, taken as generalities, must be admitted as actual truths." *Appeal, Works* (Boston 1866), Vol. IV, pp. 174–5. In Aristotle, the very comparison of aristocracy and oligarchy would suggest the contrary.

[8] Viereck, *op. cit.*, p. 26; Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 7; also Kirk, *Academic Freedom* (Chicago 1955), pp. 30–1; Francis Graham Wilson, *The Case for Conservatism* (Seattle, 1951), pp. 61–2.

I do not say these things because I have violent objections to established churches, or because I believe that everything the New Conservatives say is wrong. I do not. I say it because I am alarmed, lest, once we get rid of "progress" or "relativism" as a frame of reference for political thought, we should substitute "tradition," a frame almost as tenuous. My agreement or disagreement with the immediate aims of these writers (not all of whose aims are identical) is irrelevant. What is relevant, what is very much at stake, is the direction political thought is to take. Let me examine what I think is the most far-reaching statement in Prothro's paper: that "normative political theory" is "the one field of political science where (content analysis) is perhaps most appropriate." (p. 737) If that means that we may use content analysis to understand political philosophies which have sought a norm for political life, we certainly may, and generations of scholars have done so. If it means, as I think Prothro intends, that we may establish political theories which develop such norms by studying the writings of those who make political pronouncements, regardless of their penetration or judgment, to see a trend, regardless of its seriousness, the establishment of such theories and norms will be largely accidental. No serious scholar would waste his time trying to understand Hegel, for example, merely to find out whether or not Hegel is a "conservative." The effort required to study Hegel is such that it is useless to undertake it, unless we have good reason to believe that we may find something that will help us in our political search. If it is merely to label Hegel, why bother?

Of course there are certain differences in the speeches of public men. It is strange that in studying the political thought of this country, we study public men to a surprising degree, whereas historians of western political thought generally study primarily political philosophers. Is it because we have so many prudent statesmen, or because we have so few political philosophers? It does not vitiate the value of studying one's ancestors to say that, if the trend to conservatism means that we shall have more biographies of Adams and fewer of Jefferson that result will not help us to solve our political problems, at least not radically. What the study of trends in popular appeal means is brought out by Prothro when he sees the possibility that if the "academic New Conservative" can get a political hearing, conjectures regarding new symbols and the "new conservative dictionary" may be reformulated as testable hypotheses. Such a function, however, differs but little from salesmanship. It involves the discovery of principles by a government, as Gordon Harrison urges, "*justifying its present action* and defining its future intent." (italics mine)[10] It is indeed possible that that is being done, though perhaps not in the manner indicated. Prothro's Table III shows that "God" figures as a demand symbol only in the speeches of Eisenhower. Is that "conservatism"? Is it anxiety? Is it a new trend in public opinion? Is it a new trend in speech-writing? Is it a deeper personal conviction than those of Eisenhower's predecessors? It certainly might be adopted by a conservative administration, if it is true that religion is a bulwark of conservatism.

---

[9] Rossiter, *op. cit.*, p. 44; Kirk, *Academic Freedom*, p. 31.

[10] *Road to the Right* (1954), p. 6.

It is true, I think, that there is a tension in "conservative" thought between one's own old, and the best, or the oldest, or the most lasting old, as conservative writers recognize.[11] Insofar, however, as conservatism is wedded to tradition, it hardly needs a conceptual frame. It might inquire whether current doctrines of "religious establishment" or the New Deal are prescriptive rather than whether they are right. Why should a conservative, if conservatives pride themselves on the relative unimportance of speculation, level vigorous attacks on New Deal agencies, if those agencies have become prescriptive? Subversion might be accepted, but even subversion would have to be, in conservative language, "with the materials at hand." Prothro's hypothesis should therefore not only be one that conservatives could accept, but also one that is, I suspect, implicit in their doctrine. It may or may not be true that, as Thoreau implied, a tradition loses every moment some of its integrity.[12] It is certainly true that it loses some of its radicalism, and makes an appeal for the attachment of the conservative, which grows with longevity. In effect, what Prothro is saying is that the New Deal has, as he suggests, become a part of history, and history is, to Clinton Rossiter, the "Creator of all the Conservative holds dear." (including God?)[13] Again we are faced with the problem of whether that which, by definition, takes its bearings by the sweep of events, can furnish a frame of reference for the interpretation of those events. It seems to me to follow that it cannot, and this is not at all to say that "the conservatives" cannot, but only that conservatism cannot. Granting, however, that conservative thought cannot be the "most significant thought," it may still furnish us with useful categories and a useful interpretation for specific purposes; a question which leads to the problem of content analysis.

II.

Let me again eschew any aesthetic objections to content analysis, which seems to me a very fruitful method for answering certain rather circumscribed questions, which is exactly what I understand Prothro to say. A basic assumption of content analysis is, however, according to Bernard Berelson, that "inferences about the relationship between intent and content . . . can validly be made."[14] These inferences can be made, however, only if the precise character of that relation can be accurately described, or, at least suggested. I do not mean that we have to insist on "sincerity." Propaganda analysts certainly investigate the planned lie. My problem is whether speakers say what they want to say, and it seems to me that there are reasons why they might not. Among these, and I do not claim them as definitive, are urgency, ignorance, and prudence. Though these factors do not necessarily relate to Prothro's hypothesis, their relation to the content he analyzes is by no means far-fetched. He fully recognizes the problem of urgency, and points to the enormous increase in international items, in Table V. We could perhaps expand that. Herbert Hoover's personal commitment to prohibition and his dismay at the experience with the Eighteenth Amendment may have led him into stressing law enforcement, while at another time he might have stressed food relief. Let me add that I have not checked any findings; I am depending purely on impressions. It is interesting to me, however, that while "class appeals" (Table I), stand higher in rank in Roosevelt than in Truman, they are fewer in number. I wonder whether that would have been true if the Roosevelt of 1936 had been analyzed. I wonder to what extent class appeals may have been a form of counter-attack, which is itself a kind of urgency. There is no need to dwell on it, because, while urgency may be complex, implying the urgency of the issues, of public opinion, of party pressure, and so on, it is none the less strong.

---

[11] Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 25; Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 428 ff.; Rossiter, *Yale Review*, *loc. cit.*, p. 356; Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 314, etc.

[12] *Civil Disobedience*, in *Works*, Canby ed. (Boston, 1937), pp. 789–90.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

[14] Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1952), p. 18.

Much more complicated is the problem of ignorance. Theoretically a president may, especially in our time, know nothing of the difficult problems confronting his administration, and rely altogether on advisers, including speech-writers. Or he may know exactly where he stands on all major issues, and require only to be briefed by intelligent subordinates, who know what he wants to achieve and faithfully present the facts to him. State-of-the-Union messages are notoriously written for the President mainly by the several departments and agencies, in the form of paragraphs submitted to him for inclusion. Surely the content analyst would find it useful to know something of the knowledge or ignorance of a president. Yet the problem is not even so simple as that. Obviously, what a president may learn, he may not know at the moment of his acceptance speech. Prothro, in testing his hypothesis, concentrates on the incoming and relatively unknowing presidents. By analyzing the "first acceptance speeches, inaugural addresses, and state of the union messages", for very good reasons, he none the less precludes any analysis in terms of the lessons of experience. That you can study "conservativism" or the antithesis in terms of what a man was just before and just after he became president, almost presupposes an inability to learn. The acceptance speech is, moreover, a very special case, though it is one-third of the sample. What Franklin Roosevelt did to the acceptance speech when he flew to the convention in 1932 is well-known. It was the despair of those political scientists who, like Sait, regarded that speech, in Blaine's formulation as "the legitimate creed of the party." Whatever else it portended, it certainly put the dark horse at a disadvantage. Stevenson in 1952 was reported to have been working rather furiously on his acceptance speech, while his advisers asked him to be at the door of the convention, so that he might appear as soon as he was nominated. Obviously what a man thinks in a hurry and what a man knows deliberately are often quite different, and the acceptance speech may well differ from all other speeches, implying, for better or worse, more spontaneity and less painstaking. On the other hand, a carefully planned acceptance speech, intended to pitch the tone of the campaign, may be the least spontaneous of all speeches. These distinctions may weigh, quite heavily, in one's findings, and even more so in the future, if conventions are to be managed by movie actors.

Yet we have not even begun to explore the problem of ignorance. Prothro presents a dichotomy between generality and specificity, and, in one of his most suggestive findings, shows a higher level of generality among the Republican presidents. But, I am obliged to ask, what, besides conservatism, might lead to a high level of generality? Apart from sheer audience appraisal, I can think of two things: ignorance and delicacy. Prothro's hypothesis that the acceptance of New Deal symbols by Eisenhower is reluctant would, while granting the importance of audience appraisal in their acceptance, substantially preclude that factor in their rejection. Beyond that, I should not dare to resolve the question. We have no right to demand that delicacy, often required in matters of foreign policy, be treated as ignorance or insincerity. Delicacy comes off rather badly in content analysis, and it is part of the mystery of foreign policy that we must often assume its spokesmen to be wiser than we honestly believe them to be. As far as the Acceptance speech and campaign speeches generally are concerned, I should like to suggest another hypothesis: we may expect a high level of generality when a candidate has or believes that he has a commanding lead. Witness Dewey's speeches in 1948 and the conversion of Ives in 1954 from high level generality to low level polemic when the going was rough.

A speaker may, in other words, be silent, or speak tongue-in-cheek, not only through knowing too little, but also, as Lincoln pointed out, through knowing too much.[15] To say the contrary, in our time, is to say that every scientific experiment should at once be made public, and few responsible persons say that. This restraint is a part of what the ancients called practical wisdom, or prudence, and its incidence in verbal material is not easy to explore, by content analysis or by any other method which I know. Whether, indeed, it is actually relevant to Prothro's own findings, I cannot possibly say. Without, however, knowing all the literature of content analysis, I may at least wonder how far its practioners have explored the factor of prudent silence. Let me repeat that I do not mean by this simply the well-planned lie. I mean a silence that is knowing but disinterested; or even a lie that is noble but disinterested. The importance of this method of communication has been brought to our attention particularly by Leo Strauss,[16] and its usefulness in the analysis of many historic works in political philosophy is certain. That Shakespeare, in *King John* does not mention Magna Charta, that Bacon avoids mentioning Bruno, that Locke avoids mentioning Hobbes, that several political writers avoid mentioning Spinoza, though they may be indebted to him: these and many other instances of prudent silence cannot be interpreted in terms of timidity or insincerity alone and are integral parts of content. Of course, the speech of a public man is something else again, but we should not preclude the possibilities of prudent silence. If, as many of us believe, the study of "normative political theory" is best furthered by the study of old and often neglected texts, wherein writers come unashamedly to grips with the recurrent problems of the political life, the radical revision of content categories follows. Even in the conservative tradition, the fact that the word "democracy" is little in evidence among, for example, the founding fathers, is not insignificant; nor is the reason obvious. And in political history generally, what a man does not say is often of as much importance as what he does. Where was "civil rights" in the list of Eisenhower appeals?

---

[15] Speech on War with Mexico, January 12, 1848, opening paragraph.

[16] *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1952), particularly Essay 2, of same title.

Keeping in mind, however, the limited role of political spokesmen, I should like to explore certain of the problems raised by Prothro's extremely interesting tabulations. His suggestion that political appeals show the shift from Hoover to Eisenhower, while demand symbols indicate the reluctant character of that shift is persuasive, and confirms his carefulness in using both categories. What, however, is the nature of the ambiguity? Is it intrinsic, and do "appeals" relate more closely than "demands" to the insistence of the audience? If I think, however, in terms of urgency, which seems to me the most obvious limitation on the President's freedom in major speeches, I am particularly inclined to compare Truman and Eisenhower, who share, as Prothro shows us, the appeal to "dark realities". The Korean War should not obscure the fact so tellingly indicated in Table V that Truman, although not then involved in actual warfare, was obliged, like Eisenhower to stress, to an overwhelming degree, "international" questions. This similarity lends particular color to the question of peace. Yet, while 63 of the Truman appeals dealt with peace, only 23 of the Eisenhower appeals dealt with it. In terms of demand symbols, the contrast is perhaps even more striking. Peace, which stood second highest on Hoover's list, with 28 demands, 14% of all Hoover demands, stood highest on Truman's list, with 21 demands, 16% of Truman demands, but is reduced to fourth place in the Eisenhower speeches, with 16 demands, 9% of the total. By way of contrast, there are but 19 demands for freedom in the Truman speeches, while there are 41 (or more than twice as many as peace) in the Eisenhower. Out of context, of course, it is hard to judge, and, I repeat, I have not checked any speeches. The suspicion in this corner is, however, that a radical shift in the verbalization of foreign policy was even then under way, and that we may see in these figures something of the moral intransigeance of the State Department. It is indeed possible, though I cannot be sure from the presentation, that the exclusive use of the demand symbol "faith" by Eisenhower may contribute to the same result. One of the tenets of a conservative program suggested by Russell Kirk is "national humility."[17] There may be evidence in Prothro's tabulations, and there is certainly evidence outside them, that this particular tenet of conservatism has not been stressed by the party in power.

My great difficulty is, however, the feeling that Prothro's hypothesis cannot really be tested unless we can be sure that the men whose speeches are analyzed are not unduly timid towards public opinion. The postulate that the "basic tenets of the New Deal can no longer be frontally attacked at the highest level of conservative leadership" is certainly supported, but it is not demonstrated, by the fact that the "chief post-New Deal spokesman for the conservative point of view" did not so attack it. It seems to me that, if there is a body of doctrine which can be called "conservatism", the question of whether its tenets may be influenced or modified by anti-conservative doctrines and practices might better be studied by a content comparison of the speeches of Winston Churchill with those of an earlier conservative, like Disraeli, and those of a later "liberal", like Franklin Roosevelt. Churchill, after all, writes his own speeches, and he once scorned excessive timidity towards public opinion by scorning those who maintain the embarrassing position of keeping their ears to the ground. To say that is not to say that Churchill is not a politician. It is reasonably certain, however, that no one from Madison Avenue ever told him what to say. We can never be certain that someone like Churchill would not frontally have attacked what appears no longer susceptible of successsful frontal attack. Madison Avenue, on the contrary, makes it difficult to get fruitful results as to the structure of conservatism and its potentiality. Madison Avenue must, moreover, have its own content analysts, who go by their own well-paid hunches. It is sad to reflect on the possibility that the skillful use of content analysis by those who plan speeches may to some extent vitiate its use by those who study them.

---

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 423.

Briefly to answer the first two questions that I have put to myself: it seems to me that content analysis is a very useful method for the study of political theory, on the whole, however, rather for historical than for "normative" purposes. In the study of philosophic texts, simple computations may be replete with meaning. But these tools are useful provided that two factors, at least, are present: 1) the writer studied is worth the care that the method requires, and 2) the writer intended to speak to more than one audience, and would have welcomed the content analysis of the careful reader. The first factor precludes wasting time; the second precludes assuming that we are wiser than the writer we study. Hence the value of content analysis tends to decline in those areas where communication is concerned with getting the maximum possible support from the maximum possible audience. In such cases, it may evaluate propaganda themes; it can seldom disclose "thought" or find reason in the essentially irrational. It can seldom detect "conservatism" in a universe of audience response, despite the fundamentally anti-philosophical character of "conservatism." Philosophers may be conservatives, as many have been, but, if we studied their own work, we should be disappointed to find nothing but "conservatism."

III.

My third problem, that of giving precision to impressions, has yet to be touched. I suppose that content analysis, however refined its modern procedures, is an old and reputable method. Every reputable scholar wants to confirm or refute his own impressions, to substitute precision for predisposition. I suppose that content analysis may correctly be described as the method used to understand a difficult text, almost any text that could not be read while running. That method certainly involves computation, though it is by no means restricted to computation. It rests, I suppose, on the desire of the analyst to understand what a text means. It is, I think, the way Bacon studied Machiavelli, or Rousseau studied Montesquieu. In this case, the analyst studies the text because he believes that the text has something he wants. Of the contemporary content analyst, however, that is no longer altogether true. He studies the emptiest comic books as well as the most important texts. He does so, not because of their intrinsic importance but because he thinks that they may help us to understand "our world". Whatever commentary on "our world" that suggests, he may be right. He is certainly right in supposing that, in a world that rests so easily upon opinion, he must explore the solidity of that opinion. He must therefore investigate impressions which people regard as "self-evident". In any society, the "obvious" is not necessarily true, and in modern democracy, the fact that the obvious is not true is of real political importance. If that democracy depends, as it certainly must, on the "common sense of the common man", it is necessary that that common sense be buttressed by the refutation of certain false shibboleths. That does not, however, tell us, and I cannot here explore, which false shibboleths should be refuted, and when, on the contrary, it may be useful for the "most rational government" to have "the prejudices of the community on its side."[18] Prothro has shown, and, I think, conclusively, that the "impressionistic" interpretation of Eisenhower's relation to Hoover on the one hand and the New Deal on the other is essentially sound. Such a demonstration may be less startling than the contrary would have been, but it is no less solid, and no less helpful to the voter, who wants the answer to these questions.

What, however, are the prospects, and what are the limits of giving precision to the imprecise? It is an ancient political question and I can here do no more than touch upon it. Obviously, beliefs about the most important political things cannot be given support, nor can they be refuted, by content analysis alone. The suggestion that they could would involve an authoritarian view of some specific content. The support which content analysis may give to "impressions" cannot carry that far, but it is still far-reaching. One reason for exploring what is generally held and is believed to be obvious is the polemical. If a man has a just quarrel, he has every reason to enforce that just quarrel with facts, even though they seem but to furnish proof where impressions should have made proof unnecessary. If content analysis can possibly convince the hunter that he should pause in his hunting, it is a boon to the hunter and the hunted as well. To show in figures, so that the unreasonable man may read what the reasonable man already understands, is often a boon. On such a ground, I believe, one must commend studies of communism that show the complexity of attachment to injustice, presenting the real reasons why young and inexperienced persons may regard injustice as just. Whether by content analysis or by some other method, the use of naked figures to challenge cant is never altogether useless.

---

[18] *Federalist*, No. 49.

To refine a polemical function into a pedagogical function is not always easy. Studies of Nazism, however, may have succeeded in convincing people not only that Nazis were to be condemned, but also that it was possible for people to act and behave as Nazis do, a difficult pill for Americans to swallow. Content analysis may have helped them to swallow it. But, whether a prejudice is sympathetic or unsympathetic, one can, I think, assert with finality that it is always useful to explore the "obvious," so long as the "obvious" may lead to conclusions that are ridiculous, inhumane, and unjust. But suppose the "obvious" or the commonly held belief is ridiculous and at the same time humane? You cannot decide that from the analysis itself. Yet the responsible scholar must know whether he should publicly refute widespread opinions which are ridiculous yet humane. Figuratively speaking, to practice content analysis he must have a license.

The primary reason for exploring what may be acknowledged without careful exploration is, however, the philosophical one. The most serious political thought is likely to begin with the questions which everyone asks. Very often the philosophical answers to questions of justice, natural right, and so on, are refinements of barber shop answers or voting booth answers. The Platonic dialogue begins with common agreement and refines common agreement into philosophic truth. In that procedure I emphatically agree with Prothro's method as a starting point. Let us begin with what the presidents say, whether it is clear or not. But let us proceed from what the presidents say to a bold confrontation of what they ought to say.

TOTALITARIANISM AND RATIONALITY

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI*
Harvard University

The experience of modern totalitarian regimes suggests that they are not likely to perish through internal revolt unless that occurs at a time when the totalitarian regime is in mortal danger from an external challenge, as in the marginal Italian case, or these the totalitarian movement in power is about to undertake decisive measures to turn the country into a totalitarian system, as in the case of the counter-revolution against Peron in Argentina. Other than that, and even considering the succession crises, modern totalitarian regimes have shown themselves capable of maintaining their totalitarian character in spite of domestic and foreign opposition. More recently it has been argued (*e.g.*, by I. Deutscher, *Russia: What Next*) that modern totalitarian regimes, if not overthrown by external forces, will nevertheless in the end be quietly and inevitably transformed into more democratic states by the subtler but irresistible influence of rationality inherent in the bureaucratic and managerial apparatus that no modern state can do without. This proposition will be developed more fully and given critical consideration in subsequent pages in order to test whether rationality, regarded in this context as a certain mode of thought and behavior induced by the requirements of modern industrialized and bureaucratized societies, is in fact incompatible with modern totalitarianism. To do that, however, we first have to seek some specific political definition of the system of rule currently known as totalitarianism. That this is no simple problem is illustrated by the variety of approaches taken by such distinguished authorities as Arendt (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*), Fainsod (*How Russia is Ruled*), Friedrich (ed. *Totalitarianism*), S. Neumann (*The Permanent Revolution*) and others. A preliminary attempt to posit a working definition and to discuss the process of totalitarian development in terms which might justify the application of the term "totalitarian" to such otherwise varied systems as the Nazi, the Soviet and possibly the Fascist, thus seems proper.

I. A DEFINITION OF TOTALITARIANISM

The crux of any attempted definition of totalitarianism is the perplexing issue of its uniqueness; what is distinctively new about it? Certainly, autocratic systems in the past displayed many of the features developed and accentuated by modern totalitarianism. Diocletian's tyranny or the Shogunate in Japan, for instance, stressed to a high degree the acquiescence of the population in centralized control. Both systems also institutionalized an atmosphere of fear through a system of secret police informers not unlike the totalitarian societies of the twentieth century. Similarly, we find among many of the nineteenth century European reformers a readiness to use violence for the sake of postulated improvements and reforms much like the ideological intolerance and consequent brutality of the Rosenbergs or Zhdanovs of our own age.[1] Cromwell's regime also displayed some analogies. The examples could easily be multiplied to include many other cases involving features similar to some of the characteristics of totalitarianism. Spain is a contemporary example.

---

* The author is indebted to the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for the support given him.

Totalitarianism, being a dictatorship, characteristically includes the coercive qualities noted in such varied dictatorial systems. But unlike most dictatorships of the past and present, the totalitarian movements wielding power do not aim to freeze society in the status quo, but on the contrary institutionalize, or plan to, a revolution which mounts in scope, and frequently in intensity, as the regime stabilizes itself in power. This revolution is to pulverize all existing social units in order to replace the old pluralism with a homogeneous unanimity patterned on the blueprints of the totalitarian ideology. The power of the totalitarian regime is derived not from a precarious balance of existing forces (*e.g.*, church, landed gentry, officer corps) but from the revolutionary dynamism of its zealous supporters who disarm opposition and mobilize the masses both by force and by an appeal to a better future. This appeal is normally framed in the official ideology, or action program, of the movement. In time, of course, the dynamism decreases, but by then the system is buttressed by complex networks of control which pervade the entire society and mobilize its energies through sheer penetration. An institutionalized revolution, patterned on the totalitarian ideology, thus makes totalitarianism essentially a forward-oriented phenomenon. Most dictatorships, on the other hand, have as their object the prevention of history from keeping in step with time. Their survival depends on maintaining the status quo. When they fail, they become history.[2]

This proposition can be further developed by examining the fate of restraints on political power, which are present in varying degrees in all societies, once the totalitarian movement seizes power. These restraints can be broadly listed in three categories: 1) the direct restraints, expressed through *pacta conventa* such as the English *Magna Carta* or the Polish *Nihil novi* . . . . , the Bill of Rights, constitutional guarantees, a rule of law, or even the broad consensus of tradition which rules out certain types of conduct, such as the use of violence; 2) the indirect restraints which stem from the pluralistic character of all large-scale societies, and which necessitate adjustment and compromise as the basis for political power, *e.g.*, the churches, the economic interests, professional, cultural or regional pressure groups, which all impede the exercise of unrestrained power; and 3) the natural restraints, such as national character and tradition, climatic and geographical considerations, kinship structure and particularly the primary social unit, the family. These also act to restrain the scope of political power.[3]

---

[1] Much was made of this in J. L. Talmon's *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy* (Boston, 1952).

[2] This is the political tragedy of such leaders as Chiang Kai-Shek or Naguib who came to power to effect a revolution but became dependent in their control of power on conservative elements.

[3] One might also consider a supernatural restraint in the sense of a transcendent

In constitutional societies all three categories of restraint are operative on political power. In practice, of course, various violations occur, but these generally constitute a deviation from the norm rather than the norm itself. Dictatorial or ancient autocratic societies are characterized by the absence of the direct restraints since these are incompatible with the nature of arbitrary, and frequently personal, leadership. Suspension of civil rights, open or masked subversion of established constitutional practices, and negation of popular sovereignty have been characteristic of all non-constitutional states, totalitarian or not.

The indirect restraints, however, have usually escaped the dictatorial scythe except when a significant social grouping chooses to resist directly the dictates of those in power. If, for instance, the church or the nobility, for one reason or another, clashes with the ruler, it is then subjected to the dictatorial pattern of coercion. Generally, however, the broad outlines of social life are not disturbed by the dictator even though an individual objector, even in high place, is struck down. An average Hungarian under Horthy or a Frenchman under Louis XIV was not directly drawn into the operations of the regime, and could continue in his traditional associations much as before the advent of the ruler. The ruler himself based his power to a great extent on the varying alliances reached among combinations of social-political forces, and maintained himself in power as long as such alliances endured. Revolutionary changes were hence anathema to a dictatorship of this kind.

It is only totalitarianism of our own age which rejects all three kinds of restraints.[4] It not only subverts the direct restraints immediately after the seizure of power but, unlike traditional dictatorships, it proceeds, once entrenched, to pulverize all existing associations in society in order to remake that society and subsequently even man himself, according to certain "ideal" conceptions. In time it even attempts, not always successfully, to overcome the natural restraints on political power. Without doing so, totalitarianism can never achieve the isolation of the individual and the mass monolithic homogeneity that are its aim. Only with both of them (the paradox between them is more apparent than real) can the existing pluralism be transformed into an active unanimity of the entire population which will make the transformation of society, and ultimately man, possible. Only through them can man be conditioned to the totalitarian image, for the totalitarian hope is that action patterns will lead to thought patterns. This process, however, even if purposely gradual (as, for instance, in Poland under the communists), inevitably involves the regime in evergrowing applications of coercion. Some of the "unredeemable social misfits" have to be removed, and it is difficult for the regime to single out for extinction particular social groups without soon involving itself in large-scale

---

moral order to which many governments pay lip service. In fact, however, its *political* significance is probably covered fully by the three outlined above, and particularly by the first two.

[4] Democracies do so, to a limited extent, in time of recognized danger; this is the concept of constitutional dictatorship. However, it always has some time limit.

terror. Society is composed, after all, of largely overlapping associations and loyalties. Terror thus becomes an inevitable consequence, as well as instrument, of the revolutionary program. But the totalitarian revolution would be meaningless without a justification to induce the active unanimity of the population. Hence ideology is not merely a historical guide. It becomes a daily dose of perpetual indoctrination. The total social impact of the totalitarian efforts to make reality conform to totalitarian thought, involving terror and indoctrination as well as institutional and social reorganization, makes for a quantitative difference from old dictatorships which is sufficiently great to become a qualitative difference.

In order to define totalitarianism one may also attempt to isolate its objective attributes, some of which have already been implied. C. J. Friedrich suggests that these may include, in a syndrome, the following: an official ideology, a single mass party, a technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly of all means of effective armed combat and of effective mass communication, and a system of terroristic police control.[5] The combination of these by no means exclusively totalitarian characteristics with the total social impact stemming from the inherently dynamic revolutionary spirit of totalitarianism makes it, in terms of the accepted categorizations of political systems, historically distinct. Totalitarianism, therefore, has to be considered as a new form of government falling into the general classification of dictatorship which includes the ancient autocracies, tyrannies, despotisms, absolute monarchies and traditional dictatorships. *Totalitarianism is a system where technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions proclaimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population.*[6] This definition thus goes beyond Friedrich's descriptive syndrome of discernible characteristics of totalitarianism, and attempts to point also to its essence, *i.e., its institutionalized revolutionary zeal.*

II. DYNAMICS

Existing political situations in a number of countries provide useful illustrations of the stages of totalitarian development. Admittedly these overlap. In France and Italy, the totalitarian movements operate today, competing electorally and plotting conspiratorially, in a non-totalitarian environment. Their task is to overthrow, at an opportune moment, the existing political systems and to seize power as a prerequisite to the implementation of their programmatic goals. Their situation, broadly speaking, is analogous to the position of the NSDAP in the Weimar Republic prior to 1933 or to the Bolsheviks in Russia prior to 1917, although the latter had to rely much more on conspiratorial action. This is the pre-revolutionary stage, which may range through varying phases of maturity and ripening before the actual moment of seizure of power.

---

[5] *Totalitarianism*, p. 53. (Cambridge, 1954). The author acknowledges his debt to C. J. Friedrich with whom he has collaborated in teaching a graduate seminar on dictatorship. A product of that collaboration is their forthcoming book on *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Harvard University Press).

[6] For a fuller discussion, see the author's *The Permanent Purge—Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, 1956), esp. pp. 1–8, 168–175.

The next stage follows the seizure of power, with the totalitarian movement solidifying its hold on the instruments of power. This is the period of entrenchment, of occasional compromise, of preparation. Active opposition elements are removed and comprehensive plans for future operations drafted. Gradual efforts to penetrate and neutralize hitherto abstaining groups, which could become potential sources of resistance, are made in anticipation of their total absorption. This was the situation prevailing in Italy during almost the entire Fascist period,[7] in Germany roughly till the war, in the USSR till the early thirties, and in Argentina until the actual collapse of the Peronist regime when it was about to embark on its revolutionary program. It is thus a stage of consolidation and anticipation, of tactical appeasements masking strategic planning.

The totalitarian system begins to materialize with the launching of the internal revolution and the attempted pulverization of existing social units. At this stage not only the indirect restraints but even the so-called natural ones are assaulted. As the image and the structure of the totalitarian movement come to be reflected in the new institutions, organizations, and the factories built on the ashes of the old society, the system takes shape. In all walks of life the operational principles of the movement become the standards for conduct, and the race into the future starts. All the energies of the population are mobilized through force, rewards, opportunities and propaganda. Ideology, reduced to the level of the daily exhortation, is used to justify the existing sacrifices and to give meaning to the unending search for the ideal Tomorrow. This is the situation initiated in the USSR by the first Five-Year Plan and in the satellites since about 1948.

Inevitably, however, stabilizing factors begin to intervene even before the full impetus of the internal revolution is felt. Power, like wealth, has an inherent tendency to attract strong attachments in those who enjoy it. Consequently the triumphant elite, while not officially abandoning its ultimate ends, tends to stress immediate power considerations. An ideological rationalization for such a tendency is ever-ready: power must be consolidated if further advances are to be made. The sincerity or insincerity of such reasoning notwithstanding, the consolidation of power becomes a conservative tendency. In an ideologically motivated, zealous organization this breeds its own antithesis among those anxious to push ahead. Those who toiled and risked to seize power accordingly become all the more fearful of the rising young stars and new constellations in the movement, into which many late arrivals have flocked. Some therefore urge that revolutionary changes be pushed immediately lest new elements come to the fore. Others urge greater restraint, and even compromise with the former dominant groups, now suppressed, but still not liquidated. Purges provide a partial solution for this dissension. The history of the right and left wing deviations in the USSR, and of the SA-SS clash in Germany, is instructive in this respect. The intervention of such stabilizing factors, in the initial stages at least, thus tends merely to accentuate the tension. Its longer run consequence, however, so far as available experience teaches, is to generate even greater violence and unpredictability.

---

[7] Fascist inability to cope decisively with the old officer corps, the monarchy and the Vatican probably also explains the relative swiftness of the collapse of Fascist power as compared to the Nazi capacity to control the situation until the final annihilation.

But in time other pressures towards gradualism and stability develop. As the ruling elite ages, it becomes more and more concerned with succession, with status, and also with the transmission of its privileges to its children. Revolutionary considerations begin to be obscured by a desire to assure one's own offspring better education, advancement opportunities, etc. Such processes develop unconsciously as an inevitable consequence of privilege. Distinct class differentiation thus develops, producing thereby another element impeding the totalitarian revolution which tends to emphasize social mobility, arbitrariness and uncertainty.

This process in communist totalitarian systems has been specifically linked with the rapid development of an industrial economic order. Communist dictatorships have made industrialization and (to a lesser degree) collectivization the central theme of their internal revolution, partially to prove *ex post facto* the correctness of Marxist assumptions, partially because in a technological age industry is the backbone of national power, and especially because they seized power in backward areas where industrial development had been seriously retarded but had become the focal point of aspirations. Industrialization, imposed politically and without regard to cost, necessitates not only great sacrifices from the people but also involves the application of tremendous coercive force on those who, because of tradition, self-interest or apathy, resist it. In that sense Soviet terror in the thirties was functionally rational, although its aberrations and excesses were frequently irrational. Some theorists, like Arendt, have tended, however, to overemphasize the latter aspects. The oppression and terror of the Soviet system was significantly linked with this at-all-cost, ruthless attempt to destroy the existing way of life. It involved the commitment of all the energies of the regime to push the program and mobilize the entire population to carry it through.

The first repercussions of this program were therefore in the direction of accentuating the totalitarian character of the system. As industrialization and collectivization through coercion grew in scope, an ever larger number of people were affected. Traditional allegiances and alliances were shattered, and those suspected of opposing the party program were arrested, deported or shot. Terror and fear grew rapidly. Not even the party was immune, and countless members were purged for alleged inefficiency, often translated into accusations of sabotage and wrecking.[8] The first consequences of industrialization, to repeat, were thus to maximize existing fear, arbitrariness, caprice and terror; in other words, to stress the irrational elements. At the same time, a tremendous social upheaval was created, and literally millions of people were torn from their traditional occupations or surroundings. While this meant misery or death for many, unprecedented opportunities for rapid advancement also opened up. The totalitarian revolution, therefore, stimulated not only negative reactions; it appealed to the imaginations and self-interest of many others. The presence in this upheaval of a disciplined, and the only organized body, the Communist Party, gave its leaders almost unlimited power to channel the revolution, to direct it, to head it. A society in this stage of destruction and construction could not produce any restraints on the totalitarian leadership. A society subjected to so total a revolution, socially and economically, offers only two political alternatives: anarchy or totalitarian control. The disciplined and militant totalitarian movement insured the latter alternative.

---

[8] See *The Permanent Purge* (cited in note 6) particularly chapters 4 and 5.

We do not know what forms the totalitarian revolution, unhindered externally, would have taken in the more advanced societies where totalitarian movements came to power before World War II. Those, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, that have come under communist dictatorships since the war have in a broad sense been subjected to the same pattern, although with significant variations pointing in the direction of greater gradualism. Nonetheless, collectivization, nationalization of trade and expansion of heavy industry all have tended to reproduce this total social impact which dissolves the traditional society. Very specific circumstantial factors prevented the Fascist and Nazi regimes from launching similarly large-scale schemes of social reconstruction. Nonetheless it is sufficient to read Starace's plans to change the Italian national character or Mussolini's remarks on the need to eradicate the Italian "softness," as well as some of the party regulations on daily behavior of the citizen issued in 1938, to realize that such a revolution was being seriously contemplated in Italy. In the case of the Nazis, there is even more ample evidence that the New Order in Europe would have resulted in revolutionary changes in Germany proper, changes highly inimical to the established order. Hitler's wartime conversations and Himmler's plans for the SS are full of projects that would have involved radical changes in German society and economy.

The question arises, however, what happens when the initial impetus of purposefully induced change has spent itself? What happens when the initial economic drive is more or less achieved, and further efforts are merely the accentuation of something already existing?

III. A RATIONALIST TOTALITARIANISM?

It could be argued, and some have, that Soviet totalitarianism, the most advanced totalitarian society of our age, is now entering upon a new stage of development, the character of which will be determined by the industrialized nature of the Soviet economy. This analysis, partaking somewhat of a material determinism, stresses the incompatibilities between totalitarianism and the requirements of a modern, industrial and hence also bureaucratic order. Noting that totalitarianism in the past has seemed largely irrational, it argues that the rationalistic routines of the indispensable managers of the industrial society will necessarily transmit themselves to the totalitarian leadership and gradually effect a fundamental transformation of the system itself. This transmission will be aided by the fact that the totalitarian movement has become highly bureaucratized and therefore shares in many of the operational patterns associated with running the industrial machine. Furthermore, it is argued, the totalitarian movement itself has become increasingly staffed by the managerial-bureaucratic elements to whom party membership means no more than an important club association necessary to satisfy career ambitions. The revolutionary torch and the unending quest are accordingly displaced by the swivel chair and the punch-clock.

Totalitarianism, in the extreme form of this argument, is thus to disappear imperceptibly and unintentionally. As stability, predictability and overall rationality set in, fear, terror, and arbitrariness will fade. Mass enthusiasm and passionate unanimity will give way to disagreements on matters of expertise, and hence also on policy. Policy discussion will then become genuine arguments on alternate courses of action; selection will be made on the basis of rational (technical, objective assessments of the implications of perceived reality) considerations without violent (hence arbitrary and fear-inspiring) consequences for those whose arguments did not prevail. This, together with the growing stability of various privilege groups, will in turn lead to a form of pluralism, suggestive of the existing democratic systems. Democracy, even though likely a curtailed one, will enter by the back door.

One example of this type of reasoning is the argument advanced by I. Deutscher in his *Russia: What Next?* Deutscher stresses the point that: "the economic progress made during the Stalin era has at last brought within the reach of the people a measure of well-being which should make possible an orderly winding up of Stalinism and a gradual democratic evolution."[9] This argument leaves considerable room for dissent. Democracy involves more than what Deutscher suggests. It requires, in the view of some, a certain philosophical tradition, a basic recognition of some sort of higher law, a fundamental attitude of toleration, an absence of doctrinal fanaticism—all of which are, at most, only indirectly linked to a state of "well-being" and none of which seem to be even remotely present in the existing Soviet scene. One may also wonder what is actually meant by "a measure of well-being," especially since wants are relative. Furthermore there is little of substance in what is known today of totalitarian institutions to indicate the likelihood of such a democratic development. It is difficult to assume that the party, having such a vested interest, will be willing to resign its absolute control of the instruments of power. The argument also assumes a short-range quality to the goals of the party, and it ignores the impact of international developments on domestic policies.

---

[9] (New York, 1953), p. 227. Deutscher's argument should not be confused with B. Moore's reasoned analysis in *Terror and Progress USSR*. This weighs alternative patterns of development in terms of the possibility of continued totalitarian development, or a technical-rational pattern, or the emergence of a traditionalist form.

Deutscher's analysis thus falls down on two counts: its highly monistic interpretation of democracy fails to see democratic development in its complex and pluralistic perspective, the economic aspects of which are merely one component part of a diversified whole; and its interpretation of Soviet totalitarianism fails to perceive the self-generating power of the system of controls and the resulting vested interests in the maintenance of these controls. Fainsod, in concluding his examination of the Soviet regime, makes this statement:

> As long as the Kremlin leaders continue to see their future in terms of industrial and military might, they will probably persist in relying on totalitarian instruments to force the pace of industrialization. Those who possess absolute power do not part with it willingly. The governing formula of Soviet totalitarianism rests on a moving equilibrium of alternating phases of repression and relaxation, but its essential contours remain unchanged. The totalitarian regime does not shed its police-state characteristics; it dies when power is wrenched from its hands.[10]

The question remains, however, whether in the long run totalitarianism is compatible with a rationalistic orientation prevailing in its extensive bureaucracy and in the managerial classes of its industrial order. To some extent, this issue, like the one discussed above, is made more complex by the general problem of the range of predictability in political science. It is doubtful that any "scientific" prediction can be made in matters not clearly connected with institutional, legal, stable processes; such as, for instance, one that presidential elections will occur in the United States in 1956 and 1960, and that, barring some drastic denouement, the contenders will be the Democratic and Republican parties. Predictability becomes more difficult, and its range much shorter, in matters involving general problems of political-social development in a system where little is known of the processes of decision-making at the top, of the motivations and considerations involved, of the nature of the various power alignments, and last, but not least, of the morale of the leaders. There are also few biographical data, beyond the barest essentials, about most of the leaders. In such cases, one must rely to a considerable degree on the projection of past experience, and estimate the future implications of current commitments of the system.

The experience of Germany with Nazi totalitarianism, albeit brief, may therefore not be irrelevant. The Nazi system was imposed with all the earmarks of revolutionary totalitarianism on a society with a highly developed industrial order, with an established and conservative managerial class, with the most efficient and routinized bureaucracy in all Europe. Yet there is no indication in all the available evidence that the fanatical, often irrational and usually brutal, Nazi leadership was in any way deterred from its purposes by the influence or orientations of the German technocrats or bureaucrats. With few exceptions, the German bureaucrats and technocrats adjusted meekly to the requirements of the totalitarian movement and were happy to reap any material benefits that Nazi successes produced. It was not until the Nazi regime began to crumble that the bureaucratic and technocratic elements, *e.g.*, Speer, showed any initiative or purposeful action of their own. Until then, it was more a matter of the bureaucrats absorbing Nazi values, *e.g.*, in the treatment of slave laborers, than of the Nazis absorbing a bureaucratic orientation. It seems, therefore, that a violent, arbitrary totalitarianism can, at least, arise and maintain itself in an industrially advanced area without loss of its revolutionary zeal and fanatic brutality. It did so in Germany and Italy and Czechoslovakia.[11] The crucial factor throughout was the presence of a movement with a revolutionary morale able to wield effectively the instruments of power.

---

[10] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 500.

A rebuttal, however, might point to the fact that both the German and Italian systems were of brief duration, and the experience of Czechoslovakia is too recent for confident evaluation. Furthermore, the emergence of a new and imposing industrial and bureaucratic order under the totalitarian regime itself in the USSR is obviously of the greatest importance for the domestic political development of the Soviet society. It is a development not paralleled in any of the other countries mentioned, where the totalitarian movements were superimposed on already existing industrial systems.

One must acknowledge, therefore, that conceivably totalitarianism may become, because of the factors suggested and in spite of the Nazi experience, rationalistic and hence less unpredictable, arbitrary and openly terroristic. But there is no evidence to suggest that this in itself is incompatible with totalitarianism, which need not be interpreted, as H. Arendt seems inclined to do, in terms of irrational terror almost for the sake of terror. Such a rationalist system, arising in the context of one-party domination (not to mention international pressures), could be nothing less than a rationalist dictatorship, just as total in control as its less predictable and more violent antecedent of the thirties. The institutionalized revolution which still characterizes the existing totalitarianisms will inevitably slow down in the future, but by then it will be involved in an economic commitment which also has its own political logic. The totalitarian economy, as many have observed, has been developed in the USSR over the last thirty years in keeping with plans oriented to a final (if not yet precisely defined) goal. It is thus a goal-oriented economy, the goal being communism. That this goal needs more definite formulation is, for our purposes, irrelevant. The important thing is that those in charge of the Soviet society have assumed that economic and social development in all its aspects can be purposefully steered by man in the direction of an ideal solution. This produces consequences not only economic but also political, quite different from those induced by other equally technologically advanced economic systems where, to a large extent, economic life is self-directive and ultimate goals, such as plenty and progress, are purposely vague. These goals have less bearing on current decisions than such factors as past experience, demand, prices, competition, and opportunity. In the latter case, a measure of freedom of interplay is inherent. In the former, all decisions and plans are made, or are rationalized, in terms of the ultimate goal.

---

[11] There is also the case of Japan, where industrialization advanced rapidly under a form of government which was increasingly marked by totalitarian tendencies. All indications prior to 1945 suggested that a "democratic evolution" was not to be expected.

Consequently it makes little *political* difference whether the range of man's alternatives is limited by uneducated revolutionaries or by scientific Ph.D.'s, once the entire economy is subjected to a process of human engineering oriented on a goal which cannot be questioned. Admittedly, operations conducted by trained bureaucrats and technocrats may be more "rational" and less directly oppressive (in so far as extreme oppression may be uneconomical, which is not entirely certain). But to be less totalitarian such operations would have to involve some degree of withdrawal on the part of those in charge from their commitment to total social and economic engineering, thus granting to those living under the system the opportunity to make important choices *not* in keeping with the goal. But such a politically meaningful development would in turn involve a further condition, which at the present appears highly unlikely, namely the decline of ideology and a basic reconsideration of the firmly instituted schemes of economic development. Barring that, the totalitarian economic system would continue to exert pressures for the maintenance of a dictatorship capable of enforcing the kind of discipline that such total plans demand. It is doubtful that as long as the party remains in power the tendency of the regime to stress unattainable goals will vanish. Indeed, it is these goals, inherent in the current ideology, which justify to the population the sacrifices which the party's domination involves. Thus, as long as the party continues to hold its successful grip on the instruments of power, we can expect it to continue stressing first the long-range goals of an ultimate utopia, and then the consequent sacrifices to achieve them, even though possibly at a diminishing rate of effort.

The rationalist tomorrow, if it ever comes, will therefore not be an introduction to a democratic form of government, but rather a stage in further totalitarian evolution, accentuating rationalist features present from the start and minimizing some of the irrational outbursts already noted. The prototypes of such a rationalist totalitarianism need not be sought only in Orwell's *1984*. They exist, in an embryonic stage, in our own industrial organizations and bureaucracies. If one could imagine the entire United States run like some executive department, with its myriad of minute, and often incomprehensible, regulations, routinized procedures, even sometimes arbitrariness of officials, one would be all the more inclined to be thankful that the rule of law (rooted in a traditional regard for the individual) and legislative fears of administrative expansion (a democratic "irrationalist" feature) act as a check.[12]

Totalitarianism and rationality, therefore, when viewed in a developmental perspective and not merely from a standpoint of a static definition pinpointing certain characteristics of a given epoch, are not necessarily incompatible. Rationality alone is hardly a sufficient condition for the inevitable growth of a democratic order. At different stages, totalitarianism can be characterized by a minimization of rationalist considerations (as in the thirties in the USSR), or by an increased emphasis on them. But it is as unlikely that totalitarianism can become fully rational as it is incorrect to claim that it has been essentially irrational in the past. Today, for instance, in the USSR the totalitarian system is operating in an environment where the need (as seen by the leadership) for unbridled violence, terror in its most open form, and unpredictability based on dictatorial whims seems no longer to be present or desirable. The population appears to be relatively pliant, the younger generation has absorbed a great deal of the indoctrination, resistance of an active kind is almost entirely absent. The domination of the party in the country, and of the leadership in the party, appears to be firmly established. If only the party could be satisfied with the status quo, a rationalist totalitarianism could possibly become reality.

---

[12] For another example, consider the political implications of Kafka's *Trial.*

But even then the problem of power would not disappear. Governmental rationality cannot go far beyond the realm of function and account for all human action. Basic drives for power are not likely to wane. And given the nature of the system, even if the Party declines and is supplanted ultimately by the bureaucracy (or merges with it), the total control of the system over those under it will not disappear even though its exercise will become more functionally rational. In such a system it is likely that the institutional controls will be utilized to maintain the existing interests of the ruling class, and social stratification will become even more marked as position, education, and even wealth become inheritable. The abyss between those wielding power and the masses will create a real ruling caste, which itself will be highly stratified in terms of the proximity of its members to the center of power. It will create too an entire non-political stratum of those who will be given a vested interest in the *status quo* by virtue of their utility to the system, such as the specialists, artists, military scientists, etc. In many respects such a system will more nearly resemble the Nazi-Fascist dictatorship than the earlier Stalinist model. This curiously dialectical consequence might deprive Soviet totalitarianism of its revolutionary essence while maintaining its institutional forms. The lesson of history is, however, that this does not necessarily spell the end of the system.

That appears to be, however, at best only a distant prospect. The tasks that face the totalitarians today in the captive nations in Europe, among the long dormant masses of China, in the rice paddies of northern Vietnam, or in the Malayan jungles, not to speak of the virgin lands, overgrown urban centers and ever-struggling collective farms in the USSR, are very difficult and likely to command all their energies for many years to come. Indeed, the commitments currently made by the present Soviet leaders indicate that the party is not satisfied with the *status quo;* hence the abandonment of large-scale drives, which involve in turn the maintenance of discipline, does not seem imminent even in the USSR, the most developed totalitarian system. These commitments are both domestic and international. Domestically, they suggest a three-pronged attack on the following goals: an increased emphasis on party zeal, especially in terms of a reassertion of "Leninism" as defined by the present leadership; continued expansion of heavy industry with major goals set for 1960; further drives in the agricultural sector, including both reclamation projects and the diminution of private plots. On the international plane, briefly, the commitments made to China and the satellites, coupled to those now being made to the underdeveloped countries, will continue to be felt on the domestic scene through scarcities and insistence on maximum effort. At the same time, with Stalin dead and Stalinism impracticable without him, the new leadership is searching for a new basis for power both in the realm of ideological justification and practical measures. This already has meant the rejection of some of the vicious attributes of Stalinism as well as an attack on Stalin himself. This may involve in turn some unsettling consequences, as an accepted frame of reference is destroyed and old slogans and operational procedures fall by the wayside. Finally, the problem of succession, given the age bracket of the present leaders, cannot be dismissed as having been resolved entirely. From all of this, it might appear therefore that both internally and externally the likelihood of a *status quo* situation in the foreseeable future is doubtful. If so, the era of revolutionary totalitarianism may not yet be over.

THE TWENTIETH C.P.S.U. CONGRESS: A STUDY IN CALCULATED MODERATION*

CHARLES D. KENNEY
Michigan State University

The world listened attentively while the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was in session in the spacious vaulted white and gold Great Hall of the Kremlin palace from February 14 to February 25, 1956. This was the first congress since the death of Stalin, and in the interim events had prompted some bewilderment and much speculation among interested observers everywhere. Specifically, outside spectators looked to the congress to illuminate the pattern underlying a series of developments between March, 1953, and February, 1956: the resignation of Georgi M. Malenkov as Premier; the ascendancy of First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev; Soviet assent to a peace treaty with Austria, politically "neutralizing" that country; Soviet withdrawal from bases in Porkkala, Finland, and Port Arthur; the visits of Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin to India, Burma, and other countries; the announced reduction of Soviet military forces and military budget; the attempted *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia; initiation of an unprecedented Soviet economic offensive; and many other "unexpected," Soviet-instigated moves.

The congress proceedings constitute a source of information on current policy emphasis; but despite the fact that the party rules designate the congress as the "supreme" policy-making organ of the CPSU, it has no real "legislative" significance. At least in the past twenty-five years, the congress has in no case exercised control over the leadership except through prearranged and coördinated criticism (and "self-criticism") of technical shortcomings, nor has it instituted policy after debate and open compromise of views. Rather, speeches at the sessions occasionally indicate shifts in policy. Indeed, the Soviet leaders have tended to convoke the congress if and when they wished to prepare the country, and sometimes the world or parts of it, for a reorientation of approach or otherwise to publicize decisions of great portent. Thus the Nineteenth Congress in 1952 signified that Malenkov was Stalin's chosen "successor," and the Eighteenth Congress in 1939 issued a subtle warning that unless the Western powers stopped appeasing Hitler, the USSR might conclude a pact with Germany to insure its own security. As an institution, the congress dates back to 1898 when the so-called Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party assembled in Minsk. It typically convened annually after the 1917 revolution; but as Stalin eliminated one rival after another and his deification as the sole fountainhead of Marxist-Leninist wisdom progressed, there were longer intervals, though the party statute specified at least one congress every four years. Today, as under Stalin, the delegates perform the ritual of committee reports, debate sequences, and formal resolutions; but the principles and policies they "approve" have been worked out in advance. In eleven days, the Twentieth Congress sanctioned everything its "agents" on the Central Committee had done in a period of three years and four months; confirmed the whole body of present and future foreign and domestic policy, down to all the details, technical and nontechnical, of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956–1960); and heard about sixty separate but highly stylized "warm fraternal greetings" from the various communist parties. In the Great Hall, no tempers were lost and no one quibbled over points of procedure. Everything took place with perfect decorum, flawless discipline. For the governing élite, the congress is a propitious occasion to tell the Soviet people how many remarkable, farsighted moves have been and will be made in their behalf, to authenticate who or what is responsible for deficiencies, and to remind the world that Moscow stands for peace, democracy, brotherhood, and truth. All this the leaders did with the consummate skill of articulate and imaginative propagandists with a flair for realistic appraisal of the requirements of Soviet national security, the opportunities for the advance of "socialism" under prevailing world conditions, and the aspirations of a people long under the aegis of Stalinist regimentation. But as far as the rank-and-file delegates were concerned, the more things "changed" the more they remained the same. They were called together as always for dramatic background.

---

* [Editor's Note: Among its other merits, this paper may be read for evidence tending to confirm or deny Mr. Brzezinski's thesis in the preceding article.]

The number of delegates varies from congress to congress, depending upon the numerical strength of the party ranks and the representational formula applied. At the Twentieth Congress were 1,355 delegates with the right to vote, one for every 5,000 party members, and eighty-one with a "consultative" voice, one for every 5,000 party candidates. In comparison with the Nineteenth Congress, the voting delegates represented 2.7 times as many workers engaged directly in production, twice as many collective farmers, a much higher educational level (well over half had completed higher education), and a far greater proportion of the total in the over-fifty age-bracket.[1] The bias toward increasing overrepresentation of the administrative and technical bureaucracy so apparent at earlier congresses was countered, though these elements distinctly predominated. Fifty-five delegations of the "fraternal communist and workers parties" were also on hand, including most of the leaders with international reputations except those of the Yugoslav and American parties.

"Collective Leadership" and the Second Death of Stalin. Western interest in developments at the congress, aside from matters of foreign policy, centered upon the post-Stalin leadership pattern. On this subject, the Kremlin executed a spectacular turnabout perhaps more far-reaching in its implications than anything else said at the congress. Not only did the élite underscore the principle of "collective leadership," but also frontally attacked the "cult of the indi-

---

[1] Averky B. Aristov, Report of the Credentials Commission to the 20th CPSU Congress (Feb. 16, 1956), *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings,* Part II (Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1956), pp. D-6 and D-10. This material, in three volumes, is the most complete record of the congress sessions presently available in English. It constitutes the chief source utilized in the preparation of this article. Subsequent citations appear as: *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings.*

vidual" (or the "cult of personality") using Stalinism as a critical point of departure. Rarely, however, were such allusions direct personal references. During the regular proceedings, Stalin was mentioned by name in only five instances. Khrushchev conveyed the impression that one-man rule is a matter of the regrettable past and that Soviet leadership today is not split into contending cliques but impersonally bound together by the "cause" to which it is morally dedicated: "The leading core of the party is not a group of men bound by personal relations of mutual advantage, but a working collective of leaders whose relations are based on ideas and principles permitting neither mutual forgiveness nor personal antagonism."[2] Admitting that under Stalin's tutelage, the central party organs had not met regularly nor dealt with important policymaking subjects, Khrushchev assured the congress that "the Presidium of the Central Committee has become a regularly acting collective body dealing with all the most important questions of the life of the party and country." In a thinly veiled reference to the quasi-religious nature of the Stalin myth, he asserted that the Central Committee "resolutely oppose(s) the cult of personality alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, which turns one or another leader into a miracle-performing hero. . . ."[3] The concrete evils of the "cult" enumerated at the congress are a pointed commentary on the stringencies and effects of rigorous dictatorship. Mikhail A. Suslov, chief of the propaganda apparatus under Stalin, declared:

> The theory and practice of the cult of personality . . . diminished the role of the popular masses and the role of the party; lowered collective leadership; undermined intraparty democracy; suppressed the activity of party members, their initiative, and independent work; led to lack of supervision, irresponsibility, and even to arbitrariness in the work of individual persons; hindered the development of criticism and self-criticism; and engendered a unilateral and sometimes even erroneous solution of problems.[4]

Suslov guaranteed that the spread of "dogmatism and parrot-learning" resulting from the "cult of personality" would be methodically counteracted.

Anastas I. Mikoyan, one of Stalin's closest associates, delivered the most outspoken, stinging rebuke of the Stalinist style of leadership. He criticized the previously sacred theoretical content of Stalin's last major economic analysis of capitalism, published on the eve of the Nineteenth Congress: "In analyzing the state of the economy in contemporary capitalism, it is doubtful that we can be helped by—and it is doubtful if it is correct—Stalin's well-known dictum in 'The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR'. . . ." Moreover, he intimated that party histories would be revised to expunge deliberate distortions: ". . . Up to quite recently, we have had books . . . which were current and were even regarded as an unchallenged yardstick in which facts were falsified. Some persons were arbitrarily exalted in them, others got no mention at all."

---

[2] Nikita S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to the 20th CPSU Congress (Feb. 14, 1956), *ibid.*, Part I, p. A-94.

[3] Both quotations *ibid.*, Part I, p. A-96.

[4] Mikhail A. Suslov, Speech at 20th CPSU Congress (Feb. 16, 1956), *ibid.*, Part I, p. C-10.

Referring to Stalin's device of dispensing retroactive "justice" to fortify his own power position, Mikoyan condemned the former dictator by deploring ". . . alleged sabotage on the part of some of the party leaders of (the civil war period) who were wrongly declared to have been enemies of the people many years after the events described had taken place." Mikoyan ended his dissection by sneering at the famous "Oath to Lenin," a pseudo-religious piece of sentimental oratory by Stalin at Lenin's funeral in 1924. This "oath," memorized by Soviet school children for years in a form resembling prayer, was caustically alluded to in these terms: "How great would be Lenin's joy if he now, . . . could see that we not only swear by Lenin's name but are exerting our efforts to put into practice Lenin's ideas and are fulfilling his behests reverently." Mikoyan's comments were doubly barbed because they were accompanied by an insinuation directed at Lenin's renowned "last will and testament" which Stalin had suppressed. Mikoyan reminded the congress of "Lenin's great anxiety about the fate of our party . . . before he left us."[5] In his testament, Lenin questioned the power which Stalin had accumulated and expressed misgivings concerning his discretion in using it. Then in a postscript, Lenin wrote:

> Stalin is too rude and this fault becomes unbearable in the Office of General Secretary. Therefore I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man, more patient, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less captious, and so forth.[6]

On June 30, Lenin's "testament" was finally published in the magazine *Kommunist* for the enlightenment of the Soviet people. It was accompanied by the most candid public criticism of Stalin up to that time. Other documentary material long buried in the Kremlin archives will no doubt be similarly publicized sooner or later. The man who spoke so contemptuously at the congress was the same Mikoyan who remarked at the Nineteenth Congress that the old dictator " . . . enlightens with the bright flame of Stalinist genius the road forward to a more brilliant communist future."

Actually, much of the luster had been rubbed from the idol for some time before the congress delegates assembled. Within a month after Stalin's death, his name had virtually disappeared from the Soviet press. Then, in the early summer of 1953 the "Kremlin doctors' plot" (primarily a "conspiracy" of Jewish physicians) against the lives of high leaders was re-evaluated as a "concoction of false allegations" by the police in general and Lavrenti P. Beria in particular. This was the onset of the exposé of the complicated plots and intrigue characteristic of the Stalinist régime, now no longer a matter of conjecture, since the same men who participated in them have candidly acknowledged that they were "unwillingly" entangled in the system. A third precongress development was the freeing of a few surviving Old Bolshevik leaders from their long imprisonment, while the authorities set about ameliorating conditions in "forced labor camps" generally. Hence before the congress, an anti-Stalin operation was underway, but observers did not suspect that the assault would be pressed to an all but open refutation of some of the most fundamental precepts of Stalinism.

---

[5] All foregoing quotations from Anastas I. Mikoyan, Speech at 20th CPSU Congress (Feb. 16, 1956), *ibid.*, Part I, pp. D-22, D-25, D-26, and D-28.

[6] Quoted by Harrison Salisbury in *New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1956, p. 4.

In the weeks following the congress, it became increasingly evident that only the opening round had been fired in the bombardment of Stalinism. Apparently the leaders decided when Stalin died to unfold their repudiation gradually, aware that poor timing might incite elements of the population conditioned by every medium of mass persuasion for more than two decades to revere him as the symbol and infallible guiding hand of Soviet society. Thus, nearly three years elapsed before the élite revealed how far they intended to go. About two weeks after the congress, Moscow confirmed persistent rumors that Khrushchev had delivered a three-hour address on February 24 to a *closed session* of the congress in which he presented a detailed indictment. The principal charges, in the form of a congress resolution read to mass meetings of party members all over the USSR, were: Stalin terrorized his colleagues so thoroughly that, as Khrushchev put it, "we never knew when we entered Stalin's presence whether we would come out alive"[7]; by liquidating several top army men on false charges during the purges of 1937–1938, he decreased the overall caliber of military leadership and demoralized the army at the threshold of imminent German aggression; he was a blunderer who immodestly thought of his nonaggression pact with Hitler in 1939 as a personal diplomatic triumph, and failed to have the Soviet forces properly deployed to resist German invasion despite clear and repeated warnings that an attack was being prepared; and, especially in later life, Stalin was obsessed with phobias that led him to distrust and scheme against even his most intimate confreres. The gravest recriminations were not simultaneously made known to the general population, though in time all the particulars will undoubtedly be brought before the public. But verbal reports of Khrushchev's sensational document spread anyway, touching off protest demonstrations in March in Tiflis, the capital of Stalin's (and Beria's) native Georgia. At their peak, the demonstrations reportedly were joined by "many thousands" of residents led by students at Tiflis university. The outburst was forcibly crushed with a toll of about one hundred deaths. Other imputations against Stalin included: expostulation against "the vicious method of administration by mere injunction" and "such ugly practices as the concealing of shortcomings"; an allegation that Stalin, contrary to the official explanation attributing her death to suicide, murdered his second wife, Nadezhda (Nadia) Alliluyeva, in a paroxysm of rage in November, 1932; an ostensible "request" by Stalin's family that he be buried beside Nadia in Moscow's Novo Deviche cemetery (the excuse the leaders must be seeking to remove his body from its place of honor next to Lenin in the hallowed mausoleum in Red Square); and censure of the old dictator for making "grievous errors" of procedure during the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930's as well as for expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948.[8] Only a régime confident of its hold on the reins of power would dare explode a myth in such a manner; but then, those who toppled the image once worked just as assiduously to emblazon it. That is the way of dictatorship—thorough doing often necessitates thorough undoing.

---

[7] Quoted in *New York Times*, March 18, 1956, Sect. 4, p. 2. See the purported full text of his "confidential" speech, *ibid.*, June 5, 1956, pp. 13–16.

What the stress on "collective leadership" and anti-Stalinism means is fairly obvious. Above all, the leaders "disproved" certain maxims and classified some things Stalin did as malpractices for pragmatic reasons. *They desire maximum flexibility for their own notions of internal and external expediency.* In "emancipating" themselves from some of the more dogmatic aspects of Stalinism and from the more rigid mechanisms of the old régime to gain freedom of action, the current leaders have the logic of objective circumstances uppermost in mind. Their reactions to the excesses of Stalinism are not those of shocked and sensitive humanitarians, for they have not disowned the efficacy of secret police methods as such, nor did they hesitate to use the same techniques of repression in disposing of Beria (however justifiably) or in breaking up the Georgian pro-Stalin demonstrations that they once employed in the service of Stalinism. However, a dictatorship requires a source of clairvoyance, an emotional comfort for the faithful at the core of their secular religion, which in this case might take Stalin's place. The answer provided by the Twentieth Congress is Lenin who presently enjoys primacy in the pantheon of neoMarxist deities. If the speeches at the congress were taken literally, it would seem that Lenin had never ceased to be "correct" and that Stalin wilfully perverted canonical Leninism, necessitating his excommunication. Soviet monotheism has been continued, but with a god removed from the realm of temporal authority. Their sole aim, so the current leaders sermonize, is to be about the master's business: "Lenin's spirit and Leninism permeate our entire work, all our decisions, as if Lenin were living and among us."[9] Tangible works must follow reconversion to the one true creed, and in the process, the Soviet people will likely be governed in the immediate future more temperately than in nearly three decades. Probably Stalin will get credit in the forthcoming textual revisions only for his part in the revolution and civil war, his leadership during the few years between Lenin's death and the destruction of his rivals, and his emphasis on priority for heavy industry.

Genuine "collective leadership," however, is more than mere spiritual incantation. Khrushchev's status at the congress suggests that even if he is not in absolute control in the Stalinist sense, undeniably there is no one who outranks him, nor is anyone else in so favorable a position to succeed in accumulating supreme power should he try to do so later. In making the keynote address, in which he systematically set forth a doctrine with a partly new, malleable framework, Khrushchev placed himself, wittingly or unwittingly, in the role of bidding for recognition as the ideological heir of Stalin and chief interpreter of

---

[8] *Pravda,* March 28, 1956; *New York Times,* April 1, 1956; *Pravda,* April 7, 1956; and *New York Times,* June 5, 1956.

[9] Mikoyan, *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings,* Part I, p. D-27.

Lenin. Most analysts are agreed that the First Secretary displayed expansive but not overbearing confidence in this guise. As Welles Hangen of the *New York Times* described it: "Khrushchev . . . addressed the 20th Congress . . . with the assurance of a successful corporation director reporting to a stockholders' meeting."[10] Events justify such assurance. Since Stalin's death, Khrushchev saw Beria executed and Malenkov demoted. These were the men who might have contested his position as First Secretary which he assumed in September, 1953. Furthermore, the internal control mechanisms of the party and the highly bureaucratized power structure of Soviet society generally encourage the rise of a single leader. Stalin achieved supremacy by virtue of his post as General Secretary, from which vantage point he played off potential competitors against each other until he had disposed of all of them and established his claim to absolute doctrinal succession as well. An ambitious man adept in intrigue can surge to the top simply by using the existing apparatus. Khrushchev's affirmation that the present leadership is "not bound by personal relations of mutual advantage" nor distinguished by "personal antagonism" runs against the grain of Soviet history. The régime's incessant struggles for power, resulting in countless political exiles and liquidations, are testimony to the fact that "personal advantage" (if life itself is a "personal advantage") is precisely the lever by which the dictatorship has habitually operated. *"Collective leadership" may therefore be partly an expedient "gentleman's agreement" among the top leaders aimed at reciprocal self-preservation.* The execution of powerful police-chief Beria, who was in a favorable position to arrogate exclusive power to himself, and the subsequent "reform" of the organization and procedure of the police establishments, support such a conclusion. Much tribute was paid at the congress to "decentralization" of both party and government responsibility but there is no evidence that the *power* edifice has been altered. In addition, irrespective of the many references at the congress to proper regard for "socialist legality," the rule of law has never been adhered to in practice. The élite, at least, have always been above the law, following Lenin's axiom that "law is politics," that law, like all other institutionalized arrangements, can never be interpreted as superior to the "needs" of the dictatorship. The leaders, of course, define those "needs" as they go. The USSR is still governed in the final analysis by executive decree. The prestige and overall authority of the police are more limited today than for many years, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee of State Security are very useful to the oligarchy. The men at the apex of a steep power pyramid require secret police because a régime impervious to any limitations other than its own sense of restraint cannot govern permanently without it.

Nevertheless, there is increased tolerance toward deviation and dissent. During the congress, Khrushchev and other leaders attended a recently revived play by Nikolai Pogodin, despite the fact that *Pravda* had severely criticized the author. Such a thing would have been inconceivable in Stalin's day. How long the comparatively relaxed atmosphere will last is conjectural—probably until another inflexible dogma is developed by one man able to insulate himself as the center and the symbol of the power structure. One unique feature of the Twentieth Congres was the tendency to praise the whole "Leninist" Central Committee rather than to glorify any existing leader. Apparently in the foreseeable future the dictatorship will be more subtle, less personalized, and perhaps more difficult to assess realistically than in the past. The leaders have gone to considerable lengths since the congress to convince Western diplomats that full and free discussion of all issues is the *modus operandi* of the Central Committee. They have iterated and reiterated that "dissent" is permitted, that all dissenting opinions are recorded so that if a "majority decision" later turns out to be incorrect, the dissenters cannot be blamed for the error, and that experts in appropriate fields are consulted before decisions are made. It is probably true that the Central Committee is now a more genuine forum for the expression of opinion than the USSR has known in at least two decades, and to this extent a "democracy of the élite" may well exist. However, it must also be concluded that: (1) there is still an interlocking oligarchy astride both party and government hierarchies; (2) there is no evidence that *public* debate of *policy* is any more widespread than under Stalin; and (3) major policies are still formulated in traditional oligarchical, if not personal, fashion. With respect to Khrushchev, the judgment of the Department of State seems most substantiated: that there are no conclusive reasons for assuming he has won the race for succession, but that certainly he is top candidate.[11] The vital question is whether a thoroughly bureaucratized, dogmatized totalitarian system, whatever the avowed intentions of its leaders, can really afford the luxury of genuine "collective leadership."

---

[10] *New York Times*, Feb. 15, 1956, p. 1.

The Stars in the Soviet Firmament. The membership of the Central Committee, ostensibly the highest policy-making organ of the party between congresses, was explanded from 125 to 133 on February 25, including fifty-three persons elected to that body for the first time. Seventy-six of the 122 candidate members were replaced. Most of those who were dropped were simply victims of recent changes in party and government organization in the provinces. Among the new full members, reflecting the shakeup of the police, are Colonel-General Ivan A. Serov, chairman of the Committee of State Security, and Nikolai P. Dudorov, newly appointed Minister of Internal Affairs. Prominent among those dropped were Sergei N. Kruglov, who had been removed as Minister of Internal Affairs in January, 1956, and Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, chief of staff of the Soviet navy (until he was also relieved of that post in April, 1956, because of "illness"). The navy is now represented only by a few officers still serving as candidates. A total of ten military men were dropped from the Central Committee and its candidate membership, while only four new officers were elected. Not a single naval officer and only a few army leaders spoke during the congress sessions. Clearly, the military is not especially close to the center of political power in this totalitarian system, as it is in most others.

Two days after the congress ended, the freshly elected Central Committee announced the personnel it had chosen to fill the all-important positions on its Presidium and Secretariat. The eleven members of the Presidium, the real locus of power charged with making policy between plenary sessions of the Central Committee, were re-elected without change: Bulganin, Kliment E. Voroshilov, Lazar M. Kaganovich, Alexei I. Kirichenko, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Mikhail G. Pervukhin, Maxim Z. Saburov, Suslov, and Khrushchev. Also elected were six alternate members of the Presidium; and it was on this second level of party power that the most drastic reshuffling occurred. Three of the four alternates chosen on the day after Stalin's death were not retained, meaning that five of the six present alternates are newcomers to the select circle. In the order in which they were announced, the alternates are: Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, the first professional military man to ascend to the top bracket; Leonid I. Brezhnev, chief of the party organization in the Kazakh SSR and one of the key men in the recently instituted program for development of virgin and idle lands east of the Urals; Nikolai A. Mukhitdinov, party leader and former Premier of the Uzbek SSR, another focal area in the drive to increase agricultural output; Dmitri T. Shepilov, editor of *Pravda* and a leading party theorist who replaced Molotov in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 1, 1956; Ekaterina A. Furtseva, rapidly rising First Secretary of the Moscow party organization, who is the first woman to be elevated to the highest echelon; and Nikolai M. Shvernik, titular chief of state until Voroshilov replaced him and current head of both the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Party Control Commission, who was the only alternate to be re-elected. The roster of the eight-member Secretariat, the executive arm of the all-union party apparatus, reveals the names of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Suslov, Furtseva, and Shepilov, all of whom are also either full or alternate Presidium members. The other three secretaries, who were re-elected, are Averky B. Aristov, Nikolai A. Belyayev, and Pyotr N. Pospelov. The radical changes in the Presidium's alternate membership and in the candidate membership of the Central Committee reflect the apparent desire of the "collective leadership" at the pinnacle to build a strong, relatively youthful organization dedicated to the "new" policies.

---

[11] *New York Times,* Feb. 16, 1956, p. 3.

The men whose prestige suffered most, though they were not officially demoted, were Molotov and Malenkov, the latter now Minister of Electric Power Stations. Molotov had engaged in "self-criticism" and confessed he had been at fault in telling the Supreme Soviet in 1955 that only the "basis" of socialism had been built in the USSR. He also admitted to being "the captive of habits and conventions created before World War II" and to "shortcomings manifest in the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which fact our party Central Committee pointed out in time."[12] At the congress, Mikoyan referred to past foreign policy as "ossified" and implied that the "collective leadership" had taken over active direction of foreign affairs. When Shepilov was appointed Foreign Minister in June, Mikoyan's hint was substantiated, though Molotov remained a member of the Presidium—distinctly a more important post than that of Foreign Minister. While Malenkov was Premier, March 6, 1953, to February 8, 1955, he evidently attempted to expand consumer goods industries at a faster rate than tradition or expediency dictated, resulting in his "resignation." At the congress, however, Malenkov paid his respects to heavy industry and lauded the "Leninist" principle of revealing mistakes, "no matter by whom they were made."[13] Doubtless a capable man who convinced observers during his visit to Britain in April, 1956, that a comeback is likely, Malenkov is one of the few leaders in Soviet history to fall from the summit yet remain in the party's central power nucleus.

---

[12] Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Speech at 20th CPSU Congress (Feb. 18, 1956), *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings*, Part I, p. G-10.

In addition to Khrushchev, those who emerged from the events surrounding the congress on a higher plane of prestige were Mikoyan who presided over the deflation of the Stalinist hero-figure; Shepilov who delivered a withering attack on "Western imperialism"; and last but far from least, Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov's personal acquaintance with President Eisenhower, his elevation to alternate Presidium status, and his post as Defense Minister of the Soviet government suggest that in any future correspondence or any future meetings with the President, Zhukov would be able to speak and act with authority.[14] It is no mere coincidence that Zhukov was listed first among the six alternates, implying that he is subordinate only to the eleven full members. This probability is reënforced by the fact that the other party bodies were listed in strict alphabetical order, except that Khrushchev, as First Secretary, appeared at the top of the Secretariat roster. As the conqueror of Berlin, Zhukov was so popular at the end of the war that Stalin assigned him to inconsequential posts, beginning in 1946, and kept the marshal in official obscurity. Zhukov's rise in less than three years increases his already considerable popular stature as well as the prestige of Red Army leadership generally. His promotion also fits into the pattern of "rewriting history" to delete falsified "treason" charges against several military leaders, including Marshal Tukhachevsky, who were executed during the purges of 1937–1938. The other four new alternates are comparatively unknown figures closely associated with Khrushchev in the past. Their promotion is additional evidence of his primacy in the "collective leadership."

Party Organizational and Ideological Tasks. Khrushchev announced at the congress that party membership on February 1, 1956, was 7,215,505, including 6,795,896 full members and 419,609 candidates.[15] This is the largest roster in the history of the CPSU, about three times the number of members after the purges of the late 1930's and 333,360 more than at the time of the Nineteenth Congress, an increase since October, 1952, of about five per cent.[16]

The leaders emphatically asserted that party work falls short of desired standards in several important respects. In accordance with the Leninist dictum that quality of personnel and performance is much preferable to sheer numbers, the congress' final Resolution stated:

---

[13] Georgi M. Malenkov, Speech at 20th CPSU Congress (Feb. 17, 1956), *ibid.*, Part I, p. E-3.

[14] Cf. Harry Schwartz' article in *New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1956, p. 7.

[15] *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings*, Part I, p. A-93.

[16] Figures by Aristov, *ibid.*, Part II, p. D-6.

> Following the principle that the main thing is not the numerical growth but the improvement of the quality of the party ranks, the congress instructs party organizations to intensify their care for the individual selection for party membership of leading personalities, primarily from among workers and collective farmers.[17]

For many years, as the régime sought to solve the organizational and technological problems connected with fulfillment of the successive five-year plans, the trend was progressively toward a preponderance of party members belonging to the élite administrative and technical class. The leaders have openly lamented this situation for some time. The congress speakers stressed the need to recruit many more women, young people, and ordinary workers and farmers; to pay more attention to the training of cadres; to show more inclination to promote younger members; and to distribute party personnel more rationally among the various economic and cultural sectors of Soviet society. It is not unknown in this country either, when the trend of behavior runs counter to official doctrine, to repeat the doctrine more vehemently as practice diverges further from it. In tune with the desire to inject new blood and more economically productive elements into the party, the leaders voiced the complaint again and again that too many members devote themselves excessively to "paper work," resulting in cumbersome "bureaucratic formalism" and abstract theorizing at the expense of working acquaintance with concrete economic subjects and problems. "A communist has no right to be an onlooker," Khrushchev philosophized.[18] Members must study technology, agronomy, and production.

To achieve "closer ties with the masses," the congress was told, the party would continue its practice of increasing the number of primary party organizations (i.e., party groups in factories, collective farms, Machine Tractor Stations, and the like). Aristov informed the delegates that the total number of primary party organizations is now about 350,000, with the increase since 1952 concentrating upon collective farms. However, he complained, out of a current total of 80,015 primary party organizations on collectives, there are still 7,356 farms on which no party organizations exist and 10,850 with no more than three to five communists.[19] The party's avowed efforts to secure a firmer footing in rural areas is directly related to the comprehensive plan to raise farm output sharply in the next few years. Khrushchev pointed out that the "biggest defect" in party organization is at the local level, but especially in the countryside. Evidently hoping to stimulate more efficient use of local resources and to reduce "bureaucratism" at the center, he also called upon the "weak" *rayon* (district) organizations of both the party and the government to improve their work, taking particular care to implement directives from above more conscientiously. In a move designed to invigorate the local party organs, the party statute was amended on February 24 to regularize the convening of *krai* (territorial), *oblast* (regional), and *rayon* conferences and committee sessions. The concern for party performance at the lower echelons coincides with the recent "decentralization" policies instituted by the Soviet government. More than 11,000 industrial enterprises in the past two years have been turned over to the ministries of the union-republics by the all-union ministries. For example, the Azerbaijan SSR now has its own Ministry for Oil; the Kazakh SSR, a new Ministry for Metallurgy; and so on. Decentralization has also been proceeding on an unprecedented scale in other sectors. Theaters may select their own repertories without detailed supervision by the Ministry of Culture of the USSR. State and collective farms are now allowed to recommend, and in some cases to decide for themselves, the types of crops they are best equipped to grow. Whether decentralization of initiative and authority can be more than nominal in a political system presided over by a totalitarian oligarchy, however, is open to question. For many years the union-republics have had the formal "right" of secession, while foreign and military affairs have been their constitutional prerogatives; but in practice these apparent concessions to "decentralization" have been meaningless. On the other hand, not all recent moves in the direction of "decentralization" should be equally evaluated as entirely shadow and no substance. Certainly some secondary technical decision-making might be and has been surrendered to local initiative, and in the process the relative importance of certain government and party organs has increased accordingly. Yet the comprehensive system of planning, as well as other monolithic features of the Soviet environment, make a large degree of centralized policy-making mandatory. Besides, in any system, decentralization of *authority* is not necessarily identical with decentralization of *power*.

---

[17] Resolution of 20th CPSU Congress (Feb. 24, 1956), *ibid.*, Part III, p. I-16.

[18] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. A-98.

[19] Figures *ibid.*, Part II, pp. D-8 and D-9.

A dictatorship may be expected to make life more bearable when it is asking its people to exert maximum effort to fulfill the goals of an ambitious five-year plan as well as to forget the "mistakes" of a painful past. Here is much of the rationale for the plea for "socialist legality," gestures toward individual and local "initiative," and condemnation of the harsher features of the Stalin era. Though Stalin's basic emphasis on heavy industry and collectivized agriculture has not been discarded, the present leaders seem more disposed than Stalin was to grant substantial concessions to the Soviet people at the same time. The "collective leadership" needs demonstrable "proof" that it is not a draconian régime callous toward human requirements like that of the predecessor from whom it strives to dissociate itself. The specific incentives announced at the congress and the provisions of the Sixth Five-Year Plan[20] embrace, among other things: (1) transition to the seven-hour day (42 hour week) in some branches of the economy, beginning in 1957, and in other branches to the five-day week with an eight-hour working day; (2) introduction of the six-hour day for adolescent workers between sixteen and eighteen and reinstitution of the same hours for all persons employed in underground mining; (3) reduction of the work-day on the eves of holidays by two hours; (4) "radical" improvement of old-age and disability pensions, and extension of paid maternity leave; (5) abolition in the fall of 1956 of tuition fees now charged for attendance at any existing educational institution; and (6) an increase in real wages and salaries during the plan period of thirty per cent above the level attained in 1955 (forty per cent in the case of collective farmers).[21] With comparative ease, a dictatorship swiftly shifts back and forth between the stick and the carrot. If actually consumed, the carrot is temporarily nutritious, but it may be withdrawn as suddenly as it was bestowed. Simply because the Soviet régime *is* a dictatorship, "collective leadership," "decentralization," and conciliation are just as compulsory as hero-worship, centralization, and immoderation once were.

---

[20] Only the major "calculated moderation" aspects of Soviet policy as reflected in the Sixth Five-Year Plan are relevant to the purposes of this article. Much of the discussion at the congress dealt with specialized economic subjects too technical or detailed for adequate analysis here.

Soviet Foreign Policy and World Communism. The major premise of the Kremlin's current foreign policy orientation is "peaceful coexistence." The official attitude of relatively calm assurance that means and conditions exist for realization of impressive economic and social objectives at home while Soviet influence is prudently augmented abroad pervades both the internal and the external approaches. Policies of calculated moderation in both spheres are designed to complement each other. The USSR no doubt wants "peace" in the immediate future to gain a breathing spell for further development of physical and moral prowess, while domestic policy must simultaneously "prove" that the party has the needs of its citizens at heart and validate the "superiority" of the Soviet system.

In reality, the official creed of "peace" is not a Khrushchevist invention. During the revolution and civil war period, Lenin emphasized that the then shaky Soviets should seek peace at any cost, in deference to the imperative need for consolidation of internal control and economic construction. To Lenin, "peaceful coexistence" was a short-run tactic applicable only until the Bolsheviks had digested their victory in Russia; hence he did not foresee any possibility of permanent or even long-range accommodation between the capitalist world and the USSR: "As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism."[22] Stalin, too, often stated that the USSR and "capitalism" could not long avoid a violent clash. But in the 1930's, when Moscow backed "popular front" governments in Western Europe as counterpoise against resurgent Germany, Stalin also enunciated the "peaceful coexistence" line. Indeed, whenever the leaders assigned the country tasks involving "sacrifice" for national security or drastic social measures likely to be temporarily debilitating, they have talked about "peaceful coexistence." With the need to repair extensive war damage after 1944 and to solidify wartime gains in face of increasing counterpressure by the Western powers, the leaders again expressed the formula, as this comment in an official publication appearing in 1952 typically illustrates: "The Lenin-Stalin foreign policy of the USSR proceeds from recognition of the fact that the two social systems . . . will inevitably coexist for a considerable historical period, and that coöperation between them is both possible and desirable."[23] Thus circumstances putting the USSR at a disadvantage literally forced "peace" upon Moscow, in a large sense whether the leaders liked it or not. "Peace" out of regard for self-preservation is evidence of a "basic principle" of policy only so long as the need continues.

---

[21] Nikolai A. Bulganin, Report on the Draft Directives of the Sixth Five-Year Plan to the 20th CPSU Congress (Feb. 21, 1956), *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings*, Part I, pp. J-43, J-44; Khrushchev, *ibid.*, Part I, p. A-75.

[22] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 8 (New York, 1943), p. 297.

There is a major difference, however, between the Twentieth Congress' formulation of "peaceful coexistence" and previous versions of the subject. The congress set forth in unusually concrete detail what the concept means under "present conditions." For example, Stalin never fully retreated from the view that in every capitalist society, there comes a time when the "inexorable" historical process gives way to sheer violence. "The spontaneous process of development yields place to the conscious actions of men, peaceful development to violent upheaval, evolution to revolution."[24] But the congress took a much broader view of "peaceful coexistence." It related its words to a whole chain of conciliatory *actions*, disavowed revolutionary violence as a universal phenomenon, and reserved force for certain capitalist countries under given conditions only. "It is not true," said Khrushchev, "that we regard violence and civil war as the *only way* to remake society."[25] Whether violence occurs or not will depend on what the most recalcitrant "exploiters," supported by the "repressive organs" of the bourgeois state apparatus, themselves do in a particular country, rather than on the deliberate provocation of the "proletariat." This modified stand may pose a question for the American courts. In prosecuting communists, the United States government has based its case largely upon the fact that communists, by their whole ideological outlook, inalterably seek the "violent overthrow" of existing governmental institutions. Is it possible that the prosecution's quotations from Marx, Lenin, or Stalin in the future will be countered by the defense with quotations from Khrushchev and Bulganin? Conceivably, the Kremlin may have some such thing in mind.

The reformulation of the credo of violence rests squarely on the notion that "tension" in contemporary international relations has lately been replaced by a "certain relaxation." The decisive reason for this is said to be the emergence of "a group of peace-loving European and Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as a principle of their foreign policy."[26] The final Resolution of the congress grouped these states in the "peace-loving" category: India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Finland, Austria, and

---

[23] I. Kirilin, "Lenin and Stalin on the Coexistence of the Two Systems," *USSR Information Bulletin*, vol. 12 (Feb. 11, 1952), p. 82.

[24] J. V. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (New York, 1940), p. 44.

[25] *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings*, Part I, p. A-31. Italics added.

[26] Khrushchev, *ibid.*, Part I, p. A-13.

Sweden, all of which are either former Asian colonial areas or else so-called "neutralist" states of Europe. The "zone of peace" consists of both "socialist" and "nonsocialist" states. By "socialist" states, the Soviet leaders mean those belonging to the Soviet bloc, including China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia and East Germany, with which "fraternal" relations are to be "strengthened." Yugoslavia was not called "fraternal," though it was classified as a "socialist" state populated by "fraternal *peoples*" with whom "friendship and coöperation" should be "developed."[27]

In addition to the ever widening "zone of peace" geographically speaking, there are "many other sections of society," chiefly Socialists and other "workers parties" in several countries, which also belong to the "forces upholding peace." The First Secretary discovered "increasing real opportunities" for collaboration between communists and "other segments of the working class" in the interests of forming a united front against war. When "fighting" for peace, said he, doctrinal disagreement within the "working class movement" should be shelved. Cordial references were made to the Socialist parties abroad, invariably labeled in the past decade as "lackeys of American imperialism" and typically for decades as "jabbering reformists." The Kremlin has invited the Socialist parties in Western Europe to dispatch visiting delegations to the USSR. After the French Socialists consented during the winter to pay their respects in May, 1956, the French communists initiated a campaign for a "popular front" government.

Therefore, while "socialism" became a truly "world system," the aggregate "forces for peace" have been expanding too. Such a concept required reinterpretation of the Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as "imperialism" exists. Khrushchev theorized that the "inevitability" principle was valid when "imperialism was an all-embracing world system" and the "social and political forces which did not want war were weak," but that presently the "world camp of socialism" is a powerful bastion possessing "not only the moral but also the material means to prevent aggression."[28] In assuming this position, Khrushchev relegated Stalin's already diluted theses of "capitalist encirclement" and "socialism in one country" to historical significance only, to a time when the USSR was a beleaguered island in a hostile capitalist sea. Especially since World War II, Stalinism tended to mean that *any* state outside the "socialist camp," no matter how weak it was or how vocal against insidious "Western imperialism," represented a "threat" to Soviet security. With few exceptions, any state not directly responsive to Soviet control was simply consigned to "the other side." Hence postwar Stalinism generally saw a dichotomous split between the "imperialist camp" and its "lackeys" on the one hand and the "socialist camp" on the other. The latter camp was awarded a monopoly on "upholding peace." Clearly, Stalin's approach is currently considered outmoded, too rigid and too crude to fit "conditions." Mikoyan described the

---

[27] See summary of basic foreign policy tasks in Resolution of 20th CPSU Congress, *ibid.*, Part III, pp. I-7 and I-8.

[28] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. A-29.

"new" outlook as "a fresh course, . . . a policy of high principles, active and elastic, maintained on a calm level, without abuse. . . ."[29] Though Stalin himself had virtually reached some of the same conclusions by the time of the Nineteenth Congress in 1952, naturally he is not going to be credited with acumen.

During the months following the congress, the technique of trying to win the sympathy and coöperation of the Socialists became the Kremlin's dominant policy in Western Europe. On March 31, *Pravda* issued a glowing appeal to the Socialists for "friendly collaboration" on all questions bearing upon relaxation of world tension, prohibition of atomic weapons, and establishment of a "genuine" all-European collective security system. The CPSU previously encouraged "popular fronts," not only in Western Europe in the 1930's but also in Eastern Europe at the close of World War II for the purpose of building the satellite empire which ultimately resulted.

Nowadays, however, a more ramified strategy underlies Moscow's coöperative bids. Khrushchev indicated that former colonial areas would be safe in investing their *economic* future with the USSR rather than relying on the assistance of their erstwhile "exploiters." Following the argument used when Soviet delegations appealed on the spot to India, Burma, and Afghanistan, Khrushchev told the congress: "These countries, although they do not belong to the socialist world system, can draw on its achievements to build up an independent national economy and to raise the living standards of their peoples. Today they need not go begging . . . to their former oppressors."[30] Khrushchev has astutely manipulated, to Soviet advantage, the almost obsessive introversion of many newly independent peoples who fear foreign exploitation and suspect that outright gifts are always given with ulterior motives. He assured and reassured them that Soviet offers are not contingent upon participation in "military blocs," that the USSR does not intend to turn underdeveloped countries into "agrarian raw material appendages," and that Soviet aid would not stimulate a feverish arms race nor burdensome taxation.[31] The Kremlin's economic counteroffensive, designed in part to show American assistance in its "true light," and incessant hammering on the "peace" theme have had an adverse effect on American relations with some Asian governments. John Sherman Cooper, United States ambassador in New Delhi, admitted in February that relations with India had deteriorated. Though they have subsequently improved somewhat, public opinion polls have revealed that many Indians believe the United States threatens peace, while few think the real danger lies in Moscow. Before the congress, the Soviet leaders reversed the Stalinist refusal to give anything to anyone and contributed for the first time to the United Nations technical assistance program. They then offered aid in the form of loans or barter trade to India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Liberia, Latin America, Iran and Pakistan (with the implicit proviso that the last-named state give up its affiliation with the Baghdad pact powers). Egypt and Burma have made it clear that Soviet agreement to take cotton or rice in payment is much better than accepting the political and military "strings" dangling from direct grants extended by the United States. At this point in economic warfare, for that is precisely what it amounts to, a dictatorship has a marked advantage. Khrushchev can open the purse at psychological moments, for he does not have to account for reasons or amounts to a critical press, an openly probing legislature, nor a demanding public opinion. Many of the states upon which Moscow is concentrating its economic efforts are impressed by the fact that the USSR does not appear to be inveigling them to join anything, while the United States utilizes money as a weapon of diplomacy, to enclose all uncommitted countries in the network of anti-Soviet alliances. To adamant neutralists like India, which has categorically refused to be a party to any military coalition and has shown great reluctance to accept grants, the Soviet style is very appealing.

---

[29] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. D-8.

[30] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. A-17.

[31] *Ibid.*, Part I, pp. A-17 and A-18.

To the non-neutralist, "capitalist" states, Moscow proposes coöperation in the arena of trade, more cultural and scientific interchange, and "friendship pacts" with the USSR in order to improve relations and strengthen "mutual confidence." Khrushchev suggested: "In contrast to the 'Let's Arm!' slogan of the North Altantic bloc, we put forward the slogan, 'Let's Trade!'."[32] As if it were somehow possible to separate ideological warfare from the other ingredients of world politics, Khrushchev underlined the fact that "peaceful coexistence" does not apply to the realm of ideas:

> The fact that we support peaceful coexistence and economic competition with capitalism certainly does not mean that one can relax in the struggle against bourgeois ideology and against the remnants of capitalism in the minds of people. It is our task constantly to unmask bourgeois ideology, reveal its character, inimical to the people, and its reactionary nature.[33]

Perhaps the widest departure from the traditional communist position forthcoming from the congress was the dictum that in certain countries "a stable majority in parliament" backed by "a mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat" might transform the institution from "an organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will." Such a majority in control of a bourgeois parliament "in a number of capitalist and former colonial countries" might actually bring about "the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes."[34] Such "creative Marxism," as the communists call their theorizing when they wish to overhaul their intellectual equipment for expedient reasons, comes perilously close to the legalistic "social opportunism" or "right Socialism" that Bolsheviks have always abominated. The speakers at the congress advanced some rather specious arguments concerning the difference between evolution and revolution to deny the resemblance. Almost equally surprising was the degree to which the leaders developed the notion that the transition from capitalism to socialism might proceed along different paths in different countries. In 1948, an article in *Bolshevik* stated the traditional view that the "general laws" of transition, "first revealed by Marx and Engels and verified, systematized, and developed by Lenin and Stalin on the basis of the experience of the Bolshevik party and of the Soviet State, are mandatory for all countries."[35] But Khrushchev insisted that the Soviet model need not be copied by countries in other circumstances. He cited "people's democracy" as one "peaceful" way to effect "transition," while Chinese experience reveals "much that is unique." Though civil war is not uniformly associated with the "transition" process, Khrushchev did recognize an old maxim *sine qua non*: "Whatever the form of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class, *headed by its vanguard*. Without this there can be no transition to socialism."[36] Here, at the heart of the matter, is old wine in new jugs. Unless the communists afford leadership in every country, no social transformation satisfactory to Moscow can occur under any conditions; and if the remarkably swift adaptation of the various parties abroad to Khrushchev's "creative Marxism" at the congress is any indication, communists around the world are just as susceptible to Soviet ideological shifts and "fraternal" guidance as in the past.

---

[32] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. A-26.

[33] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. A-112.

[34] Both quotations from Khrushchev, *ibid.*, Part I, p. A-32.

The Soviet leaders say they believe that any international problem can be solved by diplomatic bargaining among the great powers. Khrushchev denoted negotiation as the "sole method" of resolving controversies.[37] However, from Moscow's viewpoint, negotiation must be based on the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: *mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty* (not only does the USSR define "sovereignty" more rigidly than most states, but this presumably means also that the West must take official cognizance of the entire Soviet realm as it now exists); *nonaggression* (by being the navigator on the "inevitable" tide of history, the USSR cannot, by its own definition, be guilty of "aggression," while in any case both sides are already committed to "nonaggression" by the United Nations Charter); *noninterference in each other's internal affairs* (the USSR takes an extremely broad view of the scope of its own "internal affairs," while the traditional Western contention that communist parties abroad are agents of Soviet foreign policy still cannot be answered credibly by the Kremlin, despite Khrushchev's declaration that "it is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to order)"[38]; *equality and mutual advantage* (apparently meaning reciprocal *concessions* yielding place to gradual Soviet expansion); and peaceful coexistence buttressed with active *economic coöperation* (the Soviet bilateral barter concept is bound to attract some Western countries with chronic dollar shortages, one-commodity export countries, and governments allergic to "dollar diplomacy"). There are so many semantical pitfalls and one-sided advantages for the USSR inherent in these unilaterally promulgated bases for "negotiation" that this conclusion seems inescapable: *Moscow has no real intention of negotiating major world problems except on its own terms.* This interpretation is further substantiated by Soviet behavior at the Geneva conference in the fall of 1955. At that time, the Kremlin was presented with an unusually favorable opportunity to negotiate three outstanding matters—disarmament, extension of cultural and economic contacts between East and West, and unification of Germany as a first step in creating conditions for European security. But Molotov made it clear that the USSR would not bargain on any of these subjects, despite the relaxed but deceptive joviality of the "summit conference" in Geneva four months before. It is now plain enough that the "Geneva spirit" was a tactical curtain behind which the Soviet Union maneuvered a diplomatic victory. In the Machiavellian credo, there is no necessary connection between smiles and deeds, and still less between words and conscious objectives.

---

[35] *Bolshevik*, No. 17 (Sept., 1948).

[36] *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings*, Part I, p. A-33. Italics added. "Vanguard" of course refers to the Communist party.

[37] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. A-21.

[38] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. A-27.

Since "communist morality" admittedly allows any means whatsoever which (the leaders say) serve the end of world transformation,[39] the self-image of a "new" USSR devoted to peace, friendship, and restraint for their own sake demands close scrutiny. First of all, *the Twentieth Congress clearly did not subscribe to peaceful coexistence, parliamentary transition, nor renunciation of force under all conditions not involving direct attack on the Soviet Union.* The leaders were careful to modify the tempering of violence with such relative phrases as "in the present world situation" or "in certain capitalist countries." And even more fundamental is the fact that a few men in a totalitarian oligarchy decree in given instances whether the "situation" is or is not amenable to "peaceful coexistence." Only the élite may "develop" ideology, and there is no guarantee against sudden, diametric reversal. Soviet history yields many precedents for the recent turn of events in foreign policy. "Peace" has long been utilized as a stratagem to cloud the direction and tempo of longer-range objectives and as a soporific for the "bourgeoisie" while strength is being mustered. The First Secretary, as if in anticipation that this interpretation might be placed on Soviet deportment, commented somewhat defensively at the congress that "peaceful coexistence . . . is not a tactical move, but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy."[40] Undoubtedly Moscow is sincere about wanting peace "under present circumstances," but this says nothing about the future when other leaders might "re-create Marxism," merely by quoting Lenin's "inevitability" maxim. Moreover, "peaceful coexistence" does not seem to preclude opportunistic exploitation of the more acute existing international animosities. For example, Soviet diplomacy arranged to have satellite Czechoslovakia ship arms to Egypt in September, 1955, and to offer to train Egyptian officers. By diverting the combustible Arab-Israeli situation to its own immediate profit, Moscow obtained a foothold in the heart of the Arab lands, drew several Arab governments closer to its orbit, and precariously tilted the scales

[39] *Kratkii Filosoficheskii Slovar* (Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1941), p. 177.

[40] *20th CPSU Congress Proceedings,* Part I, p. A-26.

of power in the ultrasensitive Middle East. That the Israelis and the Arabs hovered on the edge of full-scale war as a result demonstrates that the Soviet olive branch blooms and withers quickly with the political climate of the moment in different areas of the world. The Kremlin, having little to lose and much to gain, was quick to exploit the ensuing differences between Egypt and the western powers, and the olive branch was scarcely the symbol to characterize its political collaboration with Nasser in the events preceding and following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956.

Though the *propaganda* of "peace" is now just as basic a tool as ever, the idea is presently connected with an unprecedented variety of overt behavior calculated to convince the world, in ways selectively adjusted to the tastes of different countries or social elements, that the USSR is bursting with good intentions. This is precisely what the Department of State has been insisting the Kremlin do ever since the "cold war" began. As a consequence, Moscow has taken the diplomatic edge off the official American argument that the Soviets merely utter platitudes while doing nothing to make their words ring true. In little more than two years, in addition to other moves previously mentioned, the Soviet régime opened its borders to visiting agricultural, educational, parliamentary, cultural, and even religious delegations from the West ("We smote to smithereens the stupid invention alleging that we fear contact with foreigners," said Mikoyan)[41]; selected its negative adjectives more discreetly (the leaders of the "capitalist" states are now "imperialists" rather than "blood thirsty warmongers" or "fascist beasts"); and simultaneously gravitated in numerous other directions toward an external demeanor far more moderate than has been the case in nearly three decades. After making a literally groveling apology to Tito in 1955, Moscow could hardly do less than "dissolve" the Cominform, as formally announced in April, 1956, because it had become a rabid purveyor of anti-Tito propaganda after Yugoslavia's expulsion in 1948. The Cominform was also closely associated with Stalin's methods of unbending supervision over the East European "people's democracies" and Beria's "traitorous activities," although its disappearance as a functioning body has no basic importance insofar as the relationship between Moscow and communist parties abroad is concerned. The impact of such a sequence of events, including publicized reductions of the armed forces by 640,000 in 1955 and by 1,200,000 in 1956, whether "sincerely" motivated or not, upon the "neutralist" states especially—and indeed upon the balance of critical judgment in all areas and countries—has already begun to coincide with Soviet expectations. In June, the results of parliamentary elections in Iceland indicated that the United States would be asked to give up its air base at Keflavik since the world situation is "no longer tense," and Ceylon gave increasing indications of joining the "neutralist" ranks.

The Soviets have wrested the initiative from the Western powers. The new complex of tactics represents a more flexible and formidable policy than the Kremlin has adopted in at least three decades. In the short run, world relations will not seem so "tense"; but *in the long run, calculated moderation will make the Soviet Union a more subtle and therefore a more dangerous opponent, and the international communist movement more versatile than ever.* Systems of alliances and armament spending to countervail direct military action may have been decisive in 1948 or 1950; but counteracting possible "popular fronts" and economic aid to the needy call for other responses by the West. *The USSR is now meeting the West on its own ground,* suggesting that the "revolution" can be consummated in some instances through the very parliamentary processes highly valued in Western political ideology. This is a challenge aimed at the heart of Western political morality. While Stalin abetted force in Greece, Korea, and elsewhere, it was not too difficult to convince most states in Europe and even some in the Middle East and the Far East that the Kremlin might strike in their direction next. But military coalitions and heavy taxes in support of defense programs to keep the wolf away from the door become "unreasonable" or even "warmongering militarism" when the wolf has stopped huffing and puffing. Some Western allies, which could benefit in the short run from expanded East-West trade and from diminished friction to stabilize their own internal political situations, might not prove to be the accommodating American auxiliaries they seemed before the "smiling offensive" commenced.

---

[41] *Ibid.*, Part I, p. D-9.

In a sense, the Kremlin's altered approach attests to the overall success of "containment," yet at the same time renders it obsolete by making it insufficient in itself. Stalin tried "direct action" in Western Europe when the Cominform admittedly attempted to wreck the Marshall Plan through strikes and mass disturbances, but these techniques did not live up to expectations. When Moscow sought to countermand the defensive unification of Western Europe, that failed for the most part also. The West even began to break down the Arab front of resistance to military pacts, and in 1955 the Baghdad pact materialized. Thus the more the USSR pressed the "cold war," the more people lined up on the other side. With its utilitarian outlook, the Soviet oligarchy concluded that if the Western system of alliances could not be thwarted, at least the uncommitted "neutralists" might be prevented from joining the Western camp by offering alternatives of sweet reasonableness. Especially in Asia is the moral gauntlet most profoundly challenging. Most Asian countries are extremely sensitive on the subject of "black" (Western) imperialism. In many cases they hate it more than they fear Soviet aggrandizement. Their peoples appraise Western governments in the light of their experience with European colonial administrations in the past. Hence while the Asian masses take Western achievements for granted and have first-hand knowledge of Western "mistakes," they have no corresponding acquaintance with Soviet realities; and they tend to look upon "Marxism" as if no one had ever "tried" it.

Khrushchevism is doubtless more appealing also to the Chinese comrades than doctrinaire Stalinism was. Mao Tse-tung has long been much more favorably inclined toward "collective leadership" than Stalin ever was, and he must have been pleased to hear the principle that the forms of "transition to socialism" do not depend on mimicry of Soviet experience. In addition, since the

Kremlin intends to augment trade with technical aid to China, which might be highly salutary for Peiping's current five-year plan, a more equalitarian Sino-Soviet partnership may well emerge. The other comrades abroad may have been startled by the kaleidoscopic changes in Soviet tactics, and certainly the reputations of certain foreign communist leaders, some posthumously, can scarcely escape re-evaluation—a result of switches in party line with considerable precedent. Already, Klement Gottwald, the deceased Czech leader, and Bulgaria's Vulko Chervenkov have been re-examined and found to be suffering from a new malady called "cult of the individual." Other leaders such as Bela Kun, head of Hungary's short-lived communist régime in 1919, have been officially restored to favor. The foreign communists should be accustomed by this time to dextrous accommodation, and despite outward appearances, there is no real indication that any of the parties are seriously split or otherwise maladjusted. All parties, even the one in Yugoslavia which has predicated its *rapprochement* with Moscow on the "further development" of anti-Stalinist policies, have fallen into step with the fundamentals of Khrushchevism. Comrades Togliatti of Italy and Thorez of France have criticized the present Soviet leaders for failure to clarify their own roles during the Stalinist era and for downgrading Stalin in a unilateral manner, while the *Daily Worker* has condemned the "collective leadership" for the *way* the policy of de-Stalinization has been implemented. But more important than these attacks on the details of Khrushchevism is the fact that even the Italian, French, and American parties have endorsed the assault on the "cult of the individual" in general and on Stalin in particular. The French party, which was the most "Stalinized communist movement in the world outside the USSR . . . has hardly been shaken by the iconoclasts who smashed their god."[42] The principles of Khrushchevism itself invite precisely what Togliatti, Thorez, and the *Daily Worker* have done. The speakers at the Twentieth Congress said it was no longer necessary to copy Soviet revolutionary experience, that each party should march toward "socialism" using means adapted to its own national environment, that "shortcomings" lingering from the past should be exposed with "Leninist straightforwardness," and that from now on, there would be tolerance, even encouragement, of criticism and dissent by the reformed régime in Moscow.

After all, Thorez and Togliatti did not express their "independence" until the Kremlin itself gave the signal at the Twentieth Congress that it is acceptable to disagree, that one man's opinion imposed on everyone else is a violation of Leninist criticism and self-criticism as well as of "Bolshevik modesty." The fact that these leaders dared to question the Soviet élite is evidence that the foreign parties are responsive to Soviet guidance, not unresponsive. Moscow is trying hard to make the parties abroad, even those in Eastern Europe, appear more like other political parties as far as *methods* are concerned. In view of the new relaxation of controls in the satellites and the new emphasis on "popular fronts," this should not be surprising. Khrushchev apparently wants to make the foreign comrades appear more "respectable," to get more votes in Western Europe. Just as he is permitting more "deviation" at home to unleash human energies so long pent-up under the rigors of Stalinism, so he has given the parties abroad more room to maneuver politically for the same general reason. For three decades the communists abroad have been correctly regarded in the West, with few exceptions, as servile tools of Moscow. Now the counterpropaganda of Khrushchevism is designed in part to disturb that notion. The reactions of Thorez and Togliatti underline indelibly the profound challenge to Western political morality which Khrushchevism entails. The question is, of course: To what extent can the communist movement be "liberated" and still serve the specific requirements of Soviet foreign policy in the future? But today it is in each party's own local interest to follow the milder, more respectable approach prescribed by the "creative Marxism" of the Twentieth Congress. For years, some parties had to sacrifice themselves on the altar of Soviet foreign policy, when they might have profited in their own countries by behaving differently. Only a patently undedicated communist would ignore current possibilities to move in the direction of "socialism" as local circumstances permit, utilizing a combination of expedient means blessed by the Twentieth Congress. To this extent, some of the resilience and verve of "communism" as a world movement, largely smothered under Stalin, has been deliberately revitalized by the "collective leadership."

---

[42] Suzanne Labin, "French Communism Shrugs off Stalin," *N. Y. Times Magazine*, May 27, 1956, p. 22.

Out of the byways of opportunism, certain consistent and traditional elements of the "new" foreign policy are evident. The things that have not changed are far more basic and significant for the future of world politics than those that have. The Kremlin still looks forward to a world "dictatorship of the proletariat," and no one at the congress even implied otherwise. The leading force of the "transition" is still the communist party in each country; and each party is still susceptible to signals and aid from the "fraternal" CPSU which rules one of the two most powerful states on earth. Woven into the fabric of all the "new" policies, which are in reality conscious tactics, is a strong thread that has served Moscow well many times in the past in overcoming crises and adapting to changed conditions—time.

THE GUATEMALAN AFFAIR: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY*

PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR.
University of Michigan

I

Latin views toward the United States are not merely those of the weak toward the strong. They are, by the Latins' own definition, those of the poor toward the rich, the cultured toward the uncultured, the idealist toward the pragmatist.[1] They are those of a people largely inexperienced and misled in the political arena, and without practical criteria for the Anglo-Saxon notion of "democracy," either political or cultural. But they are bitterly experienced in the ways of dictatorship, economic exploitation, and grinding poverty. Born in Iberian feudalism and Catholic fervor, the Latin plainly does not understand the largely Protestant, industrialized, politically and culturally democratic, radical (and yet conservative) United States.[2] It is certainly a slight exaggeration to say that the most important thing the two groups have in common is the hemisphere in which, by geographic accident, they live.[3]

To them we are *Yanquis*, past and present exploiters, rich *because* they are poor, slightly drunk with our new postwar power, and verging toward fanaticism in our anti-communism. But their principal current complaint against us is our overflowing generosity toward Europe and Asia and our niggardliness toward themselves. A rather common postwar joke among underdeveloped nations seems to acquire new meaning when applied to Latin America: a presidential adviser, gloomily surveying our massive aid to Germany and Japan, suggests war on the United States, because we are so generous to those we defeat.[4]

---

* Research for this paper was assisted by a grant from the Penrose fund of the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia.

[1] This view of the United States is common, not only among Latin Americans, but among nearly all underdeveloped nations. The leaders of India, for example, argue that while the United States may be rich and powerful, India has far greater spiritual values which may be glimpsed only faintly by Americans. The best expression of the corresponding Latin American view is frequently said to be found in the famed and quite powerful work *Ariel*, written by the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó, in 1900. For a short synthesis of the Indian view, see F. S. C. Northrop, *The Taming of the Nations* (New York, 1952), Chs. 3, 4, and 6.

[2] One of the better explanations of the basic characteristics of Latin American society can be found in L. Cecil Jane, *Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America* (Oxford, England, 1929), Chs. 2–8. See also Frank Tannenbaum, "The Future of Democracy in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 33, pp. 429–44 (April, 1955).

[3] The contrary view, although presented without significant documentation, is stated by former Ecuadorian President Galo Plaza Lasso in his little book *Problems of Democracy in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1955), pp. 2–3.

[4] The rejoinder of the adviser's chief is not necessarily apropos; after agreeing that this might hold possibilities, he objects, "Suppose we won?"

The disparity of United States economic aid to the various areas is striking when

Guatemala, in its backwardness, general maldistribution of power and wealth, and syncretistic culture and religion, nearly epitomized those nations which sprang from the imposition of the Spanish yoke on a relatively well-populated Indian nation. Independent of external political control in 1823, Guatemala was a member of the United Provinces of Central America until 1838. *Caudillo* followed *caudillo* in the presidency, some enlightened but most despotic, some sympathetic to the Catholic Church, some anti-clerical. As in much of Latin America, "elections" were held only when the government felt sure it could win, so revolutions became the more popular way to change governments.[5] The last completely typical *caudillo* was General Jorge Ubico y Castañeda, who came to power in 1930 and maintained himself until an almost fantastically courageous university student-led strike forced his resignation in July, 1944. A brief but uncertain interim government, taking his orders, was ousted by a real military uprising in October, and in a subsequent election, Juan José Arévalo was elected for the 1945–1951 presidential term. There is little doubt that communism got its start in Guatemala under Arévalo;[6] Arévalo's successor, Lt. Col. Arbenz, who served from March, 1951; until his ouster in July, 1954, was quite sympathetic to Communist activities, but under the best of contrary circumstances the ouster of Communists from their positions in the government would have been extremely difficult and would have stripped the government of its trained, though not necessarily efficient, bureaucrats.[7] Criticism of the character of the government, centering

---

viewed statistically. Seymour Harris, in "How Good is our Good Neighbor Policy?," *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 28, 1954, pp. 17 ff., says that "of about $80,000,000,000 of United States Government foreign aid since 1940, the people to the south of us have received but 1 to 2 per cent." The point is supported by the *Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate Communist Aggression in Latin America to the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session* . . . (Washington, 1954), p. 18: " . . . the fact remains that to this critical area we have devoted less than 1 percent of the billions of dollars of grants that we have appropriated . . . to help friendly nations. . . . "

Tom Fitzgibbons, in his article "An Empty Briefcase at Rio," *The New Republic*, Vol. 131, pp. 12–15 (Dec. 13, 1954), states even more dramatically: "Since the war, the United States has given, outright, to wealthy Belgium and tiny Luxembourg three times more than to all 20 Latin American nations."

[5] See Sol Tax, "The Problems of Democracy in Middle America," *The American Sociological Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 192–99 (April, 1945). Many of Tax' generalizations are based in part on field study and observation in Guatemala.

[6] See Daniel James, *Red Design for the Americas* (New York, 1945), an imposing synthesis based, in large part, on 1945–1954 materials. See also the somewhat more authoritative publication by the U. S. Department of State, *Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala* (Washington, 1954), pp. 35–88.

[7] James, pp. 46–52, 70 ff., cites a few of the Communists who held important positions in the government. The late John E. Peurifoy, who was United States Ambassador to Guatemala from October 3, 1953 to September 15, 1954, told a House of Representatives committee investigating Communist aggression in Latin America that his conversations with Arbenz had convinced him that the man was a Communist. *Ninth Interim Report of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Latin America of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session* (Washington, 1954), pp. 124–26 (hereinafter cited as *Hearings*).

in the United States, developed during this period. A series of five articles by Fitzhugh Turner of the *New York Herald Tribune* in February, 1950, was illustrative of the nature of this comment.[8]

Among the exiles forced from Guatemala by the operations of the Arévalo-Arbenz government was Lt. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who had been condemned to death for his implication in an unsuccessful attempt against the government in late 1950. Castillo had escaped in June, 1951, and had established himself in neighboring Honduras. By the end of May, 1954, he was openly active in the preparation of a force designed to invade Guatemala and overthrow its government. The Honduran government seems not to have undertaken to fulfill the customary obligation of nations in international law to prevent one's territory from being employed as a base of operations against a state with which diplomatic relations are currently maintained.[9] On the other hand, the Guatemalan government had not been overly-correct in its relations with Honduras. A general strike had gradually developed in Honduras between February and May, 1954, in a situation in which there had never before been organized unions or even significant labor leadership. At one time 44,000 workers were absent from work, and substantial damage resulted from untended crops and some vandalism. Ambassador Peurifoy later testified that probably at least $750,000 entered the country as aid to the strikers from Guatemala.[10] It is quite likely that Honduras' hospitality to Castillo Armas was a means of redressing the record against Guatemalan intervention.

For a brief but authoritative account of the political events prior to 1954, together with a brief description of the structure of Guatemalan government, see Austin F. Macdonald, *Latin American Politics and Government*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1954), pp. 613–21.

[8] *New York Herald Tribune*, Feb. 8–13, 1950.

[9] Green H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, 8 vols. (Washington, 1941), Vol. 2, pp. 291–98, states the general obligations in customary practice, as does Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1948), pp. 301–2. Honduran action specifically violated numerous provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American States, including articles 5, 7, 11, and 15. See United States Department of State, *Ninth International Conference of American States* (Washington, 1948), pp. 168 ff.

The *New York Times*, June 18, 1954, reported: "Foreign correspondents in the Honduran capital were impressed by the numbers of khaki-clad men in the city and gathered at the airport. Wearing no insignia, the men boarded planes without any apparent effort to hide their movements." Honduran failure to check such an obvious gathering of forces can lead only to the conclusion that that nation was in fact performing an act of aggression against Guatemala. Failure of joint inter-American action to develop under the circumstances was further an ignoring of the meaning of article 24 of the O.A.S. Charter, which states that "Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States," and of the resultant article 25: "If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory . . . of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression . . . , the American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject."

[10] *Hearings* (cited in note 7), pp. 119–20. See also the *New York Times* for this period.

II

The Tenth Inter-American Conference met at Caracas, Venezuela in March, 1954.[11] The United States had previously expressed its desire to have the conference record itself as being anti-Communist. Such a policy declaration had been elicited from the Ninth Conference in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948,[12] but in view of the increased Communist power in Guatemala it was felt desirable to reassert the compact that communism was unwelcome in this hemisphere. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles led the United States delegation during the opening phases of the Conference, addressed its plenum several times, and was rewarded by the passage of his resolution:

> . . . The . . . Conference . . . Declares: That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, . . . and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.[13]

The "existing treaty" referred to is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, written in 1947 at the Quitandinha, Brazil, Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics (often referred to as the "Treaty of Rio de Janeiro"). Article 6 of that treaty, referring to acts of aggression which are not armed attacks, seems most appropriate to the Caracas anti-Communist resolution. This article authorizes a meeting of the Organ of Consultation (the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics meeting in special session) for the determination of "measures which should be taken for the common defense. . . ."[14] The Rio Treaty and the Bogotá Charter of the Organization of American States of 1948 are in turn linked; article 19 of that Charter states: "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in articles 15 and 17."[15] It therefore follows that sanctions taken under the Caracas anti-Communist resolution cannot be construed as violative of the provisions of the Charter of Bogotá which state the principles of territorial and political integrity of the signatory states.

---

[11] These quinquennial Inter-American Conferences are declared to be "the supreme organ of the Organization of American States," by article 33 of the Charter.

[12] See resolution 32 of the Final Act of the Bogotá Conference, entitled "The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America," U. S. Department of State, *Ninth International Conference of American States* (Washington, 1948), pp. 266–67.

[13] From section 1, "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against the Intervention of International Communism," adopted as resolution 93 of the Final Act of the Conference on March 28, 1954. See U. S. Department of State, *Tenth Inter-American Conference* (Washington, 1955), pp. 156–57.

On his return from Caracas, Mr. Dulles held a press conference in which he made an effort to imply that the Monroe Doctrine was the United States' reply to the aggressive designs of Czarist Russia. *Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala,* cited in note 6, p. 788. This is a mis-emphasis of historical fact which is only slightly removed from rewriting it. For a sounder version of the circumstances, see Samuel F. Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York, 1943), pp. 48–72, and Dexter Perkins, *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston, 1941), Ch. 2.

[14] "Professor Telders" Study Group, *United Nations Textbook,* 2nd ed. (Leyden, Netherlands, 1954), p. 365.

It is significant that those who sprang to Dulles' support in the debates following the presentation of the resolution were not the democratic nations but the authoritarians, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Peru.[16] Guatemala's Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, denouncing the Dulles proposal as " . . . the internationalization of McCarthyism, the burning of books, and the imposition of stereotyped thought," received twice the ovation that Dulles did.[17] The *New York Times* reporter Sydney Gruson later put it succinctly:

> Senor Toriello had said many nasty things about the United States that virtually all Latin Americans believe. They were willing to applaud him since it cost them nothing. But not many were willing to vote against the United States when they might have to get up later in the conference and ask for economic aid. In the committee vote, only Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina sided with Guatemala.[18]

After the final vote Uruguay, frequently a Latin bellwether, said through its delegate: "We contributed our approval without enthusiasm, without optimism, without joy, and without the feeling that we were contributing to a constructive measure.[19]

Having obtained a conclusive 17–1 vote in committee, Mr. Dulles returned to Washington on March 14, 1954. The conference was to run for two weeks longer and, from the Latin viewpoint, had only just gotten to work. The Latins are not unaware of the threat to their security implied by international communism, but they have long felt that they cannot solve effectively their social and economic problems, which are indeed the breeders of communism, without substantial help from one or more of the great industrialized and capital-exporting nations. This was the problem which they had come to Caracas to dis-

---

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 371.

[16] *New York Times*, March 3 and 4, 1954.

[17] *Ibid.*, March 6, 1954. For the text of Toriello's speech see O.A.S., Tenth Inter-American Conference, *Document 95 (English), SP-23, 5 March 1954*. Toriello's argument against the United States as an interventionist nation and destroyer of Guatemalan democracy is elaborated in his *La Batalla de Guatemala* (México, 1955). Toriello here (pp. 65–66) develops his thesis that the Arbenz government was doomed from the moment of the triumph of the Republican party in the 1952 United States presidential elections, by virtue of the fact that Dulles is both stockholder and long-time corporation counsel for the United Fruit Company, and legal adviser to the company in the drawing up of the contracts of 1930 and 1936 with the Ubico government.

an interesting thought

[18] *New York Times*, March 7, 1954. The Latin American view that their votes represented a *quid pro quo* for securing a hearing for their views regarding United States' economic policy can scarcely be avoided from a literal reading of this quote. Such an interpretation is not far from the truth.

[19] *Ibid.*, March 16, 1954. Guatemala voted against the proposal, Mexico and Argentina abstained. Costa Rica did not attend the conference in protest against the government of Venezuela.

[cuss, and Mr. Dulles' proposal received their support because the present United States administration has made it reasonably clear that only nations which take approved views of international communism can expect to be recipients of economic aid or technical assistance without much American grumbling. This assistance is of course vital in view of the inability of the private sector of the United States economy to supply sufficient developmental capital to Latin America to meet that area's needs. Further, in view of their support of his proposition, Mr. Dulles' departure was, in their eyes, tantamount to his saying that he was concerned only with that support, and could not take time to discuss Latin American internal problems since they were not sufficiently important.] Mr. Dulles attended one meeting of an economic subcommittee of the Conference, but his discussion there, while frank, indicated that the United States was unprepared to discuss meaningfully Latin America's economic preoccupations.[This inability of the two sectors of the hemisphere to agree even on the nature and scope of the problems confronting them seems characteristic of inter-American relations. The post-World War II period seems merely to have witnessed a heightening of the lack of mutual understanding.]

III

From the viewpoint of the United States, the Caracas meeting's principal significance, therefore, was that it gave us the firmer anti-Communist statement desired from the Latin American nations. Guatemala was not specified in the statement, but it was obvious that it was directed against that nation. Sydney Gruson pointed out the atmosphere of the Conference:

> One of the by-products of the political committee's debate [on the resolution], many delegates believe, is the tying of the United States' hands so far as the situation in Guatemala is concerned. The United States has publicly expressed its alarm over the growing influence of Guatemalan Communists on the Government of that country. For some time much of Latin America has been expecting unilateral U. S. action in regard to Guatemala.
>
> But Secretary Dulles repeatedly assured the delegates that his resolution was not aimed at any American country and that the United States was solely concerned with intervention of international communism in this hemisphere. Much of the support given the United States' resolution was given on this understanding, and there would be deeply felt unhappiness in Latin America if, having passed, the resolution were to be turned into a weapon against Guatemala.[20]

---

[20] *New York Times*, "Review of the Week" section, March 14, 1954. For many years the Latin American nations tried to achieve United States acceptance of the principle that no nation should intervene in the domestic or international affairs of another. Specific efforts were made at the 1928, 1933, 1936, and 1947 meetings of the American nations. At the 1936 (Buenos Aires) meeting the Special Protocol Relative to Nonintervention was signed by the United States and later ratified. Article 1 of this protocol states in part: "The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties. . . ." Bemis, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–89. Article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter probably states the ultimate degree of this principle: "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. . . ."

But the declaration was to serve by implication almost immediately as if it were indicative of moral support for United States action inimical to the Arbenz government in Guatemala. The impression that the Caracas resolution might be used against Guatemala was heightened by consultation visits to Washington by the United States' ambassadors to four of the Central American nations. One of them, who was not identified, was reported by Paul P. Kennedy to have told that writer: "Well, we put through our resolution in Caracas, and now we have got to decide what we're going to do about it."[21]

On October 3, 1953, John E. Peurifoy had been appointed United States Ambassador to Guatemala. He had already established a reputation as one of the United States' more accomplished anti-Communist diplomats by his activity in Greece. It seems clear from the circumstantial evidence presented by journalists concerning the period from his arrival to the outbreak of the civil war between Castillo Armas and the Arbenz government that the United States did little to disabuse Arbenz' opponents of the notion that North American aid, moral and/or military, would not be lacking when the need arose. But it is difficult to find evidence which would clearly implicate Peurifoy or other United States' representatives in the plotting which resulted in Castillo's invasion from Honduras.[22]

Events in Guatemala leading to the civil war seem to have commenced with the State Department announcement on May 17, 1954, that a shipment of arms totalling 1,900 tons had arrived at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala. The arms shipment originated in Czechoslovakia, but reached Guatemala by a chartered Swedish ship whose charterer disclaimed any knowledge of the use to which

---

This hard-won principle was, in the eyes of the Latins, endangered by the anti-Communist resolution, as was another article of the O.A.S. Charter, number 13: "Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. . . . "

[21] See Kennedy's article in the "News of the Week" section of the *New York Times*, May 23, 1954.

[22] The lack of publicly-available proof has been noted by many writers. Donald Grant of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* writes: " . . . this writer is not in a position to assign precise roles for the events which culminated in the fall of the Arbenz government, although he was, in fact, an eyewitness to many of the decisive events. Exiled Guatemalans, the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, the United States Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States National Security Council and other agencies and individuals were involved." "Guatemala and United States Foreign Policy," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 69 (1955).

Flora Lewis, writing for the *New York Times Magazine*, July 18, 1954, p. 9, says of Peurifoy: "It was perfectly clear that his instructions and his purpose had one simple theme: 'Get rid of the Reds'." In testimony before a special House of Representatives committee investigating Communist aggression in Latin America, Peurifoy denied this charge, however: " . . . I would like to take this opportunity to explode a popular and flattering myth regarding the part I played in the revolution led by Colonel Castillo [Armas]. My role . . . was strictly that of a diplomatic observer. . . . The first and only active role that I played . . . was to lend my good offices to assist in negotiating the truce between the forces of Colonel Castillo and the military junta that was established in Guatemala after President Arbenz resigned. . . . " *Hearings* (cited in note 7), p. 114.

the ship was put.[23] News stories concerning both content and purpose conjectured unrestrainedly, but the full truth of the shipment probably will never be known. On the one hand, the *New York Times* writer Sydney Gruson reported from Guatemala City at the time of the shipment's arrival in May that the evidence seemed to indicate that the arms would be almost entirely for the army, and only in slight measure for rural or worker's militia or subversion in neighboring nations.[24] On the other hand, materials written later could not conflict more directly with this version.[25] The contents themselves are the object of equal uncertainty. While Gruson in July wrote that the bulk of the shipment was obsolete, including a great deal of materiel that can only be classed as "white elephants" by any standards relative to the Guatemalan situation, other versions argued that the arms were modern in the extreme and deadly under any circumstances.[26] The reader seems free to accept the version of his choice. The strength of the State Department version seems heightened by the fact that the ship in question, the M/S *Alfhem*, was known to have been involved in the carrying of newly-manufactured arms from the Skoda Czechoslovakian plant. It had been loading them at the Polish port of Stettin and taking them to other Communist ports throughout the world for some time preceding this incident.[27] The cloak-and-dagger atmosphere of the affair was also heightened by Secretary of State Dulles' statement that the *Alfhem* had cleared first for Dakar, French West Africa, and that it had been unloaded at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala, "under conditions of extraordinary secrecy and in the personal presence of the Minister of Defense.[28]

---

[23] Reuters dispatch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, May 22, 1954. The *New York Times*, May 23, indicates the material was shipped in cases marked "hardware, auto parts, iron rods, optical glass, etc."

[24] *New York Times*, May 24, 1954. It is ironic to note that Gruson reported in this dispatch that the outcry of the United States against the arms shipment (it had been the United States which had first released the news of the event to the world) had produced a solidarity of Guatemalan opinion behind the government that had been surprising even to government leaders themselves!

The day previous, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello had announced to the diplomatic corps at Guatemala City that his nation rejected the protest and action of the United States as "aggression," and that it was considering seriously a plea to the United Nations Security Council under article 35 of the Charter.

[25] See, for example, "Guatemala: What the Reds Left Behind," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 211, pp. 60–65 (July, 1955), by a free-lance writer, Keith Monroe. Monroe's version was substantiated to this writer by a confidential source in Mexico in the summer of 1955.

[26] Gruson's version is found in the *New York Times*, July 9, 1954. Gruson states that the bulk of the shipment was of World War II or earlier vintage, and that much of it was anti-tank mines and very heavy German artillery built to travel on the *autobahns* of Hitler's construction. Other equipment, he states, included nonfunctioning Czech, British, and German rifles, and a few useful Czech machine guns. Gruson tells the story that the army spent much of its time after the outbreak of fighting trucking the mines, which had been stored in the army headquarters in the heart of Guatemala City, out of town to prevent a catastrophe from a lucky bomb hit. This version has definite comic-opera overtones.

The contrary version, that much of the shipment was highly modern, is supported by Monroe, *op. cit.*, and the press statement by United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on May 25. In the questioning after the presentation of the statement, Dulles even conjectured that the arms might well be intended to develop a Communist strong point dominating the Panama Canal! See *New York Times*, May 26, 1954.

[27] *New York Times*, May 20, 1954.

Sydney Gruson's version in the *New York Times* could only lead to the conclusion that the Communist leaders of Guatemala had been made fools of by their own Soviet superiors; it should be added that this is not impossible, granted the apparent manner in which Soviet leaders regard Communist leaders outside of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the parallel between the shipments to Guatemala in 1954 and those to Egypt in early 1956 is inescapable.

The United States employed the shipment to arouse sympathy for its subsequent anti-Arbenz actions. It was also employed as the basis for a nearly unprecedented request to the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that they grant the United States the privilege of searching their merchant ships on the high seas for arms shipments to Guatemala. The request was rejected by all of the nations to which requests were made.[29]

On May 20, the United States concluded a Mutual Security Treaty with Honduras[30] (a similar treaty had been signed with Nicaragua on April 23), and on May 24 it was announced that the United States Air Force was airlifting war materiel to the two nations. On May 25, United States Representative Patrick J. Hillings of California repeated to the House the Dulles charge that "the arms [imported by Guatemala] apparently were to be used to sabotage the Panama Canal." On May 26, the United States searched the French merchant ship *Wyoming* at the Panama Canal, finding cases of Browning automatic rifles not carried on the ship's manifest.[31] On the 27th, three B-36 bombers paid a "courtesy call" on Managua, the Nicaraguan capital.

Nicaragua had broken diplomatic relations with Guatemala on May 19, and undertook immediately to discuss the Guatemalan situation with the other American republics, with the intention of seeking a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the members of the O.A.S. as an Organ of Consultation. In spite of its obvious concern, the United States indicated it would not try, at that time, to call for such a meeting, but rather would let the Nicaraguan action mature. But on June 7 the *New York Times* reported that the United States had initiated informal talks for the same purpose, under the terms of articles 39 and 40 of the O.A.S. Charter.

---

[28] Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 30, pp. 873–74 (June 7, 1954).

[29] See Covey T. Oliver, "International Relations and International Law; Some Problems of Inter-Relationship," a paper read at the 50th meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 9–11, 1954, pp. 7–9. Also, *New York Times*, June 19, 1954. The rumor, previously reported on May 25, that two additional shiploads of arms had departed for Guatemala, undoubtedly was instrumental in causing the United States request.

[30] For text see U. S. Department of State, *Publication 5530*, May 20, 1954.

[31] The *Wyoming* carried several cases of sporting guns and ammunition, but these had been indicated in the manifests. The Browning automatic rifles, consigned to a private address in El Salvador, had not been so listed. Evidence indicated that the falsification had been performed by some private person, not by the French Line, which operated the ship. *New York Times*, May 27 and 28, 1954.

It had been assumed generally that the United States, having by this time received informal support from a majority of the O.A.S. members for such a convocation, would propose formally that this meeting be called at the regular meeting of the O.A.S. Council on June 16. This was not done, although such a call would have made it more possible for the O.A.S. to take immediate action at the highest level when the fighting in Guatemala actually broke out on June 19.[32] United States failure to act is regrettable. Clear information concerning the facts of the situation could have been discerned more easily at that time than later, and it certainly would have given satisfaction to the entire hemisphere that the United States wanted the facts to be known.

Tension mounted within Guatemala. An effort was made to blow up a part of the railroad line to the capital from Puerto Barrios[33] and an unidentified airplane spread anti-government leaflets on Guatemala City. Secret police activity, including arrests, tortures, and murders, stepped up markedly.[34] Sporadic outbursts of violence in opposition to government police and troops occurred in outlying settlements, and the departure by air of Arbenz' mother and children on June 15 indicated the real seriousness of the situation.

---

[32] It had been expected that the meeting would be set for either June 28 or July 1 at Montevideo. Under Article 40 of the Charter of Bogotá, support of the United States proposal by an absolute majority of the O.A.S. Council would have resulted in the convocation of the meeting.

It is significant that steady United States pressure had apparently gained the acceptance of the proposal by a majority of O.A.S. members, including Mexico. The State Department's approach was designed to show that the acts of Guatemala had been a threat to the security of her immediate neighbors, and the relative success of the effort showed that the view was taken seriously. State Department spokesmen, including Mr. Dulles, noted that the Guatemalan attitude was persistently that the only real issue was that government's treatment of the United Fruit and other private interests. Accordingly, Guatemala had proposed as early as May 23 that Presidents Eisenhower and Arbenz personally discuss the matter in an effort to improve relations between the two nations. In his press conference of June 8, Mr. Dulles declared in part, "[this] is a totally false presentation of the situation. There is a problem in Guatemala which affects the other American states just as much as it does the United States, and it is not a problem which the United States regards as exclusively a United States-Guatemala problem." *New York Times*, June 9, 1954.

2

[33] The confidential source cited in note 25 stated that this destruction was actually an effort by part of the Guatemalan army to prevent the arrival of the arms at a point where they could be distributed to peasant militia units organized for the defense of the Arbenz government and to potential saboteurs in Honduras.

[34] Ambassador Peurifoy, testifying before the special House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression in Latin America, said in part: "No case of Soviet direction was more clear than what occurred after the return of [José Manuel] Fortuny [Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Guatemala] last January. A press and propaganda campaign, stirring alarm over resistance of anti-Communists to the Arbenz regime, was immediately cranked up in the endeavor to prepare public opinion for the blow to fall. Then, at the end of January, 1954, the dramatic announcement was made of the uncovering of a subversive 'plot,' with the sinister note of foreign intervention, linking the United States by innuendo as 'the country of the North' from which direction and aid was allegedly being furnished the 'plotters.' This set the stage for wholesale arrests of anti-Communist citizens and for subsequent imprisonment, torture, and even murder. Many who were later released, beaten and broken, were pushed across the frontiers into México and Honduras by the vicious truncheon-wielding police. . . . Your committee is well aware that these tactics of brutal suppression and terrorization of the opposition is characteristically the last blow of communism in a country outside of the Soviet Union before complete seizure of power." *Hearings*, p. 117.

Col. Castillo Armas' troops entered Guatemalan territory from Honduras on June 19. A period of somewhat desultory fighting followed. Arbenz resigned on June 27 after an all-day conference with his military leaders, and the Army Chief of Staff, Col. Enrique Díaz, established a short-lived provisional government composed of three officers. One of these, Colonel Elfego Monzón, replaced Díaz on the 29th, after the direct intervention of Ambassador Peurifoy. Peurifoy and a Marine bodyguard, both armed, were present in the conference room at the time power changed hands.

Monzón and Castillo Armas met in San Salvador, the capital of the neighboring nation of El Salvador, on June 30, under the good offices of Salvadorian President Oscar Osorio. Initial talks seemed inconclusive, and Peurifoy was notified that his presence would be desirable. He had been holding himself in readiness in Guatemala City, and flew immediately to San Salvador. He was quoted as saying, as he debarked from his plane at the airport, "We will get this straightened out." Monzón and Castillo Armas reached an accommodation on July 2. A June 30 *Christian Science Monitor* dispatch headed "Red Guatemala Rout Ups U. S. Obligations" seemed to epitomize the intimate role the United States had played in the change of governments, while Milton Bracker of the *New York Times* wrote in that paper's July 3 issue: "The signing [of the Monzón-Castillo Armas agreement] represented an unmistakable victory for United States policy, and particularly for . . . Peurifoy, . . . who had taken an essential, difficult role in bringing it about."[35]

The conclusion that the United States played an important part in the struggle in Guatemala seems inescapable. It cannot be shown that any of the arms airlifted to Honduras or Nicaragua ultimately appeared in the hands of the Castillo Armas forces. Rather, news reports indicate that the Castillo troops were armed with a hodge-podge of weapons, including even a few muzzle-loading rifles. Jeeps, DC-3, and P-47 aircraft were used by Castillo's men, but the ubiquity of such materiel, ten years after the Second World War, is virtually axiomatic. In fact, the military strength of Castillo was largely symbolic, and casualties and combats were few. The decision of the Guatemalan army not to seek battle with Castillo was really what toppled Arbenz.[36] But it can be shown that the United States played a role in the United Nations which tended to deny to Guatemala the privileges apparently guaranteed it by its membership in that organization. At the same time vacillatory Guatemalan action made it difficult for the U.N. and the O.A.S. to do anything significant to prevent the success of the Castillo movement.

---

[35] See both *New York Times* and *Christian Science Monitor*, May 18 to July 3, 1954, for articles covering the affair. See also James, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–19, and Milton Bracker, "The Lessons of the Guatemalan Struggle," *New York Times Magazine*, July 11, 1954, p. 11.

[36] See *Life*, July 12 and July 19, 1954, for illustrations indicative of the arms used in the fighting.

IV

In response to the urgent request of the Guatemalan representative on June 19,[37] the U.N. Security Council met on the call of its president, United States representative Henry Cabot Lodge, on June 20. Guatemalan representative Eduardo Castillo-Arriola asked immediate U.N. investigation of his charge that the fighting had begun with the invasion of his country by forces stationed in Honduras and Nicaragua and backed by "foreign monopolies" with the knowledge of the United States State Department. The two accused nations denied this, and a draft resolution was presented by Brazil and Colombia.[38] The draft pointed to the availability of machinery under the O.A.S. for the possible settlement of the problem, provided that the Security Council would refer the problem to this machinery, and asked for immediate O.A.S. action to bring bloodshed to an end. The vote on the resolution was 10–1, the Soviet representative vetoing. An innocuous French-offered resolution calling for a termination of bloodshed was then adopted, ending five hours of occasionally bitter debate.[39]

The Brazilian delegate remarked that the Soviet veto did not prevent the O.A.S. from taking action in the matter.[40] But the Security Council took no action to insure the enforcement of the resolution, and did not ask the O.A.S. to take action for several days. In the meantime, Guatemala, which on June 19 had asked immediate O.A.S. action (and was accorded a special meeting of the Inter-American Peace Committee within three hours after the delivery of the Guatemalan note), reversed its ground completely on the 20th and told the Peace Committee it would not cooperate with Committee action pending the outcome of the resolution of the Security Council of the 20th. This was in spite of the realization that that resolution was essentially meaningless from the viewpoint of terminating attacks on the Arbenz government.[41] The sudden Guatemalan switch was explained on the nominal ground that Guatemala had never completed its ratification of the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the O.A.S. Charter, documents which provide the legal bases for action on behalf of the O.A.S. by the Peace Committee.[42] The argument presented by the Guatemalan delegation was that the Peace Committee " . . . is only competent to deal with disputes between the Member States . . . ."[43] This completely ignored the record of several years' action by Guatemala, which seemed to offer presumptive evidence that Guatemala considered itself a full member of the O.A.S. family of nations.

---

[37] U.N., *Document S/3232*, June 20, 1954.

[38] U.N., *Document S/3236*, June 20, 1954. Sr. Castillo-Arriola's statements obviously referred to the private United States enterprises in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company being not only the best known but the favorite target of the Arbenz regime and its spokesmen. This attitude is explained in greater detail in Toriello, *op. cit.*

It seems unnecessary to belabor the role of the Fruit Company in the Caribbean area, since this has been done virtually *ad nauseam* in a number of excellent and well-documented books. See particularly Charles David Kepner, Jr., and Jay Henry Soothill, *The Banana Empire* (New York, 1935), and J. Fred Rippy, *The Capitalists and Colombia* (New York, 1931). The company has played a more enlightened role in the area as the result of recent pressures, but its mere size lends credence to the recent emotional outbursts against it by nationalistic leaders. Sydney Gruson, in an article in the *New York Times* "Review of the Week" section for July 4, 1954, reports its assets at $579,342,000, of which approximately 10 per cent was located in Guatemala.

[39] U.N., *Documents S/3237* and *S/PV. 675*, June 20, 1954.

[40] The U.N. Charter provides (article 12) that the General Assembly may not make "any recommendation" regarding a dispute while the Security Council remains seized of it. But there is no analogous statement regarding regional organizations. The Charter states only (article 52, par. 3) "The Security Council shall encourage the . . . pacific settlement of local disputes through . . . regional agencies. . . . " Article 53, par. 1 reinforces this. In the absence of definitive Charter statement on the matter, it seems quite indefinite. Norman J. Padelford in his "Recent Developments in Regional Organizations," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting (1955), pp. 23–41, finds only the views of the Colombian delegate who was chairman of Committee III/4 of the U.N. Conference on International Organization at San Francisco (1945), as a basis for conjecture on this point. Padelford states that " . . . it would not have been incompatible with the accord reached at San Francisco *if* the Security Council had encouraged the parties to go to a regional organization and then had considered under Articles 33 or 34 a request to investigate whether a situation existed likely to disturb international peace and security." (His italics.)

The Council was never seized of the Guatemalan issue. See U.N. *Documents S/3253*, June 28; *S/3261*, July 6; and *S/3265*, July 12, 1954.

Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello and the Soviet representative combined to bring pressure on Security Council President Lodge for a second Council meeting on June 25. The fighting had continued, and Guatemala had not hesitated to level serious charges against its neighbors, although Castillo-Arriola, the Guatemalan representative, wrote anachronistically in a letter of June 23 that " . . . certainly Guatemala has no dispute of any kind with the neighboring States of Honduras and Nicaragua."[44]

---

[41] On June 19, the Guatemalan Chargé in Washington delivered a note to Luis Quintanilla, chairman of the Peace Committee, asking for an immediate meeting of the Committee for the purpose of taking action in regard to Castillo Armas' attack. The note alleged the intimate participation of Honduras and Nicaragua. Quintanilla further received a telephone call direct from Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello that midnight, asking that an investigating subcommittee leave for Guatemala on the 20th.

But on the afternoon of the 20th , the Chargé notified Quintanilla by telephone that the Guatemalan request was to be withdrawn, on the ground that the Security Council was considering the matter. This was later confirmed by several notes. See O.A.S., *Informe de la Comisión Interamericana de Paz sobre la Controversia entre Guatemala, Honduras, y Nicaragua*, Document CIP-131/54, pp. 1–3. Full texts of the notes and other documents mentioned are contained in the appendix of this report.

[42] See United States Department of State, *Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security* (Washington, 1948), pp. 59–65, for the text of the treaty. See also *Ninth International Conference of American States* (cited in note 12), pp. 170–71, for the text of chapter six of the Charter, which provides for peaceful settlement of disputes among the signatories.

The Peace Committee was extended and accorded a vote of confidence by resolution 102 of the Caracas (Tenth) Inter-American Conference. See *Tenth Inter-American Conference* (cited in note 13), pp. 101–2.

[43] U.N., *Document S/3241*, June 23, 1954.

[44] *Loc. cit.* See also *Documents S/3238, S/3240, S/3244, S/3246,* and *S/3248*, June 21–24, 1954.

The Council meeting voted to take no direct action until it had the opportunity to receive a report from the Peace Committee.[45] The Guatemalan government, which prior to the second Council meeting had rejected O.A.S. Peace Committee investigation, now reconsidered and announced it would welcome it. The date was the afternoon of June 26. After confirming the Guatemalan change of attitude, the Committee on the 27th determined that it would send a five-member team to Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, starting the 28th.[46]

At this juncture, it was announced that ten nations, including the United States, had requested a special meeting of the O.A.S. Council to consider the advisability of calling a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Rio Treaty under the terms of articles 6 and 11 of that treaty. The note had been presented to the O.A.S. Council chairman on June 26. Notwithstanding the June 27 resignation of Arbenz in favor of Enrique Díaz, the matter was pressed on the 28th by the United States. The meeting was voted unanimously, for Rio de Janeiro on July 7.[47] The discussion was a lengthy one, and attitudes expressed by some Latin American representatives seem to indicate considerable reserve regarding the statement of United States representative Dreier which conveyed the thesis that had been maintained steadily by his government, that the Guatemalan matter could only be interpreted as an attack on the hemisphere by international communism.[48]

It seems quite tenable to argue that the action was intended as a smokescreen rather than as a sincere request. Dreier's statement acknowledged that governmental changes were proceeding in Guatemala, but argued that it was yet too early to know if the new government would be free of the Communist taint. Certainly events between June 16, when it had been anticipated generally that the United States would ask such a convocation, and June 28, had not heightened the dangers of Communist profit in Guatemala. If anything, the position of Arbenz would seem to have weakened during this period. Surely there can have been no real suspicion that the government attacked by Castillo Armas could continue to govern Guatemala for any length of time. The question why the United States should have requested the investigation after the horse had fled the stable, rather than before, seems almost rhetorical under the circumstances. Investigation, or the proposal of a real study of the situation, prior to the outbreak of fighting, would have been sincere. The action of the 28th was only an empty gesture. Events, of course, proceeded in the direction of Arbenz' ouster, and with the agreement of July 2 between Castillo Armas and Monzón, all rationale for the meeting disappeared.

The O.A.S. Council met in special session on July 2 to approve 18–1, with one abstention, the motion presented by Honduras and seconded by the United States that the July 7 meeting be postponed *sine die*. Perhaps the most meaningful attitude taken in the discussion was that of Argentina. Its representative pointed out that while his country was as anti-Communist as any other, it was also concerned with armed intervention in the affairs of any other American nation, for whatever reason. Argentina further argued that the Guatemalan affair had in reality been only the beginning of such intervention, and as such deserved study. Further, in the light of the accusations against certain nations by the late Guatemalan government, the Argentine representative implied he would assume that they would welcome confirmation of the truth of their denials of complicity.[49] It was not often that one found Perón's Argentina thus on the side of the angels!

---

[45] U.N., *Document S/PV. 676*, June 25, 1954.

[46] *Informe de la Comisión Interamericana de Paz* (cited in note 41), pp. 6–10.

[47] O.A.S., *Document C-a-153, Corr.*, Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria celebrada el 28 de Junio de 1954 (Washington, 1954).

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 794–800.

But the Argentine point was lost. And, of course, the inspection team of the Peace Committee did not reach its destination either. It was in Mexico City when the Castillo-Monzón negotiations opened, and it remained there. At the urgent request of the Monzón *junta*, it cancelled its trip at that point on July 2 and returned to Washington.[50] The inaction of the U.N. Security Council and of the Inter-American Peace Committee (as agent for the O.A.S.) had combined with the successful operations of Castillo Armas to overthrow the Arbenz government.

V

The assignment of responsibility for the outcome to any single nation is difficult. The Arbenz government cannot be separated in our thinking from the role of martyr it voluntarily chose to assume. Had it not blocked Peace Committee intervention, it is possible—though not necessarily probable—that we would understand more clearly the maneuverings of both the United States and the Soviet Union. While it was conceivable in theory that the Peace Committee's field investigations might have produced a resolution of the condition in favor of the Arbenz government, it does not necessarily follow that this would in fact have been the outcome. Comparison of the Guatemalan matter's handling by the Peace Committee with the behavior of the O.A.S. Council in the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan dispute in January and February of 1955 seems inescapable. In the latter instance, the Council chairman was Dr. José Mora of Uruguay. His precedent-making action was responsible for immediate Council response to the Costa Rican complaint, and a cessation of hostilities in time to save the established Costa Rican government. This action in itself bears inspection for its implications for meaningful response by international organizations to threats to the peace of the world. It is of more than passing importance, however, to note that in this latter instance the United States accepted the lead of the Council, and that this acceptance made the Council's action significant in the solution of the matter. It seems doubtful that the United States would have supported a similar Council request on behalf of the Arbenz regime.

---

[49] O.A.S., *Document C-a-155*, Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria celebrada el 2 de Julio de 1954 (Washington, 1954), pp. 920–22.

[50] *Informe de la Comisión Intramericana de Paz* (cited in note 41), pp. 10–14.

The Arbenz government, after first seeking help from the Inter-American Peace Committee, reversed its ground and decided to place its hopes in the U.N. Security Council. It is true that U.N. intervention has, in certain situations, been effective for the restoration of peace. It is also true that the Communist-controlled Arbenz government could receive the moral support of the Soviet Union in the U.N., while it could not in the O.A.S. It seems likely that this latter consideration was of greater significance in Guatemala's decision to present its case to the Security Council than any possible conflict of interest or jurisdiction which might have arisen between the U.N. and the O.A.S. One may wistfully remark that it would be most interesting to see the correspondence, diplomatic or (probably) otherwise that must have passed between Guatemala City and Moscow's agents on June 20, 1954, the day the Arbenz government decided to abandon its request for immediate O.A.S. action and turned completely to the U.N. Security Council.

But the international legal niceties of the jurisdictional question are not the focus of this paper, however interesting they may be. It seems sufficient to note that there has never been any definitive answer to the question: Does action by a regional organization preclude simultaneous remedial action by the United Nations? Closely linked to this question is another: Would not a decisive resolution of this question imply the relegation to political ineffectiveness of one or the other organization?

It is therefore significant that Guatemala chose to go to the Security Council. The Soviet Union, fulfilling expectations, vetoed a resolution calling for meaningful investigation by the O.A.S. The United States delegate denounced this Soviet action in heated words and rejected the alternative to O.A.S. action, the U.N. intervention asked by Guatemala.[51]

While the United States has frequently posed as a defender of the United Nations, at least in its clashes with the Soviet Union, the United States was here placed in the unhappy position of questioning the sincerity of an appeal to the organization. Mr. Lodge's dual position as United States delegate and Security Council President was productive of further embarrassment, for Guatemala's numerous notes stating that the "bloodshed" had not ceased and that outside help was being given the Castillo Armas forces stated also what many did not doubt, that the entire matter was the product of United States support, indirectly if not directly. When, on June 22, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello wrote Lodge, as Council President, asking that the Council take steps to assure that the resolution of June 20 be made effective, Lodge replied:

> . . . the Soviet Union . . . has crudely made plain its desire to make as much trouble as possible in the Western Hemipshere. . . . But the Government of Guatemala should not lend itself to this very obvious Communist plot, lest they should appear to be a cat's

---

[51] Oliver, *op. cit.* (note 29), observes cryptically, " . . . the sensitively attuned representatives of some of the other American republics must have felt [Lodge's 'emotional asides'] were reversions to the older, unilateral version of the Monroe Doctrine, to 'manifest density,' Senator Platt and all of that." For the text of the Lodge statement see U.N., *Document S/PV. 675,* paragraphs 164–172, and 223.

> paw of the Soviet conspiracy to meddle in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, as it is, many persons will wonder whether the whole imbroglio in Guatemala was not cooked up precisely for the purpose of making Communist propaganda here in the United Nations. This I am sure Mr. Toriello would not want.[52]

The implication that even Castillo Armas was a part of the "whole imbroglio" is inescapable, and the sarcastic concluding sentence can only be described as tongue-in-cheek. The tone of the reply certainly states that a government which does not trust the impartiality of a regional organization's procedures—*as Guatemala's leaders obviously did not*, granted the predominant position of the United States in that organization—has no alternative but to use the regional procedure anyway. It can be argued correctly that the resolution calling for referral of the Guatemalan appeal to the Inter-American Peace Committee was introduced jointly by two Latin American nations and not by the United States. But events over a long period both before and after the meeting of June 20 indicate fully that Latin American nations are frequently ready to perform the United States' desires in order to avoid embarrassment to this country. The suspicion that this very thing was occurring on June 20 became valuable capital for Soviet and Guatemalan argumentation in the debate of that day.

Mr. Lodge continued in his reply to Guatemala's request for a second Council meeting, " . . . it has become increasingly plain that the situation in Guatemala is clearly a civil—and not an international—war . . . ." This seemed to fly in the face of all the evidence then available, and certainly caused serious doubts as to the good faith of the United States. But it was an attempt to offer a rationale for O.A.S., rather than U.N., action. Mr. Lodge's statements would not have been so devastatingly a denial of "due process" to Guatemala had he not been Security Council President. Mr. Lodge was placed by Guatemalan-Soviet tactics in the unfortunate dual position of defending politically the reputation of the United States while at the same time behaving correctly as President of the U.N. Security Council. In the latter capacity his functioning and impartiality were impaired by the feeling he apparently had that he must, as United States representative, denounce Guatemala as cynical because of its consistent request for U.N., as opposed to O.A.S., action. His choice of words can only be construed as gratuitous, since Guatemala's appeal to the U.N. was not improper under its position as a member only of the U.N. The Soviet veto of the Brazilian-Colombian resolution calling for inter-American Peace Committee jurisdiction over the civil war also was not improper, although it may well be viewed as cynical. In the Council debate of June 20, both the Soviet and Guatemalan delegates called repeated attention to articles 34, 35, and 52 (par. 4) as substantiation for their contention that the Security Council had both jurisdiction and responsibility. The failure of the Guatemalan delegate to secure the introduction of a resolution in the Council calling for U.N. rather than O.A.S. action may well have been a tactical device (dictated by the Soviet Union?) designed to condemn the United States by implication, rather than directly. If so, it did not fail of its purpose.

---

[52] *Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala* (cited in note 6), p. 18.

If a case can be made that the Guatemalan affair was necessary by reason of unbearably imminent Communist danger, there is perhaps a rationale for the behavior of the United States. Secretary Dulles' statement of May 25 and address of June 30 made a serious effort to make such a case.[53] But it must be argued that, if such danger existed, effective and impartial investigation would certainly have shown it, and would have eased the minds of many small nations in both Latin America and elsewhere. Since no investigation was permitted, by an ironic coincidence of United States and Soviet Union policy (the Arbenz government assisted in the development of this coincidence), the answer will forever hang on the statements of Mr. Dulles and the State Department.[53a] In terms of preserving its good reputation, the United States was in the position of having to make out a case for its actions. The Soviet Union, as so often happens, was not. One wonders if the United States would, in fact, have countenanced a full field investigation by an international body. In the absence of generally believable facts, conjecture runs riot. Guatemala's geographic position relative to the United States and to the Panama Canal renders rather unreasonable a statement that even a thoroughgoing Communist government could have been a substantial threat to the security of the United States, and the Mutual Security Treaties of April and May with Nicaragua and Honduras, respectively, served to put them beyond the immediate damage possible from irregular guerrilla troops operating on the basis of the famous 1,900-ton arms shipment. At the time of the shipment, numerous spokesmen for the United States government pointed out that Guatemala is but two hours' flight time from either the Panama Canal or the territorial United States, as modern jet aircraft fly. This is quite true, but such calculation is not equivalent to saying that jet aircraft *do* fly from Guatemala. The only airfield even scarcely suitable for such air operations, La Aurora at Guatemala City, is open to constant observation from the city itself by all who wish to look to see the planes taking off. Should such aircraft actually have begun to operate there, or should the government have expelled all suspect individuals (including, of course, United States citizens not excepting the United States Military Missions which remained there throughout the civil war), the United States would have had ample warning.

The shocked conscience of the world was probably represented best in the British House of Commons on July 14, 1954, by Clement Attlee, head of the Labor party, in foreign affairs debate:

> The fact is that this was a plain act of aggression, and one cannot take one line on aggression in Asia and another line in Central America. I confess that I was rather shocked at the joy and approval of the American Secretary of State on the success of this *putsch*.
>
> . . . we cannot pass this off as just a Central American squabble, of which there are so

---

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–34.

[53a] See the speech by Donald McK. Key, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, in United States Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. 31, pp. 115–118 (July 26, 1954) for a most flagrant misrepresentation of the situation.

> many. There was a principle involved and that principle was the responsibility of the United Nations. I think it was a mistake in these circumstances to try to hand over to a regional body. We might also have talk of handing over to a regional body in other parts of the world [China] and I do not think we would like the results very much. Therefore, I am afraid that Guatemala has left a rather unpleasant taste in one's mouth because, to illustrate the theme I was putting, it seems in some instances that the acceptance of the principles of the United Nations is subordinated to a hatred of Communism.[54]

And William Frye, the *Christian Science Monitor's* United Nations writer, concludes:

> The reputation of the United Nations as the primary resort of victims of aggression . . . has been beclouded. The Soviets, of all people, have been enabled to pose as the U.N.'s champion against attack by the United States. . . . Here at U.N. headquarters, the United States' reputation as stout champion of collective security has been severely tarnished.[55]

Mr. Frye's conclusion makes reference to Sydney Gruson's observations regarding the Caracas anti-Communist resolution almost inescapable (see above, p. 792). It may well be that the United States, in late May and early June, 1954, had been able to present so persuasive a case to its fellow American Republics as to convince them that Guatemala presented a threat of subversion to them all. The comments of Arthur Krock of May 27, 1954, plus the arguments of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Dreier, indicate that such effort was made.[56] Thus the State Department was aware of the views which were reported by Gruson. But the entire situation leads to the conclusion that the United States failed to give evidence of faith in the processes of the United Nations; that it dragged its feet regarding effective O.A.S. action beyond the point of reason; that it was intimately involved in a situation of subversion of a constitutional government; and that it did not at any time undertake to make the record clear to the people either of the United States or of Latin America. However justifiable the circumstances may have been, the United States has not allowed itself to be put in a complimentary light.

VI

Obviously none of this touches on the question of the qualities, democratic or undemocratic, of the Castillo Armas government which became the chosen instrument of the United States. Castillo was confronted with a well-nigh insurmountable problem of government. He found himself with a ruined treasury, a suspect bureaucracy, and a citizenry frightened and mutually suspicious. His career military training had little prepared him for his new role. Yet the consensus has been that he has done well with the raw materials at hand.[57]

---

[54] H. M. Stationery Office, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons,* Official Report, 5th Series, Vol. 530 (London, 1954), cols. 489–90.

[55] *Christian Science Monitor,* June 26, 1954.

[56] See Mr. Krock's column in the *New York Times* of that date.

[57] See the series of articles by Paul P. Kennedy in the *New York Times* on Castillo's first anniversary in office, June 30–July 4, 1955.

Perhaps the intervention of the United States has come off better than we had any right to expect![58]

But the essential point of the experience has not been altered by the relative success of Castillo Armas. Rather, the entire experience seems to indicate the desirability of a stock-taking regarding United States foreign policy *vis-à-vis* Latin America. From the date of the passage of the anti-Communist resolution at Caracas, Latin America, it has been shown, considered that the days of the Arbenz government were numbered. Few were surprised when the blow fell, although the precise manner and blunt nature of it had not been foreseen. Just after the start of the Guatemalan fighting, Joseph C. Harsch wrote:

> . . . The only question seriously at issue is whether the United States can manipulate an operation of this kind skillfully and successfully. . . . If there were no native revolutionary movement to encourage and support, then some other . . . remedy would have to be found. Fortunately, there was a bona fide native movement; and, fortunately, Honduras was willing to let it be launched from Honduran soil. . . .[59]

Harsch continues:

> The best thing, of course, would be to prevent the establishment of communism in the first place. Unless and until more is done in the preventive line than has been done recently there will have to be more operations of this type. Economic aid in Latin America was one of the victims of the 1953 economy wave in Washington.

Mr. Harsch's contention is true, for our record with regard to our overall economic policies (not just economic aid) is far from satisfactory or consistent.[60] But even more urgently needed is some means of demonstrating, in forceful and pragmatic terms, the intimate connection between the security of the United States and that of the other nations of the hemisphere. This will not be accomplished by a contrived revision of history, nor by the imposition of North American standards of political morality on Latin Americans. Rather, it can be accomplished by punctilious compliance with both the spirit and letter of inter-American obligations, a vigorous effort to explain the United States viewpoint and nature to Latin Americans in such terms as will be understandable within their own frames of reference, and a conduct of economic relations such as to give evidence that this country is as concerned with the material advance of Latin America as it is with the advance of areas farther from our own borders.

---

[58] Instrumental in the survival of the Castillo government has been a series of grants, loans, and technical assistance agreements concluded between Guatemala and the United States. See *General Agreement for Technical Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Guatemala*, signed at Guatemala City September 1, 1954, and entered in force on the same day. Department of State, *Publication 5698* (Washington, 1955). See also Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings . . . on the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1956* (Washington, 1955), pp. 288, 306–8, 313.

[59] *Christian Science Monitor*, June 22, 1954.

[60] Perhaps the most comprehensive and critical survey of recent United States economic policy toward Latin America is Simon G. Hanson's article, "The End of the Good-Neighbor Policy," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. 7, pp. 3–49 (Autumn, 1953). Mr. Hanson's writing is very harsh, but his vigorous judgments make far too much sense to be ignored.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES*

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER†
Deputy Secretary, Department of Internal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Gilbert Abcarian, Political Romanticism: Coleridge and Tolstoi. *California* (Berkeley).

Fred Ablin, George Plekhanov and the "Iskra" Period. *Columbia.*

Milton C. Abrams, The Political Philosophy of Christopher Saint German. *Utah.*

Minoo Adenwalla, Political Philosophy of the Indian National Movement. *Northwestern.*

Albert Alexander, Impact of U. S. on Revolutionary Ideas in Europe, 1830–1848. *New School.*

Robert J. Alperin, Problems of Leninism: The Communist Party, U.S.A., 1930–1956. *Northwestern.*

Moses J. Aronson, History of Legal Thought in America. *New School.*

Justin Atkinson, The Political Thought of L. T. Hobhouse. *California* (Berkeley).

Meyer Auerbach, American Theories of Democratic Politics. *Columbia.*

Robert D. Barendsen, The Chinese Communist Germ Warfare Propaganda, 1952–1953. *Yale.*

Charles S. Bednar, Pragmatism: A Projected Metaphysics for a Democratic Society. *Columbia.*

Stanislaus Belch, Paulus Vladimiri and his Doctrine: A Historical and Political Study of the 15th Century Polish School of International Law, with Ten Treatises of Vladimiri Critically Edited. *Notre Dame.*

---

* Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW annually since 1911, except for 1915–19, 1921 and 1923–24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX, 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1955, list are in general classified under the same headings in the present list, and new items have been assimilated to the 1955 classifications as far as possible. In cases where classification of an item has been suggested by the institution concerned, the suggestion has been followed. Each item is listed under one classification only.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science. Often dissertations are in progress in departments of economics, history, sociology, etc., which overlap or supplement dissertations in preparation in political science. Attention is called especially to the following lists: "Current Research Projects in Public Administration" (reported to Public Administration Service), the most recent edition of which appeared in 1951; "Doctoral Dissertations in Political Economy in Progress in American Colleges and Universities," in the *American Economic Review;* "List of Doctoral Dissertations in History Now in Progress," published annually by the Division of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution through 1938, and since then by the American Historical Association, as supplements to the *American Historical Review* (1940 and 1941), as Vol. III of its Annual Report (1941), and as separate publications (1947, 1949 and 1952); and "Doctoral Dissertations in Sociology," in the *American Journal of Sociology.* Consult also the "External Research List," published by the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State. These are in addition to the "List of American Doctoral Dissertations Printed in 1938," the most recent of an annual series published by the Library of Congress; and Arnold H. Trotier and Marian Harman, "Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities, 1952–53," the twentieth of a series beginning in 1933–34, compiled for the Association of Research Libraries. Consult, for other lists, T. R. Palfrey and H. E. Coleman, Jr., "Guide to Bibliographies of Theses, United States and Canada" (Chicago, American Library Association, 2nd ed., 1940).

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

† On leave of absence from the University of Pittsburgh.

Laurence Berns, The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon with Special Attention to the Principles of Foreign Policy. *Chicago.*

Samuel B. Bloom, Public Housing and Politics in Richmond, California. *California* (Berkeley).

William T. Bluhm, The Theory and Practice of Social Catholicism. *Chicago.*

Robert L. Bock, The Political Philosophy of Subhas Chandra Bose. *American.*

Wilmer L. Bohlmann, The Legal and Political Theories of Leon Duguit. *Washington.* (Seattle).

George F. Brasington, Jr., Representative Government in Jacksonian Political Philosophy. *Illinois.*

William R. Brown, Deviations in American Communism: The Influence of American Politics and Economics on Communist Theory. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Francis P. Canavan, S.J., The Role of Reason in Politics: Burke and 18th Century Rationalism. *Duke.*

Vincent Chen, Mao Tse-tung's Views of the Chinese Communist Revolutionary War: A Critical Study. *Yale.*

Yung Ping Chen, Comparative Study of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's and Mao Tse-tung's Political Theories. *Maryland.*

Vincent C. Chrypinski, The Progressive Catholic Movement in Poland. *Michigan.*

Jules Conn, The Political Theory of Lester Frank Ward. *Rutgers.*

Michael R. Curtis, The Theories of European Syndicalism. *Cornell.*

J. Raymond Derrig, S.J., Political Thought in American Catholic Newspapers. *St. Louis.*

Susan H. Devine, The Political and Social Philosophy of Herbert Hoover. *Pennsylvania.*

Paul M. Downing, Corporatism or Solidarism in Catholic Social Philosophy. *Columbia.*

David M. Earl, Political Thinking in Maiji Japan. *Columbia.*

Harris I. Effross, The Political Philosophy of Herbert Croly. *Rutgers.*

Emily H. Ehle, The Identification of Local Leadership within an American City (Philadelphia). *Pennsylvania.*

Arnett A. Elliot, Contemporary British Conservative Thought. *Columbia.*

Frank Evans, Jr., The Political Theory of Richelieu. *Georgetown.*

Edward Fishman, The Political and Social Philosophy of Owen J. Roberts. *Pennsylvania.*

Martin Fleisher, Political Theory of James Harrington. *Columbia.*

Theodore B. Fleming, Jr., John Stuart Mill's Essay *On Liberty* and Its Critics. *Yale.*

Thomas A. Flinn, Croce, Collingwood and Cassirer, Their Concept of Method in the Study of Man and Application to Politics. *Minnesota.*

Garland Fothergill, Political Ideology of the New Republic. *Minnesota.*

Julian Franklin, The Theory of Caesarism. *Columbia.*

Leonard Freedman, Group Opposition to Governmental Welfare Activities in the United States. *California* (Los Angeles).

Thomas M. Furst, American "Anti-Intellectualism" and the Left Intelligentsia. *California* (Los Angeles).

Stanley T. Gabis, Secrecy in Politics: A Study in Attitudes. *Chicago.*

Alexander L. George, The Intelligence Value of Content Analysis. *Chicago.*

R. Gordon Gilbert, Description and Prescription in Seventeenth Century Science. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert Goldwin, Property, Money and Justice: A Study of John Locke's Political Teachings. *Chicago.*

Peretz Gordon, The Political Thought and Action of David Ben-Gurion. *Chicago.*

Richard B. Gray, A Study of the Politics and Political Ideology of Jose J. Marti, the National Hero of the Cuban Republic. *Wisconsin.*

Gordon B. Greb, The Political Philosophy of the American Press. *Stanford.*

Myron Q. Hale, American Conservatism: Conventionalism, Historicism, Functionalism. *Columbia.*

Joseph B. Hampton, The Political Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre. *Rutgers.*

Edward Handler, The Political Theory of John Adams: A Study of the Emergence of a Conservative Tradition in American Political Thought. *Harvard.*

Heber R. Harper II, The Political Views of Certain Contemporary Religious Fundamentalists. *Michigan.*

William H. Hatcher, The Political Thought of Westel Woodbury Willoughby. *Duke.*

Beresford Hayward, An Evaluation of the Program of American Labor for a Full Employment Economy as an Efficient Expression of

Its Contemporary Political Philosophy. *Chicago.*

Robert S. Hill, The Political Philosophy of David Hume. *Chicago.*

Henry J. Hodder, The Political and Social Thought of Thorstein Veblen. *Harvard*

David Holland, The Problematic Situation as a Context for Valuation in the Writings of John Dewey. *Harvard.*

Harry Holloway, T. H. Green and the Liberal Tradition. *Cornell.*

Richard L. Hough, The Jurisprudence of Learned Hand. *California* (Los Angeles).

Thomas A. Israel, The Implications of the Social Contract Theory for International Organization and International Law. *Illinois.*

George W. Jaeger, The Political Philosophy of Irving Babbitt. *Harvard.*

George Kateb, The Political and Social Thought of Simone Weil (1909–1943). *Columbia.*

David Kettler, Adam Ferguson and the Scottish Historical School. *Columbia.*

John K. Knaus, The Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. *Stanford.*

Kwang Il Koh, The Political Theories and Practices of Syngman Rhee. *Rutgers.*

Richard P. Kosaki, Majority Rule in the Theory of Democracy: A Critical Analysis. *Minnesota.*

Irma Lang, Swiss Federalism: Theory and Structure. *Harvard.*

Guenter Lewy, The Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana. *Columbia.*

John Logue, The Political Philosophy of Edward Hallatt Carr. *Chicago.*

Myron J. Luning, The Question of Censorship: Art and Government in a Democracy. *Iowa.*

Adele Haddad McCarus, The Concept of the State in Islamic Thought. *Michigan.*

Allen McConnell, Alexander Herzen and the Revolutions of 1848. *Brown.*

Thomas McEnroe, The Political Theory of American Syndicalism with Particular Reference to the I. W. W. *Minnesota.*

Brian A. McGrath, S.J., The Basic Political Philosophy of Woodrow Wilson. *Harvard.*

Donald McIntosh, Psychoanalysis and the Theory of Liberal Democracy. *Columbia.*

Maan Madina, Ijma: Public Consensus in Islam According to Al-Ghazali. *Chicago.*

Cesar A. Majul, The Political Philosophy of the Philippine Revolution, 1896–1899. *Cornell.*

Serif A. Mardin, The Influence of Positivism on the Development of Turkish Political Thought in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. *Stanford.*

Lucian C. Marquis, The Political Thought of Protestant Churches and Sects in the United States, 1928–1955. *California* (Los Angeles).

Sylvester Massman, The Family in Twentieth Century Political Thought. *Minnesota.*

Robert K. Neary, Some Problems in Contemporary American Liberalism. *Southern California.*

Thomas Nedumgottil, Manabendra Nath Roy's Criticism of Marxism and Bolshevism. *Notre Dame.*

Dorothy L. Noble, Francis Nicholson. *Columbia.*

Holtan P. Odegard, Approaches to a Theory of Administrative Democracy. *Wisconsin.*

Anthony J. Pearce, Theories of Imperialism. *California* (Berkeley).

Cheryl J. Petersen, Philosophical Anarchism: A Study of European and American Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

James H. Popham, Political Ideas in the American Novel, 1870–1910. *Princeton.*

Fred Raniele, Theories of Conscientious Objectors Toward War in the 16th and 17th Centuries. *Minnesota.*

David Rapoport, Theories of Change. *California* (Berkeley).

William O. Reichert, The Mind of William H. Mallock: A Study in Conservative Political Thought. *Minnesota.*

William A. Ritchie, A Critique of the Political Theory of Henry Sidgwick. *Michigan.*

Norman M. Rosenberg, The Grande Chartreuse: Studies in the Literature of Marxist Disenchantment. *Columbia.*

Daniel Rossides, Lamennais' Political Thought. *Columbia.*

Esther E. Rowland, Political Theory of Ernest Jones. *Columbia.*

George Rozos, Development of the Concept of Property before Locke. *Columbia.*

Gene W. Setzer, Contemporary American Ideas of Human Equality. *Columbia.*

Marciarose Shestack, The Effect of Television on Political Campaigning. *Pennsylvania.*

Herbert P. Shyer, The Political Philosophy of David Hume. *Harvard.*

Paul A. L. Smith, The Impact of International Events upon Domestic Political Behavior. *Princeton.*

Richard C. Spillane, S.J., The Political Theories and Method of Robert A. Taft: A Study of Basic Political Ideas and Operational Techniques. *Georgetown.*

Stanislaw Staron, Public and Private Morality:

A Study and Criticism of Some Selected Theories of their Inter-Relationships. *Minnesota.*

Robert F. Stephens, Political Theories Inherent in Selected Psychological Theories. *Michigan.*

William A. Stewart, The Political Ideas of L. T. Hobhouse. *Minnesota.*

Otto C. E. Stoetzer, The Influence of European Political Thought in Latin America (1789–1954). *Georgetown.*

Elaine Strauss, The Beginnings of *Realpolitik* with Particular Reference to the Ideas of August von Rochau. *Rutgers.*

James E. Titus, Left of Center: A Study of American Liberalism in the 1930's. *Wisconsin.*

James A. Toomey, An Analysis of Taylor's Inquiry. *New School.*

William F. Troutman, Theories of the Relationship between Church and State in America in the Period 1786–1791. *Duke.*

Vijayadevaraj Urs, The Problem of Compromise in Political Theory. *New School.*

Carlo A. Valentino, The Influence of Catholic Social Doctrine on the American Labor Movement. *California* (Los Angeles).

Vincent C. Watson, The Indian Constitution and the Hindu Tradition: Compatibility and Conflict of Basic Political Ideas. *Northwestern.*

George Weber, Church and State in France: A Study in the Manipulation of Liens upon Political Obedience. *Virginia.*

Nathan Weiss, The Political Theory of General Benjamin F. Butler—Practicing Politician. *New York University.*

Norman Welling, The Political Ideas of Bertrand Russell. *Minnesota.*

Ruth L. Wishneff, Charles Peguy and the Crisis of the Third Republic. *Cornell.*

Neal N. Wood, Marxist Thought in Contemporary Britain; A Political Study of Six Academicians: J. D. Bernal, Maurice Dobb, Benjamin Farrington, J. B. S. Haldane, R. H. Hilton, and George Thomson. *California* (Berkeley).

Marvin Zetterbaum, Natural Law and the Supreme Court: A Study in Theory and Practice. *Chicago.*

Noel I. Zinman, Fascist Thought in America. *New York University.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Herbert E. Alexander, The Role and Influence of Money in the Political Process. *Yale.*

Myer Alpert, Public Policy and the Pulp and Paper Industry. *Harvard.*

Cleveland Anschell, Federal Aid for Highways. *Harvard.*

Richard E. Baird, Echo Park Dam: A Study of Public Policy Formation. *Illinois.*

David W. Barkley, Problems of the Aging Population and the Role of Government. *Harvard.*

David Bass, The Veto Power of the President: Its Theory and Practice. *Chicago.*

Robert L. Berg, Presidential Power and the Royal Prerogative. *Minnesota.*

David Booth, Constitutional and Political Aspects of the Jay Treaty. *Virginia.*

Ray Bronez, Interest Groups and Public Housing. *Chicago.*

Edmund Brownell, A Study of the Interaction between the Department of the Treasury and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. *Michigan.*

Edward M. Caine, The Regulation of Commercial Aviation under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. *New York University.*

Mark W. Cannon, Political Biography of George Q. Cannon, Political and Religious Leader in Utah from 1872–1901. *Harvard.*

King Carr, Collective Bargaining as a Public Campaign: Steel Industry, 1945–1949. *Chicago.*

William C. Carr, The Development of the Movement for Statehood in Utah, 1847–1896. *California* (Berkeley).

Wesley S. Chumlea, Legislative Reapportionment in Texas. *Texas.*

Milton Cikins, BOASI, Federalism, and Public Welfare. *Harvard.*

Charles L. Clapp, The Presidential Primary in 1952. *California* (Berkeley).

Frank B. Cliffe, Industrial Dispersal and Civil Defense. Chicago.

Omar A. Coleman, Interstate Trade Barriers. *Washington* (Seattle).

Rudolph S. Comstock, The St. Lawrence Seaway Project. *Ohio State.*

Edward G. Cook, The Position of the United States Navy on Unification. *Kansas.*

Melvin Crain, Some Aspects of Representation in Alaska, 1912–1952. *Southern California.*

John A. Crampton, Organization and Development of the National Farmers Union. *California* (Berkeley).

Dorothy H. Cronheim, The Relation between the Communication Practices of the Members of Congress and the Status of Party Politics in Selected States. *Ohio State.*

Alten Davis, Conflicts in Land Policy between Federal and State Government. *California* (Berkeley).

James W. Davis, The Use and Effect of the Presidential Primary System. *Minnesota.*

Daniel F. DeNauw, O.S.B., A Study of Proposals for Home Rule for the District of Columbia. *Catholic University.*

William Dial, Instruments of Party Control in the United States Senate. *New York University.*

Norris Ellertson, A Study of Marginal Political Affiliations. *Minnesota.*

David N. Farnsworth, Bipartisanship in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1945–1955. *Illinois.*

Jason L. Finkle, Executive Decision-Making in the Dixon-Yates Case. *Michigan.*

James Flannery, Water Pollution Control: Development of Public Policy and Federal-State Relations. *Wisconsin.*

Adolfo Fortier-Ortiz, The Office of the Governor of Puerto Rico: A Study in the Development of Executive Leadership. *New York University.*

Roy E. Fossett, The New Deal Comes to Georgia: The Political Career and Administration of Governor E. D. Rivers. *Florida.*

George Foufas, American Party Platforms: 1940, 1944, 1948. *Harvard.*

Paul C. Fowler, The Formulation of Public Policy for Commercial Broadcasting by the Federal Communications Commission. *Indiana.*

Gabriel Gabrelian, Voting Behavior in the United States. *Princeton.*

Franklin J. Gayles, Treason and "Cold War Treason.". *New York University.*

William C. Gibbons, Congress and the International Information Programs since the End of World War II: A Case Study in the Intellectual Role of Congress in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. *Princeton.*

Thomas V. Gilpatrick, The Midwest Farm Vote and Farm Price Support Theory. *Chicago.*

Betty Goetz, The Foreign Affairs Program of the League of Women Voters: Formulation, Mobilization of Public Opinion, Methods of Influencing Government Action, Evaluation of Results. *Minnesota.*

Antonio J. Gonzalez, Constitutional Development in Puerto Rico since 1900. *Harvard.*

Lyman J. Gould, The Government of Puerto Rico: From Territory to Commonwealth. *Michigan.*

Gerald Grady, The St. Lawrence Waterway Controversies: A Study in Policy Formation. *Chicago.*

Alice Greene, The Not So Supreme Court (The Supreme Court Fight of 1937). *Harvard.*

Don F. Hadwiger, Farm Groups and United States Foreign Economic Policy, 1946–1955. *Iowa.*

Harry Hall, Congressional Images of Scientists and Their Conception of Their Political Roles and Responsibilities. *Chicago.*

Samuel Halperin, American Zionism: The Building of an Interest Group. *Washington* (St. Louis).

William D. Hatley, The Dixiecrat Movement. *Missouri.*

David Hazel, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Legislative Process, 1940–1954. *Michigan.*

Marston Headley, Recent Developments in the Regulation of Railroad Consolidation. *Harvard.*

Richard B. Henderson, The Republican Party and the States' Rights Doctrine. *Maryland.*

Jack M. Hertzog, The Administration of Soldier Voting in the United States Army. *American.*

Donald C. Hester, Development of United States Participation in International Conferences. *Maryland.*

Victor K. Heyman, The Congressional Legislative Process: A Study of Selected Pressure Groups' Power and Influence. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Walter Hohenstein, Federal Control over Local and State Personnel. *Minnesota.*

Frank Holloway, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act before Congress: A Study in the Legislative Process. *Texas.*

Jack E. Holmes, Politics of National Farmers Union. *Chicago.*

James Howe, The Budget and Foreign Affairs. *Harvard.*

Robert J. Huckshorn, Congressional Reactions to the Second Hoover Commission. *Iowa.*

Robert M. Hunsaker, The Politics of Public Utilities. *Minnesota.*

Leigh Hunt, The "Kerr Bill" and National Regulation of the Independent Natural Gas Producers: A Case Study of the Political Process. *Minnesota.*

Slater K. Isenberg, The Social Characteristics of Selected Areas of Non-Voting Concentration. *American.*

Erwin A. Jaffe, The Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Study in Policy and Practice. *Rutgers.*

Malcolm E. Jewell, The Role of Political Parties in the U. S. Senate regarding Major U. S. Foreign Policies towards Europe, 1947–1955, *Pennsylvania State.*

Fridolph Johnson, Limitations on the Scope of Presidential Power to Conclude International Agreements. *Michigan.*

Robert C. Kennedy, The Development of Labor Legislation in the Eightieth Congress (First Session). *American.*

Alan E. Kent, Wisconsin and Foreign Policy; Wisconsin's Senators and Representatives since World War I. *Wisconsin.*

Charles F. Kiefer, The Secretary of Agriculture. *Harvard.*

Kenneth Kofmehl, Congressional Staffing, with Emphasis on the Professional Staff. *Columbia.*

Allen D. Drumm, A Study of the Political Status of the American Indian. *Utah.*

Richard E. Lambert, INCODEL, an Instrument of Interstate Governmental Cooperation. *Rutgers.*

Harry Lease, William Howard Taft and the Powers of the President. *Indiana.*

Milton Levine, Reorganization Plans Submitted by the President to the 83rd Congress. *American.*

James R. Lewis, The Impact of Television on Political Conventions and Campaigns. *American.*

Joseph D. Lubin, The Item Veto and the Presidency. *California* (Berkeley).

Howard R. Ludden, Informational Activities of the Department of State: Historical Development and Present Organization and Operations. *Princeton.*

Thornton McClanahan, Organization of the Presidency for Fiscal Policy. *Harvard.*

David W. McCormick, Partisan Politics in a Middle-Sized Midwestern City: A Case Study of Rockford, Illinois. *Chicago.*

Charles A. McCoy, James Polk and the American Presidency. *Boston University.*

Charles Macklin, Land Grant Colleges and Public Policy. *Chicago.*

William B. Macomber, Jr., The Congressional Republicans and Organized Labor; 1926–1948. *Chicago.*

James M. Mahoney, The Irish Americans and Their Attitudes on Foreign Affairs. *Clark.*

Lewis Mainzer, Research Policy Formation Under the Research and Marketing Act of 1946. *Chicago.*

Kenneth K. Marcus, Federal Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry, 1945–1955. *Illinois.*

David R. Matthis, The National Committee in American Organization. *Texas.*

James B. G. Maunde, The Republican Party in the South. *Northwestern.*

Frank S. Mellor, Employment of Civilians by the Department of the Army: Factors in Determining Whether Military or Civilian Personnel Should Be Assigned to Particular Activities or Jobs. *Harvard.*

Leno C. Michelon, Postwar Conceptions of Managerial Responsibility in Labor Relations. *Chicago.*

Clifford Miller, Institutional Considerations in the Formulation of Federal Fiscal Policy. *American.*

Lester E. Mosher, Political Activity Restrictions in the United States. *New York University.*

Don Muchmore, Political Use of the Presidential Appointive Power, 1900–1950. *California* (Los Angeles).

Arthur W. Murphy, Communist Penetration of the United States Maritime Industry. *Georgetown.*

Henry Nash, The Selection of the United States Ambassadors to the Soviet Union. *New York University.*

Morris S. Ogul, Reforming Executive-Congressional Relationships in the Conduct of American Foreign Policy: History and Analysis of the Idea of an Executive-Legislative Council as a Proposed Solution. *Michigan.*

Edward R. Padgett, The Minority Party in Bi-Partisan Foreign Policy Formulation in the United States. *Maryland.*

A. Edward Patmos, Some Recent Attempts of Non-Political Organizations to Influence Federal Legislation. *New York University.*

Stewart M. Patterson, The Role of Executive Agreements in the Execution of U. S. Foreign Policy. *American.*

Arthur Peterson, McCarthyism: Its Foundation and Ideology. *Minnesota.*

Walfred Peterson, The Foreign Policy of the Socialist Party. *Minnesota.*

Hugh D. Price, Scale Analysis of Senate Voting Patterns, 1949–1956. *Harvard.*

John R. Probert, Staff Arrangements in the Organization for National Security. *Pennsylvania.*

Edward Proxmire, The Limitations and Possibilities of Increasing Public Understanding of National Politics Through the Daily Newspaper. *Harvard.*

Michael Reagan, Congressional Mind and Military Foreign Policy. *Princeton.*

Norman F. Reber, Main Factors that Determine the Editorial Content of Farm Magazines as it Relates to Influence on Public Opinion. *Pennsylvania.*

Merton L. Reichler, Disintegration and Insurgency in the Democratic Party in New York County. *Columbia.*

Donald H. Riddle, The Truman Committee: A Study in Congressional Control of the Military. *Princeton.*

James W. Riddlesperger, Alexander Hamilton and the Modern American Constitution. *Texas.*

James M. Roherty, The Legislative Council as a Legislative Institution. *Wisconsin.*

James N. Rosenau, The Senate and Dean Acheson, 1949–52. *Princeton.*

Harold I. Roth, Collective Bargaining Patterns in the Motion Picture Industry. *Chicago.*

Martha L. Saenger, The 1944 Presidential Campaign: An Analysis of the Forces behind the Pro-Roosevelt CIO Political Action Committee. *Ohio State.*

Carl Santoro, A New Approach to the Problem of Non-Voting. *Pennsylvania.*

Peter P. Schauffler, The History and Potentialities of the Legislative Veto Device in the Federal Government. *Harvard.*

Paul J. Scheips, The Chiriqui Improvement Company: An Experiment in American Economic Expansion. *American.*

Seymour Scher, The National Labor Relations Board and Congress: Study of Legislative Control of Regulatory Activity. *Chicago.*

Saul Schindler, The Townsend Movement in California, 1935–40. *New School.*

Harry M. Scoble, Jr., Yankeetown: A Study of Community Decision-Making Processes. *Yale.*

Kenneth E. Scott, Marshall Plan and Executive Decision-Making. *Princeton.*

Morris Simon, Woodrow Wilson and the Legislative Process. *Cornell.*

Franklin Smallwood, Advisory Group Activity in the Atomic Energy Program. *Harvard.*

John W. Spanier, Political-Military Strategy in Korea: The Truman-MacArthur Conflict. *Yale.*

Stephen Stamatopulos, Colonel E. M. House: A Biography. *Harvard.*

Isadore Starr, Proposals for the Reform of the American Anti-Trust Laws. *New School.*

Leonard Stein, Labor and Politics: An Inventory of Research. *Chicago.*

Robert C. Stender, The Defense Budgetary Process. *Harvard.*

Oscar Stradinger, The Bureau of Reclamation: A Study in Administrative Organization and Techniques as These Influence and Are Influenced by Policy Positions. *Chicago.*

Anthony Y. S. Szu-tu, Legal Status of Chinese in the United States. *New York University.*

Morton J. Tenzer, Woodrow Wilson and the Palestine Question: A Study in Influence on American Policy of Minority Groups of Foreign Origin. *Yale.*

Paul D. Tillett, The Cancellation of Air Mail Contracts: 1934. *Princeton.*

Henry Tomasek, The Great Plains Agricultural Council. *Chicago.*

Daniel Tuttle, Intergovernmental Relations in Wyoming Land Policy and Administration. *Minnesota.*

Thomas D. Ungs, The Political Theory of the Second Hoover Commission Report. *Iowa.*

Herbert Waltzer, A History and Analysis of Federal Corrupt Practices Legislation. *New York University.*

Andrew J. Wann, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Study of Leadership. *Missouri.*

Leo Weinstein, The Place of Lobbying in the Legislative Process. *Chicago.*

Warren Weston, A Comparison of the Method of Filling Vacancies in the United States Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. *Minnesota.*

Quentin H. Whybark, Political Aspects of the Public Power Issue in the Pacific Northwest. *Stanford.*

Ralph D. Williams, The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. *New York University.*

Vytautas S. Zvirzdys, Select Committees of Congress in Foreign Relations: A Study in Legislative Process. *Wisconsin.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Roscoe C. Adkins, Justice Brandeis and Administrative Law. *Texas.*

Karl Andresen, U.S. Supreme Court Interpretations of State Constitutions. *Minnesota.*

Louis A. Antrobus, The Federal Exclusionary Rule in Relation to the Fourth Amendment as Applied and Interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. *Missouri.*

George R. Blackburn, Freedom of Association:

The Group versus the Individual before the Courts. *Harvard.*

Ruth L. Byrd, Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham and the Growth of Capitalism in the United States. *American.*

Gordon B. Cleveland, The Role of the Rule of Law in the Administrative State; with Special Emphasis on Civil Liberties. *North Carolina.*

Fredryc R. Darby, The Constitutionality of Antimiscegenation Laws under the 14th Amendment. *California* (Berkeley).

Emily Dawson, The Supreme Court's Conceception of Religious Liberty in the Jehovah's Witnesses' Cases. *Minnesota.*

Rondal G. Downing, The Federal Courts and Labor Relations, 1935–1955: A Study in Judicial Decision-Making. *Illinois.*

Christopher Dyer-Bennet, Justice Harlan and the Federal System. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert J. Frye, Civil Rights and United States Immigration and Deportation Policy. *Florida.*

Spencer Gervin, The Development of Executive Rule in the United States. *Duke.*

Royal C. Gilkey, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties. *Minnesota.*

Ernest R. Griffin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause as Applied to Divorce Decrees. *Duke.*

Luther Hagard, Equality of the States in the United States: Theory, Constitutional Law and Practice. *Minnesota.*

Joseph T. Hart, Secondary Boycotts: The Experience under the Taft-Hartley Act, 1947–1955. *Fordham.*

Heinz R. Hink, Aspects of Governmental Liability for Torts of Officers in Anglo-American and Continental Law. *Washington* (Seattle).

Charles A. Hollister, A Judicial Analysis of the Right to Acquire, Possess and Protect Property in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

John W. Hopkirk, William O. Douglas, Individualist. *Princeton.*

James A. Killough, Federal Regulation of Economic Aspects of Air Carriers: A Study of Civil Aeronautics Board Policies Enforcing the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as Amended, Emphasizing Certificates of Public Convenience, Permits to Foreign Carriers and Rate-Making Practices. *Pennsylvania.*

John T. Kitos, Coordination of Public Health and Hospital Administration in New York State. *Syracuse.*

James R. Klonoski, The Influence of Government Counsel on Supreme Court Decisions Involving the Commerce Power. *Michigan.*

Jacob Kossman, Constitutional Rights of a Defendant in Federal Criminal Proceedings. *Pennsylvania.*

Oscar Kraines, Ernst Freund's Contribution to American Legal Thought. *New York University.*

Roseana Kronick, The Power of the President to Remove Officials with Emphasis upon Officials Exercising Quasi-Judicial and Quasi-Legislative Functions. *California* (Berkeley).

J. T. Law, The Constitutional Ideas of Mr. Justice Horace Gray. *Wisconsin.*

Harold J. Leu, Some Constitutional Aspects of the Extra-Continental Jurisdiction of the United States. *Michigan.*

Eleanor T. Linenthal, Free Speech and the Power of the Courts and Congress to Punish for Contempt. *Cornell.*

Lewis I. Maddocks, Justice Harlan and the Role of the Supreme Court. *Ohio State.*

Ernest Means, Free Speech v. Fair Trial. *Wisconsin.*

Lyndon R. Musolf, Water Law in the Western States and Federal Control and Development of Water Resources. *California* (Los Angeles).

Theodore Norton, The Right to Leave the United States. *Chicago.*

Gordon Patric, The Impact of the McCullom Decision in the State of Illinois. *Illinois.*

Eugene S. Powell, Limits on the King's Prerogative: The Colonial Background to Substantive Due Process of Law. *California.* (Berkeley).

Earl Radley, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Conception of the Role of the Supreme Court in the American Federal System. *Harvard.*

Charles M. Rehmus, Executive Powers in National Emergency Labor Disputes. *Stanford.*

Yosal Rogat, Political Theory and Judicial Review: A Study of the Thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. *California* (Berkeley).

Eva R. Rubin, The Supreme Court at Mid-Century: A Study of Judicial Self-Limitation. *Johns Hopkins.*

Robert Runo, Law Making by the Roosevelt Court: A Study in Methods of Statutory Interpretation. *Chicago.*

Robert Scigliano, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury: A Study of Courts and the Political Process. *Chicago.*

Timothy H. Scully, Federalism and Judicial Review as Reflected in the Supreme Court

Opinions of Felix Frankfurter. *Fordham.*

Eugene Sekulow, Congressional Polls and the Legislative Process. *Johns Hopkins.*

Finn Sollie, A Comparative Study in Judicial Review in Norway and the United States. *Johns Hopkins.*

L. Dean Sprague, Civil Rights During War. *Syracuse.*

Richard G. Stevens, Modern Social Science and Mr. Justice Frankfurter. *Chicago.*

Raymond P. Stone, Separate but Equal: A Study in the Formulation and Modification of a Constitutional Doctrine. *Princeton.*

Hobert P. K. Sturm, The Legal Theory of Associate Justice David J. Brewer. *Utah.*

Bertrand C. Trautman, Natural Law Concepts Found in Supreme Court Decisions. *Harvard.*

Kenneth W. Treacy, Collision of the Supreme Court and the States. *Utah.*

Robert S. Walker, The Right and Writ of Personal Liberty. *California* (Berkeley).

Harold F. Way, Illegal Searches and Seizures. *Cornell.*

Paul A. Weidner, Justices Samuel F. Miller and Stephen J. Field: A Comparative Study of Judicial Attitudes and Values. *Michigan.*

William Welsh, The Local Regulation of Minimum Housing Standards in Selected Cities Throughout the United States. *Syracuse.*

Warren C. White, Rulemaking Procedures in the Interstate Commerce Commission. *Maryland.*

Peter Woll, Judicial Control of Administrative Procedure. *Cornell.*

Stephen B. Wood, Child Labor and the Constitution. *Chicago.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Sylvester S. Aichele, Pressure Groups and the Legislative Process in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

Dee Akers, Procedures of Regulatory Administration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. *Kentucky.*

James K. Anderson, Inter-Relation of Governmental Jurisdictions within the State of New York. *New School.*

Eva Aronfreed, City of Philadelphia Public Relations Department. *Pennsylvania.*

Richard N. Baisden, Los Angeles Labor and the Los Angeles City Government. *Chicago.*

John T. Ballard, The Impact of State Controls Upon Financial Procedure: Johnson County, Iowa. *Iowa.*

Jewel Bellush, Herbert H. Lehman, Lt. Governor and Governor: A Study in State Leadership, 1928–1942. *Columbia.*

Joseph Bernd, A Study of Primary Elections in Georgia, 1946–1954. *Duke.*

Lemuel F. Blitz, The Involvement of Local Governments in Metropolitan Problems in the Norfolk, Virginia Area. *North Carolina.*

William J. Block, The Separation of the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service: A Study of Group Activities. *Illinois.*

Donald E. Boles, Conservation and the Administrative Process in Wisconsin. *Wisconsin.*

John A. Bond, Legislative Reapportionment in Minnesota. *Minnesota.*

Morton Broffman, Executive Office of the Mayor of New York City. *Harvard.*

William P. Brown, LaGuardia As Administrator. *New York University.*

Ronald E. Chinn, The History of the Democratic Party in California since 1920. *California* (Berkeley).

Warren I. Cikens, Case Study of Alabama Power Company and TVA in Power Resource Development. *Harvard.*

Alexander Cloner, The Role of the Executive in Local Public Housing Authorities in the United States of America. *Southern California.*

Ralph Conant, Government of Metropolitan Areas. *Chicago.*

Geoffrey Cornog, An Analysis of Turnover in the Minnesota State Service. *Minnesota.*

Howard D. Criswell, Urban County Government and Administration: A Study of the Arlington County, Virginia, Government. *American.*

John A. Crittenden, County Politics: Urban and Rural. *North Carolina.*

Charles C. Curran, The Health Function on the Local Level: Kansas City, Missouri—An Administrative Case Study. *Harvard.*

John M. DeGrove, Water Resource Development in Florida: A Study of Resource Administration and Intergovernmental Relations. *North Carolina.*

Carl E. DeVane, Administrative Problems in the Public Budgetary Process, with Special Reference to the City of Philadelphia. *Pennsylvania.*

Stanley E. Dewey, The Portsmouth Area of the AEC: Its Impact on Local Government (With Special Reference to Intergovernmental Relations). *Ohio State.*

Brock Dixon, The Problem of Local Government in the Metropolitan Area of Portland, Oregon. *Southern California.*

Manuel Dobrusin, Proportional Representation in Massachusetts: The Success of Seven Massachusetts Municipalities with the Proportional Representation Method of Voting. *Boston University.*

Douglas J. Doubleday, Legislative Review of the Budget in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Paul M. Douglas, Administrative Reorganization in New Jersey. *Princeton.*

Russell E. Dybdahl, The Administration of Professional Licenses in Iowa. *Iowa.*

George Elcaness, A History of the Consolidation of the City of New York. *New York University.*

Thomas A. Flinn, Governor and Legislature: A Case Study in Political Decision-Making. *Minnesota.*

Floyd O. Flom, The Minnesota Governmental Conservation Act: A Case Study in the Legislative Process. *Minnesota.*

Houston I. Flournoy, The Liberal Party in New York State. *Princeton.*

Richard Frost, Standards for Zoning Agencies with Particular Reference to Use Variances and Conversions in Syracuse, N. Y. *Syracuse.*

Herbert Garfinkel, F.E.P.C. Legislation in Illinois. *Chicago.*

Robbins L. Gates, The Politics of Desegregation in Virginia Schools: May 1954 to May 1956. *Columbia.*

Juanita Gibson, The Office of Governor in Florida. *Michigan.*

Marilyn Gittell, County Government in New York State. *New York University.*

Israel Glasser, An Analysis of Differential Voting Participation in the 1953 Democratic Mayoralty Primary Election in New York City. *New York University.*

Gibson Gray, A Political Education for the New Reformers: A Study of the Evolution of the Movement for Fair Employment Legislation in Pennsylvania from 1945 to 1951. *Columbia.*

William M. Griffin, The Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid on Certain Aspects of Texas State Government. *Texas.*

G. Phillips Hanna, New Hampshire Politics: A Case Study of the Recruitment of Political Leaders. *Princeton.*

Lyle M. Hansen, A Case Study in Selected Aspects of the Role of City Councilmen. *Syracuse.*

Marvin A. Harder, The Democratic Party in Kansas: A Case Study of the Role of a Minority Party in a One-Party State. *Columbia.*

Louise Harned, Participation in Political Parties: A Study of Party Committeemen. *Yale.*

Frederick H. Harris, Jr., A Study of Political Activity in Two North Carolina Counties. *North Carolina.*

James B. Harrison, Democratic Party of Oregon. *Washington* (Seattle).

Richard B. Harvey, Earl Warren and Social Progress in California. *California* (Los Angeles).

Allan Healey, An Analytical History of the Power of Political Parties in Illinois, 1928–1948. *Chicago.*

Murray Herman, The Office of Borough President in the City of New York. *New York University.*

A. Freeman Holmer, The Executive Budget in Oregon. *Columbia.*

Page L. Ingraham, Politics of Agriculture in Minnesota, 1930–1950. *Chicago.*

Evan A. Iverson, Organization and Administration of State and Local Law Enforcement. *Utah.*

James A. Jarvis, Intergovernmental Relationships of Louisville, Kentucky, with Special Reference to Public Housing. *Illinois.*

James G. Kehew, Development of Smoke Control Policy in the Pittsburgh Area. *Pittsburgh.*

Robert Kelsey, Southern Neo-Populism of the 1920's *Florida.*

John H. Kessel, The 1956 Gubernatorial Campaign in Ohio. *Columbia.*

Gertrude Lamb, Administration of State Grants-in-Aid. *Boston University.*

John A. Larson, Jr., Community Participation in Tennessee's Postwar Industrial Development. *Northwestern.*

Hugh LeBlanc, The Political Process in the District of Columbia. *Chicago.*

Eugene Lee, Non-Partisan Local Government in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Roy M. McClintock, Jr., Pressure Politics in the Missouri General Assembly. *Missouri.*

Ellis E. McCune, Jury Selection in California: A Study in Judicial Administration. *California* (Los Angeles).

Hugh MacNiven, Payments in Lieu of Taxes and Payments to School Districts in Defense Impacted Areas of Minnesota. *Minnesota.*

Arthur Mann, The Role of the Warden in

Modern Correctional Institutions. *New York University.*

Arthur C. Marlow, The Executive Budget in Missouri. *St. Louis.*

Thomas R. Masterson, The Milwaukee Harbor Board. *Chicago.*

Warner Mills, Jr., Ross Sterling, Governor of Texas. *Johns Hopkins.*

John C. Murray, The Development of the Executive Branch of Government in Rhode Island. *Brown.*

Earl A. Nehring, Local Political Leadership: A Study of Decision Making in a Council-Manager City. *California* (Los Angeles).

Walter H. Niehoff, Democratic Trends in the Constitutions of Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania State.*

James Nietmann, The Administration of Government in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, 1875–1950. *Harvard.*

Benjamin Nispel, The Office of the Lieutenant Governor in the United States. *Pennsylvania.*

Sally J. Oleon, David L. Lawrence, Mayor of the City of Pittsburgh: Politics and Public Service. *Pittsburgh.*

Daisy Parker, The Executive Department of the State of Florida. *Virginia.*

William W. Parrott, Municipal Public Relations in New York State's Villages. *New York University.*

Dorothy S. Pealy, An Evaluation of the Work of the Ann Arbor Home Rule Charter Commission. *Michigan.*

Philip C. Pendleton, A Critical Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Municipal Leagues of Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

Dwynal B. Pettengill, Financing Political Parties in Maryland. *Johns Hopkins.*

Hyrum Plaas, The Administration of the Departments of Roads and Bridges of the 29 Counties in the State of Utah. *Utah.*

Theodore Powell, "The Child Benefit Theory"; A Study of Public Services to Non-Public Schools in Connecticut. *Columbia.*

Robert J. Quinlan, The Governor of Connecticut: A Study in the Development of Executive Leadership. *Yale.*

Leo F. Redfern, Fiscal Control of State Universities. *Harvard.*

Ernest C. Reock, The Taxation of Real and Personal Property in New Jersey. *Rutgers.*

Samuel J. Resnick, The City Planning Commission and the Department of City Planning of the City of New York. *New York University.*

Herbert D. Rosenbaum, The Dynamics of Parties and Politics in the Expanding Suburb: A Case Study of Nassau County, New York. *Columbia.*

Leonard C. Rowe, The Problem of Money in Elections in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert L. Sawyer, Jr., The Regulation and Control of Subversive Activities in Michigan. *Michigan.*

Joseph A. Schlesinger, Methods of Ascendancy to the Office of Governor in the United States. *Yale.*

Edgar L. Sherbenou, The Structure and Method of Political Power in a Small Town. *Kansas.*

Gerald H. Silverburgh, Fusion Reform in New York City, 1933–1934. *Columbia.*

Frederick C. Spiegel, The Liability of the American State with Special Reference to Illinois. *Illinois.*

Israel Stiefel, Reorganization of the Pennsylvania State Administrative Structure. *Pennsylvania.*

John O. Stitely, The Rhode Island General Assembly. *Harvard.*

James D. Thomas, Jr., County Government and Administration in Alabama. *Ohio State.*

William G. Thomas, Jr., A Study of the Bureau Chiefs of the City of New York. *Columbia.*

Donald S. Vaughn, Administrative Responsibility in Alabama. *Columbia.*

Nathalie Sher Wald, Water Resource Policies in Northern New Jersey: A Study in Politics and Administration. *Columbia.*

Seymour S. Weisman, Disaster: A Study of the Impact upon Administrative Agencies in Norwalk, Connecticut, of the 1955 Floods. *New York University.*

John E. Westburg, Constitutional Reforms for Effective Government in Nevada. *Southern California.*

John Wheeler, State-Local Relationships in Vermont. *Syracuse.*

Dean L. Williams, Inter governmental Relations between Long Beach and the Federal Government: An Analysis of the Harbor Development and the Tidelands Oil Controversy. *California* (Los Angeles).

George D. Wilson, The Politics of Governmental Integration in the Atlanta Metropolitan Area. *North Carolina.*

William C. Wimberly, The Illinois Primary. *Illinois.*

Harold Winson, An Evaluation of the New

York City Career and Salary Plan. *New York University.*

S. Joseph Wodka, Factors Related to Homogeneity and Stability of Political Preference in a Hamtramck Polish Precinct. *Michigan.*

John W. Wood, A Study of the Iowa Judicial System. *Iowa.*

Lloyd Woodruff, County Boards in Wisconsin. *Minnesota.*

George D. Young, An Analysis of the Conflict in the House of Representatives of the Missouri General Assembly, 1955. *Missouri.*

Norman L. Zucker, Power Factors in the Political Process of Metropolitan Areas: A Study of the Role of Violence, Coercion, and Compulsion. *Rutgers.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

James H. Bahti, The Implementation of the Wriston Committee Report. *Michigan.*

John G. Barmby, Utilization of Funds and Personnel for Naval Research. *American.*

Norman Beckman, Federal-State Relations in Public Health: A Study of the Non-Fiscal and Non-Regulatory Techniques of the Bureau of State Services. *Columbia.*

William J. Bell, A Study of Personnel Practices in a State Administration under a Merit System (The Pennsylvania Employment Security Board). *Indiana.*

Eugenie K. Bigelow, Role of Advisory Bodies in the Foreign Service. *Pennsylvania.*

David A. Bingham, Agriculture Departmental Inspectional Activities: A Comparative Study. *Iowa.*

Kenneth P. Borgen, Development of Budget Policy for the Department of Defense. *American.*

Calvin G. Brooks, Administration of an Extended Social Security System in the United States. *American.*

Fred R. Brown, The Administration of Tax-Supported Indigent Medical Institutional Care Programs. *Pennsylvania.*

Milon L. Brown, Personnel Policies and Practices in Federal Administration: A Critique of Personnel Management in Selected Federal Agencies. *Pennsylvania.*

Andrew S. Bullis, Jr., Fiscal Administration in Selected Pennsylvania Cities. *Syracuse.*

Frederick O. Bundy, The Administration of Rule Making and Licensing Processes under Selected Statutes of the Department of Agriculture. *Syracuse.*

Benjamin S. Burton, The Decision-Making Process in Administration. *New York University.*

Charles E. Campbell, Current Executive Development Programs in the United States Army and Air Force with an Appraisal of Selected American Industrial Training Procedures. *American.*

John M. Capozzola, The New York Regional Office of the N.L.R.B.; Organization, Policies and Procedures. *Pennsylvania.*

T. Daniel Carroll, The Development of the Appeals System in the Federal Civil Service. *Chicago.*

Edwin L. Cling, Unionization of the City Government of Milwaukee, with Particular Reference to Unions with Membership Primarily in Private Industry. *Northwestern.*

Wallace C. Clopton, The Budget Division of Connecticut as a Staff Agency. *Yale.*

Robert J. Courtney, The Manager Plan in Pennsylvania Local Government. *Pennsylvania.*

Irving O. Dawson, The Texas State Teachers Association: A Study in Public Employee Organization. *Texas.*

Roderick K. deCamp, The Chicago Transit Authority: A Study in Responsibility. *Chicago.*

Mabel E. Deutrich, Fred C. Ainsworth: Army Surgeon and Administrator. *American.*

Robert E. DeVelbiss, Administration and Philosophy of Consumer Protection by the Federal Government. *California* (Berkeley).

Russell E. Dybdahl, The Administration of Professional Licenses in Iowa. *Iowa.*

Eugene T. Ferraro, The Aircraft Spare Parts Industry in the United States: A Case Study in New Administrative Problems of Big Government. *New School.*

Max Fiks, Equal Pay for Equal Work: An Inquiry into Compensation Standards in the Civil Service of New York City. *New York University.*

Thomas S. Francis, An Analysis of the Organization and Operation of Privately Sponsored Commissions of Inquiry. *Columbia.*

Emaneul R. Fuchs, Federal-State Relations in River Basin Development: A Case Study of the Missouri Valley. *Harvard.*

Albert M. Gaddy, Study of the Operations of the Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior. *Iowa.*

Albert Z. Gammage, The California Highway Patrol: A Study in Administration. *Texas.*

David R. Gardner, The Coordination of Federal, Regional, State and Local Agencies in the

Preparation of Detailed Soil Survey Reports. *Harvard.*

Reverdy T. Gliddon, Regulation of the Air Route Pattern by the Civil Aeronautics Board. *Texas.*

Paul Gordon, Evaluation of Top Management and Organization in Hospitals. *Syracuse.*

Clifford R. Gross, The Budgetary Administration of the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance. *Syracuse.*

Donald E. Habbe, Pearl Harbor: A Case Study in Administration. *Wisconsin.*

Mordecai Hacohen, The Administrative Aspects of the Jordan Valley Administration. *New School.*

John M. Hale, The Administration of State Highway Authorities in Selected Midwestern States. *Michigan.*

Harriet Hanellin, Administration of Aid to the Aged in the United States. *New York University.*

Fred J. Harsaghy, Jr., Administrative Aspects of American Cultural Influences in Japan. *New York University.*

Alden D. Hayes, The Wisconsin Income Tax System: A Case Study in Administrative Effectiveness. *Wisconsin.*

John Hebal, Field Administration of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Minnesota and Wisconsin. *Minnesota.*

Robert S. Herman, Revenue Estimating in New York State Government. *New York University.*

Donald S. Hiller, The Commission Plan of City Government in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

Victor C. Hobday, Tennessee Municipalities and TVA Electric Power. *Syracuse.*

Walter W. Hodgson, Health Administration in the Philadelphia Metropolitan Area. *Pennsylvania.*

Barrett Hollister, Natural Resources Administration in Ohio. *Syracuse.*

Erin Hubbert, William Ashby Jump, Public Administrator. *Syracuse.*

Clyde W. Humphrey, Organizing and Administering Vocational Business Training in Public Educational Agencies. *American.*

Albert P. Ingraham, Situational Factors in Federal Government Executive Positions and Their Relation to Executive Selection and Development. *American.*

Penrose Jackson, Personnel of Selected Federal Regulatory Commissions. *Texas.*

Judith N. Jamison, Administrative Reforms of the Hiram Johnson Era in California. *California* (Los Angeles).

Holman W. Jenkins, The American Philosophy of War: An Inquiry into the Sources and Principles Governing the Strategic Concepts of the Armed Forces of the United States since World War II. *Pennsylvania.*

Harvey N. Johnson, Jr., The Administration of Federal Public Housing Legislation by Local Authority Personnel in the United States. *New York University.*

Walbert W. Kaempfer, West Virginia's Board of Public Works: A Study of the Utility of the Plural Executive at the Highest State Level. *Alabama.*

Robert W. Kaufman, An Examination of the Organization of Selected Non-Governmental Associations which Attempt to Influence the Formation of Federal Public Policy in the United States. *American.*

Robert L. Kliner, The Administration of Federal Migratory Waterfowl Legislation. *Iowa.*

Anna Knoll, The Problem of Training Career Administrators. *American.*

Gerhard J. Kruger, Position Classification and Employment Policies in the Department of Agriculture from 1914 to the Present Time. *American.*

Walter Kurylo, A Study of the Federal-Aid Highway Program with Special Emphasis on Its Budgetary and Planning Aspects. *American.*

Ezra Lander, Performance Budgeting and Accounting Policy in the Department of the Army. *American.*

William Larsen, The Field Service of the United States Bureau of the Budget. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert S. Lorch, Career Development in the Air Force. *Wisconsin.*

John M. Lowe, Authority Without Sovereignty: An Inquiry into Public Authorities. *New York University.*

William H. Ludlow, Goverment Control of Urban Population Densities. *Chicago.*

Conrad L. McBride, The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact: An Analysis of the Compact as a Basis for Regional Administration. *California* (Los Angeles).

John P. McCarthy, Legislative-Executive Relations: Federal Organization. *Chicago.*

Gordon McLean, Relative Power of the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve System in Monetary Management and some Controversial Proposals for Changes. *New York University.*

Robert J. McNeill, The Administration of Natural Resources in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Donal E. J. MacNamara, The Administrative Organization and Operation of Provost Marshal General Activities in World War II. *Columbia*.

Donald R. MacQuivey, Frequency Assignment in Administrative Control. *American*.

Dean E. Mann, The Administration of Natural Resources in the State of Arizona. *California* (Berkeley).

Byron S. Martin, Planning for Total Mobilization for War in the United States: 1920–1940. *Chicago*.

Gunther Marx, Federal Highway Policies, 1916 to 1956. *New York University*.

Martin A. Mendelson, A Factor Analysis of the Personality and Interest Patterns of USAF Master Sergeants. *New York University*.

Charles Miller II, The Administrative Feasibility of Including Domestic Servants under the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Program. *Pennsylvania*.

William B. Monat, A Critical Analysis of the Merit System in Minnesota. *Minnesota*.

Chester Morrill, Jr., Organizational Principles: Applied to the Lower Echelons of the United States Army. *American*.

Harry F. Mullaly, The Refugee Relief Act of 1953: Its Effects upon United States Society, Foreign and Intergovernmental Relations and Economy. *New York University*.

Dennis E. Mulvihill, An Appraisal of the Army Ordnance Management Improvement Program. *Pittsburgh*.

Mildred E. Negus, A Study of the Unit Cost of a Tax-Supported Public Health Nursing Service, with Special Reference to the District of Columbia. *American*.

Ken Nishimoto, The Committees of the Department of the Interior with Special Reference to Intra-Departmental Committees. *American*.

James E. Nix, The Admission of Negroes to State Universities in the South. *Syracuse*.

William C. Nolan, Organization for the Regulation of Trade—The Federal Trade Commission from Humphrey to the Basing Point Decisions. *New York University*.

Robert M. Northrop, Administrative Doctrine and Administrative Behavior: The AEC Experience. *Michigan*.

Ben Posner, Accounting Data as Related to Performance Budgeting in the Federal Government. *American*.

Robert W. Powers, Interagency Cooperation in Foreign Technical Assistance Programs. *Minnesota*.

Nathaniel S. Preston, The Use and Control of Public Authorities in the United States: A Study of the Public Corporation on the State, Local and Regional Levels. *Princeton*.

Lee B. Reifel, Limitations and Potentialities of Democratic Administration in Colleges and Universities in the United States. *American*.

Vorley Rexroad, The Administration of the Los Alamos Atomic Energy Project. *New York University*.

Leo Richards, Budgeting in the National Housing Agency. *American*.

G. Franklin Roberts, The National Production Authority: Administrative Organization and Operation—1950 to 1953. *American*.

Herbert Rosenberg, Office of Defense Mobilization: A Study of Civil-Military Relations During the Korean Mobilization. *Chicago*.

Arthur H. Rosien, The Administrative Relationship between the Army and the Territory of Alaska. *Syracuse*.

Harold H. Roth, The Executive Office of the President: Its Development as an Administrative Instrument. *American*.

Liberata B. Ruscigno, Organization for Personnel Management in California. *Stanford*.

Lillian V. Salsman, Functional Roles of Nursing Personnel of the New York State Department of Hygiene. *New York University*.

Harry Seymour, Organization and Administration of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. *Syracuse*.

William Shore, Doctrine of Governmental Liability and Its Impact upon Public Administration. *Syracuse*.

Cyril O. Shuler, Logistics Systems Research with Special Reference to United States Air Force Problems. *American*.

Bernard E. Shultz, The Federal Occupational Classification Structure under the Classification Act of 1949. *American*.

William J. Siffin, Government and the Cotton Problem. *Harvard*.

Elizabeth B. Smith, Intergovernmental Relations in Public Health Administration: A Study of the Adaptation and Execution of Public Policy. *Virginia*.

Sidney Spector, Public Administration Among Primitive Societies. *Chicago*.

Richard Stuart, Financing Capital Improvements in Maine. *Pennsylvania*.

Frank W. Suggitt, Area Analysis—The Educational Function in Program Adaptation. *Harvard.*

Arnold E. Sukrow, Qualifications of Federal Personnel Techniques. *American.*

George A. Tapper, Public Unionism in New Jersey. *Pennsylvania.*

Nelson E. Taylor, Jr., The Association of American Railroads—Its Role as a Pressure Group. *Harvard.*

T. F. Thompson, Responsibility of School Teachers as Public Servants. *Indiana.*

William Thorkelson, Planning and Programming in the Armed Forces. *Syracuse.*

James D. Tschirgi, Administration of the Federal Mining Laws. *Chicago.*

Simon Tucker, The Development of the Employment Activities of the United States Civil Service Commission. *American.*

Martin K. Tytell, Determining the Make, Model and Approximate Age of a Typewritten Document from Its Write. *New York University.*

A. Donald Urquhart, The Conduct of Administrative Hearings in Metropolitan Los Angeles. *California* (Los Angeles).

Jess H. Walters, Planning for Rurban Areas: A Survey and Analysis of Approaches to the Problem, with Special Reference to the Los Angeles Area. *California* (Los Angeles).

Troy Westmeyer, Administration of Municipal Income and Payroll Taxes. *New York University.*

J. Lee Westrate, The Administrative Theories and Practices of Herbert Hoover. *Chicago.*

Walter Wilmot, Administration of Air Pollution Control. *Harvard.*

Richard D. Winans, Institutional Administration. *New York University.*

John L. Withers, The Administrative Theory and Practice of William Howard Taft. *Chicago.*

Arthur Wolfe, American Civil Service Examinations. *Chicago.*

Laurence N. Woodworth, Taxation of American Individuals and Corporations Earning Income Abroad. *New York University.*

Deil S. Wright, The Prestige of Public Employment in a Metropolitan Community. *Michigan.*

John D. Young, Regional Administration in the Federal Government. *American.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Bruce Adkinson, British Commonwealth in Southeast Asia. *Princeton.*

Bilquis Ali, The Pakistan Reform Movement. *New York University.*

Eduardo D. C. Austin, The First Democratic Revolution in the Far East: Philippine 1895–1905. *Georgetown.*

Kemdi Azoma, Development of Federalism in Nigeria. *New York University.*

Hans H. Baerwald, Problems of Developing Democratic Leadership in Japan. *California* (Berkeley).

Samuel Barnes, The Political Role and Ideology of Organized Labor in Canada. *Duke.*

Robert W. Barrie, The Council of Europe. *Minnesota.*

Paul Barringer, Soviet Policy Toward Scientific Research: A Case Study. *Harvard.*

Robert O. Berdahl, British Universities and Government Grants. *California* (Berkeley).

William Berry, Problems in the Economic Development of British African Territories. *Harvard.*

P. V. Bhambal, Social Security in India and the United States. *Syracuse.*

Brij Bhushan, The Fundamental Rights in India: Indian Philosophic and Anglo-American Legal Concepts. *American.*

Byron E. Blankinship, Spain and World War I: A Study of Foreign Policy, 1910–1920. *Columbia.*

Robert C. Bone, Jr., West Irian, New Guinea, Microcosm of Conflict, 1949–1955. *Cornell.*

Louis C. Boochever, Jr., The Development of the Soviet Coal Industry. *Harvard.*

George Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1918–1921. *Columbia.*

Simon Broder, A Comparative Study of the U. S. Patent Office and the German Patent Office. *American.*

Lyle C. Brown, The Cardinas Administration in Mexico, 1934–40. *Texas.*

Fred Burke, Local Government in Uganda. *Princeton.*

Leo D. Cagan, Civil Service Unions: A Comparative Study of American and British Commonwealth Experience. *Chicago.*

Charles Carroll, Australia and Argentina: A Study of the Bases of Federal Government. *Harvard.*

Jay H. Cerf, A Study of Attitude Controls in the Membership State: The Sanction-Applying Process of the Freie Deutsche Jugend in the School and University System of the German Democratic Republic. *Yale.*

Sudershan Chawla, India and Communism. *Ohio State.*

Romeo A. Cherot, Kazakh Customary Law

under the Russian Empire, 1824–1917. *Columbia.*

G. W. Choudhury, The First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1947–1954): A Study in the Failure of its Mission. *Columbia.*

Cathie L. Clark, The Development of Government and Administration in Brazil since 1889. *American.*

John M. Clarke, The Budget in the Central Government of the Commonwealth of Australia. *American.*

Guillermo B. Corpus, National-Local Government Relationships in the Philippines. *New York University.*

Alvin J. Cottrell, The Evolution of the Government of Malta in the Twentieth Century with the Primary Emphasis on the Proposal to Give Malta Three Representatives in the House of Commons. *Pennsylvania.*

George R. Crossman, Codetermination. *Columbia.*

Ralph E. Crow, Personnel Organization and Practice in Syria. *Michigan.*

Chauncey R. Crutcher, The Federal District of the United Mexican States. *North Carolina.*

Francis D. DeTarr, The French Radical Party, 1944–1956. The Problem of Doctrinal Coherence. *Yale.*

Kurt DeWitt, The Relation between Civil and Military Power in a Totalitarian Dictatorship: The Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party 1933–1945. *George Washington.*

Alfred Diamant, The Course of Political Catholicism in Austria. *Yale.*

P. Allan Dionisopoulos, The Conduct of Foreign Policy Under Shigeru Yoshida. *California* (Los Angeles).

Warren H. Donnelly, Organization for Atomic Energy in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. *New York University.*

Jack D. Dowell, The Parliament of West Germany. *Stanford.*

Horst Duhnke, Politics and Society in the Soviet Zone of Germany, 1945–1956. *California* (Berkeley).

Demetrius P. Economou, The Judicial Control of Administrative Discretion: The Greek Experience. *Yale.*

Rudolph Eilers, Foreign Policy Problems of the West German Government, 1949–1952. *American.*

Harold T. Ellis, The Development of the Constitution of Ireland, 1911–1923. *Stanford.*

John G. Eriksen, Church and State Relations in Germany, 1930–1945. *Minnesota.*

Phoebe Everett, Land Tenure in Burma. *Syracuse.*

Alejandro Fernandez, The Philippine Presidency: Powers and Functions. *Cornell.*

Francesco G. Ferraroti, The Italian Managerial Elite. *Chicago.*

Cary O. Fisher, Revolution by Coup d'Etat: A Study of Modern Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics. *Stanford.*

William Fleming, Judicial Review of Chancellor von Papen's Coup d'Etat in 1932. *Columbia.*

Harold A. Fletcher, Jr., The Nationalization of Industry in France: A Study of the Political and Administrative Aspects of the Problem. *Harvard.*

Edwin Fogelman, British Constitutionalism and the Welfare State. *Princeton.*

Charles R. Foster, Postwar Changes in Structure and Ideology of the German Social Democratic Party. *Ohio State.*

Evan Fotos, Land Tenure and Rural Organization in Turkey since 1923. *American.*

Lloyd Freese, The United States and the Birth of the States. *Chicago.*

Julian R. Friedman, The Impact of Democracy on Imperialism: A Study of the British Colonial Administrative Service. *California* (Berkeley).

J. Richard Gaechter, Government Liability in Tort: A Comparative Study of the French and Anglo-American Systems. *Cornell.*

Khalil A. Ghalayini, Organization and Administration of the Arab States: Selected Problems and the Problem of Arab Unity. *American.*

I. Paul Giardina, The Economic Effects of the Disposition of the Italian Colonies upon the Economy of Italy. *New York University.*

George Gondicas, Problems of Ecuadorian Economic Development Policy. *Harvard.*

Jack Gourman, Germany: The Hitler State, 1933–1945. *California* (Los Angeles).

Norman D. Greenwald, The Soviet Union in British Labour Party Politics, 1933–1941. *Columbia.*

Gene Gregory, Local Administration and Organization in Vietnam. *Cornell.*

John G. Grumm, Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in Western Europe: A Quantitative Approach. *California* (Berkeley).

Joel Guin, Labor Conditions in the Belgian Congo. *Columbia.*

John R. Habicht, Executive Legislation and Its Control in Switzerland. *Ohio State.*

Darrell P. Hammer, Russian Jurisprudence and Legal Reform before the 1917 Revolution. *Columbia.*

Norman B. Hannah, The Government of Thailand. *Minnesota.*

Robert W. Harper, Indonesia: The First Ten Years. *American.*

Tetsuichi Hashimoto, The Developments in Japanese Bureaucracy since World War II. *Duke.*

John Haupert, The Swedish Foreign Policy During the Second World War. *Syracuse.*

Laurin L. Henry, International Technical Assistance in Public Administration. *Chicago.*

Paul H. Hepper, The Ideology of the Canadian Liberal Party, 1921–1951. *Wisconsin.*

Alfred O. Hero, The Contribution of Social Psychology and Cultural Anthropology to the Analysis of Nationality Characteristics. *George Washington.*

James K. Herold, The Role of the Trade Unions in Nationalized Industries—A Case Study: The National Union of Mineworkers. *Harvard.*

H. Grant Hicks, Chinese Nationalist Administration and Reform in Formosa. *Columbia.*

Karl A. Hochschwender, The Politics of Civil Service Reform in Western Germany. *Yale.*

H. M. Holland, Japanese Political Parties in the 1920's and 1930's. *George Washington.*

Ernest V. Hollis, Jr., Police Systems of Imperial and Soviet Russia, 1700–1938. Columbia.

Leonard J. Horwitz, United States-Argentine Relations, 1943–1947, with Special Reference to the Braden-Peron Affair. *Pennsylvania.*

John F. Hostie, The Rise and Fall of the Rally of the French People. *Stanford.*

George Howatt, An Evaluation of Australian Experience with Preferential Voting and Proportional Representation. *Pennsylvania.*

Kyaw Htun, Problems of Industrial Development in Postwar Burma. *Chicago.*

Earl Huyck, Population Growth in South Asia: A Study in Differential Fertility in India and Ceylon. *American.*

W. Carter Ide, The Politics of French Labor. *Harvard.*

Aroh Ifekwunigwe, Problems of Federal Regionalism in Nigeria. *New School.*

Conrad Joyner, The Referenda Campaigns Over Extension of Australian Commonwealth Powers, 1911–1919. *Florida.*

T. M. Joshi, Economics of Public Finance in Bombay. *Pennsylvania.*

Peter H. Juviler, The Function of the Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1937–1955. *Columbia.*

Wadie Jwaideh, The Contemporary Kurdish Problem. *Syracuse.*

Misha N. Kadick, Soviet Use of Manpower. *Princeton.*

Eli Kaminsky, The French Government and the Communists since 1947. *Harvard.*

Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., The Role of the Kuomintang in the Effort at Chinese Unification, 1928-1930. *Harvard.*

Mehdi Kianfar, Greater Syria. *American.*

Robert A. Kilmarx, History of the Soviet Air Force through World War II. *Georgetown.*

Jerome B. King, Agencies for the Coordination of the Ministries of the Fourth Republic. *Stanford.*

Stephen P. Koff, Pacifism and the British Labour Party. *Columbia.*

Roy D. Laird, The Evolution of Soviet Agrarian Policy in Theory and Practice. *Washington* (Seattle).

Walter E. Langway, The Public Service of Sweden. *New York University.*

Harry Lazer, Balfourian Conservatism: A Study in Political Ideas and Political Leadership. *Columbia.*

Daniel C. Lazorchick, The Issue of Nationalization within the British Labour Party. *Stanford.*

Thomas J. Leonard, The Reorganization of States in India. *Southern California.*

Edgar Love, British East Africa Colonial Policy: A Study of British Policy in Relation to Internal Political Tensions. *Southern California.*

Ruth H. Lutz, The Political Parties of Mexico. *Pittsburgh.*

Charlie Lyons, Jr., The Political Impact of American Assistance in India. *Ohio State.*

Thomas H. McLeod, Dominion-Provincial Conferences as a Technique in Intergovernment Coordination. *Harvard.*

Ruth T. McVey, History of the Communist Party in Indonesia. *Cornell.*

Ram C. Malhotra, Administrative Reorganization of the Government of Nepal. *American.*

Joseph F. Marsh, British Departmental Decentralization: A Study of National Departmental Organization in the Southern (#6) Standard Region for the Administration of

Public Health and Welfare Services. *Harvard.*

David K. Marvin, Development of Conceptual Analysis for Study of African Political Systems in Transition. *Northwestern.*

Gordon P. Means, The Evolution of Self-Government in Malaya. *Washington* (Seattle).

Frank A. Mesple, The Native Political Parties of French North Africa. *Stanford.*

Edmund C. Mester, The Road to Political Democracy in Turkey. *Maryland.*

Frank O. Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi—Exponent of Liberal Constitutionalism under the Maiji Constitution. *California* (Berkeley).

Ante Mlikotin, The Political Development of Yugoslavia after 1945. *Indiana.*

George R. Monsen, De Gaulle and the R.P.F.: Man, Movement and Mystique. *Stanford.*

Glenn G. Morgan, The Soviet Procuracy. *Virginia.*

Henry W. Morton, The Political Character of Soviet Sports. *Columbia.*

Carl C. Moses, Judicial Control of the Constitutionality of the Laws in Cuba: A Study of Development in Theory and Practice. *North Carolina.*

Steven Muller, The Prime Ministership in Canada. *Cornell.*

Mirza Shikoh Muzaffar, The Constitutional Development in Pakistan: Its Problems and Its Prospects. *New York University.*

P. N. Narayanan Nair, The Office of the District Collector in the Government of India. *Cornell.*

V. K. S. Navar, An Analysis of the Major Influences in the Drafting of the Constitution of India. *Yale.*

Robert Nave, Local Government in the United Provinces: India. *Minnesota.*

Joe W. Neal, The State Governments of Northeastern Mexico: Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. *Texas.*

Elechukwu N. Njaka, Igbo Political Institutions in Transition. *California* (Los Angeles).

Stelios Papadakis, An Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece. *Pennsylvania.*

H. Carroll Parish, Jr., The Development of Democratic Institutions in Thailand. *California* (Los Angeles).

Amos Perlmutter, A Study of the Socialist Zionist Parties in Israel, 1897–1955. *California* (Berkeley).

Lawrence L. Petersen, The Swedish Cooperatives and Politics. *Notre Dame.*

Ivan M. Ponedel, The Development of English Labor Law: The Legal Position of the Laborer from 1349 to the Present. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert W. Quick, French Political Attitudes toward European Integration, 1950–1954. *California* (Los Angeles).

Herbert F. Quinn, The Nationalist Movement in Quebec since 1930: The Impact of Industrialization on Party Politics. *Columbia.*

Gabriel Racz, Changes in the Economic Structure of Hungary under Communist Rule (1948–53) and their Sociological Implications. *New York University.*

G. V. Sudhaker Rao, Public Personnel Management in Hyderabad State. *Columbia.*

Alfred Rath, A Study of the Trust Territories in Africa Administered by the United Kingdom. *Southern California.*

Gholam Hossein Razi, Religion and Politics in Iran: A Study of Social Dynamics. *California* (Berkeley).

Enuga S. Reddy, Village Government in South India. *Columbia.*

Ralph Retzlaff, The Praja Socialist Party. *Cornell.*

Edward Richards, Soviet Control over International Communism. *Iowa.*

Linford D. Riley, Jr., The Associated State Concept in Vietnam. *California* (Los Angeles).

Leslie G. Rofe, The French Economic Council. *Columbia.*

William L. Rofes, A Study of the Prime Minister in Great Britain. *Columbia.*

Leo E. Rose, The Effect of Occupation Policy upon the Labor Movement in Japan. *California* (Berkeley).

Judith Rosenberg, Role of the Malay Group in Postwar Political Development in Malaya. *Cornell.*

Ernest E. Rossi, Italy and the Political Integration of Europe. *Pittsburgh.*

Stanley Rothman, Conflict and Consensus in British Politics: The Interwar Years. *Harvard.*

I. Milton Sacks, Communism and Nationalism in Vietnam. *Yale.*

Salim Salim, Labor Problems in Four Arab Countries (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan). *Southern California.*

Will J. Selzer, The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations and Self-Government, with Particular Reference to British Administration in Africa. *Pennsylvania.*

George A. Shanker, Constitutional Techniques to Avoid Undemocratic Majorities in Democratic Legislatures. *New School.*

Mirza M. Shikoh, The Constitutional Development in Pakistan: Its Problems and Prospects. *New York University.*

Koji Shimatzu, Methods of Communist Penetration in Japanese Labor Unions. *Notre Dame.*

Charles E. Shumaker, The Malayan Chinese Association. *Ohio State.*

Josef Silverstein, Asian Socialism. *Cornell.*

Seymour Slessinger, Nationality Doctrine as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy. *Boston University.*

Elmer W. Smith, British Political Parties: The Role of the Annual Party Conference. *Harvard.*

Olga C. Sonder, Political Processes and Electoral Procedures under the Indian Republican Constitution put into Effect on January 26, 1950. *Stanford.*

Herbert G. Sonthoff, Robert von Mohl and the Problem of German Federalism. *Harvard.*

James R. Soukup, A Study of the Political Activities of Selected Japanese Labor Unions. *Michigan.*

Frances L. Starner, The Philippine Agrarian Problem and Its Political Implications. California (Berkeley).

Charles I. Stastny, The Hungarian Communist Party: A Study of Ideology and Operational Development. *Harvard.*

Richard G. Staveley, Commerce Clause: Australia. *Chicago.*

Hans Steinitz, Native Participation in Colonial Government in the French Territories in Africa. *New School.*

Elonore Sterling, Anti-Semitism in Germany (1800–1848). *New School.*

Herbert Storing, The British Ministry of Agriculture: A Study of Public Administration and Private Interests. *Chicago.*

Melvin P. Straus, The Control of Subversive Activities in Canada. *Illinois.*

Ulrich A. Straus, The Japanese House of Councillors: An Analytical Study. *Michigan.*

Robert S. Sullivant, The Ukraine and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—A Study in Soviet Policy and Ukrainian Nationalism. *Chicago.*

John O. Sutter, Indonesianisasi: Political Motivation in a Metamorphosing Economy. *Cornell.*

Zoltan M. Szaz, The Principal Foreign Policy Problems of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–55. *Catholic University.*

Harold M. Thewlis, Authoritarian Tendencies in the French Right, 1924–1940. *Columbia.*

Jack E. Thomas, The Organizational Structure and Administration of SHAPE. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert F. Thompson, The Retention and Rejection of Occupation Reforms in Japan after the Signing of the Peace Treaty. *Minnesota.*

Hugh G. Thorburn, The Politics of New Brunswick: A Study of the Growing Importance of the Acadian Population in the Political Life of the Province. *Columbia.*

Thomas W. Thorsen, The Administration of Medical and Health Services in Scandinavia. *Utah.*

Roy Tollefson, Political Thought in the Norwegian Labor Party (1917–1928). *Chicago.*

Lois E. Torrence, The Canadian Party System. *American.*

Frank Untermyer, The Problem of Federation in the British Central African Colonies. *Chicago.*

Margaret D. Urist, Nationalism in Guatemala. *Southern California.*

George Vlasak, The Czech Political Tradition: A Study in the Formative Period. *New York University.*

Fred von der Mehden, The Influence of Islam on Politics in Indonesia, 1910–1941. *California* (Berkeley).

Melvin Wachs, Public Administration and Government in Thailand. *Cornell.*

Harold Webb, The Liberal Party in England: Theory and Practice. *Brown.*

David Wilson, Political Changes in Thailand. *Cornell.*

Ernst F. Winter, Austrian Agrarian Policy, 1945–1953. *Columbia.*

Ernest Wohlgemuth, The Politics of Labor in West Germany. *Chicago.*

John Wortman, The Socialist Unity Party in Soviet Germany: Problems of a Satellite Party. *Minnesota.*

Manoog S. Young, Russia and the Armenian Question since 1917. *Clark.*

Phoebe Yu, A Comparison of the British and American Personnel Systems. *Chicago.*

Drago C. Zalar, A Critical Study of Yugoslav Communism with Special Regard to the Present Stage. *Georgetown.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, POLITICS AND LAW

Robert L. Abbey, The World Health Organization: A Case Study in the Functional Approach toward International Organization. *Harvard.*

Rajai Abou-Khadra, UNESCO and the Arab Community. *Indiana.*

Kenneth P. Adler, Can Adult Education Affect Foreign Policy? *Chicago*.

Costas Alexandrides, United Nations Collective Action in Korea. *New York University.*

Iwuoha E. Aligwekwe, American Policy towards Colonial Areas in Africa, 1933–1952. *Ohio State.*

Nouri Al-Kadhim, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations and Their Personnel. *Southern California.*

Charles E. Allen, The Development and Significance of International Health Collaboration, 1792–1950. *Stanford.*

Brent Allison, The Teaching of History for International Understanding. *Chicago.*

Clovis Altice, The State of Israel in International Law. *Catholic University.*

A. Aiman Altroggen, Power Politics in Sinkiang since 1860. *Chicago.*

Abdul-Malik S. Al-Zaibag, Iraq Oil Politics in the Interwar Period. *Columbia.*

Charles D. Ameringer, Never Abandon Panama! The Story of Philippe Bunau-Varilla and the Panama Canal. *Fletcher School.*

Nan Louise G. Amstutz, The Establishment of an Indonesian Importing Class, 1950–53. *Fletcher School.*

John A. Anderegg, The Marshall Plan: A Historic Reversal of United States Foreign Policy. *Rutgers.*

Albert Androsky, Indian Policy in the United Nations. *Chicago.*

Tranquilino B. Aquino, Philippine-American Trade Relations with Particular Reference to the Postwar Period. *American.*

Arne Arnesen, The Scope and Practice of the Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the United Nations Charter. *Minnesota.*

Henry Austin, India's Position in and Policies with Respect to Asia during the Period 1947–1954. *American.*

Hager W. Bach, The Position of the United States in the United Nations in Regard to Political Developments in Non-Self-Governing Territories. *Chicago.*

William Baier, Concepts of National Interest in the 1840's. *Brown.*

Bettie J. Baker, Toward an Understanding of International Regionalism. *Michigan.*

Marjorie Murphy Baldwin, The Sterling Area and the European Payments Union, 1950–1953. *Fletcher School.*

Edward Barber, The Evaluation of National Power. *Georgetown.*

Sidney N. Barnett, Judicial Interpretations of the United Nations Charter in International and National Courts. *Columbia.*

George Basich, The Effect of Russian Expansion on British Political Opinion, 1763–1856. *Chicago.*

Victor Basiuk, Steel and the Changing Strengths of the Great Powers. *Columbia.*

Leisl G. Baum, Preparation of the Agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. *Columbia.*

Frederick O. Beattie III, The Utility of Theories of Aggression to the Understanding of International Relations. *Chicago.*

Anne B. Beeler, The International Labour Organization: Important Developments in Its Structure, Function and Constitution since 1953. *Cornell.*

M. Anwer Beg, The Attitude of United Nations Members towards the Use of Advisory Opinion Procedure. *Columbia.*

John A. Bekker, The Soviet Union and World Organization. *Chicago.*

Aaron Bell, The United States' Doctrine of the Just War. *Chicago.*

Mary M. Benyamin, Fluctuations in the Prestige of the United States in France between 1950 and 1955. *Columbia.*

Leonard Berkowe, The Fund and GATT as Instruments for the Prevention of Economic Conflict in the Postwar World. *Columbia.*

Sylvan Berman, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1938–1941: A Study in Conflicts of Ideology and Expediency in International Relations. *American.*

Stanislaw K. Bilinski, The Pattern of Soviet Russian Maritime Expansion after the Second World War: European "Satellite" Shipping (1945–1955). *Georgetown.*

Helen A. Blackway, Ideas and Opinion Determinants in Foreign Policy Issues. *Pennsylvania.*

Helen Bonnell, The International Economic Position of Iran. *American.*

Robert J. Bower, The Russians in North America up to 1824. *Chicago.*

James E. Boyce, The United States and the Integrity of China, 1898–1908. *Fletcher School.*

Henderson B. Braddick, Italy and the United States: International Politics, 1937–1941. *Washington* (Seattle).

Jan J. Brazda, The Korean Peace Negotiations. *Florida.*

J. Cudd Brown, The United Nations Trust Territory in Tanganyika. *American.*

Weldon J. Brown, The Political Aspects of Commercial Trade Controls in Central and South America. *American.*

Jean E. Buckens, Land Tenure and Labor Conditions among Indigenous Peoples. *Fletcher School.*

Philip H. Burch, Pakistan's Policy in the United Nations. *Rutgers.*

William S. Caldwell, The Organization and Operation of American Informational and Propaganda Activities in Postwar Italy. *Minnesota.*

Russell B. Capelle, The M.R.P. and French Foreign Policy. *Boston University.*

George A. Carroll, American Policy Concerning Control of Atomic Energy. *Fletcher School.*

Webster C. Cash, A Comparative Study of the Specialized Agencies in the United Nations: The Relation of Their Organizational Forms. *Chicago.*

Alphonso Castagno, Regional Influences in Italian Foreign Policy. *Columbia.*

Nancy G. Cattell, Soviet Policy and the German Revolution of 1918–19. *Columbia.*

Mangalam E. Chacko, Visiting Missions of the United Nations Trusteeship System. *New York University.*

Harry M. Chase, Anglo-American Relations, 1945-Present. *Syracuse.*

Chu Pei Chen, The Diplomatic Services of Major Powers. *New York University.*

Shin-chai Chen, Study of the Agenda of the Security Council. *New York University.*

Yu-Ching Chen, American Policy and the Collapse of the Nationalist China. *New York University.*

Tao Cheng, The Protection of Persons and Property: Evolution of Clauses in Bilateral Treaties. *Columbia.*

H. Dicken Cherry, Mainsprings of Nationalism in Southeast Asia. *Chicago.*

Jack Chia, The Secretary-General of the United Nations: Office and Powers. *Fordham.*

Chieh Yue Chiang, The Concept and Development of International Responsibility for Colonial Administration. *Washington* (Seattle).

Chia-Mour Chung, Personnel Management in the Secretariat of the United Nations. *New York University.*

Isaac Ciechanowicz, Soviet Views of International Law as Reflected in Their United Nations Pronouncements. *New York University.*

William H. Clark, The Work of the United Nations Commissions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. *New York University.*

Robert E. Clute, The International Legal Status of Austria, 1938–1955. *Duke.*

George C. Constantinides, The United States and Greece, 1940–47: A Study in Foreign Policy. *Harvard.*

Ralph E. Cook, The United States and the Armenian Question, 1895–1925. *Fletcher School.*

Brownlee S. Corrin, The United Nations, the United States and the U.S.S.R. from Dumbarton Oaks to Korea: A Study in Controversy and Cooperation. *Stanford.*

Morton H. Cowden, Soviet and Comintern Policy toward the British Labor Movement, 1917–26. *Columbia.*

Richard F. Crabbs, Administrative Aspects of Technical Assistance. *Stanford.*

Martin G. Cramer, T.C.A. Program in India. *Fletcher School.*

Jackson H. Crowell, Central American Relations of the United States, 1869–1877. *Fletcher School.*

Dorothy Culbertson, A Supra-National Authority to Deal with Aggression: Critical Analysis of Private Proposals since 1945. *Columbia.*

Frank J. Curtis, Jr., The Role of Argentina in the United Nations. *Pennsylvania.*

Zein Dabbagh, Method and Procedure of Concluding Treaties in Saudi Arabia in the Light of the Rules of International Law. *Cornell.*

William B. Dale, The Balance of Payments of the Principal Middle East Countries: Recent Developments and Prospects. *Fletcher School.*

William M. David, Jr., U. S. Policy toward the Baltic States, 1917–1922. *Columbia.*

Margaret M. Davies, The Role of the American Trade Union Representatives in the Aid-to-Greece Program. *Washington* (Seattle).

Grant R. Davy, Canadian Policy on Disarmament, 1945–55. *Fletcher School.*

Brewster C. Denny, Analysis of Official Soviet Domestic Interpretation of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1952–1956, with Emphasis on U.S. Foreign Policy in the United Nations. *Fletcher School.*

Anton DePorte, The European Policy of France, 1944–1947. *Chicago.*

Elmer A. DeShazo, The Pacific Settlement of Disputes in the Organization of American States. *Indiana.*

Francois M. Dickman, The Economic Foreign Policy of the United States in Western Europe from 1945 to 1948. *Fletcher School.*

Winston Dindial, The Making of New International Law in the United Nations. *New York University.*

Joseph J. R. Dobrich, The European Political Community: A Political-Legal Study. *New School.*

Joseph F. Dolecki, Polish Foreign Policy, 1932–1945. *New York University.*

Arthur E. Dowell, Appeasement and Conciliation in Global Crises, 1938–1948. *Chicago.*

Margaret W. Dower, The International Thinking of George Bernard Shaw. *Boston University.*

Edward Drake, The Soviet Alliance System. *New York University.*

Martin Dubin, The Development of the Concept of Collective Security in the American Peace Movement 1899–1916. *Indiana.*

William B. Dunn, Franco-British Relations in Southeast Asia, 1863–1904. *Chicago.*

Marvin L. Durham, The American Expansionist Movement in Mexico, 1848–1862. *Fletcher School.*

Maria Perry Eaves, Prelude to War in Eastern Europe: Romania and the Powers, 1931–1941. *Columbia.*

Morris O. Edwards, An Administrative Evaluation of Military Government in Germany during and after World War II. *Georgetown.*

John Eldridge, American Public Opinion and the Korean War. *Johns Hopkins.*

Harold E. Engle, The Place of International Administration in the Structure of International Politics: A Critical Study of "Functionalism". *Columbia.*

Eliezer Ereli, Truce Supervision by the United Nations. *Fletcher School.*

Mohsen S. Esfandiary, The Role of the General Assembly in Dealing with Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression. *Columbia.*

Milton Feder, Great Power Relations in the Origin and Development of the Kingdom of Lybia. *Michigan.*

Oleh S. Fedyshyn, German Plans in the East, 1917–1918, with Special Attention to Ukraine and the Crimea. *Columbia.*

Edmund S. Finegold, The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. *Harvard.*

Lawrence S. Finkelstein, Indonesia and the United States. *Columbia.*

Marina Salvin Finkelstein, The Soviet Challenge in the Balkans. *Columbia.*

Henry W. Forbes, Disarmament in the Twentieth Century: A Study of Proposed Methods. *Georgetown.*

Arthur Frank, The Wool-Growers and Their Struggle for Political and Economic Security. *Utah.*

Robert W. Frase, Proposals for the International Control of Atomic Energy. *Harvard.*

C. Dale Fuller, The Soviet Union's Concept of the League of Nations as an Instrumentality for the Maintenance of Peace, 1934–1939. *Columbia.*

Richard F. Gardner, The Relations of the United States and Spain from 1898 to 1948. *Fletcher School.*

Frederick Gareau, American Policy toward German Industrial Disarmament, 1943–1950. *American.*

Leslie M. Gellert, Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy as a Problem of International Organization. *Columbia.*

Charles Gendreau, Agricultural Settlement and Colonization in Latin American National Development Programs. *Minnesota.*

Eggert W. Giere, The Separation of Powers and the Making of Foreign Policy: Germany, A Case Study 1942–1947. *Washington* (Seattle).

Shirley Gifford, United States' Relations with Morocco from 1778 to 1956. *Fletcher School.*

Joan Gillespie, The Balance of Power Concept in American Far Eastern Policy, 1900–1955. *Fletcher School.*

Meredith Gilpatrick, Strategy of the Western Front, 1871–1914. *Chicago.*

Alvin B. Glaser, The Development of Regionalism within the United Nations. *New York University.*

David Golding, The United States Foreign Policy in Palestine-Israel under the Truman Administration. *New York University.*

Elliott R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State. *Columbia.*

Leon Gordenker, The United Nations Commission in Korea, 1947–1950. *Columbia.*

Marjorie H. Gordon, Development of American Policy for the Occupation of Japan, 1941–1945. *Indiana.*

Robert C. Gordon, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: A Study in Comparative International Organization. *California* (Bereley).

Budda V. Govindaraj, The Role of India in the Settlement of Disputes within the United Nations. *Michigan.*

Angelina Grammatico, The United Nations and the Development of Human Rights. *New York University.*

Morris A. Greene, The Transfer of a Functioning International Organization from One Site to Another. *American.*

Robert W. Gregg, International Narcotics Control under the Aegis of the United Nations. *Cornell.*

Frances A. Gulick, Agrarian Problems in Indonesia. *Fletcher School.*

Jamal Haddad, The Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. *New York University.*

Ahmad Haffar, The Middle East as an Area of International Conflict. *Utah.*

Thomas H. Handy, Russia and Postwar Anglo-American Relations. *Texas.*

John Hanessian, Jr., The Question of Western European Integration. *Syracuse.*

Maurice Harari, Boundaries in the Near and Middle East: A Political Analysis. *Columbia.*

Jane W. Harbaugh, Origins and Early Implementation of the Balfour Declaration: An Analysis of Development of British and American Policy towards the Establishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, 1914–1919. *Fletcher School.*

Bruce B. Harlow, Determinants in International Relations: An Inquiry into Fundamentals. *Columbia.*

Takeshi Haruki; Japanese Foreign Policy under Matsuoka. *Southern California.*

Bartlett Harvey, Foreign Policy and Public Opinion: The Shift in Policy toward the German Economy, 1945–48. *Harvard.*

Malcolm Hay, Jr., British Opinion of Nazi Germany, 1933–1939. *American.*

Joseph A. Hearst, American Policy in Occupied Italy. *Columbia.*

Charles H. Heimsath, India's Participation in the Korean War and Its Settlement. *Yale.*

William A. Helseth, The Turkish Aid Program, 1947: A Study in United States Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School.*

Maurice Héroux, Canadian Outlooks on Foreign Policy Matters, 1914–1923. *Georgetown.*

Robert W. Herrick, Russia's Strategy at the Turkish Straits, 1907–1917. *Columbia.*

Wilhelm G. Hertz, The Swiss Conception of International Law. *Columbia.*

Abraham M. Hirsch, International Rivers in the Middle East: A Legal and Political Analysis. *Columbia.*

Wilbur W. Hitchcock, Defense of National Honor as Justification for Military Measures. *Pennsylvania.*

Conrad P. Homberger, A Theory of International Relations. *Columbia.*

Robert D. Hopkirk, Toward More Effective Coordination of United Nations Economic and Social Activity. *New York University.*

Joseph E. Hoskins, The United Nations and World Disarmament. *Pennsylvania State.*

Stephen T. Hosmer, The 1955 Indonesian General Elections in Java. *Yale.*

Thomas Hovet, Jr., The General Assembly of the United Nations: An Analysis of the Establishment and Development of Its Organization and Procedures. *New York University.*

Edwin C. Hoyt, Jr., The Unanimity Rule in the Revision of Treaties: A Reexamination. *Columbia.*

Chuntu Hsueh, Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution. *Columbia.*

Robert P. Huff, Diplomatic Relations between Spain and the United States, 1945–1953. *Stanford.*

Richard Jaffe, Japanese Aggression in Southeast Asia, 1938–1941. *Chicago.*

Louis C. James, Relations of the North American Railroads: A Study in International Cooperation of the Railroads of Canada, Mexico and the United States. *Columbia.*

Abdulfattah Jandali, U. N. Efforts to Set Standards for National Independence. *Wisconsin.*

Michael Jaworskyj, Soviet Critique of Western Legal Philosophy. *Johns Hopkins.*

Barbara G. Johnson, French Foreign Policy and International Organization. *Johns Hopkins.*

Raymond Van Kirk Johnson, Development and Administration of the International Broadcasting Program of the United States. *Stanford.*

Doris W. Jones, The First Moroccan Crisis and the Foreign Policy of Theodore Roosevelt. *Fletcher School.*

Catherine S. Kadragic, Role of the League of Nations in the Pacific Settlement of Political Disputes in the Balkans. *Columbia.*

Ihor Kamenetsky, German *Lebensraum* Policy in Eastern Europe during World War II. *Illinois.*

Subbiah Kannappan, The Indian Trade Union Movement: An Account and an Analysis. *Fletcher School.*

Mark Karp, The Economic Development of Somaliland under the Trusteeship. *Fletcher School.*

Harry R. Keller, Soviet Doctrine and Practice Concerning the Law of Territorial Waters. *American.*

Pierre B. Keller, American Defense Policy in Europe, 1947–1951: Official Views and Congressional Attitudes. *Yale*.

William B. Kelly, Jr., The 1927 Convention on the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions: Its Significance in United States Commercial Policy. *Fletcher School*

Richard J. Kempe, United States Diplomacy in East-West Trade: A Study in Economic-Political Strategy. *New York University*.

Jesse C. Kennedy, American Foreign Policy in China, 1937–1950: An Analysis of Why It Failed. *Chicago*.

Nancy Jane Kenney, The Economic Ideas of Gandhi and Indian Economic Planning. *Fletcher School*.

Cyrus H. Khabiri, Position of Iran in Contemporary World Affairs. *American*.

Amir K. Khodayar, Iranian Participation in the Specialized Agencies. *New York University*.

Chonghan Kim, Konoye Fumimaro and Japanese Foreign Policy: 1937–1941. *Indiana*.

Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Chiang Kai-Shek and the Causes for the Disintegration of the First Sino-Soviet Entente. *Chicago*.

John W. Kizler, Non-Self-Executing Treaties and Congressional Action. *George Washington*.

Mary Klachko, Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918–1921. *Columbia*.

George Kline, United States Relations with Jugoslavia since World War II. *Illinois*.

Robert F. Kobee, The Personnel Problems of the United Nations Secretariat: The Study of a Career Service. *Fletcher School*.

Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby and the Formulation of American Foreign Policy, 1945–1951. *Florida*.

Seldon M. Kruger, Major British Foreign Polices in the United Nations, 1945–1955. *Rutgers*.

Shiwaram Kshirsager, Development of Relations between India and the United States since 1947. *American*.

Vukan Kuic, The Deviations of Titoism from Orthodox Bolshevist Doctrine. *Chicago*.

Theodore Kyriak, Austria, 1945–1955: Soviet Interferences. *Southern California*.

Max Landau, Political and Legal Aspects of Discrimination with Special Reference to North American Investments in some Latin American Countries. *New York University*.

Peter W. Lande, The Serious Injury Concept in Recent United States Tariff Policy. *Fletcher School*.

Ernest D. Lehman, Business Attitudes toward American Foreign Policy: 1943–1955. *Chicago*.

Bruce LeMessurier, The United States Senate and America's Latin American Policy, 1938–50. *Chicago*.

Sigrid Leube, The Position of Non-Member States with Regard to International Organizations: The League of Nations and the United Nations. *New York University*.

Jonathan Levin, A Theory of Export Economies: Case Studies of Peruvian Guano and Burmese Rice. *Fletcher School*.

Georgia B. Levy, The Northern Council. *Washington* (Seattle).

Jung-shun Lin, Popular Movement of Taisho Era Japan, 1912–1926. *Pennsylvania*.

Paul Ta-Kuang Lin, Problems in the Policy of the British Commonwealth toward the Japanese Empire, 1921–1941. *Harvard*.

Arthur W. Lindsley, The Problem of Control over Current Methods of Conflict between Nations. *New York University*.

Eugene E. Lindstrom, The Nordic Council. *Stanford*.

Seward Ling, The Administrative Tribunal at the United Nations. *New York University*.

Helen C. Low, The Changed Role of Foreign Capital in India. *Fletcher School*.

Stephen Low, Population Redistribution under Colonial Government: American Experience in the Philippine Islands. *Fletcher School*.

Kun-hsi Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, 1937–1941: Japan's Entry into the Second World War. *Columbia*.

Eugene M. Lyons, The Politics of Korean Reconstruction: A Case Study of the Impact of American Politics on the Operations of an International Agency. *Columbia*.

Stuart H. McIntyre, Legal Effect of War on Treaties. *Columbia*.

Joseph C. McKenna, S. J., Diplomatic Protest as an Instrument of United States Foreign Policy. *Yale*.

Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy towards the Chinese Communists, 1935–1949. *Columbia*.

Charles H. McLaughlin, Principles of Treaty Interpretation. *Columbia*.

Robert L. McNeill, United States Policy toward Self-Government for Puerto Rico, 1898–1952. *Fletcher School*.

John MacDonald, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties. *Cornell*.

Ronald S. MacLean, British Top-Level Personal Diplomacy in Two Wartime Coalitions: A Comparison. *Fletcher School*.

Raymond D. Mack, The Development of the Inter-American Regional System: The Contribution of the Jurists. *Indiana.*

Norman Mackie, Jr., France's Security Policy toward Germany, 1944–1947. *Columbia.*

James W. Mahoney, India in the Commonwealth. *Fletcher School.*

Hans Mair, The Position of the Austrian Republic in International Law. *Johns Hopkins.*

George Malley, The Legal Effects of General Assembly Resolutions. *Cornell.*

Alfredo Manat, The Relations of the United States and the Philippines since the Coming into Effect of the Commonwealth Act, 1935–1950. *Chicago.*

Melvin M. Marcus, Voting Procedure in the Practice of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. *Michigan.*

D. Bruce Marshall, The Role of the Assembly of the French Union. *Yale.*

Gerald Maryanov, Domestic Jurisdiction in the United Nations. *Indiana.*

A. Warren Meixner, Provisional Measures in United Nations Practice. *New York University.*

Everett K. Melby, The Refugees in Western Germany. *Chicago.*

Stanley Millet, The Principles of Majority Rule and International Organization. *New School.*

Carol C. Moor, Positions of Governments at the United Nations Conference on International Organization on Problems Inherent in an International Security Organization. *New York University.*

Andrew J. Morse, An Analysis of British Opinion in Reaction to the American Initiative during the Postwar Years. *Chicago.*

Leo J. Moser, The Human Rights Program of the United Nations, 1945–1955. *Southern California.*

Norman W. Mosher, State Trading and Great Britain: A Case Study of State Trading, Methods of Its Implementation, the Effects on the National Economy and Its Relation to Multilateral Trade. *Fletcher School.*

Ezzeldin Moustafa, British Participation in European Organizations. *Minnesota.*

A. Glenn Mower, The Committee System of the United Nations General Assembly. *Pennsylvania State.*

Daniel P. Moynihan, United States and the International Labor Organization. *Fletcher School.*

Robert J. Myers, The Political Philosophy of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. *Chicago.*

Charles W. Naas, The Development of a Constitution for Pakistan. *Fletcher School.*

Robert I. Neiman, The Anschluss: A Study of Austrian-German Relations. *New York University.*

Harold I. Nelson, The Making of the German Territorial Settlement, 1919. *Columbia.*

Inez Nelson, The Security of Small States. *Chicago.*

Norman W. Nelson, Subsidies to Producers as a Substitute for Tariffs. *Fletcher School.*

Albert Nestel, International Administration of the Korean Aid Program. *American.*

Joseph L. Nogee, The Soviet Union, the United Nations and Disarmament. *Yale.*

Khalil A. Norsir, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan and Pan-Islamism. *American.*

Bernard Norwood, United States Government Procurement Abroad. *Fletcher School.*

Leon Novar, Great Power Conflicts in Iran, 1920–21 and 1943–47: A Comparison. *Chicago.*

Donald E. Nuechterlein, The Foreign Policy of Iceland, 1939–1951. *Michigan.*

Grady Nunn, Coordination of U.N. and other American Agencies. *New York University.*

James F. O'Brien, The London Economic Conference of 1933. *Georgetown.*

Irwin Oder, The United States and the Palestine Mandate, 1920–1948. *Columbia.*

Eric H. Olson, The New Colonial Administration of West Africa. *Syracuse.*

Gene D. Overstreet, The Soviet View of India and Communist Policy in India: A Study of Strategy and Tactics. *Columbia.*

Richard Owen, Western European Federation: A Study of the Efforts, Problems, and Prospects in Economic, Political and Social Integration. *Southern California.*

Robert von Pagenhardt, The Executive Office and Powers of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. *Stanford.*

Alexander A. Palamiotis, The Legal Status of Greece in Post-War International Relations. *Utah.*

Frank Parrella, European Recovery Program vs. Communism in Italy, 1948–1950. *Georgetown.*

R. V. Patwardhan, Possible Development of a Regional System in South East Asia. *New York University.*

DeVere E. Pentony, The Marshall Plan: Declared Objectives and Apparent Results. *Iowa.*

Oscar Perlmutter, The Foreign Policy of Dean Acheson: A Case Study in the Conduct of Foreign Relations in a Democracy. *Chicago.*

Joseph A. Peters, Nationality Policy in Soviet Central Asia, 1928–1941. *Pennsylvania.*

Robert J. Peterson, The Status of Manchuria since 1931. *Chicago.*

Tobias R. Philbin, The Soviet Citizens' Picture of International Affairs—1953: A Study of the Official Soviet View of International Affairs as Presented to the Soviet Citizen by the Soviet Press. *Georgetown.*

Harry E. Pierson, The Significance of Sea Power in the Politico-Economic Affairs of the Countries of the Western Pacific Areas. *American.*

Emil R. Platig, The Philosophy of International Relations of John Foster Dulles. *Chicago.*

Adamantia Pollis, The Effects of Great Power Policy on Greek Nationalism. *Johns Hopkins.*

John A. Power, Financing of the United Nations and Its Specialized Agencies. *Catholic University.*

John W. Price, Anglo-French Attitudes in the Council of Europe. *Michigan.*

Fahim I. Qubain, The Impact of the Petroleum Industry in Iraq, Bahrain, and Kuwait: A Case Study. *Wisconsin.*

Willard Range, Franklin Roosevelt's Theory of International Relations. *North Carolina.*

Charles A. Raith, The United Nations as Viewed by American Isolationists and Internationalists. *Pennsylvania.*

Abdul J. Rawi, The Termination of the Lebanese Mandate and its Aftermath. *American.*

Beulah B. Reifel, Recent Developments in International Law Regarding Territorial Waters. *American.*

Vladimir Reisky-Dubnic, A Study of Propaganda Methods in Czechoslovakia Aiming for Closer Integration with the Soviet Union. *Chicago.*

Arthur H. Rice, Some International Legal Aspects of European Integration. *American.*

George H. Ried, Administration of an International Police Force. *Syracuse.*

Najmuddin Rifai, Lybia—Road to Independence. *Columbia.*

Alfred S. Rigsbee, A Study of Functional International Organization in Its Administrative Aspect. *Indiana.*

Walter L. Riley, An Analysis of the Law of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East. *Washington* (Seattle).

Dorothy Roberts, The Role of Partisanship in the Conduct of the Foreign Relations of the United States. *Chicago.*

Dorothy Robins, The Work of Non-governmental organizations between Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. *New York University.*

Leonard I. Robock, The Influence of the American Federation of Labor on American Foreign Policy, 1948–1955. *Columbia.*

Berta Rodriguez, International Criminal Jurisdiction and Genocide. *Cornell.*

John M. Rogers, The International Authority for the Ruhr, 1948–1952. *American.*

George K. Romoser, Theories of Political Resistance: Germany, 1933–1945. *Chicago.*

Neale Ronning, Contribution of the Organization of American States to Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the Western Hemisphere. *Minnesota.*

Donald Rothchild, Federalism in British Tropical Africa: The Struggle for Regional Integration. *Johns Hopkins.*

H. S. Royce, Jr., The British Withdrawal from Malaya. *Columbia.*

Paul Rupprecht, The International Position of Hungary in the U.S. Foreign Policy, 1933–1947. *Minnesota.*

Donald E. Russell, Revolution in China: A Study in American Reactions. *Chicago.*

Edwin H. Rutkowski, The Governmental Process Providing for the National Defense, as Observed in Pre-World War II Defense Aviation Politics. *Columbia.*

Frank W. Ryan, Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: Political, Economic and Social Implications. *New York University.*

Wallace Safford, Psychological Operations in International Relations. *American.*

Ralph Sanders, Nuclear Electrification in Latin-America—Its Political, Social and International Implications. *Georgetown.*

Isamu Sato, The Impact of International Relations upon the Government and Politics of Japan. *Chicago.*

Charles E. Savige, A Study into the Obligatory Character of Resolutions Passed by the Principal Organs of the League of Nations and the United Nations. *Florida.*

Theresa Schmatz, The Status of Dependent Areas in International Organizations in the Field of Communications. *Columbia.*

Andrew J. Schwartz, American Foreign Policy and the Russo-Finnish War, 1939–1944. *Fletcher School.*

Donald H. Scott, The Cultural Relations Program of the United States in Mexico. *Southern California.*

Rosa A. Segarra, South American Attitude toward the Continental Shelf. *Cornell.*

Charles B. Selak, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties. *Columbia.*

Otis Shao, American China Policy in 1937. *Brown.*

Ursula H. Shears, The Social Democratic Party of Germany: Friend or Foe of European Unity. *Fletcher School.*

Valentine Sherring, A Critical Study of India's Participation in the U.N. Operations. *American.*

Barbara J. Shockley, The Creation of a European Nationality. *Pennsylvania.*

Melvin Silverman, Records Management for an International Organization. *New York University.*

William Simonson, Nazi Infiltration in South America, 1933–1945. *Fletcher School.*

Herman T. Skofield, Private Foreign Investment. *Fletcher School.*

Glenn Snyder, Civil-Military Perspectives on Raw Materials Security Policy. *Columbia.*

James L. Snyder, Japanese Organization in Manchuria, 1931–1937. *Yale.*

James W. Spain, The Northwest Frontier: Political Problems of a Borderland. *Columbia.*

Gordon L. Spangler, Conflicts in United States Agricultural and Trade Policies, 1933–1955. *Fletcher School.*

George S. Springsteen, The British Navigation Laws: The Influence of Foreign Nations upon Their Modification and Repeal, 1783–1849: A Study in Commercial Policy. *Fletcher School.*

George Stambuk, American Bases Abroad: A New Pattern in International Relations. *Indiana.*

Emil Starr, The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union. *Chicago.*

Edward W. Steele, Military Images of International Politics. *Princeton.*

David J. Steinberg, British Policies and Administration Relating to the Economic Development of the Sterling Area 1945 to 1955. *Harvard.*

David B. Stenzel, Nazi Foreign Policy from Munich to War (Sept. 1938—Sept. 1939). *California* (Berkeley).

Peter Stercho, The Carpatho-Ukraine in World Affairs, 1938–1940. *Notre Dame.*

Elizabeth I. Sterenberg, The Role of Forced Labor in Economic Development. *Chicago.*

Charles Stermer, Early Relations between the Spanish Philippines and China. *Chicago.*

Herman A. Stern, The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. *New York University.*

Albert C. Stillson, The Use of Military Force in Peace by the United States Government: Civilian and Military Attitudes toward the Use of Military Force in Peace and Their Application. *Columbia.*

Jonathan D. Stoddart, The Influence of Immigrant Groups on United States Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School.*

George S. Sugden, Influence of the Submarine on United States Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School.*

Frank Tachau, The Kemalist Revolution. *Chicago.*

Howard J. Taubenfeld, Economic Sanctions: An Appraisal and Case Study. *Columbia.*

Loren E. Tesdell, The Middle East and Technical Cooperation. *Stanford.*

Joseph M. Thom, The International Legal Status of the Refugee. *Washington* (St. Louis).

William W. Thomas, Francis Lieber and the International Law of Land Warfare. *North Carolina.*

Donal Thomson, The Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. *American.*

Clarence E. Thurber, Contributions of the State of California to the Point Four Program. *Stanford.*

Leif Tobiasson, Access to United Nations. *New York University.*

Donald R. Toussaint, The French Contribution to the Political Unification of Europe, 1944–1953. *Stanford.*

William J. Trainor, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. *Harvard.*

Jan F. Triska, Totalitarians in International Organization: A Developmental Construct. *Harvard.*

Erwin W. Umbach, A Study of the Foreign Relations of the United States with Austria. *Fletcher School.*

Carlos A. Urrutia, The Right of Diplomatic Asylum. *American.*

Juliane von K. Valentin, German-Japanese Relations in the Period between the Two World Wars. *Pennsylvania.*

Teimoor Vaziri, The Economic Relations of Iran and America since World War II. *New York University.*

G. Hans Voelkel, Discrimination Against Aliens in International Law. *Columbia.*

Walter E. Volkomer, The Postwar Structure and Policies of the German Christian Democratic Party. *Rutgers.*

Kalman Von Voros, The Origins of the Munich Pact of 1938. *Georgetown.*

David Warren, Munitions, Production and Export in Relation to American Foreign Policy, 1914–1936. *Fletcher School.*

Maurice Waters, The Special Foreign Policy Agent. *Chicago.*

Paul Weaver, Soviet Interference in the Government of Iran, 1941–1951. *American.*

James L. Weber, The Development of the Foreign Policy Objectives of the British Labor Party, 1919–1939. *Fletcher School.*

Melvin A. Weightman, The Present Status of the Concept of Self-Defense in International Law. *Pennsylvania.*

Guenter Weissberg, The International Personality of Entities other than Independent States. *Columbia.*

Alan F. Westin, American Diplomatic Relations with the Vatican. *Harvard.*

Harold B. Whiteman, Norman H. Davis and the Functional Approach to Collective Security. *Yale.*

Donald J. Whitney, Developments in the Field of International Law in the U. N. *American.*

Robert Wilfong, UNRRA and Displaced Persons. *Harvard.*

Eric Willenz, The American Conduct of the War in Indochina, 1953–1954: A Study of Coalition Warfare Problems. *Georgetown.*

Haydn Williams, Air Power and American Foreign Policy: The Berlin Air Lift. *Fletcher School.*

Maurice J. Williams, The Problem of Economic Integration in Western Europe. *Chicago.*

Martin W. Wilmington, Regional Cooperation for Supply and Development in the Middle East during World War II (The Middle East Supply Center). *New York University.*

Ann R. Wilner, Labor and Culture in Indonesia. *Chicago.*

Kurt Wimer, United States Executive-Legislative Tensions in Relation to the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. *New York University.*

Harry Winkler, The Political Orientation of Israel in the Struggle between East and West. *Chicago.*

Gregory B. Wolfe, The Montevideo Conference, 1933: Reactions of the North and South American Press to Foreign Policy of the United States. *Fletcher School.*

Klaus Wolff, Pioneer Entrepreneurs in Industry: A Study in the Sociology of Industrialization. *Chicago.*

Claude Woltz, Bloc Action in the United Nations. *New York University.*

Wah Wong, The Problem of "Self-Determination" in the United Nations. *New York University.*

Philip M. Woo, Korean Reconstruction: A Comparative Case Study of United Nations Efforts in Korea and Thailand. *New York University.*

Herbert H. Wood, Jr., International Supervision of Colonial Administrative Unions. *Columbia.*

Theodore P. Wright, Jr., American Support of Free Elections Abroad. *Yale.*

David Wurfel, Relationship between Political Power and Landlordism in the Philippines. *Cornell.*

Laurence Wyatt, Theory and Practice of the World Health Organization. *Minnesota.*

Agnes Hwun-giat Yao, Comparison of Mandates and Trusteeship. *Chicago.*

Takehito Yoshihashi, The Background of the Manchurian Crisis: A Study of the Rise of the Japanese Military. *Yale.*

Tien-Cheng Young, International Civil Service: Principles and Problems. *New York University.*

Bahman Zand, The British and Russian Policies in Persia between 1907 and 1927. *Fordham.*

Feraidoon Zandford, International River Problems of Iran. *New York University.*

Rev. Irwin W. Zinger, Korea as a Test of the Effectiveness and Validity of the Concept of Collective Security. *Pennsylvania.*

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Murray Abend; B.A., Alabama, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1955. Hitler's Racial Theory and Practice. *Syracuse.*

Eugene Brien; M.A., Fordham, 1948; Ph.D *ibid.*, 1956. An Ethical and Juridical Approach to the Suarezian Notion of Sovereignty. *Fordham.*

Francis M. Carney; A.B., Southern California, 1948; M.A., Stanford, 1950; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1956. Concepts of

Political Representation in the United States Today. *California* (Los Angeles).

Richard H. Cox; B.S., Northwestern, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Chicago, 1955. Locke's Theory of International Relations. *Chicago.*

Robert L. Gaudino; B.A., California (Los Angeles), 1950; M.A., Chicago, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Public Rights and the Private Duty of Higher Education: An Inquiry Based on Contemporary Understandings of Academic Freedom. *Chicago.*

Andrew Hacker; B.A., Amherst, 1951; B.A., Oxford, 1953; Ph.D., Princeton, 1955. The Politics of Psychotherapy: A Reappraisal of the Liberal View of Man. *Princeton.*

Yorguy Hakim; Law Degree, Faculty of Law, Damascus, 1941; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1956. Background and Development of the Qadarite Doctrine until the Fall of the Umayyad Dynasty. *Georgetown.*

Terry Hoy; A.B., South Dakota, 1948; M.A., Washington, 1950; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1956. Theories of the Exercise of Suffrage in the United States: A Critical Analysis. *California* (Berkeley).

Dollena Joy Humes; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1950; M.A., Nebraska, 1951; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1956. Oswald Garrison Villard: A Study in American Liberalism. *Syracuse.*

James R. Jensen; B.A., Iowa, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Conservatism in Transition: The Socio-Economic Theories of *Fortune* and Its Editors (1930–1952). *Iowa.*

Nick A. Masters; B.A., Southern Illinois, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1955. Father Coughlin and Social Justice: A Case Study of a Social Movement. *Wisconsin.*

J. Keith Melville; B.A., Utah, 1947; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1949; Ph.D., Utah, 1956. The Political Ideas of Brigham Young. *Utah.*

David W. Minar; A.B., Reed College, 1949; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Knowledge, Opinion, and Politics: Public Opinion as an Ingredient in Political Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

Simon Noveck; A.B., Yeshiva, 1936; Ph.D., Columbia, 1955. History of the Democratic Idea in the United States, 1774–1801. *Columbia.*

F. Oladipo Onipede; A.B., Syracuse, 1950; A.M., Columbia, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Nigerian Plural Society: Political and Constitutional Development, 1870–1954. *Columbia.*

Ivan W. Parkins; B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1943; M.A., Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. John Dewey: Freedom as Intellectual Participation. *Chicago.*

John C. Rensenbrink; B.A., Calvin College, 1950; M.A., Michigan, 1951; Ph.D., Chicago, 1956. Technology and Utopia: Political Claims of Moral Freedom. *Chicago.*

Vance L. Shiflett; A.B., George Washington, 1938; M.A., *ibid.*, 1940; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1956. Jeremy Bentham: An Appraisal of his Political Ideas and Contributions to Legal Development. *Georgetown.*

Donald E. Smith; B.A., Th.B., Eastern Baptist Seminary, 1951; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1953; B.D., Eastern Baptist Seminary, 1953; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1956. Jawaharlar Nehru's Thought on the Democratic State. *Pennsylvania.*

Nathan M. Talbott; B.A., Western State Teachers College (now Western Michigan College of Education), 1939; M.A., Michigan, 1941; Ph.D., Washington (Seattle), 1956. Intellectual Origins and Aspects of Political Thought in the *Jen Hsüeh* of T'an Ssu-t'ung, Martyr of the 1898 Reform. *Washington* (Seattle).

James Tierney; A.B., Brown, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Political Theory of Bolingbroke and Halifax: A Comparative Study. *Brown.*

Charles W. VanCleve; B.A., Chicago, 1947; B.S., in Ed., Ball State, 1949; M.A., Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., Texas, 1955. The Doctrine of Church and State in Roman Catholic Thought in the Twentieth Century with Primary Emphasis upon the United States. *Texas.*

David B. Walker; A.B., Boston U., 1949; A.M., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., Brown, 1956. The Political Ideas of Rufus Choate. *Brown.*

Lloyd M. Wells; B.S., Southwestern Missouri, 1948; M.S., Missouri, 1951; Ph.D., Princeton, 1955. The Defense of "Big Business" 1933–1953: A Study in the Development of an Ideology. *Princeton.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Charles H. Backstrom; B.A., Moorhead State Teachers College (Minnesota), 1949; M.A., Wisconsin, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Progressive Party in Wisconsin, 1934–1946:

An Analysis of a Modern American Third Party. *Wisconsin.*

Marion C. Brewer; B.A., Lynchburg, 1949; M.P.A., Harvard, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Science and Defense: Military Research and Development in the United States. *Harvard.*

John T. Dempsey; Ph.B., Detroit, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Michigan, 1956. Control by Congress over the Seating and Disciplining of Members. *Michigan.*

Martin Diamond; M.A., Chicago, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Socialism and the Decline of the American Socialist Party. *Chicago.*

Don W. Driggs; B.S., Brigham Young, 1950; Ph.D., Harvard, 1956. Executive-Legislative Relationships and the Control of American Foreign Policy with Respect to Collective Security. *Harvard.*

George S. Duggar; A.B., Wisconsin, 1936; A.M., *ibid.*, 1937; A.M., Harvard, 1944; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Tax Structure in a Responsible Program for Housing. *Harvard.*

Aurie N. Dunlap; A.B., Union, 1929; A.M., Columbia, 1931; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Political Career of Arthur H. Vandenberg. *Columbia.*

Nancy Ann Edwards; A.B., Vassar, 1950; A.M., Columbia, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Congress and Administrative Reorganization. *Columbia.*

William C. Ellet, Jr.; A.B., Michigan, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Atomic Cities: The Atomic Energy Act and the States. *Michigan.*

Richard F. Fenno; B.A., Amherst, 1948; A.M., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The President's Cabinet: An Analysis in the Period from Wilson to Truman. *Harvard.*

Jenniellen W. Ferguson; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Presidential Election Trends in the United States, 1900–1948, A County Analysis. *California* (Los Angeles).

Lewis P. Fickett; A.B., Bowdoin, 1949; LL.B., Harvard, 1952; M.P.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Eisenhower Security Program: A Study in Public Policy. *Harvard.*

Charles E. Gilbert; A.B., Haverford, 1950; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1955. Problems of a Senator: A Study of Legislative Behavior. *Northwestern.*

Charles J. Graham; A.B., Illinois, 1950; A.M., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Republican Foreign Policy, 1939–1952. *Illinois.*

Donald E. Hayhurst; A.B., Pittsburgh, 1950; M.L., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Development of Consumer Welfare as a Function of the National Government in the Food and Drug Administration. *Pittsburgh.*

Edward J. Heubel; B.A., Yale, 1948; M.A., Minnesota, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Organization and Conduct of Congressional Investigations since 1946. *Minnesota.*

Stanley Kelly; A.B., Kansas, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1955. The Public Relations Counsel as Campaign Manager. *Johns Hopkins.*

Joseph L. Krieger; B.B.A., City College of New York, 1936; M.B.A., *ibid.*, 1939; Ph.D., American, 1956. Executive Performance and Executive Success in Government. *American.*

Norman Meller; L.L.B., Hastings College, 1936; B.A., California, 1942; M.A., Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Hawaii: A Study of Centralization. *Chicago.*

Karl E. Meyer; B.S., Wisconsin, 1951; M.P.A., Princeton, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Politics of Loyalty. *Princeton.*

Robert H. Myers; M.A., Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Politics of American Banking: The Dual System, 1929–1939. *Chicago.*

John H. Michener; B.A., Kansas, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1956. The United States Cabinet: A Study of Proposed Modification, with Especial Reference to Cabinet-Congressional Relations. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert L. Munkres; A.B., Nebraska Wesleyan, 1952; M.A., Nebraska, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Use of Congressional Resolutions to Influence Foreign Policy. *Nebraska.*

John R. Owens; B.A., Syracuse, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Party Campaign Funds in Connecticut, 1950–1954. *Syracuse.*

Denis S. Philipps; A.B., New York University, 1940; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Americans and Compulsory Military Service: A Study of Changing Public Policy, with Particular Reference to the Period 1940–1951. *New York University.*

Robert J. Pitchell; A.B., Fordham, 1939; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1955. Twentieth Century California Voting Behavior. *California* (Berkeley).

Ross R. Rice; M.A., Chicago, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Politics of Missouri Basin Development. *Chicago.*

Robert M. Rosenzweig; B.A., Michigan, 1952; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., Yale, 1956. The

Meaning and Significance of Involvement in a Political Campaign. *Yale.*

Lloyd I. Rudolph; A.B., Harvard, 1948; M.P.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Meaning of Party from the Politics of Status to the Politics of Opinion in Eighteenth Century England and America. *Harvard.*

Warren D. St. James; B. Ed., Southern Illinois, 1943; A.B., *ibid.*, 1947; M.S. in Ed., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., St. Louis, 1956. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People: A Case Study in Pressure Groups. *St. Louis.*

Harris E. Thurber; B.A., Vermont, 1943; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Princeton, 1955. The Vermont Judiciary: A Study in Cultural Adaptation. *Princeton.*

Robert A. Wallace; B.A., Washington (Seattle), 1945; Ph.D., Chicago, 1956. Congressional Control of Federal Expenditures. *Chicago.*

Oliver P. Williams; B.A., Reed College, 1951; M.A., Chicago, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Politics of Grain Storage: The Commodity Credit Corporation Issue in the 1948 Presidential Election. *Chicago.*

William W. Young; A.B., California, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Congressional Investigations of the Federal Administration. *California* (Berkeley).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Raymond L. Carol; A.B., Johns Hopkins, 1947; M.A., Syracuse, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Science in the Courts: A Survey of Scientific Evidence and Its Impact upon the Judicial Process. *Syracuse.*

Samuel Krislov; B.A., New York University, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Princeton, 1955. The Supreme Court since 1937—Nine Judges in Search of a Role. *Princeton.*

Eugene A. Mawhinney; B.S., Maine, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Illinois, 1955. The Development of the Concept of Liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment. *Illinois.*

Harding C. Noblitt; B.A., Berea College, 1942; M.A., Chicago, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Supreme Court and the Progressive Era, 1902–1921. *Chicago.*

William O'Brien, S.J.; B.A., Gonzaga, 1940; M.A., *ibid.*, 1941; S.T.L., Alma College (California), 1949; M.A., Boston College, 1952; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1956. Justice Reed and the First Amendment Liberties. *Georgetown.*

Ruth L. Roettinger; A.B., Ashbury College, 1926; M.A., Kentucky, 1927; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1956. The Supreme Court and the Police Power of the States, 1930–1956: A Study in Federalism. *North Carolina.*

Jackson W. Selman; B.S., Alabama, 1942; LL. B., *ibid.*, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1955. Proposals to Amend the Constitution of the United States Regarding the Mode of Electing the President, 1789–1955. *North Carolina.*

Robert J. Steamer; A.B., Bucknell, 1947; Ph.D., Cornell, 1954. The Constitutional Doctrine of Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson. *Cornell.*

Shirley S. Ulmer; A.B., Furman, 1952; M.A., Duke, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The South Carolina Delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787: An Analytical Study. *Duke.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Frank C. Abbott; A.B., Cornell, 1942; M.P.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Harvard, 1956. Public Policy-Making in Higher Education: A Study of the Regents of the University of the State of New York. *Harvard.*

Chester W. Bain; B.A., Virginia, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Annexation in Virginia: The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries. *Virginia.*

Donald G. Balmer; B.A., Washington (Seattle), 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Interest Groups in Action: A Case Study of Oregon Milk Control, 1933–54. *Washington* (Seattle).

Emmett W. Bashful; A.B., Southern, 1940; A.M., Illinois, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Florida Supreme Court: A Study in Judicial Selection. *Illinois.*

Kenneth E. Beasley; A.B., Kansas, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Municipal Debt Limitations and Control in Kansas. *Kansas.*

James R. Bell; B.S., California (Berkeley), 1938; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Administrative Role of the California Governor, 1943–1953. *California* (Berkeley).

Wallace H. Best; A.B., Occidental, 1950; A.M., Southern California, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Initiative and Referendum Politics in California, 1912–1952. *Southern California.*

William E. Biggs; B.A., Louisville, 1938; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1940; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1956. The Handling of Workmen's Compensation Claims by the Ohio Industrial Commission. *Ohio State.*

Norman Blume; B.A., Connecticut, 1948; M.A., Boston, 1951; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1956. Municipal Home Rule in Ohio. *Ohio State.*

Gilbert L. Brown; A.B., Redlands, 1938; A.M., *ibid.*, 1939; Ph.D., Southern California, 1956. The Relationship of Elective Political Office in the City of Redlands, California, to the Status Concept. *Southern California.*

Claude J. Burtenshaw; B.S., Utah, 1947; M.S., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The State: Cooperation or Conquest; A Case Study of the State of Idaho. *Utah.*

James G. Coke; B.A., Harvard, 1948; M.A., Minnesota, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. State Imposition on the Local Governments of Minnesota of Personnel Standards for Aided Functions. *Minnesota.*

James T. Crown; A.B., Florida, 1949; A.M., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., New York University, 1956. The Development of Democratic Government in New York State Through the Growth of the Power of the Executive since 1920. *New York University.*

Ira R. Davis; B.A., Yale, 1949; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1951; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1956. Party and Voting Behavior in the Portsmouth Atomic Energy Establishment Area. *Ohio State.*

Thomas J. Davy; B.S., Seton Hall, 1943; M.G.A., Pennsylvania, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Pennsylvania Public Service Institute—A Study of State Administered In-Service Training for Local and State Government. *Pennsylvania.*

David R. Derge; A.B., Missouri, 1950; M.A., Northwestern, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Power Position of the Chicago Legislative Delegation in the Illinois General Assembly. *Northwestern.*

John H. Duke; B.J., Texas, 1935; A.M., Southern California, 1942; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The County Committeeman and His Role in Politics. *Southern California.*

John H. Fenton; A.B., Kentucky, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Harvard, 1956. Political Dynamics in the Border States. *Harvard.*

Leroy C. Hardy; A.B., California (Santa Barbara College), 1949; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1955. The California Reapportionment of 1951. *California* (Los Angeles).

Clarence J. Hein; B.A., Minnesota, 1941; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Operation of the Direct Primary in Minnesota. *Minnesota.*

McCown E. Hunt; B.S., Utah, 1952; M.S., *ibid.*, 1953; Graduate Certificate in Public Administration, *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Political and Technical Aspects of the Utilization of Ground Water in the State of Utah. *Utah.*

William P. Irwin; A.B., Hiram, 1947; A.M., Western Reserve, 1950; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1955. The Rocky Mountain Ballot: A Study of the Politics of the State of Colorado. *California* (Berkeley).

Eugene W. Jones; A.B., Akron, 1942; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1955. The Employment Security Commission in North Carolina. *North Carolina.*

Lois B. Merk; A.B., Smith College, 1924; A.M., Clark, 1927; Ph.D., Harvard, 1956. Massachusetts and the Woman-Suffrage Movement. *Harvard.*

Lester W. Milbrath; B.A., Minnesota, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1956. Motivations and Characteristics of Political Contributors: North Carolina General Election, 1952. *North Carolina.*

Donald C. Mundinger; B.S., Concordia, 1951; A.M., Northwestern, 1952; Ph.D., Washington (St. Louis), 1956. The St. Louis City Earnings Tax. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Frank J. Munger; S.B., Northwestern, 1951; Ph.D., Harvard, 1956. Two-Party Politics in the State of Indiana. *Harvard.*

Isham G. Newton; A.B., Lincoln, 1939; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Minor Judiciary in North Carolina with Special Emphasis on the Justices of the Peace. *Pennsylvania.*

G. Sieber Pancoast; B.S., Ursinus, 1937; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1940; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Second Class Townships in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

Wesley A. St. John; B.S., Drake, 1948; M.A., State University of Iowa, 1949; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1956. The Issuance, Suspension, and Revocation of Occupational and Professional Licenses: A Study of California Administrative Procedure. *California* (Berkeley).

Jesse Winzenreid; B.S., Wyoming, 1945; M.S., Denver, 1946; Ph.D., New York University, 1955. State Financial Administration in Wyoming. *New York University.*

Frederick M. Wirt; B.A., DePauw, 1948; M.A., Ohio State, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. State

Motion Picture Censorship, with Special Reference to Ohio. *Ohio State.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Sidney Baldwin; B.A., Wesleyan, 1949; M.P.A., Syracuse, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Farm Security Administration: A Study in Politics and Administration. *Syracuse.*

Lowell R. Eklund; B.S., Michigan State, 1939; M.S., Syracuse, 1948; D.P.A., *ibid.*, 1956. A Century of Service: An Historical Analysis of the Service Function of a State University. *Syracuse.*

Harold E. Finnegan; B.A., Nebraska, 1943; Ph.D., American, 1956. Selected Indices of Manpower Management and an Interpretation of Their Statistical Application in Portions of a Large Federal Mental Hospital, 1948–1951. *American.*

Edward L. Henry; B.A., St. John's University, 1943; M.B.A., Harvard, 1944; Ph.D., Chicago, 1955. A Politico-Administrative Appraisal of Government Organization for Monetary Policy Formation. *Chicago.*

Clyde T. Hardwick; B.B.Ad., Detroit, 1940; M.P.A., Wayne, 1948; Ph.D., Michigan, 1956. Cooperative Purchasing Techniques for Municipalities. *Michigan.*

George A. Holmes; D.D.S., Loyola University Dental School, 1933; B.S., Y.M.C.A. College of Chicago, 1936; M.A., Chicago, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Dental Licensing Administration in the United States. *Chicago.*

Robert V. Kirch; B.A., Indiana, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Administrative Regulation of a Public Utility: A Case Study. *Indiana.*

Richard H. McCleery; B.A., Hawaii, 1950; M.A., Syracuse, 1953; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1956. Institutional Change: A Case Study of Prison Management in Transition, 1945–1955. *North Carolina.*

Carroll F. Miles; A.B., Seton Hall, 1938; A.M., Catholic, 1940; M.P.A., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1947–1953: A Study in Administrative Theory. *Harvard.*

Leavy Oliver; B.A., Miles College, 1942; M.A., Indiana, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. A Historical Survey and Analysis of the Progress of Negroes in Public Service (1932–1952). *Indiana.*

Benjamin L. Olsen; A.B., Stanford, 1943; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Administration of Water Resource Programs. *Stanford.*

Arthur S. Patrick; B.Ed., State Teachers College (Wisconsin), 1931; M.A., Iowa, 1940; Ph.D., American, 1956. An Analysis of the Duties and Responsibilities of the First-Line Office Supervisor in Government. *American.*

Robert H. Pealy; B.S., Akron, 1937; M.P.A., Michigan, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. A Comparative Study of Property Tax Administration in Illinois and Michigan with Emphasis on State Administration of Inter-County Equalization. *Michigan.*

William M. Ransom; B.A., Iowa, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Reorganization of Public Health Administration in the State of Iowa. *Iowa.*

Alfred M. Skolnik; B.A., New York University, 1941; M.A., Columbia, 1948; Ph.D., American, 1956. The Role of the Government in Providing Cash Benefits for Temporary Disability. *American.*

Richard Stillman; B.S., Southern California, 1938; M.P.A., Syracuse, 1950; D.P.A., *ibid.*, 1955. A Critical Review of Modern Administrative Practices Related to the Cadet Store at West Point. *Syracuse.*

Russell P. Strange; B.A., Maryland, 1952; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Personnel Administration in the Department of Defense: Theory and Practice. *Maryland.*

David L. Stratmon; B.A., Howard, 1947; M.P.A., Michigan, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. An Administrative Appraisal of the United States Public Health Mission in Liberia. *Michigan.*

James R. Woodworth; A.B., Western Reserve, 1940; A.M., Harvard, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Forces Influencing the Legislative Process in the Area of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law, 1933–1954. *Harvard.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Basher A. Aridi; B.A., Utah State Agriculture College, 1952; M.S., Utah, 1953; Ph.D., American, 1956. Parties and Politics in Lebanon. *American.*

Eme G. Awa; B.A., Lincoln University, 1951; M.P.A., New York University, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Regionalism in Nigeria: A Study in Federalism. *New York University.*

Richard Barron; B.A., Knox, 1932; Ph.D., Virginia, 1956. Government and Politics of the Fourth Republic in France, 1944–1948. *Virginia.*

Leonard Binder; A.B., Harvard, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Islamic Constitutional Theory and Politics in Pakistan. *Harvard.*

Conrad Brandt; A.B., Harvard, 1941; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Soviet Failure in China, 1920–7. *Harvard.*

Cecil C. Brett; B.A., U. of British Columbia, 1948; M.A., Washington (Seattle); Ph.D., Michigan, 1956. The Government of Okayama Prefecture: A Case Study of Local Autonomy in Japan. *Michigan.*

Theodore Bullockus; A.B., George Washington, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., American, 1956. Transportation in Thailand and its Relationship to the Economic Progress of the Nation. *American.*

Ronald F. Bunn; A.B., Southwestern at Memphis, 1951; M.A., Duke, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Organization and Political Theory of the Postwar German Employers' Federation. *Duke.*

James B. Christoph; B.A., Wisconsin, 1950; M.A., Minnesota, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Political Rights of State Workers in Great Britain. *Minnesota.*

Onofre D. Corpuz; A.B., University of the Philippines, 1950; A.M., Illinois, 1953; M.P.A., Harvard, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Bureaucracy in the Philippines: A Civil Service in Evolution. *Harvard.*

Jesus de Galindez; License in Law (Spain), 1936; Ph.D., Columbia, 1956. Trujillo's Dominican Republic. *Columbia.*

Eugene P. Dvorin; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1948; B.S., U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, (Kings Point, N.Y.), 1950; M.A., California (Los Angeles), 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Central African Federation: A Political Analysis. *California* (Los Angeles).

Marie A. Edwards; A.B., Indiana, 1938; M.A., Northwestern, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Political Activities of Japanese Postwar Labor Unions. *Northwestern.*

Augusto Espiritu; A.B., Silliman, 1951; LL.B., University of the Philippines, 1952; LL.M., Harvard, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Freedom and National Security. *Harvard.*

Vernon L. Fluharty; A.B., Ohio State, 1935; B.S., in Ed., *ibid.*, 1936; M.A., Pittsburgh, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Latin American Military Caesar and the Social Revolution: A Case Study of Colombia, 1946–1955. *Pittsburgh.*

Dante Lee Germino; A.B., Duke, 1952; Ph.D., Harvard, 1956. The Italian Fascist Party, 1925–1939. *Harvard.*

Walter I. Giles; B.S.F.S., Georgetown, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. British Colonial Policy and the Political Development of Jamaica, 1944–1954. *Georgetown.*

Werner Grunbaum; B.A., Rice Institute, 1951; M.A., Chicago, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Civil Liberties and the Cold War in Great Britain. *Chicago.*

Merlin D. Gustafson; B.S., Kansas State College, 1943; M.S., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Nebraska, 1956. Problems of British Agricultural Administrative Law. *Nebraska.*

Louis K. Harris; A.B., Ohio State, 1945; M.A., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1956. Metropolitan Mexico City. *California* (Los Angeles).

Dan F. Henderson; A.B., Whitmore, 1944; A.B., Michigan, 1945; LL.B., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1955. The Pattern and Persistence of Traditional Procedures in Japanese Law. *California* (Berkeley).

Renze L. Hoeksema; B.A., Hope, 1948; A.M., Harvard, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Communism in the Philippines. *Harvard.*

Eric G. James; B.A., McGill, 1951; M.P.A., New York University, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Administrative Institutions and Social Change in Jamaica, British West Indies. *New York University.*

Chien-Kuen Kiang; B. of Law, National University (Hunan, China), 1935; M.A., Nebraska, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Conditions for Federation. *Nebraska.*

Gikonyo J. Kiano; A.B., Antioch, 1952; M.A., Stanford, 1953; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1956. The Federation Issue in "Multi-Racial" East and Central Africa. *California* (Berkeley).

Dimitrios Kousoulas; Law Diploma, University of Athens, 1948; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1956. The Greek Communist Party since 1918. *Syracuse.*

Jean A. Laponce; Diplome, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, 1947; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1956. The Protection of Minorities. *California* (Los Angeles).

Frank M. Lewis; A.B., Indiana, 1943; M.A., Northwestern, 1949; Ph.D., Texas, 1955. The Political Effects of a Multi-Party System upon the Presidential Form of Government in Chile. *Texas.*

J. Gus Liebenow, Jr.; A.B., Illinois, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Northwestern,

1955. Chieftainship and Local Government in Tanganyika: A Study of Institutional Adaptation. *Northwestern.*

Sidney Mailick; M.A., Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Establishment of a System of Personnel Administration in Israel. *Chicago.*

Josephine F. Milburn; A.B., North Carolina, 1948; M.A., Louisiana State, 1949; Ph.D., Duke, 1956. The Fabian Society and the British Labour Party. *Duke.*

Fred W. Neal; B.A., Michigan, 1937; M.A., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., Michigan, 1956. The Reforms in Yugoslavia, 1948–1954: Titoism in Action. *Michigan.*

Amon Nikoi; A.B., Amherst, 1953; M.P.A., Harvard, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Indirect Rule and Government in Gold Coast Colony 1844–1954: A Study in History, Ecology and Politics of Administration in a Changing Society. *Harvard.*

Eze A. Ogueri; B.A., Adelphi College, 1950; M.P.A., Harvard, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Indirect Rule and the Growth of Representative Government in Nigeria. *Harvard.*

Don Peretz; A.B., Minnesota, 1944; A.M., Columbia, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Israel and the Arab Regufees. *Columbia.*

Arien L. Plotkin; B.Sc., London, 1951; M.P.A., Princeton, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Israel's Rôle in the United Nations: An Analytical Study. *Princeton.*

Allen M. Potter; A.B., Wesleyan, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Columbia, 1955. British Party Politics: A Study of Party Discipline. *Columbia.*

Thomas A. Rusch; B.S., Milwaukee State Teachers College, 1941; M.A., California (Los Angeles), 1948; Ph.D., Chicago, 1955. Role of the Congress Socialist Party in the Indian National Congress, 1931–1942. *Chicago.*

F. Burke Sheeran; A.B., Montana State, 1940; A.M., Southern California, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Federalism in the United States, Canada, and Australia, with Particular Reference to Selected Institutional and Functional Aspects. *Southern California.*

Wilhelmus Van Eekeren; B.L., Amsterdam, 1951; M.A., Oregon, 1952; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1956. The Catholic People's Party in the Netherlands—A Study of its Origin, Theory, Policy, and Political Significance. *Georgetown.*

Karl Von Vorys; A.B., College of Steubenville (Ohio), 1951; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1956. The Foundations of the French Third Republic: A Socio-Political Analysis of its First Twenty-five Years, 1870–1895. *Georgetown.*

Nicholas A. Wahl; A.B., Wisconsin, 1949; A.M., Harvard, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. DeGaulle and the Resistance: The Rise of Reform Politics in France. *Harvard.*

Eric Waldman; A.B., George Washington, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Spartacist Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement: A Study of the Relation between Political Theory and Party Practice. *George Washington.*

Myron Weiner; B.S., City College, 1951; Ph.D., Princeton, 1955. Indian Political Behavior: A Study of the Development of a Multi-Party System. *Princeton.*

George E. Wolff; A.B., Florida, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1956. Executive-Legislative Relations in the Third French Republic, 1920–1940. *North Carolina.*

Willard R. Yates; B.A., Oregon, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Yale, 1956. An Examination of the Leading Constitutional and Social Ideas of the Mouvement Republicain Populaire. *Yale.*

Janusz Zawodny; B.S., Iowa, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Stanford, 1955. Workers' Settlement of Grievances in Soviet Factories. *Stanford.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, POLITICS AND LAW

Abdel Raouf Abu Alam; B.Sc., Fouad I.U., Egypt, 1946; M.A., American, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Analysis of Egyptian-Sudanese Relations since 1936 with Special Emphasis on the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Agreement. *American.*

Walter Adamson; A.B., New York University, 1939; A.M., *ibid.*, 1940; Ph.D., Fletcher School, 1956. Ecuador in Transition: An Analysis of Persistent Problems and Current Progress. *Fletcher School.*

Luther A. Allen; B.A., Williams College, 1941; M.A., Iowa, 1942; Ph.D., Chicago, 1955. The French Left and Soviet Russia to 1936. *Chicago.*

Fenton Babcock; B.A., Yale, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Issues of China Policy before Congress, September 1945 to September 1949. *Yale.*

Arthur C. Banks, Jr.; B.S., St. John's, 1939;

A.M., New York University, 1945; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1955. International Law and the Second World War. *Johns Hopkins.*

Irving Barnett; A.B., Yale, 1938; LL.B., Columbia, 1941; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. UNRRA in China: A Case Study in Financial Assistance for Economic Development with Emphasis on Agricultural Programs. *Columbia.*

Lincoln P. Bloomfield; S.B., Harvard, 1941; M.P.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956, The United Nations, the Status Quo, and the Process of Peaceful Change. *Harvard.*

John J. Boyne; A.B., Alabama, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1956. United States Responsibilities for Colonial Territories under the United Nations Charter. *North Carolina.*

Edwin C. Buell; B.S., North Texas, 1941; M.A., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1955. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs: A Study of Inter-Governmental Cooperation. *North Carolina.*

Robert O. Byrd; B.A., College of Puget Sound, 1938; M.A., American, 1939; M.A., Columbia, 1945; Ph.D., Chicago, 1955. Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy. *Chicago.*

Charles K. Chu; B.A., National Central University (Nanking, China), 1943; M.A., Wisconsin, 1949; Ph.D., Chicago, 1956. The China Policy of the Taft-Knox Administration, 1909–1913. *Chicago.*

William G. Cornelius; A.B., Vanderbilt, 1934; A.M., *ibid.*, 1935; Ph.D., Columbia, 1956. Latin American Patterns of Voting in the United Nations. *Columbia.*

Omar Dajany; B.A., American University of Beirut, Lebanon, 1942; Ph.D., American, 1956. The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. *American.*

Dorothy Dodge; B.A., Minnesota, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Recognition of Communist China: Legal and Political Aspects. *Minnesota.*

Bernard Fall; M.A., Syracuse, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Post-War Problem of Indo-China. *Syracuse.*

Richard Forster; B.A., Denver, 1949; M.A., Yale, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The British Political Image of the United States. *Yale.*

Elizabeth R. Fraser; A.B., Southern California, 1949; A.M., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Korean Conflict with Special Reference to the Theory and Dynamics of Collective Security. *Southern California.*

Harry J. Friedman; B. Litt., Rutgers, 1948; M.A., Wisconsin, 1949; Ph.D., Pittsburgh, 1956. Consolidation of India since Independence: A Comparison and Analysis of Four Indian Territorial Problems—Kashmir, Hyderabad, Portuguese Possessions and French Possessions. *Pittsburgh.*

Geraldine S. Garlick; B.A., Iowa, 1952; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Communistic Interpretations of the Causes of War. *Iowa.*

Richard A. Geisler; A.B., North Carolina, 1946; M.F.S., Southern California, 1949; Ph.D., New York University, 1955. Military Collaboration in the Western Hemisphere. *New York University.*

John S. Gibson; A.B., Oberlin, 1948; A.M., Western Reserve, 1950; Ph.D., Columbia, 1956. The Development of Mutual Security Arrangements and their Impact upon the UN in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. *Columbia.*

Bryant W. Giles; B.A.: Utah, 1946; M.A., Stanford, 1948; Ph.D., Yale, 1956. The "Belize" Question: A Problem of Anti-Colonialism in the New World. *Yale.*

John S. Gillespie; A.B., Oberlin, 1933; A.M., *ibid.*, 1939; Ph.D., Columbia, 1956. The Role of the Director in the Development of the International Labour Organization. *Columbia.*

Mehmet Gonlubol; Graduate, Izmir School of Business (Turkey), 1947; A.M., Denver, 1952; Ph.D., New York University, 1955. Turkish Participation in the United Nations. *New York University.*

Robert C. Good; B.A., Haverford, 1945; B.D., Yale, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Contribution of Reinhold Niebuhr to the Theory of International Relations. *Yale.*

Sania Hamady; B.A., American University of Beirut, 1946; M.A., Michigan State, 1950; Ph.D., Chicago, 1956. The Character and Temperament of the Arabs. *Chicago.*

Milan E. Hapala; A.B., Beloit, 1940; M.A., Nebraska, 1941; Ph.D., Duke, 1956. The Evolution of Czechoslovak Political Parties and the Russian Question, 1918–1921. *Duke.*

Charles W. Hostler; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1942; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1956. The Turks of the Soviet and Western Orbits and their Unifying Ideals. *Georgetown.*

Lawrence C. Howard; A.B., Drake, 1949; A.M., Wayne, 1950; Ph.D., Harvard, 1956. American Involvement in Africa South of the Sahara, 1800–1860. *Harvard.*

Albert J. Hoyt; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1941; A.M., *ibid.*, 1943; Ph.D., Southern

California, 1954. Regionalism and the United Nations. *Southern California.*

Dunning Idle IV; B.A., Princeton, 1949; M.A., Yale, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Indonesia's Independent and Active Foreign Policy. *Yale.*

Hoyt M. Jackson; A.B., Chico State College (California), 1948; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1950; Ph.D., Nebraska, 1955. Aggression as Defined by the United Nations. *Nebraska.*

Howard W. Johnston; A.B., Coe, 1935; A.M., Columbia, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. United States Public Affairs Activities in Germany, 1945–1955. *Columbia.*

George H. Kelly; A.B., California, 1937; A.M., Stanford, 1940; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Political Development of the French Overseas Empire. *Stanford.*

Chase Kimball; A.B., Yale, 1925; LL.B., *ibid.*, 1928; A.M., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Fletcher School, 1955. A Commentary on the Civil Liberties Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. *Fletcher School.*

Leon Korusiewicz; LL.M., Warsaw, 1930; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1955. Polish-German Diplomatic Relations, 1934–1939. *California* (Berkeley).

Hua-Wei Li; A.B., St. John's University (China), 1947; A.M., Maryland, 1949; Ph.D., New York University, 1956. The Development of Economic and Social Rights by the United Nations. *New York University.*

Pichon P. Y. Loh; B.A., Phillips University, 1950; M.A., Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. China: Its Westernization and Nationalism, 1919–1926. *Chicago.*

Virginia H. MacLean; A.B., Linfield College, 1942; A.M., Fletcher School, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Domestic and Foreign Factors in Egyptian Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. *Fletcher School.*

Yunan Mao; M.A., University of Ottawa, 1943; M.A., Harvard, 1947; Ph.D., Chicago, 1956. The Principle of Sovereign Equality in the United Nations. *Chicago.*

Randall H. Nelson; A.B., Michigan, 1950; A.M., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Recent Developments in the Law and Practice of the United States Respecting the Negotiation and Conclusion of International Agreements and Commentary on Proposed Changes. *Michigan.*

Mark Neuweld; Ph.B., Northwestern, 1949; A.M., Harvard, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Central Organization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Its Structure, Leadership and Dynamics of Development, 1917–1930. *Harvard.*

Eiichi Okajima; A.B., Stetson, 1952; Ph.D., New York University, 1956. The Japanese Peace Treaty and Its Implications on Japan's Post-War Foreign Policy. *New York University.*

Ross J. Pritchard; A.B., Arkansas, 1951; A.M., *ibid.*, 1951; A.M., Fletcher School, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Will Clayton, A Study of Business Statesmanship in the Formulation of United States Economic Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School.*

Milton Rakove; B.A., Roosevelt College, 1948; M.A., Chicago, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. American Attitudes toward Negotiations with the Soviet Union. *Chicago.*

Peter P. Remec; Doctor of Jurisprudence, University of Graz (Austria), 1948; Dr. R. P., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Chicago, 1956. The Position of the Individual in International Law According to Grotius and Vattel. *Chicago.*

Robert E. Riggs; A.B., Arizona, 1952; A.M., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., Illinois, 1955. The Policy of the United States in the General Assembly of the United Nations. *Illinois.*

Edward J. Rozek; A.B., Harvard, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Soviet-Polish Relations 1939–1947: A Case Study of Soviet Foreign Policy. *Harvard.*

Hassan Saab; License es Lettres, Fuad University (Cairo), 1943; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1956. The Arab Approach to Federalism. *Georgetown.*

Bert P. Schloss; B.A., Roosevelt College, 1951; M.A., Chicago, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The American Occupation of Germany, 1945–1952: An Appraisal. *Chicago.*

John C. Sherry; B.S., Fordham, 1936; M.A., *ibid.*, 1938; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Aspects of American Policy Regarding the Unification of the Chinese National Government, 1944–1948. *Fordham.*

Joel D. Singer; A.B., Duke, 1946; Ph.D., New York University, 1955. The Fiscal Process in the United Nations. *New York University.*

Robert F. Smith; B.A., Maryville College, 1948; M.A., Tennessee, 1951; Ph.D., Chicago, 1955. The Policy of the United States toward Political Unity in Germany, 1945–1953. *Chicago.*

Robert S. Smith; A.B., Yale, 1947; A.M., Harvard, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Cultural and

Information Programs of Newly Independent Nations as Instruments of Foreign Policy. *Harvard.*

Richard W. Sterling; B.A., Yale, 1942; M.A., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Ego and Ethic in International Politics: Friedrich Meinecke and the Idea of Raison d'Etat. *Yale.*

Virgil H. Stevens; A.B., Texas, 1941; A.M., Southern California, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1953. Personnel Problems Peculiar to International Agencies: A Study in International Administration. *Southern California.*

Lois J. Stone; A.B., Barnard, 1948; A.M., Columbia, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Anglo-Russian Relations in Central Asia, 1885–1892. *Columbia.*

Owart Suthiwart-Narueput; B.L., University of Moral and Political Sciences, Bangkok, 1946; A.M., Fletcher School, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Evolution of Thailand's Foreign Relations since 1855; from Extraterritoriality to Equality. *Fletcher School.*

Barbara J. Teters; B.A., Michigan, 1946; M.A., Washington (Seattle), 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. The Conservative Opposition in Japanese Politics from 1877 to 1894. *Washington,* (Seattle).

Margaret D. Urist; B.F.S., Southern California, 1942; A.M., *ibid.*, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. An Analysis of the Participation of Guatemala in the Pan American Conferences, 1889–1933. *Southern California.*

Charles W. Vear; A.B., Indiana, 1952; A.M., *ibid.*, 1952; A.M., Fletcher School, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Organized Labor and the Tariff. *Fletcher School.*

Lawrence W. Wadsworth, Jr.; B.S., Centenary, 1947; M.A., Tulane, 1948; Ph.D., American, 1955. A Short History of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials with Special Reference to some Aspects of Procedure. *American.*

Ponnambalam Wignaraja; B.A., Ceylon University, 1948; M.A., Yale, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Demand for Foreign Capital in Indian Planning, 1951–52 to 1960–61. *Yale.*

Thomas W. Wolfe; B.A., Hiram College (Ohio), 1949; M.A., Columbia, 1950; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1956. Soviet Leadership. *Georgetown.*

Stephen Xydis; A.B., Athens University, 1935; M.F.A., Princeton, 1941; Ph.D., Columbia, 1956. The American Naval Visits to Greece and Eastern Mediterranean, 1946: Their Impact on American-Soviet Relations. *Columbia.*

Ronald J. Yalem; A.B., Washington, 1950; M.A., American, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The East-West Trade Control Program: A Case Study in United States Foreign Economic Policy. *American.*

Abraham Yeselson; A.B., Rutgers, 1947; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Brown, 1954. American-Persian Relations, 1883–1918. *Brown.*

Ira W. Zartman; B.A., Johns Hopkins, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Yale, 1956. De La Resistance a la Revolution: Postwar French Neutralism. *Yale.*

BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States; *Tickton,* The Budget in Transition; The Need for Further Budget Reform: A Joint NPA Statement, and *Colm,* The Federal Budget and the National Economy. DWIGHT WALDO 847

Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia. MAX BELOFF... 851

Khadduri and Liebesny (eds.), Law in the Middle East, Volume I: Origin and Development of Islamic Law; *Khadduri,* War and Peace in the Law of Islam. DANKWART A. RUSTOW 854

Wilcox and Marcy, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations. DANIEL S. CHEEVER 856

Development towards Self-Government in the Caribbean: A Symposium Held under the Auspices of the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation. FELIX A. NIGRO 858

Smithies, Spengler, Knight, Jewkes, Viner, and Robbins, Economics and Public Policy. ROBERT A. DAHL 860

Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. JOHN P. ROCHE 862

Rossiter, Conservatism in America. O. DOUGLAS WEEKS 864

Ekirch, The Decline of American Liberalism. CECELIA M. KENYON 866

Acheson, A Democrat Looks at His Party. OLIVER GARCEAU 867

D'Addio, L'Idea del Contratto Sociale dai Sofisti alla Riforma: E il "De Principatu" di Mario Salamonio. MARIO EINAUDI 869

Rowe, Voltaire and the State. SHELDON S. WOLIN 870

Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism. EDWARD TABORSKY 872

Papers Prepared for the Eighth American Assembly, The Forty-Eight States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators. WILLIAM H. YOUNG 873

Gladden, The Essentials of Public Administration. HERBERT KAUFMAN 874

Quigley and Turner, The New Japan: Government and Politics. RALPH BRAIBANTI 876

Beisel, Control over Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal Law: Role of the Supreme Court. ROBERT FAIRCHILD CUSHMAN 877

Kaufmann (ed.), Craig, Hilsman, Kaufmann, and Knorr, Military Policy and National Security. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON 878

Corwin and Koenig, The Presidency Today; *Rossiter*, The American Presidency. Joseph E. Kallenbach 880

Thomson, Television and Presidential Politics: The Experience in 1952 and the Problems Ahead. Donald S. Strong 882

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 884

American Government and Politics 884

Foreign and Comparative Government 897

International Law and Relations 905

Political Theory, Research, and Methodology 916

Other Books Received 925

BOOK REVIEWS

The Budgetary Process in the United States: Committee for Economic Development Research Study. BY ARTHUR SMITHIES. (New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1955. Pp. xxi, 486. $6.50.)

The Budget in Transition. BY SIDNEY G. TICKTON. (Washington, D. C., National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlets, No. 89. A Staff Study prepared for the Business Committee. 1955. Pp. ix, 50. $1.00.)

The Need for Further Budget Reform. A JOINT NPA STATEMENT. *The Federal Budget and the National Economy: How to Make the Federal Budget a Better Tool of Fiscal Policy.* BY GERHARD COLM WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MARILYN YOUNG. (Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association. Planning Pamphlets, No. 90. 1955. Pp. vi, 101. $1.50.)

The Budgetary Process in the United States was written by Arthur Smithies, Professor of Economics at Harvard, as an "aid" to the Research and Policy Committee of CED in developing recommendations for national policy. It bears some of the marks of a commissioned work; there are suggestions that a goal of formal coverage rather than intellectual *élan* moved the author. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the essential freedom of the author to form and express his own opinions within the broad outlines of the commission. And he has produced a sometimes good and always useful—though misleadingly titled—book.

The title raises the expectation that here, at last, is a successor to A. E. Buck's *Public Budgeting.* But, in the first place, attention is limited to the national scene, and while there are some references to British practice there is no treatment at all of state and local budgeting. And in the second place, there is no attempt to treat all the aspects of budgeting *seriatim* and equally; the author states, for example, that "it has not been feasible to consider the accounting and reporting systems that are needed except in a very general way" (p. 18). This is not to criticize, but only to help in describing Smithies' book. Perhaps a generation of increasing data but diversifying theories and approaches makes another *Public Budgeting* a senseless, if not impossible, goal. We "know" more than Buck did in 1929, but few of us are as sure of it.

In the fore part of the book, in parts titled "Introductory Background" and "The Setting of the Problem," the author has provided a useful summary of much historical and institutional data. Part Three moves on to "Improvement of Congressional and Executive Procedures," and Part Four is given to "The Defense Budget." (Frederick Mosher was associated with the author in the summer of 1952, and his *Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice* is a much more extensive treatment of many of the same themes.) Part Five is a review of five of the most important "Non-Defense Programs"—e.g., "Veterans Benefits." Part Six consists of a single chapter on "The Economic Impact of the Budget."

In its review and summary of data alone the book makes a useful contribution. Though less than encyclopedic, it covers much more ground than any other recent book on national budgeting. Nor is it limited to the mechanics of budgeting. There is a review of areas of public policy, and even discussion of the economic impact of national budgeting and financial policy. The author has listened intelligently and sympathetically to many points of view; he has examined a great mass of documents, personally observed the processes he discusses, and brought to a reasonably sharp focus a multitude of data.

Nor is the book limited to description and analysis. There are many prescriptions for improvement, most of them set forth in precise, concrete form, and some of them of major importance. Indeed, *improvement* of the budgetary process is the major theme of, or reason for, the book. In the case of appropriations procedures, for example, nine recommendations are made (pp. 183–184), including one that "The Congress should require that the President's budget be submitted during March each year"—omitting green-sheet detail but containing more program information; and one that "Appropriations should be recommended and enacted in an omnibus appropriations act, subject to veto by the President of legislative riders and other extraneous items."

Perhaps the most significant recommendation—certainly the most interesting to the reviewer—is that there be a separation between "program" review and authorization and "operations" review and improvement, on both the Executive and the Legislative side of the budgeting process. Present procedures, it is argued, attempt to do both simultaneously, with the result that they do neither well. The task as presently institutionalized is "unmanageable" and must be split. "The detail that is needed for a review of the past complicates and obscures the programs for the future. On the other hand, the review that is conducted does not get to the heart of the question of economy and efficiency which is its main purpose" (p. 171). Two "budgetary" cycles a year are projected, utilizing somewhat different personnel and institutions. The review of performance is to be completed before the review of program is far advanced, and to be taken account of in making program determinations.

Except for one note of caution or suspicion below, there is no attempt here to evaluate this scheme. Indeed, space does not permit presentation of the scheme in enough detail for its essential understanding, much less for its thorough discussion. Suffice it to note that the proposal is closely related to the issue of program budgeting versus traditional line-item budgeting. It attempts to obtain the objectives of the former while retaining the advantages of the latter. Sober second thoughts about (and continuing "political" dissatisfaction with) program budgeting make the inquiry a relevant and important one.

The argument of the book follows a wavering and obscure path between economics on the one hand and political science and public administration on the other. This is not said in special criticism of the book. Budgeting is naturally of interest to economists, political scientists, and specialists in administration. And indeed the phenomena involved are, could be, or should be of interest to other disciplines. But phenomena bounded and criss-crossed by two or more disciplines are perhaps especially subject to distorted or incomplete treatment. And I believe that this can be illustrated in the present book.

The book, writes Smithies in his Preface, is "the work of an economist. Budgeting is essentially an economic problem, involving as it does the allocation of scarce resources among almost insatiable and competing demands. The economist's creed compels him to maintain that decisions that result from deliberate choice among alternatives yield more satisfactory results than those made by less rational methods" (p. xv). Few would disagree with this creed, and the analysis given may well help us on the way to more rational decision-making in national budgeting. But there is substantially nothing in the analysis that is peculiar to economics as a discipline—no special tools of analysis, no conceptual apparatuses. If economics has a contribution to make to public budgeting (as apart from economic or fiscal policy) it would appear to be only in a strong "bent" toward organization for rational decision-making. The procedural refinements of economic theory have little or no relevance to choices among alternatives of public policy. This Smithies acknowledges (p. 27) in discussing the great difference between the "firm" of economic theory (with its hypothesized profit-maximization objective) and a university, with its diffuse and controversial objectives.

But the author does not limit himself to procedural refinements. (We will put aside here the question whether even these are not policy matters.) He is certainly, if not inevitably, addressing himself to questions of public policy. There is a disclaimer, no doubt honestly entered, in the first page of the Preface, that "I must take policy objectives as givens," but attitudes, generally "intelligent" from the reviewer's point of view, are struck on one issue of public policy after another throughout the book. Incidentally, it is also stated (p. 9) that a distinction between budgeting and policy-making is not feasible. It is possible, of course, to argue that organization for rational decision-making can be separated as a problem from specific decisions on public policy, whether these decisions are purely "financial," purely "policy," or both combined. The reviewer happens to regard such argument as specious. Yet economics as a discipline has for some time been busily engaged in "dealing itself out" so far as most policy questions are concerned.

These observations are related, I think, to the author's treatment of "efficiency and economy." This phrase is for the most part taken "on faith," and the analytical and critical literature of the past fifteen years has not been examined. It is assumed or asserted (p. 14) that there is a "practical" if not "logical" distinction between a "programing" question and an "efficiency" question. Upon this assumption or assertion the two types of budget review have been built. Now the "practical" distinction may be enough to justify new institutional arrangements. But for some time administrative students have been aware that questions of mechanics (say of organization) are inseparable from program decisions, and the desirability of the split review must be considered in the light of considerations which Professor Smithies has ignored (except occasionally—see p. 367, n.).

Sidney G. Tickton's *The Budget in Transition* was designed, according to the preface, "to be entirely factual and take no policy positions." In this it is highly successful. Though the matter discussed is highly charged with partisan politics there is not even a shading of a word to suggest that Mr. Tickton himself has a partisan opinion.

The booklet deals with the "major policy decisions during recent years" which have "changed the treatment, form and method of reporting some U. S. Government expenditures and the timing of some U. S. tax receipts" (p. viii). These decisions have been made variously by Congress, President, and Budget Director. The effect of the changes has been to reduce the *accounting* totals reported for Federal expenditures for the fiscal years 1951–1956 by not less than $2.5 billion and to increase the *accounting* total of receipts by at least $6.8 billion. As a result the budget, on a consolidated cash basis, will show for the six years combined a $400 million surplus instead of a $7.6 billion deficit. While the budget changes discussed began before the present Administration, they touch the issue of a "balanced budget" and will no doubt be heard of in the coming campaigns.

These changes in proceedings are generally thought to affect accounting totals only (an example was the decision to treat tax refunds as deductions from taxes received instead of an expenditure item, which had the effect of reducing both receipt and expenditure totals by more than $2 billion). But it is relevantly pointed out that there is a psychological effect of any report of a government deficit or surplus. On the basis of whether or not there is a reported deficit or surplus—or even of the reported over-all size of the government's financial operation—decisions are likely to be made which affect the "real" financial position: functions may be curtailed or added, taxes lowered or raised.

Appendix Tables illustrate the effects of the budgetary changes, and there are a series of "Historical Notes" appended—extracts from various sources "not readily available to the public." In the reviewer's opinion, these serve no function and should have been omitted. How payment for Florida was financed might interest an historian, but it sheds no light on present problems.

The third item under review consists of two documents, plus appendixes. The first document, a brief five pages, titled "The Need for Further Budget Reform," is a joint statement of policy by NPA committees. The statement urges increasing use of "economic projection" in national budgeting and economic management and longer-range perspectives in budget formulation and authorization—with appropriate institutional changes. In this connection, it is urged that the Joint Committee on the Economic Report (appropriately renamed) be given the assignment of taking the long and broad view, since at the present time, "no congressional committee gives specific consideration to the budget as a whole."

The monograph by Gerhard Colm, with the assistance of Marilyn Young, titled "The Federal Budget and the National Economy" is a gem. Here in fifty-six pages is a useful summary of much past and contemporary budgetary practice, a lucid exposition of various alternative "budget rules," and a well-presented argument for a "rule" proposed by the authors.

The problem as it is presented is one of "finding a way by which economically sound and politically sound rules of budget policy can be reconciled" (p. 40). The "political rule" is that of a "balanced budget." This sentiment cannot be ignored; it is an important political fact. Moreover, it is solidly rooted in the fact that some sort of "discipline" is needed when the market discipline of private-enterprise budgeting is not present. On the other hand, public events during recent decades have produced a situation in which government fiscal policy and national economic life are intimately related; and economic theory that justifies government fiscal and economic policies in the interests of stability or high productivity is now widely accepted.

Colm and Young examine *seriatim* "The Balanced Budget Rule," "Balancing the Budget over the Cycle," "Balancing the Consolidated Cash Budget," "Balancing the Budget under Conditions of High Employment," and "Balancing the Budget of Current Expenditures." All are found inadequate for the task. The authors take "full employment" as the keystone of good budget policy, but they seek to avoid what they regard as rigidities and inadequacies of past schemes. What they envisage depends upon a "sanguine opinion of the possibilities of economic analysis." They urge that the economic projections now used intramurally be published and that budgeting, fiscal and economic policy be based thereupon. This means institutional adjustments, for example the bringing together with greater flexibility in policy execution of "full employment" and "budgeting" apparatuses and longer time-spans in policy making. The argument is cogent. But obviously the scheme implies a degree of trust in economists and in politicians and bureaucrats which, as a nation, we are a long distance from having.

The two appendixes, "Four Concepts of Federal Receipts and Expenditures" and "Federal Capital Assets and the U. S. Budget," are recommended for anyone who wants a good twenty-minute course on these subjects.

DWIGHT WALDO.

University of California (Berkeley).

Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia. By OWEN LATTIMORE. *With a translation from the Mongol of Sh. Nachukdorji's Life.* By OWEN LATTIMORE AND URGUNGGE ONON. (New York: Oxford University Press. Issued under the auspices of The International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1955. Pp. x, 186. $4.75.)

The posthumous demotion of Stalin from his place in the Communist pantheön has aroused natural speculation as to the fate of its minor deities. Such a one is undoubtedly the Mongol Sukebatur who, before his death in 1923 at the age of thirty, had played a dominant role in the series of events by which Outer Mongolia secured Soviet aid in order to free itself from Chinese and "White" Russian invasion, and by so doing slid itself firmly into the orbit of a Soviet satellite from which it has never since been shifted. In 1943 a brief life of Sukebatur was published in Outer Mongolia by Sh. Nachukdorji, and it is a translation of this work by Professor Lattimore and one of his Mongol collaborators, Urgungge Onon, that forms Part II of the present volume. The work, which is, incidentally, probably the first modern Mongol work to be made available in a western translation, is interesting as an example of Communist hagiography among a still comparatively primitive people and also for the light it throws on the way in which the ruling circles in Outer Mongolia saw the early history of their *régime* at the time of writing.

Professor Lattimore's introduction, which takes up the first half of the volume, deals with the whole question of historical reputations in countries where historical writing is a conscious part of political indoctrination, with particular reference to the changes in the role ascribed to Sukebatur himself and to his successor Choibalsang. It also contains an account of the historical relationships of the Mongols with the Chinese and with the Manchu Empire, and the repercussions on Mongolia's economy and society of the increasing nineteenth-century involvement of China with the world market. In the light of these developments Professor Lattimore is able to give a convincing explanation of how Mongolia became first a satellite of Tsarist Russia, which was interested in creating a buffer-State here, and subsequently of Soviet Russia. The latter development, which was essentially a seeking-out of Soviet aid for the purposes of assisting both in keeping the country's independence of China and in fulfilling the aspirations of a revolutionary segment of the population, leads Professor Lattimore on to a general discussion of the nature of the "satellite" relationship. So far, certainly, Mongolia has been the best working-model of such a relationship; though one may wonder how the opening of direct railroad connections between Russia and China across its territory (announced in January, 1956) may affect its role in the future. The question is whether the model is of general application.

It may be worth quoting Professor Lattimore's definition (p. 41):

> The unmistakable satellite may be defined as the country whose domestic policies, as well as its international relations, simply cannot be discussed with candor and realism without reference to the domestic policies, social and economic character, or "way of life" of the protecting or controlling country in whose orbit it moves. There are also, however, countries that have much less effective sovereignty than the satellite, such as the protectorate and finally the colony, whose sovereignty is institutionally vested in the possessing country. An essential difference between these classes of countries with abated sovereignty or no sovereignty at all is that the satellite is under strong pressure, sometimes amounting to coercion, to remodel its internal life, social structure, political institutions, and economic methods on those of the country in whose orbit it moves, while normally the protectorate and the colony are prevented, by the policies of the protecting or owning country, from doing these very things.

It may be remarked that Professor Lattimore's view of the "colony" or "protectorate" is a somewhat one-sided one; Professor Lattimore's principal weakness has always been an unreasoning prejudice against the "Colonial" Powers; and it may well be that there are other reasons besides their objections why their protectorates and colonies, or some of them, do not move towards assimilation of the Colonial Power's political or economic institutions in every respect.

With this warning it is worth quoting Professor Lattimore's own list of the satellite characteristics (p. 42):

1. The *régime* in the satellite country came to power with the aid of the *régime* in the country in whose orbit it moves.
2. The *régime* in the satellite country does not merely accept, but actively wants the satellite relationship.
3. It could not survive without the support and protection of the dominating power.
4. The individuals, social classes, or groups within classes who are the core of the *régime* identify their interests with those of the dominating country (and those of the *régime* in the dominating country) more unequivocally and more consciously than does the population at large.
5. Outside of the *régime* there exists in the satellite country either an actual or a potential, latent opposition which is as hostile to the protector of the *régime* as it is to the *régime* itself.
6. If the opposition were to overthrow the *régime*, the result would probably not be full independence but gravitation into the orbit of some country other than, and probably hostile to, the country protecting the actual *régime*.
7. The *régime* in the satellite state therefore must, and wants to, model itself on the *régime* in the protecting country; its aim is to develop the satellite state under policies that will eventually make it homogeneous in social composition, economic characteristics, and political institutions with the state in whose orbit it moves. It regards the fulfillment of such policies as a desirable process of catching up.
8. Because of all the foregoing characteristics, any variations within the dominant state are promptly reflected within the satellite state.

In the light of this analysis, Professor Lattimore is able to develop a theory of the nature of Soviet expansionism and its peculiar features, which is certainly a considerable advance on the well-worn and fruitless theme of "parallels" between it and Tsarist "imperialism." For one thing, it enables one to look for differences where they exist; and these differences may still prove to have their importance. China is clearly an ally, not a satellite; and North Korea is thus the only other Asian nation to "enjoy" satellite status; in Europe we have Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria on Professor Lattimore's list, to which presumably we should add Albania. Elsewhere, Professor Lattimore's concept of the "irreversible minimum" (i.e., the friendly buffer-State) as the basis of Soviet policy pending further periods of Communist expansion enables him to explain the fact that Finland, for instance, has escaped this role. On the other hand, in one way the Mongolian example may be misleading, because in the case of all the European satellites with the exception of Czechoslovakia, it is difficult to see that the initial impetus to create a satellite *régime* came from within. The nearest parallel to Outer Mongolia would actually be Jugoslavia, which is for the moment not a satellite at all.

It is the fact that the Soviet Union so clearly intended to overstep, for instance in the case of Poland, the "irreversible minimum" that makes it hard to agree with Professor Lattimore's view that "there is evidence that the Russian leadership . . . hoped towards the end of the war and for a while after it that there was going to be 'peaceful co-existence' " (p. 65), unless what he has in mind is the very special meaning of "peaceful co-existence" from which the Soviet Union has never in fact departed at any stage. Nevertheless the Mongolian story is worth having for the light it throws on Asia if not on Europe; and the present volume is one more of the many services which Professor Lattimore's particular knowledge of the Inner Asian frontiers of China over the centuries has enabled him to render to students of contemporary affairs.

MAX BELOFF.

Nuffield College, Oxford.

Law in the Middle East. Volume 1: Origin and Development of Islamic Law. EDITED BY MAJID KHADDURI AND HERBERT J. LIEBESNY. (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute. 1955. Pp. ix, 395. $7.50.)

War and Peace in the Law of Islam. BY MAJID KHADDURI. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1955. Pp. x, 321. $5.50.)

Islam is the religion of one sixth of mankind—the faith of overwhelming majorities in some sixteen nations from Morocco to Indonesia and of substantial minorities in a wide belt from the Gold Coast to the Phillippines. The Middle Eastern core of this Islamic region has received a good deal of attention from Western students of history and politics ever since the rise of European power and the decline of the Ottoman Empire created what our ancestors called the Eastern Question. Quite recently, moreover, political scientists have proceeded from the traditional study of Middle Eastern diplomatic entanglements to a more systematic exploration of the domestic political forces that determine the region's response to its international environment. Among these forces the religious, intellectual, and legal tradition of Islam, holds without a doubt a crucial place; yet it is safe to say that Islam in its legal aspects has remained *terra incognita* for all but a small circle of experts.

The Middle East Institute, by inviting a select group of such experts to undertake a concise and authoritative survey of the major facets of Muslim law, has gone a long way toward charting this territory for the layman. The result has been a collective work on *Law in the Middle East,* of which the first volume, subtitled *Origins and Development of Islamic Law,* has just been published. The fifteen chapters have been contributed by fourteen specialists, nine of them prominent Middle Eastern teachers or practitioners of law and five of them scholars of Western Europe and this country. In content they range from historical studies of the development of Muslim constitutional doctrine and of the origin and sources of the *sharī'a* (or sacred law) to a systematic analysis of family law, penal law, the law of contract and of pious foundations, and judicial organization and procedure. A chapter on "Shī'ī Legal Theories" touches on an important topic generally overlooked by those who equate Islam with *sunnī* (or orthodox) Islam. The evolution of Islamic law after the fifteenth century is highlighted in a chapter on "The Development of the Sharī'a in the Ottoman Empire," and European influences are reflected in chapters on "The Development of Western Judicial Privileges" and on "The Majalla," a nineteenth-century Ottoman codification of the law of contracts and torts. Professor Khadduri, whose chapter on "International Law" concludes the volume, has treated the same matter more fully in his *War and Peace in the Law of Islam,* an expanded and revised version of a book first published in London in 1941.

In his preface to the volume on *Law in the Middle East* the late Justice Robert

H. Jackson strikingly observes that "in its source, its scope, and its sanctions, the law of the Middle East is the antithesis of Western law." Law in the West has long been a secular concern, whereas Islamic law rests in large part on the divine revelation of the Koran. Yet the gap, for a variety of reasons, is perhaps not so wide as it might seem. Muhammad was the founder of a commonwealth as well as of a religion—to a Muslim indeed the two aspects of his work are all but indistinguishable. Partly as a result, Islam has never developed a priesthood as a distinct class interceding between the believer and the Deity, so that the sway of Islamic law does not necessarily imply priestly rule over worldly affairs. The Koran itself is only one, albeit the most revered and least changeable, of the four recognized sources of the *sharī'a*. Muslim legal doctrine thus does not conform to the rigid patterns that a Westerner might expect to find in a body of religious law. Two other sources—consensus and analogy—provided much room for flexibility, even though their use was frowned upon in later centuries. The most important non-Koranic source was the *sunna*, or practice of the Prophet and his companions as attested by verbal tradition from generation to generation in early Islam. As Professor Joseph Schacht demonstrates in his two chapters on the subject, these traditions became a favorite device in the hands of early Muslim jurists for expanding the Koranic legal doctrine, as revealed in the Arabian trading centers of Mecca and Medina, and adapting it to the needs and customs of conquered populations in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. The later coexistence of four different schools of law, each adhering to its own interpretation of basic doctrines yet all alike recognized as "orthodox," is vivid testimony to the flexibility and pragmatism of early Muslim jurisprudence. In some of the large urban centers, we learn, the defendant in a suit brought before one judge even was given the choice of having it transferred to another judge of his own school. At all times, moreover the *sharī'a* was supplemented with the edicts of rulers and the customs of communities.

In its careful attention to precedent, in its slow accretion and steady amalgamation of disparate elements, Muslim law would seem to display a certain affinity to the Anglo-American tradition of common law. One contributor even suggests that the Muslim law of pious endowments may have directly influenced the much later development of the concept of use or trust in English law. This affinity between Muslim and Western law would probably have emerged with even greater clarity if, in a text intended primarily for the layman, the editors had checked the tendency of some of the contributors to overuse Arabic technical terms. Some two hundred such terms are explained in a four-page glossary. A good half of these, nevertheless, have close English equivalents which could conveniently have been substituted in the text; and surely the reader could have been spared the trouble of having to digest, without benefit of glossary entry or parenthetic translation, such Arabic phrases as *"ahlu-'l 'adl wa'l-tawhīd"* ("People of Justice and Monotheism," a name given by *Shī'īs* to their own group) or *"ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib"* ("conflict among the sources of the schools of law").

In a prefatory note to *Law in the Middle East*, the late Mr. George Camp

Keiser, Chairman of the Middle East Institute's Board of Governors, indicates that a survey of "the modern legal systems of the Middle Eastern countries" is planned as a second volume. One hopes that Mr. Keiser's successors will make it possible for the editors to proceed to the completion of the work without undue delay, and that the active cooperation of leading scholars both in the West and in the Middle East itself will again be enlisted. The first volume accurately reflects the present state of scholarship in the field by dealing largely with the theories and doctrines which Muslim jurisprudence has developed since the early centuries of Islam. Similarly, Professor Khadduri's work on *War and Peace* gives a lucid exposition of the development of legal relations between Islam and non-Islamic communities. A suitable topic for the forthcoming second volume, on the other hand, might be "Law and Society in the Middle East." In it the reader would expect to find a discussion of such topics as the relationship of law as dispensed by the *qāḍī* in the city to the autonomous legal usage of villages and nomadic tribes; the changing patterns of recruitment and training for the legal profession; and the effect of the Islamic prohibition of usury on modern commerce and banking. And no one would be better qualified than Professor Khadduri to supplement his present work with a systematic examination of legal relations among nations *within* the Islamic community—from the peace treaty of 1555 between Sultan Sulayman and Shah Tahmasp to the Arab League of our own day. By helping in some such fashion to bridge the historic gap between legal doctrine and legal practice in the Middle East Professor Khadduri and Dr. Liebesny will greatly augment the debt of gratitude that students of comparative law and comparative politics already owe them.

DANKWART A. RUSTOW.

Princeton University.

Proposals for Changes in the United Nations. BY FRANCIS O. WILCOX AND CARL M. MARCY. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1955. Pp. xiv, 537. $5.00.)

The Tenth General Assembly has secured at least a two-year breathing period during which the Members of the United Nations may consider what changes in the Charter are desirable in the light of experience since 1945. The study under review should be required reading for both officials and non-officials confronting the general and specific problems of revising the United Nations system. Wilcox and Marcy have written a scholarly work that analyzes in close, discriminating detail the various proposals for change that have been advanced by governments, interest groups, and individuals. Furthermore, they cite the experience of the United Nations to date that has given rise to the various proposals. Developments in the United States receive particular attention principally because this government has been more interested than most in Charter review, and because many Americans, for widely varying reasons, want to revise the Charter. Students of international affairs will wish to examine also the studies prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for the views of governments other than the United States, and the specific proposals of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace.

The authors are admirably qualified for their task. Both have served in the State Department and on the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. Indeed, their work is essentially a staff paper although its style and readability will commend themselves to the interested lay reader. The work furnishes evidence of the careful policy planning that, since the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, has characterized the definition of American interests with respect to international organization. Policy planning of such calibre and involving cooperation at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue can exploit in a positive way the division of foreign policy control between two independent branches of government. It also accepts as a major premise ultimate control by public opinion. Such care in the formulation of foreign policy under the separation of powers is not a guarantee against error, but it has gone a long way to chart the shoals on which foreign policy can founder. The reader may be forgiven for speculating how foreign affairs might have been conducted in 1919–20, or 1935–39, if the Federal Government had had such able staff work at the fingertips of both Presidents and Congressional leaders shaping our foreign policy.

Changes in the United Nations by Charter amendment will probably be few and far between in the forseeable future, however, for, as the authors point out, agreement sufficient to command the necessary two-thirds support is not likely. Should such agreement be forthcoming, there remains the well-nigh insuperable obstacle of big-power unanimity which is required for all amendments. For example, some member governments as well as pressure groups within governments seek to restrict the organization's authority, while others wish to expand it. Attitudes, of course, vary with the changes proposed.

Both expectations and interest in Charter amendment procedure have dwindled markedly since the bitter struggles at San Francisco in which the small powers exacted the assurance of Charter "review" at the end of ten years as part of their pound of flesh for the big-power "veto." But the lack of amendments has not resulted in a dearth of changes. The organization has grown quite differently from what was expected of the fledgling hatched at the San Francisco Conference. "The Charter, like the Constitution, has proven flexible enough to be adapted to many new situations without the need for formal amendment" (p. 9). Yet, the authors hasten to add, "the amending process set forth in the Charter is a comparatively flexible one," since many treaties cannot be amended without the support of *all* the signatories (p. 26).

The methods used to effect changes in the United Nations without amendment are set forth in considerable detail. Certain articles of the Charter have never been applied; others have been interpreted by custom and usage to mean something quite different from what the framers at San Francisco first said they meant; supplementary agreements like the Headquarters Agreement have been concluded; subsidiary organs have been created, some of them in spite of bitter disagreement among the Security Council's permament members, as in the case of the Interim Committee and the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. One need only recall how the balance in security matters has shifted from the Security Council to the General Assembly—a shift that was unmistakably plain even prior to the Uniting for Peace Resolution during the United Nations action in Korea—to gain some idea of the flexibility inherent in a system that is more political than legal. With the shift in emphasis from cold war to competitive co-existence, one should add, the pendulum may be shifting part way back to the Security Council as suggested by the Hammarskjold mission to the Middle East. We are reminded, for example, that the role of the International Court of Justice in Charter interpretation is only implied and that the implication is not necessarily firm at that, since the Court's advisory opinions, permitted "on any legal question," have no binding legal effect. Consequently, the Charter may be interpreted pretty much as a majority of the Members wish on any specific issue. To date, the General Assembly, the only United Nations organ to request advisory opinions, has limited itself to seven such requests. Some governments, however, have urged a greater role for the Court in interpreting the Charter.

Although the authors argue that flexibility has been an important means of survival for the United Nations, they warn that "it is necessary to strike a balance somewhere between the extreme positions of loose and strict construction" (p. 461). If unwise attempts are made to seek changes that cannot be achieved by the formal amendment process, the recommendations of United Nations bodies may be ignored and its influence weakened as a consequence.

The authors have made an important contribution both to the study of international organization and to the decision-making process in foreign affairs. The other six volumes in the Brookings series will have to be very good indeed to match the standards set by Wilcox and Marcy.

DANIEL S. CHEEVER.

Harvard University.

Development towards Self-Government in the Caribbean: A Symposium Held under the Auspices of the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation at The Hague, September, 1954. (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, Ltd. 1955. Pp. xi, 285).

These papers, published by the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation, were originally delivered by French, Dutch, British, and American scholars who participated in a series of discussions at The Hague in September of 1954. Apart from the excellence of the individual contributions the outstanding impression one draws from these essays is the excellence of the Caribbean as a laboratory for the study of constitutional and economic development against the background of the forces of nationalism, the struggle of small economic units for survival, and the factors promoting federation as a solution. Few areas in the world present such interesting facets for study by the political scientist.

What emerges is the striking similarity of approach, both on the part of the peoples of the different Caribbean areas discussed and of the outside powers involved. As Dr. Henry Wells, a mainland American and Professor of Political Science at the University of Puerto Rico, points out in one of his papers, dependent peoples face the three choices of assimilation, association, and independence. With the exception of Martinique and Guadeloupe, which in 1946 achieved the status of French departments, assimilation has been rejected. Independence has followers in Puerto Rico but, in the general election of November of 1952, this group polled only 19 per cent of the votes cast. In the British West Indies, the desire for federation has won a clear victory, independence being conceived in terms of ultimate dominion status. In the case of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, the new Kingdom of the Netherlands is based on association and the desire to maintain ties with the Netherlands instead of completely rupturing the relationships. As to the powers involved, since World War II each has moved rapidly to satisfy the aspiration for self-government and, although the particular measures taken have varied, the same core of realism and intelligent adaptation to postwar pressures has prevailed.

That the solution chosen for the French West Indies was assimilation need cause no surprise, since as the authors of the papers concerned (Eugene Revert, George Spitz, and Luc Fauvel) make clear, little nationalist sentiment exists in these islands, where cultural and economic ties with France have always been strong. The British West Indies present perhaps the most fascinating complex of problems. Consisting of eight separate governments, with marked differences in historical background and constitutional and economic development, stretching over a wide area, their evolution towards federation and the now near goal of dominion status evidences what clear-headed statemanship can achieve. C. M. MacInnes and E. W. Evans present an excellent analysis of the political evolution of these governments, showing how as late as 1939 the principles of Crown Colony government were re-affirmed and responsible government was not considered appropriate for the West Indian Colonies, although sympathy was given to the principle of increasing popular representation in the local legislatures. But, with World War II and a new declaration of the aims of British colonial policy, there is a break with the past, and efforts are directed towards promoting the transition to responsible government. The fruits of this new policy are seen in the new Jamaica Constitution of 1944 which, as modified in 1953, fixed the leadership in a policy-determining Executive Committee, consisting of ministers selected by the lower house, the latter itself elected entirely on the basis of universal adult suffrage. With this new Jamaica Constitution as a model, semi-responsible government was also introduced in Trinidad and other territories of the British Caribbean. However, in a penetrating analysis of power factors, Colin A. Hughes stresses that West Indian political parties, in the past weak and prone to fragmentation, now face the necessity of organizing a "stable party system," which is "the only basis on which the responsible government towards which they are advancing can be worked."

Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles now also enjoy autonomy. The Netherlands, influenced by its experience in Indonesia and in fulfillment of war-time pledges by Queen Wilhelmina, had made their autonomy complete by 1950. J. H. A. Logemann analyzes the legal characteristics of the new Kingdom of the Netherlands which came into being at the end of 1954. Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Netherlands participate on the basis of equality in the new Kingdom but, since "equality in status" could not be "reconciled with a disparity in function," the leadership of the Netherlands is accepted in those fields where the "small Caribbean territories can hardly rely on their own strength." Logemann shows how both negative and positive forces explain the desire for association. Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles have no desire to associate with any other country in their area and, at the same time, they do "bear a clear Dutch cultural imprint." Furthermore, the present arrangement does not prevent possible independence for either in the future, since the Kingdom can be dissolved by agreement of all three partners.

If economic motives and reasoned self-interest give the clue to both the emerging British Federation of the West Indies and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, they also explain the new Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Cultural differences and political realities make statehood only a remote possibility; poverty in resources and economic dependence on the United States cause most Puerto Ricans not only to spurn but also to fear independence. As Wells shows, with its new constitution the island is no longer to be considered non-self-governing, and it has possibilities of even a wider measure of freedom in the future. Thus, the picture for all these small units in the Caribbean—whether British, Dutch, or Americans are involved—presents striking similarities, above all in the flexible nature of the agreements reached.

This is an area of the globe from which much will undoubtedly be heard in the future. These papers, which also include a summary of the discussions and an excellent bibiliography, constitute a valuable contribution to the literature.

FELIX A. NIGRO.

Advanced School of Public Administration,
San José, Costa Rica.

Economics and Public Policy: Brookings Lectures, 1954. BY ARTHUR SMITHIES, JOSEPH J. SPENGLER, FRANK H. KNIGHT, JOHN JEWKES, JACOB VINER, AND LIONEL ROBBINS. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1955. Pp. vii, 157. $2.00.)

As nuclear physicists have lately learned, the road from science to policy is hard. It is (or should be) a road more familiar, perhaps, to the economist than to other social scientists; for the economist has—historically and even today—been relied on much more heavily for policy advice than have his colleagues in the other social sciences. It is all the more interesting, then, that familiarity seems, in this case, to breed respect rather than contempt for the difficulties involved.

This, at any rate, seems to be true of the six distinguished economists—four from the United States (one via Canada), two from England—who in 1954 delivered at the Brookings Institution the six lectures that form the essays in the volume under review.

It would be tedious to review each essay, even if that were possible in this short space. As one might expect, not all the essays are of equal quality; but this is the usual fault of such a series. One kind of unevenness is worth mentioning: one is struck particularly by the variations in style. The Englishmen, of course, write much more fluent prose than the Americans, who sometimes seem to have composed with pens tipped in tar—or typewriters stuffed with cold oatmeal.

Equally striking is the familiarity of the problems, of the alternatives posed, and of the answers proposed, a fact that suggests two observations. First, the essential problems of translating theoretical knowledge into policy are about the same, irrespective of content. And second, economists do not have any solutions to these problems noticeably more sophisticated than those bandied about for some time among political scientists. The first is encouraging, for it indicates that the problems can be fruitfully studied independent of content—at least in part. The second is depressing, for one is entitled to the hope that economists, with their relatively more powerful tools for theoretical analysis, might plumb the depths a little more deeply.

What then are these problems? There is, to begin with, the old familiar question of the limitations of "science" in determining policy. As Arthur Smithies points out in the opening essay, it was not so long ago that welfare economists under the influence of Pigou were extraordinarily (one is tempted to say naively) optimistic about the possibilities of determining unequivocally the "social optimum" by means of theorems deduced from a small number of apparently acceptable postulates. By now, most economists seem to have rejected this view in favor of what is surely the more sensible position that economic theory can, at most, throw some light on some of the probable consequences of some of the alternatives—some of the time.

There is also, of course, the closely related and equally ancient, if steadfastly difficult, problem of the interplay of fact and value in social theory. Smithies comes out unequivocally for the argument that since policymaking presupposes standards by which to evaluate alternatives, in his policy functions the economist must necessarily make some value commitments, and he had better do so quite openly and consciously. One might have hoped that in his concluding essay Lionel Robbins would have provided the counterargument, for which he is perhaps best known among political scientists, that the economist, *qua* economist, has no business, competence, or right to mix his own value judgments with his predictions about the probable economic consequences of different alternatives. But, as usually happens in collections of this kind, Robbins takes up a different topic (freedom and order) and so Robbins and Smithies talk right past one another. Even Frank Knight, to whom this territory is an old battleground, refuses to be tempted into this particular battle. Knight's essay, by the way, is only remotely related to the alleged subject of the book; it is characteristically Knight-ian, and rather delightful. Reading Knight is a little like climbing a mountain with no trail; the labor required is prodigious and the underbrush is often overwhelming, but from time to time you do break out on some quite dazzling perspectives.

A third problem might be called the dilemma of rigor *versus* relevance. To use a fanciful analogue, there seems to be a kind of Heisenberg Uncertainty Relation between the rigor of a social theory and its relevance to policy making. Beyond a certain level, an increase in rigor seems to be accompanied by a decrease in relevance, and conversely. In his essay, Jacob Viner has some words on this point that strike me as exceedingly wise, and I find myself wishing that economists would read and ponder his advice. Viner is in a peculiarly strategic position to comment intelligently on the issues involved, for he has made his mark as a theorist and at the same time he has had to deal responsibly with hard questions of policy. No one is more acutely aware than he that much of the most rigorous, elegant, and internally consistent theory in contemporary economics has slight relevance to questions of public policy.

There are other problems, but space permits mention of only one more. This is the question whether the economists can "without stepping outside their discipline, predict in the sense of telling us what will happen in the future." John Jewkes, who poses the question, argues with great force that they cannot, a view that is bound to make him unpopular with a great many of his colleagues. Political scientists, who are notoriously incapable of forecasting anything whatsoever that might not have been equally well or even more successfully predicted by a good newspaper reporter, may derive some wry satisfaction from the hard blows that Jewkes rains down on his fellow economists. For my part, any temporary elation arising out of the belief that we are all equally ignorant is quickly dispelled by the realization that if what Jewkes says is true, then we are still pretty much at the mercy of impalpable and uncontrollable economic forces.

In sum, then, one should look upon this volume as a well-tempered, somewhat meandering, and sometimes rewarding discussion of problems that have been of central concern to political scientists, and for which the economists also seem to have no new answers.

ROBERT A. DAHL.

Yale University.

The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. By RICHARD HOFSTADTER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1955. Pp. viii, 328. $4.00.)

If, as Hegel observed, "the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk," the reform epoch in American history must now be officially over, for the scholarly owls are in full and vigorous feather. Howard Quint in *The Forging of American Socialism*, David Shannon in *The Socialist Party of America*, and Daniel Bell in "Marxian Socialism in the United States" (in Egbert and Persons, Eds., *Socialism and American Life*) have performed the burial service for American Socialism; Robert Morlan has given the last rites to the Non-Partisan League in *Political Prairie Fire;* and Hofstadter's *Age of Reform* now joins Eric Goldman's *Rendezvous with Destiny* as an over-all interpretation of the relatively brief, but hectic and tumultuous, span of years which saw the transformation of the United States from a predominantly agrarian society to an industrial colossus.

Professor Hofstadter has written a superb book. Some Professional Scholars may cavil that the work is "not original" since the author has profited from and cited the work of others, and a few may complain of "journalism", for the style is lucid and stimulating. But, in my estimation, *The Age of Reform* entitles Hofstadter to rank with C. Vann Woodward as a master of creative synthesis, as an interpreter of the past who can add to cold data an empathetic insight that transforms history from a book of the dead into a chronicle of life.

Hofstadter has presented an essentially "revisionist" treatment of the reform era. Liberal historians, following the great trail blazed by the Beards, have generally dealt with the reformers in a most uncritical fashion. *In nuce*, they described a struggle between the Powers of Light and the Powers of Darkness for the salvation of the American Soul. Assumed implicitly by this school was the inherent nobility of the Common Man: once mobilized, the People would instinctively rally to the righteous flag of reform. Thus the key to analysis of the period became the slogan, "The People against the Interests." True, there have been dissents registered against this Manicheism: studies such as Woodward's *Tom Watson* and Albert Kirwan's *Revolt of the Rednecks* suggested that there was much more ambivalence in the reform tradition than the Beards and their following had recognized. But it was left for Hofstadter, perhaps as the spokesman for a generation that has seen the Common Man rallied as often against the cause of freedom as for it, to destroy once and for all the myth of the Golden Age of reform when, in true western movie style, the Goods rode forth against the Bads and the issue was joined with no complexities to trouble the consciences of the sensitive.

Some corybantic liberals have seen Hofstadter's approach as another sell-out to the "New Conservatism," but such a charge is as childish as it is inaccurate. Hofstadter is a liberal historian and, unless one believes that illusions about his ancestors are mandatory equipment for the liberal, he has strengthened rather than weakened the liberal tradition. In fact, a frank recognition of the liabilities of the reform tradition is symptomatic of a new maturity of the liberal viewpoint and a willingness to face the unpleasant reality that the Good Crusade must be launched most frequently on behalf of a partial truth.

Since a review is not an abridgment, suffice it here to say that Hofstadter has demonstrated effectively that the reformers were a mixed bag. He has subdivided the tradition into rural and urban wings—the Populists and the Progressives—and indicated the strengths and weakneses of each. His discussion of the Populists is particularly suggestive, for he points out that the pseudo-radicalism of the agrarian reformers was actually founded on a militant devotion to the capitalism of Adam Smith which found itself frustrated at every turn by the subversive, anti-capitalist activities of big business. Similarly, he suggests, the seeming radicalism of the Progressives was based primarily on a nostalgic conviction that the United States should remain a nation of small businessmen. The unity that existed between the urban and rural reformers was thus built around the politics of nostalgia rather than an ideology—a fact that was both its immediate strength and its long-run weakness.

I have three criticisms to register, or perhaps two criticisms and one semantic quibble. First, Professor Hofstadter has neglected entirely the Socialists, and the latter group, in my opinion, deserves inclusion in his "Progressive" category. While the Socialist Party had its quota of ideologists and Marx-choppers, its great success in the period 1900–1914 must be understood in terms of its reformist characteristics. When the Socialists elected mayors, it was no tribute to the power of doctrine, but rather was explicable only as triumphs of local, municipal reform programs. Boss control of both old parties led reform elements to adopt the Socialist label, and the success of "gas and water socialism" should be added in with the reform victories achieved on the non-Socialist line. It was when the American Socialist Party tried to be Socialist in the dogmatic sense that it lost its rank and file. This loss is not apparent in the membership totals because as the "gas and water socialists" departed from the organization their places were taken by an influx of members, largely in the foreign language federations, attracted by the Russian Revolution. As Morlan has pointed out, the Non-Partisan League was inspired by ex-socialists alienated by the doctrinaire position of the Party on agriculture.

Second, I disagree with Hofstadter's attempt to disengage the New Deal from the reform tradition. His thesis, in brief, is that the impetus and direction of the New Deal marked a break with the main currents of reform, and that the Roosevelt administration abandoned the decentralist, *laissez-faire* goals of past reforms for a new set of quasi-Hamiltonian objectives. Here I have the feeling that Hofstadter over-exerted his talents in order to disagree with Goldman. As James MacGregor Burns's recently published analysis of Roosevelt's political leadership demonstrates, the roots of the New Deal were inextricably lodged in the reform tradition, notably that of the Wilson administration.

Third, Hofstadter attacks the central thesis of Eric Goldman's book, namely, that the reform movement was spiritually vitiated by its own pragmatism. What began as a moral crusade for Good ended up with cold ethical relativism and a willingness among New Dealers to employ any means to achieve their goals. Here, in what seems to me a factitious effort to disagree with Goldman, Hofstadter has wandered off into a semantic *cul de sac.* When he asserts that the reformers suffered, if anything, from moral imperialism rather than amoral relativism, he is actually describing the other side of Goldman's coin. For who can be more ruthless and amoral as to means than the moral imperialist? As the instance of Roosevelt suggests, a man with sublime faith in his own good motives and political *telos* is capable of almost any variety of chicanery without even becoming aware of the objective contradictions. Absent a sense of humility such as Lincoln's, the actions of the Moral Man are *by definition* moral actions and the reform tradition has never been conspicuous in its humility.

JOHN P. ROCHE.

Brandeis University.

Conservatism in America. BY CLINTON ROSSITER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1955. Pp. 325. $4.00.)

After noting the apparent advance during the last few years of a "creeping conservatism" in the United States which has brought to power leaders who know little about the nature, logic, and principles of a consistent Conservative philosophy, Professor Rossiter proceeds in *Conservatism in America* to attempt to define such a philosophy in general, to review the history of conservative thought in the United States, and to make a try at formulating a working doctrine of conservatism for the America of the immediate future. This he does as well as it can be done for a country which lacks a feudal tradition and a dominant conservative church, which has hitherto had a fluid class structure, which has always believed in change and progress, which has long pinned its faith to democracy and individualism and to an essentially restraining and power-dispersing constitutionalism, and which in general has abhorred logical ideologies whether of the right or left and has preferred to pursue a pragmatic course and to avoid the neat formulations of political philosophy in the European sense of that term.

In his rapid review of conservative ideas in the American past, the writer demonstrates that, except for some fixed fundamental ideas accepted for the most part by liberals as well as conservatives, there has been little consistency or logic in the evolution of a body of conservative thought in this country. Perhaps the nearest approach may be found in the systematic thinking of men like John Adams and John C. Calhoun and the basic attitudes of Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists. These thinkers owed little, however, to European Conservatism as propounded by men like Edmund Burke.

In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries American conservatism was forced to make compromises with the overwhelming flood of democracy and the rapid momentum of industrial and population growth and social change. This is exemplified in the thought of Daniel Webster and many other leaders. Moreover, basically, the liberalism of such leaders as Jackson, Lincoln, the Roosevelts, and Wilson was grounded upon an essentially conservative base. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt provided no new deck or different set of rules for the game but only a "New Deal." The same may be said of the Populists and progressives in general since the Civil War. In short, American conservatism, such as it has been for a century or more, has stood squarely on a liberal foundation, and liberalism, so-called, has never deserted its essentially conservative moorings. Therefore, neither American conservatism nor American liberalism fits into the European conceptions of such terms, and no extreme ideological right or left in the European sense can be found in America.

How, then, can an American philosophy of Conservatism (with a capital "C") be formulated? Professor Rossiter has his doubts and is modest in his suggestions. His "program" for conservatives he characterizes as "at most a series of tentative, hopeful suggestions," and he prays that "no one will mistake them for the Conservative Manifesto of 1955." At best, one wonders if what he suggests is no more than a program which can be agreed upon by moderates who can be described either as "liberal conservatives" or "conservative liberals."

O. DOUGLAS WEEKS.

The University of Texas.

The Decline of American Liberalism. By Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. (New York, London, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company. 1955. Pp. xiii, 401. $7.50.)

It is the author's belief that the classic age of liberalism in America was the period of approximately thirteen years between the Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution. Since then liberalism has been steadily declining.

In order to understand and evaluate Professor Ekirch's interpretation of the fate of liberalism, one must first understand the meaning he attaches to the term. His explicit definition is general. Liberalism is best thought of "not as a well-defined political or economic system, but as a collection of ideas or principles which go to make up an attitude or 'habit of mind'." It must include "the concept of limited representative government and the widest possible freedom of the individual—both intellectually and economically" (p. 2). This is a very flexible definition, but it is not the one used by the author throughout the remainder of the book. His liberalism includes virtually absolute laissez-faire, at least with respect to the national government. The development of a spirit of American nationalism and the increased exercise of its delegated powers by the national government are regarded, with almost no exceptions, as sharply antithetical to liberalism.

Given this meaning for the central concept, the interpretation of American history that follows is obvious if not logical. The author recounts the familiar record of past and present abrogations of intellectual liberty from the Alien and Sedition Acts to the Loyalty-Security programs. Few liberals of any persuasion will dissent from the judgment that these policies did and do represent departures from the tradition of liberalism. Professor Ekirch's interpretation of other policies of the national government is quite another matter. He believes that the trend away from liberalism began with the adoption of the Constitution, for the economic and financial powers which it transferred from the states to the Congress set the stage "for the abandonment of laissez-faire liberalism and the substitution of a policy of economic nationalism or government paternalism" (p. 43). And so the decline of liberalism began and proceeded from Hamilton's financial policies to Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana, to the use of federal funds for internal improvements, to government subsidies for railroad building, to continued high protective tariffs, to Progressive proposals for national regulation of business, to the New Deal and the welfare state, to war and cold war economy.

This is certainly a gloomy interpretation of American history, and except for the author's failure to analyze with precision his central concept, it would be a deeply disturbing one. One example of the resultant confusion is Professor Ekirch's position with respect to the relationship between liberty and equality. He states quite flatly that "Freedom of the individual, for example, conflicts with such democratic principles as equality and majority rule" (p. 1). This may be true, of course, but since it can also be argued that freedom is interrelated to the point of interdependency with these principles, the author's failure to explore this problem reflects the superficiality of his analysis. There is also the unexplained exception of public education from the general principles of laissez-faire, and the similarly unexplained assumption that departures from laissez-faire policy by the national government are more illiberal than those by the states.

These are secondary aspects of Professor Ekirch's failure to explore and define carefully the essence of liberalism. His conception of this philosophy is static, doctrinaire, deterministic, and unrealistic. If liberalism was operative in this country for only thirteen years, then one can hardly escape the conclusion that it was not a viable system of belief. It was a doctrine suited to one segment of the population only, and only as long as agriculture remained primarily a subsistence and not a commercial pursuit. It would therefore appear to be a doctrine more or less environmentally determined, and unrealistic once its parent environment had ceased to exist. It was doubtless an interesting intellectual exercise to judge the history of America from 1789 to the present by this kind of criterion, but I do not think it has added much to our understanding of that history or of liberalism, or to the attempt to preserve and extend freedom for the individual in an age far removed from that of Thomas Jefferson and Daniel Boone.

CECELIA M. KENYON.

Smith College.

A Democrat Looks at His Party. BY DEAN ACHESON. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1955. Pp. 199. $3.00.)

This is a lively and thoughtful little book which can delight and profit Republicans and Democrats. For much of the discussion is partisan; and when the former Secretary of State writes as a partisan, he is so outrageously, egregiously, and unforgivably partisan that no one needs fear that he will subvert a Republican.

The strongest dose of Democratic adulation is concentrated in early chapters where the author explains his own party identification and his perceptions of the two parties. He became a Democrat in response to the "bugle call" of the progressives. He remained a Democrat because he saw the party as one of youth and vitality. He sees the Democrats as a party of many interests, no one of which can dominate. The Republicans are a party of one interest and are doomed to build solely on the business base. He finds comfort even in the conservatism of the South, an "invaluable asset" to the party. He winds up with a Democratic party so diverse and pluralistic that it thrashes out within itself the consensus that is needed by the general welfare, and the thrashing is so energetic that the party throws up strong, dynamic individuals, "equipped to exercise national leadership." In contrast, the Republicans are a "babel of local voices" who "divorce power from responsibility," "subordinate the Executive to the Congress . . . and the real authors of the mischief are lost in the crowd." Throughout these passages, Mr. Acheson is contributing to what he has felicitously called "the drama and gaiety of the democratic march." He does not attempt to contribute to an understanding of political behavior nor to resolving the strategic quandaries of the Democratic party, the interesting and tough problems of rebuilding a winning majority out of the disparate interests, sections, and minorities.

When he turns to substantive issues of the domestic economy, he is temperate and constructive. He describes the New Deal as a "clinic in the use of innovation to conserve and strengthen fundamental institutions." He frankly judges that there were errors. The N.R.A. was one. The Supreme Court fight he condemns as a "tragic mistake" which "obscured for years . . . the underlying conservatism of the innovations of the New Deal." Of more present interest, he is critical of the confusion of means and ends which has characterized the vested interest in fixed parity prices. He reminds Democrats that empiricism has got to remain empirical. In the era of the "moderates" it is not surprising that the author sets out no agenda for further policy experiments.

On foreign policy, however, Mr. Acheson has positive and firm advice. Rejecting on the one hand preventive war, and on the other a too easy hope of abolishing nuclear weapons, he speaks earnestly and clearly for sustained effort appropriate to the true and terrible dimensions of Communist designs. He calls for a nuclear striking power as a deterrent, for a defensive armament against nuclear attack, and for a military establishment which can deal with threats which do not involve nuclear weapons. As a good partisan, he gets into a verbal row with Republicans over the "new" policy of retaliation "instantly by means and at places of our choosing." The difference between the policy of deterrence and of retaliation has never had great potential for a political campaign. But the plea Mr. Acheson makes for recognizing in our present dilemmas the importance of limited wars is central to the issue being drawn between the parties. It is a debate that needs to be pursued vigorously if the democratic process is to fashion a durable foreign policy. It is not necessarily a contribution to clear and constructive thought for Democrats to focus on the alleged parsimony of the business interests. The Republicans, we are told, are "based so exclusively upon business interests and the business point of view" that they cannot easily pursue a sound military and economic foreign policy because it costs too much. The argument may tickle the fancy of confirmed Democrats. It is not much help in illuminating for the citizen the character of the difficult choices that confront us.

Finally, the author spells out his profound concern over the consequences of the loyalty investigations. He accepts for the Democratic administration responsibility for a policy which he is "now convinced was a grave mistake and a failure to foresee consequences which were inevitable." The mistake lay in seeking the illusion of complete security. The consequences have been a bogging down in thought control, hindrances to scientific endeavor, badly weakened morale in the foreign service, and potentially a dangerous weighting in favor of the state in the relationship between individual and government. The author has little to say about the social tensions and frustrations which culminated in our recent debates, and indeed he never mentions even so recent a background as the Dies committee and other precursors. But he ends on a note of optimism and calls on the Democrats for a revised fundamental point of view, which he stoutly defends as politically practicable. And so it will be if enough Democrats as well as Republicans have faith in democratic processes.

This is a book filled with much hope and enthusiasm. It has strong partisanship and occasional flashes of pique. But the argument is kept on a level which will serve the development of a consensus between the parties on the major issues, which the author confronts honestly and with a long experience. This is, therefore, an exemplar of fruitful democratic politics, and not an analysis of politics.

OLIVER GARCEAU

The Ford Foundation.

L'Idea del Contratto Sociale dai Sofisti alla Riforma: E il "De Principatu" di Mario Salamonio. BY MARIO D'ADDIO. (Milano, Italy: Giuffrè—Editore. 1954. Pp. xxix, 556.)

It is always fascinating to see an important figure in the history of ideas emerge from the shadows which have hitherto surrounded it and become a recognizable person, clearly related to his times. The author of this important book has achieved this feat for Salamonius. There are two parts in d'Addio's work: a history of the development of the social contract doctrine from the Sophists to the Reformation, and a careful, original inquiry into the life, works, and historical significance of Salamonius, the author of the *De Principatu.* Scholars will be particularly attracted by d'Addio's discussion of Salamonius, for much that is new and important is to be found in it.

Salamonius's position among the Monarchomachs has been well known, as has been his influence on Althusius. Gierke gave him an important role in the history of political thought, and Barker included his work among the classics of the sixteenth century. Gough in his *The Social Contract* pointed to Salamonius "as a writer of the first importance in the history of the social contract, as important in the history of the social contract proper as Manegold of Lautenbach is in the history of the contract of government." But much that was essential about Salamonius remained shrouded in uncertainty. Following Gierke's tentative identification of him as a Spaniard, both Allen and Gough thought of him as a Spanish Jesuit. Since Salamonius's main work was reissued in Paris in 1578, he has been widely believed to belong to the same historical epoch that produced the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* and Buchanan's *De Jure Regni Apud Scotos.* And Gierke puts him, as a Spaniard, in the "Catholic" column in his classification of the Monarchomachs.

The record that d'Addio develops with skill and scholarship is quite a different one. The discovery of two manuscripts of the *De Principatu,* one in the Vatican Library and the other in the National Library in Rome, made possible a precise dating of its composition. The year was 1513, and the work was dedicated to Pope Leo X. In the same year Machiavelli completed his *Prince,* dedicated to a grandson of the same pope. As d'Addio points out, "a 'juridical' political theory and a 'realistic' political theory were born at the same time, within the framework of the same tradition of political thought, formulated by two men who had worked together in the government of Florence."

Salamonius was a member of one of the more important aristocratic Roman families, the Salamoni Alberteschi. He was born in 1450 and died in 1534. He occupied positions of notable importance in the governments of the Commune of Rome and of Florence as well as at the Papal Court. He was in Florence from 1498 to 1499 as a colleague of Machiavelli, who had been elected Secretary of the Second Chancellery on June 15, 1498. Later, Salamonius became adviser to Pope Julius II and as such faced Machiavelli no longer as a colleague but as his opponent, during Machiavelli's mission to Rome in 1503. His historical rôle appears to d'Addio to have been essentially that of the defender of the autonomy of the Commune of Rome against the centralizing tendencies of the Papal curia, and his *De Principatu* must, therefore, be seen in this light. It was because of the daring of Salamonius's position against the doctrine of papal supremacy that his book, even though dedicated to the pope, was not published during his lifetime and appeared for the first time in Rome in 1544, ten years after the author's death. A friend of both the popes and the Medici, Salamonius was not ready himself to publish a revolutionary book, based on republican and individualistic doctrines.

Thus, Salamonius's theories were fully developed sixty-five years before the appearance of the *Vindiciae*, and even before the beginnings of the Reformation. His inquiry, aimed at the identification of the sources of sovereignty, is significant for the shift it provides from the notion of a *pactum subiectionis* as the foundation of government to that of a *pactum societatis*, itself fruit of the decision of separate individuals to come together and by contract establish the common rules of their political life. Historically the *De Principatu* is part of the history of the rise and struggles of the city state, and of the tradition which had produced Bartolus and Coluccio Salutati. But Salamonius succeeds in giving to municipal issues a broad theoretical treatment that places his work at the foundation of seventeenth-century contractualist theories.

MARIO EINAUDI.

Cornell University.

Voltaire and the State. BY CONSTANCE ROWE. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. xi, 254. $4.00.)

In most discussions of the history of political thought Voltaire has been used as a convenient symbol of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, the moving spirit behind the intellectual assault on the *ancien régime.* The individuality of Voltaire's political theory has been lost, however, and most students tend to the suspicion that he was really not a person but a collection of witty epigrams. Like Shakespeare, he is full of quotations. Dr. Rowe's volume seeks to correct this by approaching Voltaire as a serious political theorist who deserves to be considered in his own right. She has performed a useful service by sifting through his voluminous writings and organizing his social and political ideas around certain important themes. She discusses his conception of *la patrie* and makes the persuasive case that it represented a new notion of national loyalty. The discussion then centers on the relationship between the state and the claims of the individual. The conclusion here is that Voltaire held many of the essential postulates of liberal democracy, and that his ideas were more than an apology for the aspirations of the bourgeoisie. The volume closes with an extended analysis of his views on international relations, which tries to show that, despite occasional lapses, Voltaire remained strongly sceptical of the motives and ambitions of rulers and distrustful of imperialist adventures. The book is lucidly written throughout and supported by ample references.

The major difficulty in evaluating this work is that it is not clear what kind of audience the author had in mind. If the volume was meant solely to be a literary study which would systematize and clarify a wide variety of scattered insights and opinions, then it is to be commended as a competent and thorough piece of work. But if, as is evidently the case, the author aimed at a serious discussion of political philosophy, then the volume has certain shortcomings which ought to be pointed out. This is true whether one measures it by historical or analytical standards. On the historical side, the author has failed to indicate, except in the most general way, the relationship between Voltaire's political ideas and those of his predecessors. One result of this is to leave the impression that Voltaire was being original when, in fact, he was not. For example, an obvious relationship appears between Voltaire's ideas and those of Locke—and this is strikingly apparent in Dr. Rowe's discussion of property—yet Locke is not, according to my reading, mentioned in the book. Again, this work would have been more valuable had some attempt been made to examine the impressive criticisms directed at Voltaire by the writers of the counter-revolution, like de Maistre and de Bonald. This lack of perspective, fore and aft, has the effect of producing a somewhat foreshortened picture.

At the analytical level the author follows Voltaire's own habit of using assertion in the place of systematic argument. Democracy, we are told, "rests on the belief that the primitive equality of men as members of the human species should find the fullest possible social expression" (p. 99). Precisely how this particular conclusion flows from this premise is not made clear. Again, the author does not explore the incompatibilities among Voltaire's ideas: how, for example, to reconcile nationally derived rights and natural rights, benevolent despotism and natural rights, the belief that the pursuit of the common good is morally obligatory and the belief that the common good is identifiable with rational self-interest. These omissions have had the effect of allowing the full implications of some of Voltaire's assertions to go unnoticed. Thus the author places Voltaire among the champions of the separation of church and state, whereas he was advancing the more serious argument that the church ought to be converted into a department of state in charge of policing the morals of the masses. The whole matter can be summed up by saying that Voltaire has been treated as a political philosopher whereas in reality he was essentially an ideologist.

Having said this, however, it would be unfair to criticize Dr. Rowe on the basis of a book she had not intended to write. Moreover, she has nicely drawn for us the bourgeois character of Voltaire's outlook and in this way illumined the lines which a future study of Voltaire might take. Voltaire could provide the subject of a fascinating study of the eighteenth-century middle-class intellectual, for he voiced not only the aspirations of the bourgeoisie, but also those of a highly self-conscious group of men whose stock-in-trade was ideas. In Voltaire we have the intellectual, struggling for social approval and recognition, venting his frustration when repelled by the *haut monde* of nobility and king, and yet never failing to be mesmerized by the attractions of power. It was not accidental that Voltaire was drawn to seek out the "enlightened" despots of his day or that he held an unconcealed admiration for Louis XIV's pursuit of *la gloire*. He was a classical case of the "political intellectual" beset with a desire for exerting power or, failing that, for being close to the seat of power. While the present book does not explore these lines, it does provide an indispensable starting point.

SHELDON S. WOLIN.

University of California (Berkeley).

The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism. BY ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. 256. $4.75.)

Liquidation of political opponents and their cliques has been a concomitant of dictatorial regimes of all brands from the ancient times to the present. And the annals of ecclesiastical history are replete with glaring examples of purges of heretics who had "deviated" from prescribed dogmas. To that extent the modern totalitarian purge, including the bolshevik *chistka,* is by no means original. However, Lenin and his disciples certainly must be given the odious credit of having greatly improved its techniques, put it to additional uses, and, in fact, institutionalized it by making it a permanent multi-purpose feature of their system.

It is this permanence of the purge and its inherence in the totalitarian process of government which constitute the ideological pivot of Mr. Brzezinski's book. "Totalitarianism is the system of the permanent purge," he asserts. The more totalitarian the regime grows the more isolated it becomes from the masses. Such isolation breeds constant suspicion which in turn induces the leaders to seek out and eliminate foes, real, imaginary, and potential. Also, since the Soviet totalitarianism, pushed by its own ideology, must always march forward towards an unattainable millenium, the initial enthusiasm gradually spends itself. Hence, there is a continuous need to replace weary followers, doubters, and opportunists by fresh and more vigorous cadres. An excellent opportunity is thus offered to advance one's personal career at the expense of others in every echelon of the Soviet hierarchy. Moreover, the organs of control and repression, in particular the indispensable secret police, have an urge to prove their usefulness by turning up with more enemies rather than less.

Having shown the various causes and purposes of the Soviet purge, the author studies its effects. His conclusion is that, while the purge sometimes disrupts the enforced unity of the Soviet state, it nevertheless performs a number of positive functions: it supplies an element of security for the leadership and keeps the foes of the regime in a state of permanent insecurity; it eliminates any source of potential alternative to the regime; it provides an outlet for accumulated tension; it renews and stimulates internal activity and eliminates stagnation; it "channels pent-up aggression and dissatisfaction away from the regime."

As for the future, Mr. Brzezinski concludes that the need of the purge will not diminish in the Soviet Union, even though it may assume somewhat milder forms. "The purge and totalitarianism have been linked in an indissoluble union." Thus only the death of totalitarianism itself can bring an end of the permanent purge.

In probing into the nature of the Soviet purge, the author subjects to scrutiny its main developmental stages from the Leninist era to the liquidation of Beria and the demotion of Malenkov. In doing so he has culled a good amount of pertinent data from original Soviet sources as well as from the interviews with Russian *émigrés* done under the Harvard Interview Project.

While this reviewer finds himself in agreement with the author's main conclusions, a few of his statements give rise to serious doubt. Can one really say that the "hostility among the immediate supporters of the totalitarian dictator seems to increase in direct ratio to the distance from the dictator" (p. 22)? Are purges "less likely to develop within totalitarianisms ruled by collective forms of leadership" (p. 32)? Or is it not pushing the argument too far to assert that the purge satisfies "the need of the totalitarian masses for expression" (p. 34)?

Yet, in spite of these few rather sweeping statements, for which one can find little or no substantiating evidence in the book, Mr. Brzezinski's study rests on solid foundations of carefully selected and properly analyzed facts. Coming out at a time when the Soviet rulers attempt heels over head to prove that they are not what they are, this dispassionate scholarly study is a timely and sobering warning.

EDWARD TABORSKY.

The University of Texas.

The Forty-Eight States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators. (New York: Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, The American Assembly. 1955. Pp. 147.)

This volume contains the background papers prepared for the consideration of a distinguished panel of participants in the Eighth American Assembly held in October of 1955 under the auspices of the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University. It contains a brief introduction, prepared by Professor James W. Fesler, Technical Director of the Assembly, delineating the major questions to be considered in the volume and at the conference. The introduction sets the tone and scope of the conference in these terms: "The principal concern of this volume . . . is how well the states are doing their job, not what their job should be." Subsequently, the author admits that it is very nearly impossible to say, in particular, how well states are performing the functions entrusted to them, and that the conference elected rather to consider the states as wholes viewed from the point of how well they are equipped, politically and administratively, to make and enforce sound decisions. To put it another way, what the conference and the writers of the volume really considered was how state governments compare in practice with certain academic and professional theories about how they ought to behave.

Professor Harvey C. Mansfield in "The States in the American System" sets forth with clarity and skill the major twentieth-century trends in state government. He places heavy emphasis on the changing financial relations among nation, state, and local governments. He finds state government expanding rapidly *vis à vis* local governments and largely because of functions scarcely considered a half century ago.

"The Tradition of Government in the States," prepared by Professor Allan R. Richards, is a succinct survey of the major historical forces shaping the constitutions, law, and customs of the states today. Professor Dayton McKean addresses his remarks to "The Politics of the States" and exhorts his audience to consider the necessity of increasing public interest in and concern with state politics. Responsible parties competing for electoral support with broad and conflicting programs of governmental action and state governmental structures which allow victory to be consummated in legislation and administration are the ways to do this.

Professor Karl Bosworth in "Law Making in State Governments" in general follows the McKean lead and comes down heavily for effective two-party competition and strong, political leadership from the executive office. In "Administration in State Governments," York Wilbern generally supports the menu of administrative reforms offered this century by the experts in public administration, and generally proposed—usually unsuccessfully—by numerous "Little Hoover Commissions" in the last decade. Wilbern, however, dissents from the gospel in several particulars. He is somewhat skeptical of the civil service merit system as commonly conceived and administered. He is not for integration of all functions under all conditions.

The volume concludes with a press release which represents the consensus of the conference on what needs to be done to equip the states to perform their tasks in the modern federal system. Few of their exhortations will invite strong dissent.

William H. Young.

University of Wisconsin.

The Essentials of Public Administration. By E. N. Gladden. (London and New York: Staples Press. Distributed in the United States by John de Graff, Inc., New York. 1955. Pp. 237. $4.00.)

In 1947, Dr. E. N. Gladden, who was already known to American as well as to British students of administration for his two volumes on the British Civil

Service, undertook "the provision of a general survey of public administration to meet the needs of the student and the general reader," a survey that would, among other things, "enable the novice to obtain a general picture of his subject." The first fruit of that project was the publication, in 1949, of Dr. Gladden's *An Introduction to Public Administration;* the task has now been completed with the appearance of the present volume, which must be treated as a companion piece to the first.

The earlier book, the *Introduction*, is most accurately characterized as a description of the administrative institutions of Great Britain—a kind of handbook of government organization covering the central departments, local government administration, public corporations, etc. The *Essentials*, on the other hand, concentrates on the problems and processes and relationships encountered in operating these large-scale institutions. Accordingly, there are chapters on bureaucracy, on the modes of controlling public officials, on hierarchy, on regionalization and centralization, on personnel management, internal communications, public relations, and training for the public service, and a few other topics of this nature that are standard fare in general treatments of administration.

Unfortunately, the book never conveys the "flavor" of administrative situations, never gives the reader that "feel" for the dynamics of organization that makes it seem alive, animated. Consequently, one may surmise, many of the matters with which the book is concerned are likely to seem purely academic at best, and obscure or perhaps even unintelligible at worst, to the novice and the general reader to whom it is addressed. Readers with long experience with public administration, acquired through either direct participation in it or study, will appreciate the significance of the issues explored in this little volume, but they are apt to find the analysis elementary, and occasionally even elaborately obvious; since it was not prepared for their use, this is certainly understandable, but it means the book falls between two stools. It is not likely to satisfy fully either the lay or the professional audience.

In part, this difficulty may have developed because the author apparently takes a great deal for granted about the interest and background of the uninformed reader seeking a general survey of the field; even to have read Dr. Gladden's able *Introduction* would not seem by itself adequate preparation for the later volume. Probably more important, however, is the fact that the *Essentials* shows some signs of having been assembled rather than written all of a piece; there is a certain lack of unity that may account for the failure of the subject-matter really to come to life. This may account, too, for the unevenness of style, and for occasional seeming contradictions and repetitions.

All this means that this book is not likely, at least in this country, to displace the introductory works that preceded it. But American students of administration will not want to ignore it, by any means, for they will find interesting the views of an eminent British civil servant on politics and administration (he comes very close to the politics-administration dichotomy which American administrative thought in recent years has emphatically rejected); on the need to study comparative administration ("There is a crying need for an Institute of

Administrative History," he observes in two short but provocative chapters comparing the public services of Greece and Rome and ancient China with those of Modern Europe); on the proper training of civil servants (he proposes the development of a National School of Administration); and on other issues of current concern. Students of administration on both sides of the Atlantic, as they review the bibliographies that follow each chapter, will also discover that the exchange of information on public administration, in both directions, still leaves ample room for expansion. It is useful indeed to have these things called to our attention once again.

HERBERT KAUFMAN.

Yale University.

The New Japan: Government and Politics: BY HAROLD S. QUIGLEY AND JOHN E. TURNER. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 456. $5.00).

This is the first full length book on Japanese government to appear since Professor Quigley's earlier volume (*Japanese Government and Politics*) published in 1932. For this reason it is a welcome as well as needed work.

Organized presumably for classroom use, it has the merits of a good text: clarity, succinctness, and suggestive documentation. To these virtues might have been added balance, except that some aspects of government (party politics, especially) are given more attention than others. No doubt the student beginning Japanese studies will get a clear, overall impression of the structure of modern Japanese government from reading this book. The unusually perceptive student would be able also to get an inkling of some of the fundamental problems in adjusting the ancient apparatus of the Japanese administrative state to the demands of western constitutionalism.

Three introductory chapters are succinct yet pithy summaries of some of the characteristics of Japanese government. The authors have labeled these dynasticism, dualism, bureaucracy, and the struggle between militarism and party government. The demands of textbook organization probably require such compression of the development of Japanese government from the seventh century to 1941. The authors' selection of salient characteristics would probably be debated by students of Japanese government. Each analyst would have his own list. This reviewer regrets the omission of the following three factors which might be regarded as essential characteristics: (1) the intense race consciousness of Japan, sustained by Shinto myth and genealogical fact. The absence of large scale immigration and intermarriage in Japan for many centuries has resulted in a nation remarkably inbred. The result has been a mystical notion of superiority and quasi-divinity which explain the arrogance of Japan's conquests as well as her clearly superior achievements in organization. (2) Japan's unparalleled capacity to adapt both Chinese and western culture to her own needs and inclinations. Only this characteristic can explain her unique position as the matrix of Asian constitutionalism. (3) The trefoil of social values: harmony, hierarchy, and obligations. These concepts explain the difficulties encountered by the impact of an incompatible constitutionalism based on party differences, political equality, and an articulated law of property rights.

Wartime government and the period immediately after surrender are dealt with in three brief chapters. Emphasis is placed on the role of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association as a force in mobilizing the nation and on the rigid organization of society through the revived *tonari-gumi* system to the individual family. Perhaps more emphasis might have been placed on the peculiar status of the Ministries of War and Navy, with their right of direct access to the emperor and their tight, fanatic control of the machinery of government.

The authors have limited their discussion of occupation policy to a brief chapter. Two of the most illuminating sections of the book are those dealing with the purge of Japanese government officials and the drafting of the 1946 Constitution. The latter chapter summarizes the debates in the House of Peers and House of Representatives. In dealing with constitutional pacifism (Article Nine of the Constitution), no mention is made of the assertion of former Prime Minister Dr. Hitoshi Ashida that the first clause of the second paragraph of Article Nine was inserted by him to allow for the maintenance of armed forces for self-defense. The authors' comment (pp. 169, 228) that " 'all types' of military forces will never be maintained" is at variance with the Ashida interpretation, which may (if the Supreme Court adopts the Ashida view) become the official view of the government of Japan.

Somewhat more than a quarter of the book is devoted to party politics and legislative organization. These chapters are fuller and more analytical and the documentation is more extensive than for other topics.

The last two chapters dealing with the courts and local government are more descriptive than analytical. In appraising local government, appropriate consideration is given to neighborhood associations, the boss system of *oyabun-kobun*, and local tax problems.

An appendix which includes the old and new constitutions, a few key laws, and the Imperial Rescript on "False Conceptions" concerning the Imperial institution, help make this a convenient source of basic information on modern Japanese government.

RALPH BRAIBANTI.

Duke University.

Control over Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal Law: Role of the Supreme Court. BY ALBERT R. BEISEL, JR. (Boston, Mass.: Boston University Press. 1955. Pp. 112, $2.75.)

This little volume deals with the legal and constitutional problems surrounding illegal law enforcement practices, particularly unreasonable searches and forced confessions. It is the publication of the Bacon Lectures delivered by the author at Boston University in 1954, and certainly the first two chapters are in fact this. Being directed at a general audience, they provide a very readable review of the problems without being objectionably superficial.

The first lecture outlines the scope of the illegal enforcement problem, its causes, social costs, and suggested methods of control. The author concludes, as others have before him, that excluding from the courts evidence got by illegal action is the only effective method of preventing the evil. The second lecture deals with another method of abolishing illegal practices—namely, by declaring them to be legal. The author illustrates this technique with a useful, if critical, account of the way the Supreme Court has handled the important problems of searches without warrant and wiretapping.

The third lecture, which forms two-thirds of the book, deals with the admission in court of confessions or other evidence which has been forced from an accused. It develops historically the law of confessions and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. But, unlike the first two lectures, this is a highly sophisticated search for a rational answer to why the Supreme Court will forbid the use in court of evidence got under some circumstances but not others. Why, for example, will the Court forbid the use of evidence obtained by violence but not that obtained by an illegal search? Why does psychological pressure of a certain degree render a confession inadmissible, while pressure of a slightly less degree does not? Why will the Supreme Court, invoking the self-incrimination clause, forbid the questioning of an accused against his will in the protective atmosphere of a federal courtroom, while permitting such questioning by the police in the privacy of the police station? His analysis leads him to conclude that the Supreme Court has no basic philosophy, with the result that its opinions are necessarily confused and its decisions inconsistent. This will not, of course, come as a surprise to those students of the Court who have reached this conclusion by mere inspection. But the importance of such careful rational documentation lies in the peculiar vulnerability of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, to the charge that it is behaving irrationally. Until the intuitive market-place justice of Harun-al-Rashid has been publicly accepted in place of a system of law the search for a rationale will go on. The author does suggest answers to some of these problems which, even though not supported by the Court, will commend themselves to those who believe with Mr. Justice Holmes that it is "less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." The student of constitutional law who traditionally views these civil rights problems from the standpoint of particular constitutional guarantees will find this a useful and stimulating treatment.

Robert Fairchild Cushman.

New York University.

Military Policy and National Security. Edited by William W. Kaufmann with contributions by Gordon A. Craig, Roger Hilsman, William W. Kaufmann, and Klaus Knorr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 274. $5.00.)

The eighteenth and nineteenth century worldly philosophers gave us "economic man"—a model of human behavior based on the assumption that man's most important activity was the rational pursuit of economic wealth. Subsequent political scientists and political sociologists constructed a comparable model of "political man" based on the assumption of the rational pursuit of political power. *Military Policy and National Security* introduces still a third model of human behavior: "strategic man" dedicated to the rational pursuit of military security. The eight essays of this volume deal with a variety of topics, and the four authors have differing views on defense needs and strategic concepts. None the less, underlying the contributions of all four (although this is less true of Gordon Craig than of the others) is a common methodology resting upon the implicit and inarticulate premise of "strategic man." The authors accept his ends. They deal with his problems. They think in his terms. They write in his language: a lingo of costs and risks, incentives and deterrents, capabilities and intentions, contingencies and alternatives, assumptions and working models. With understanding, insight, and balanced judgment, the authors coolly and rationally analyse the alternatives of American defense policy. Their discussion is based, to quote William W. Kaufmann, on "the assumption of a calculating individual with a multiplicity of values, aware of cost and risk as well as of advantage, and capable of drawing significant inferences from symbolic acts." Analysis of this sort is long overdue on the part of American social scientists. It performs the essential function of illuminating the likely consequences of possible actions, thus permitting a rational choice among them. If he could, "strategic man" would reduce all issues down to problems in the theory of games. At the level of overall national policy at which this book is written, however, necessarily he is less precise.

In any symposium agreement on method is essential and agreement on substance is boring. The participants must speak the same language but they must not say the same thing. *Military Policy and National Security* meets both criteria. Their consensus on method precludes the authors from extreme conclusions, but it does not prevent disagreement on significant issues. Dr. Hilsman challenges Professor Knorr on the importance of military potential in this day and age. Professor Knorr disagrees with Dr. Kaufmann on the role of the Strategic Air Command and on the possibility of limited war in Europe. Dr. Kaufmann urges the desirability of flexible forces organized and armed for brush fire wars. Dr. Hilsman suggests that the western powers may have unduly minimized their ground strength *vis-a-vis* the Communist bloc. Professor Knorr warms of the danger of "gross concentration" on offensive air power. Professor Craig urges a reevaluation of NATO strategy to ease the inclusion of a German Army in the western defense force. With the possible exception of Professor Knorr, all the authors appear to accept deterrent-retaliatory nuclear air power as the prime element of American military strength.

In their essays each author urges the expansion of that segment of the defense program with which he is particularly concerned. The adoption of all their recommendations would probably increase the defense budget by fifty per cent. And it is here that the limitations of their method affect the usefulness of their conclusions. The danger in their method is that its users may confuse the wholly rational world of strategic man with the partly irrational world of actual rulers, governments, and public opinions. Unfortunately, this is a danger from which the authors of *Military Policy and National Security* do not entirely escape. Dr. Kaufmann, for instance, declares that his assumption of "a calculating individual" is "one that appears to correspond accurately with reality under existing conditions. . . ." In another essay, Professor Knorr persuasively analyzes the need for a more effective passive air defense system and then comments sadly that: "If the above analysis is reasonable on the basis of the assumptions that have been set forth, then it is curious and astonishing that passive air defense has been neglected in the United States." Professor Knorr does suggest reasons for this situation. But it can only be described as "astonishing" if one assumes that the world of strategic man is the world of reality. In a similar vein, the authors frequently put great faith in man's ability to foresee future contingencies and to plan for castastrophe. Throughout, the book is permeated by a quiet but desperate rationality. The rational path to military security, however, is something which social scientists may analyze acutely, but it is something which no government can pursue consistently. Economic man and political man were individuals: only their behavior after they had made their decision was social in nature. The decision itself was as rational as the individual mind which made it. Strategic man, however, is concerned with the military security not of individuals but of nation states. The decision making process itself is a social rather than a mental fact, susceptible to all the irrationalities, ambiguities, and complexities of institutional and collective behavior. The analysis of national security policy must look both to the external danger and to the internal environment. The authors of *Military Policy and National Security* have dealt with the question: "What is the most rational military policy for the United States?" They have not, with a few exceptions, tackled the question: "What is the most rational military policy feasible for the United States given its decision making institutions (particularly the separation of powers), its liberal ideology, its nationality groups, and its tradition of isolation?" Their obvious dissatisfaction with recent American defense policy is a measure of the difference between the conduct of the American government and the conduct of strategic man. Avoiding the politics of defense, however, they never have to face up to the hard problem of priorities. Instead, they issue a vague and prayerful call for leadership. The reason and logic which the authors value so highly and use so penetratingly would become more rather than less effective if they accepted the bounds of practicality. Their method is legitimate but limited. What they have done, they have done brilliantly. But, starting from their model, they make a valid criticism of American policy without making a constructive one.

Samuel P. Huntington.

Harvard University.

The Presidency Today. By Edward S. Corwin and Louis W. Koenig. (New York: New York University Press. 1956. Pp. ix, 138. $3.00.)

The American Presidency. By Clinton Rossiter. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1956. Pp. 175. $2.95.)

No feature of our governmental system is more distinctively American than the office of the President. This daring and ingenious creation of the Founding Fathers, viewed with so much doubt and misgiving by many of them, reshaped and adapted to the nation's needs under the impact of crisis, personality, and economic and political forces, has indeed become, as the subtitle of Professor Rossiter's book suggests, "the most important constitutional office on earth." These two short volumes are worthy additions to the rapidly expanding literature of recent decades on this fascinating subject.

The book by Corwin and Koenig is essentially an abridged, updated, and somewhat popularized version of Professor Corwin's earlier authoritative study, *The President: Office and Powers.* It repeats most of the basic themes and points of view of that work. It advances again Professor Corwin's judicious warning against placing undue reliance upon the Presidency as the primary agency through which recurring crises, both national and international, are met; and it restates his view that a closer collaboration between the two policy-making branches of the national government should be brought about by the institution of a new type of joint Executive-Legislative Cabinet.

Professor Rossiter's book, which is a revised version of six Walgreen Foundation lectures given in 1956 at the University of Chicago, presents a generally more complacent and optimistic view of the state of the nation as it concerns the Presidency. While he characterizes his work as "an impressionistic rendering of the main dimensions" of the office, rather than a "detailed or definitive portrait," he leaves untouched few currently controversial questions concerning it. Lively in style, with many a deftly turned phrase, his discourse abounds in highly quotable phrases and often challenging evaluations. His essay at the game of ranking the Presidents by application of eight "tests of greatness" to their performances certainly produces results with which many observers will take issue.

On the whole, Professor Rossiter apparently finds the idea of a "strong" President more tolerable and palatable than do Professors Corwin and Koenig, although in neither work are there fundamental changes suggested in the mode of selection, powers, and roles of the President to counteract the trend in this direction. Far from seeing in executive power something inherently undemocratic, Professor Rossiter maintains it has been "more responsive to the needs and dreams of giant democracy than any other office or institution in the whole mosaic of American life." And he observes, with respect to the controversy over the expanding powers of the office, that it is in fact "only a secondary campaign over the future of America," for, he maintains, the strength of the Presidency has been in the past, and will be in the future, the "measure of the strength of the nation." This generalization is one that comes easily and naturally; yet one cannot but pause to question deeply its full implications.

These two books, modest in size and sketchy as to some details, are obviously designed to serve as interpretative treatments of the subject for the general reader yet profound thought and scholarly insight are by no means lacking. No one can read them without acquiring a truer perspective on the Presidency and a fuller appreciation of its dizzying sweep of responsibilities, its burdens, and its promise.

JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH.

University of Michigan.

Television and Presidential Politics: The Experience in 1952 and the Problems Ahead. BY CHARLES A. H. THOMSON. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1956. Pp. viii, 173. $1.50.)

The preface advises that "This small book is a pioneering effort . . . to see what television has meant to date in presidential politics, to consider what its future may be, and to encourage further examination of the problems that it presents." To these ends the volume deals with the role of television prior to the 1952 nominating conventions, at these conventions, and during the campaign. Then the author turns to speculations about television's role in 1956 and later and finally addresses himself to certain questions of public policy relative to this medium.

The study draws heavily on materials from the trade journals of the broadcasting industry and so brings to the attention of political scientists material that would not ordinarily come to their attention. Thus, we learn that the conventions themselves attracted more viewers than did the addresses of either candidate during the campaign. The Democrats' peak audience exceeded 10,161,000 homes during one half-hour period of their convention; the Republican peak was 8,655,000 homes. The high spot of listening during the campaign was Nixon's explanation of his financial affairs, which was viewed in more than 9,000,000 homes. The tremendous amount of attention given to the conventions can be explained in part by the fact that none of the regular network programs were available. Viewers could not choose between "I Love Lucy" and a presidential nominating convention.

The perplexing problems of public policy raised by television in politics receive considerable attention. Is it desirable to have commercial sponsors for the convention telecast? How great is the danger of sponsor bias? Shall television be admitted to any gathering at the convention to which pencil-and-paper newspaper men have access? Being televised may alter the behavior of those on whom the camera is focused. Finally, if major parties are to have their conventions televised in their entirety, how shall we treat minor parties?

No serious attempt is made at original research into the questions of chief importance to students of political behavior. These questions relate to the importance of television in contrast to any other mass medium in making citizens decide whether to vote and for whom to vote. Does it help the undecided to get off the fence? Does it convert people from one party to another, or does it merely enable people to view in their own homes the candidate for whom they would have voted had television never been invented? The author merely refers to some already published studies of political behavior in the 1952 election and offers no help to future campaign managers on what proportion of their funds to allot to television rather than to some other mass medium.

A number of highly intelligent questions are raised throughout the book; definite answers are given to almost none. In fact, on the last page, we are told that: "Scientifically speaking, very little is known about the true nature of its [television's] impact on political nominations or elections." More characteristic answers to the questions raised are: "Opinions of experts differ by 180 degrees on this issue" (p. 138), "Probable viewer interest in the conventions of 1956 and beyond remains imponderable" (p. 154), "Some observers rated the event a stirring one. Others . . ." (pp. 160–161). Although such caution in the absence of complete data is in the best scholarly tradition, some readers may consider this book less satisfying than the type of study which suggests some concluding thesis or generalization. Of course, such inconclusiveness may be inevitable in "a pioneering effort" and may very likely "encourage further examination of the problem. . . . "

DONALD S. STRONG.

University of Alabama.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Government and Health: The Alabama Experience. By Robert T. Daland. (University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama. 1955. Pp. xi, 218.)

In his study of the Alabama public health program and its administration, Professor Daland has made an interesting and valuable addition to the slowly growing list of studies of those public functions which are cooperatively administered by national, state, and local governments.

As the author states, intergovernmental relations in the field of public health are very complex. Professor Daland here offers a painstakingly careful description of the anatomy of these relationships, having in mind always the importance of locating, in the flow of the governmental process, the actual points at which decisions, both large and small, about both policy and administration are being made. The study contains valuable material concerning the impact of federal grant-in-aid requirements upon state health department organization; upon the forces working for integration of the executive branch under the Governor; upon programming and budgeting; upon recruitment of personnel; and upon the state-local relationship. The author has attempted to trace out not only the obvious, but also the indirect and occasionally well-hidden effects of the intergovernmental process upon the public health program and upon the vitality of state and local governments in Alabama.

In sum, one of the two major foci of the study is the real nature of the current federal relationship in the field of public health in Alabama, and the probable future course of that relationship.

The second and equally interesting major focus of the study is the medical profession in Alabama and its iron grip upon the public health program. By statute, the Medical Association is the State Board of Health; this, in fact, means that the Association's Board of Censors, its governing body, is also the governing body for the state's public health program. Although the Governor is *ex officio* chairman of the State Board of Health, he almost never attends its meetings and, in general, treats the State Health Department as an independent agency.

The chapters describing the organization of the Medical Association, its efforts at maintaining a stringent discipline among the membership, and its views, as shown in statements of the leadership, as to the proper scope of public health activities and the primacy of the medical profession's interests in these activities, provide remarkable and highly interesting reading.

While Professor Daland recognizes that dominance of the public health program by the medical profession secures for that program some immunity from "politics" and assures the support of a group whose active cooperation is essential to the success of any health program, he concludes that on balance the public health program stands to lose from this narrow-based, single-specialization control.

In the final chapter, the assertion is made that federal restraints in the form of conditions attached to grants-in-aid have contributed to the development of stresses within the public health program in Alabama, most notably with respect to the overall problem of effective executive control at the state level, and with respect to state-local relationships. "Removal of the restraints must precede administrative improvement." Assuming removal of these restraints, the author believes that effective exploitation by Alabama's state government of its opportunity to direct the health program would depend upon its ability to wrest from the medical profession control of the program. Thus Professor Daland argues that freedom from federal restraints must precede reform in the direction of broadening control of the health program within the state.

It seems to this reviewer that it is possible to argue that federal restraints continue to serve useful purposes; that the major portion of the problems in Alabama's health program can be traced to the medical profession's monopoly of control, and to the existence of a kind of political system in which so deep an entrenchment of a single-interest group is possible; and that this monopoly can be broken only through fundamental change in the political system. Were such change to come about, the need for federal restraints might very well largely disappear.

In any case, it is to be hoped that additional studies of the kind made by Professor Daland will be forthcoming. Such studies show what really occurs in the areas of inter-governmental relationships, and are therefore essential if we are to have meaningful discussion of the problems in these areas.—VALERIE A. EARLE, *Georgetown University.*

The Great Plains in Transition. BY CARL FREDERICK KRAENZEL. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. 1955. Pp. xiv, 428. $5.00.)

This book is the personal interpretation of a man who has lived intimately with his subject. It is more a literary essay than a research monograph, covering some of the same ground presented twenty-five years ago in Walter Prescott Webb's *The Great Plains*, and containing many of the same premises and biases. Where Webb saw the Great Plains largely through the eyes of Texas, Kraenzel's vantage point is Montana and North Dakota. Webb was a historian, while Kraenzel is a sociologist, yet this has resulted primarily in a difference in emphasis.

As a research study the book has its shortcomings. It lacks precision and analytical rigor. But this is perhaps inevitable since the sweep of the author's attention is so wide and his range of subject so broad. The approach tends to be polemic and partisan with considerable special pleading. And the dogmatic assertions, unsupported generalizations (there are no footnotes), unstated premises, and loose argument leave the careful reader uneasy. Yet Professor Kraenzel brings together many interesting facts about the Great Plains and proposes some novel ideas and concepts. Hence the book is not without value, especially since the literature of the Great Plains, like its population, is sparse.

"The Need to Adapt or Get Out," as Chapter 21 is entitled, is a major theme of the book, and the author presents much natural and social history in support of his premise that failure to adapt has been the cause of many of the problems of the area. From this record he concludes that the "Keys for Survival" (Chapter 24) are *reserves*, *mobility*, and *flexibility*. His treatment of these survival traits is suggestive rather than specific, so the reader gets only a general impression of what adjustments are desirable and how they are to be achieved.

Kraenzel's major prescription is "regionalism" which he feels will cure all the ills of the Great Plains. But he fails to indicate how regionalism and regional consciousness are to be brought about, and seldom gets beyond a mystical vision of a unifying force which will somehow be the salvation of the area. One might, of course, question whether the Great Plains constitute a meaningful region. But curiously, Kraenzel avoids this problem by insisting that his region, like the church invisible of Protestant theology, must have no boundaries. Yet it is to have political and administrative structure, the details of which would strike most political scientists as unworkable.

The usefulness of this book to the political scientist lies in its emphasis on the relation between governmental institutions and environmental forces: space and climate, particularly. Kraenzel's concepts of "Sutland and Yonland" (Chapter 15) might be usefully adapted to political analysis, and his discussion of Great Plains "minority-group conduct" (Chapters 17, 18, 19, and 20) contributes to a better understanding of the patterns of politics in the area.—NORMAN WENGERT, *University of Maryland.*

One River—Seven States: TVA-State Relations in the Development of the Tennessee River. BY ELLIOTT ROBERTS. (Knoxville, Tennessee: The Bureau of Public Administration, The University of Tennessee. 1955. Pp. vii, 100. $1.50.)

Many of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Tennessee Valley Authority count as one of its major accomplishments a new quality of federal-state cooperation, in which the states and local units have been helped to perform many portions of the tasks assigned by law to the TVA. Mr. Roberts examines the actual operation of these relationships with regard to navigation, flood control, and electric power, primarily through the technique of specific case studies of decisions.

His conclusions are summed up in a chapter entitled "The Myth of Partnership." The pattern, he says, "is not one of partnership, nor of continuing interaction, [but] of firm federal control of basic programs . . . with intermittent attempt to make common cause with state agencies concerning fringe issues."

It should be noted that in two of the three functions which he chooses to examine, the tradition of almost exclusive federal operation was already firmly rooted before TVA entered the field. He leaves out many functions, admittedly not as central to TVA as the three he discusses, such as recreation, forestry, agriculture, and city planning, in which the patterns of partnership were easier and more effective. Furthermore, in his discussion of relationships in power, the most interesting of these three fields, he largely directs his attention to relationships with the states *per se* without much focus on the relationships with the municipalities which are frequently the marketing units. But the conclusion he reaches is certainly solidly buttressed by the data he produces.

The book includes many succinct summaries of TVA programs and policies, and many penetrating analyses and comments. These were even more interesting to this reviewer than the development of the main thesis. Mr. Roberts, a former staff member, knows his TVA very well.—York Willbern, *University of Alabama.*

Water for the Cities: A History of the Urban Water Supply Problem in the United States. By Nelson Manfred Blake. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, Maxwell School Series III. 1956. Pp. x, 341. $4.00.)

The chairman of Syracuse University's history department has provided another valuable study which will help fill the great void in U. S. municipal history. In contrast with Bridenbaugh's recent volumes, Blake confines himself—almost too closely—to the single function of water supply. Primary emphasis is placed on the story of the water supply problem in Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York from 1790 to 1860. There are occasional references to developments in other cities. Two final chapters bring the story down to the present, emphasizing public health developments since 1860.

In the earlier years the ability to evaluate the effect of a particular water source on the human body did not exist. With this exception, the story of the urban water supply regularly reveals success in solving the technical problems and failure in long-range planning. New York's great Delaware aqueduct, just completed, will remain adequate only until 1965.

One might divide the efforts of cities to obtain water into two periods. The first, lasting roughly until 1920, was characterized by a city-by-city approach. During this period the policy of public rather than private operation of water supply systems became virtually universal after many a battle in city council and state legislature. The period into which we are now moving shows signs of requiring regional cooperation in water supply, both to conserve an increasingly precious resource and to allocate water among competing cities and competing uses. The great plans of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California and of the four states participating in the Interstate Compact on the Delaware River Basin may presage complex regional water systems in some sense similar to our electric power grids.

One wishes the author had devoted more attention to the problems of administrative organization and management. For example, the question of independent water boards *versus* departmental organization is not treated. The development of metering and of rate structures is not discussed. Relationships of water and sewer systems would be of interest. The neglected subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction, including watershed protection, pollution control, and intergovernmental relations, is only casually covered. Yet the policy and politics of water supply are fully reported and the book will prove useful to most students of municipal affairs.—Robert T. Daland, *University of Connecticut.*

The Municipal Income Tax: Its History and Problems. By Robert A. Sigafoos. (Chicago, Ill.; Public Administration Service. 1955. Pp. xiii, 169. $5.00.)

This little volume bids well to become a standard reference work on the municipal income tax. Its main contribution is in the direction of making available to those interested in this field basic data on the present status and developments in the municipal income tax area. Entire chapters are devoted to such topics as municipal income tax ordinances, administration, revenues, and the fate of municipal income tax provisions in the courts. Most of the data presented were collected as a result of extensive mail questionnaires, the review of statutory provisions and official reports and over forty personal visits to various municipalities and school districts administering income tax laws. One result is a series of basic tables showing the exact status of and results obtained from the municipal income tax in the United States today. Some material is also included on municipal income taxes in other countries such as Scandinavia and Canada, but the main effort is to focus upon relevant American experience.

The presentation, while reasonably objective, is none the less put forward in a context of a desire to see that the municipal income tax grows and is more widely adopted. The author believes that the exigencies of municipal financial problems are such that only by going in another direction than the property tax will it be possible to solve local financial problems. The available alternatives are the local sales tax, increased state grants, or the municipal income tax. Among these, the author sees a number of advantages to the latter course of action. He points out that existing municipal income taxes are rather crude in their nature since they are largely gross earnings and net profits taxes of an unrefined nature. To overcome such crudeness, the author suggests certain possibilities for refining the tax. One of the suggestions is that the income tax in metropolitan areas apply to the entire area concerned rather than just the central city. The author is convinced of the theoretical as well as the practical soundness of it. "Throughout the United States, personal incomes are now possibly as reasonable and equitable a local tax base as property. However, the instability of income tax yield in certain communities suggests that it is important to strike a balance between the relative weight to be given the income tax and the property tax." Nor does he believe that the tax constitutes a severe or unusual tax burden.

In short, this is a useful volume and a basic reference work in its field while at the same time it argues for the wider adoption and refinement of the municipal income tax.—EDWARD W. WEIDNER, *Michigan State University.*

Republished Articles on Economics, Volume VII: Readings in Fiscal Policy. SELECTED BY ARTHUR SMITHIES AND J. KEITH BUTTERS. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955. Pp. x, 596. $5.00.)

The primary purpose of this seventh volume of readings sponsored by the American Economic Association is to make more readily accessible to students some of the principal items from the literature in the rather new but increasingly significant field of fiscal policy, which the editors describe as the area dealing with "the aggregative effects of government expenditures and taxation on income, production and employment." A secondary purpose is that of including selections to show how thought in this area has evolved over the past quarter-century or so. Since numerous articles relevant to fiscal policy have already been included in earlier volumes of this series (especially those on monetary theory and business cycles) or are readily available elsewhere, this volume should not be interpreted as representing the editor's judgment as to the thirty-four most significant contributions in this area of economics. Students will undoubtedly find the extensive classified bibliography of articles on fiscal policy as compiled by Wilbur A. Steger to be one of the most worthwhile features of the volume.

The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies. BY EDWARD A. SHILS. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1956. Pp. 238. $3.50.)

For one seeking a brief and lucid explanation of America today it would be hard to find a better tract than the sections of Professor Shil's book entitled "The Deeper Sources" and "The Strain of Politics." This brilliant sketch of the immediate background of the starts and alarums of the past ten years is, however, delivered in support of a thesis which involves the author in an emotional predicament from which he cannot escape. He divides the nation into two—just two—camps: "The really crucial dividing line in politics is between pluralistic moderation and monomaniac extremism" (p. 227). Then he proceeds to denounce the bad camp of wrong-headed, fantasy-obsessed extremists, lunatics, and paranoiacs for the unpardonable sin of thinking that the world is divided into just two camps—"the state of mind which sees only black and white" (p. 226). The "nativist tradition," he tells us, should be "confined to alleys and bars and back streets and to the hate-filled hearts of the miserable creatures who espouse it" (p. 15). Hate-filled the creatures may be, but in Professor Shils they have found their match.

One wishes he would not rant so against the ranters, or become so emotional in denouncing emotionalism, or so passionately censure the attitude of those who censure others for their attitudes, or indulge so often in those absolute statements against which he clamors: e.g., "No society has ever been so extensively exposed to public scrutiny as the United States in the twentieth century" (p. 39). Has he ever considered the Greek or Latin zest for living private lives in public, or the complete publicity of European peasant and court communities? This regrettable lack of wider historical perspective is reflected in a loose use of terminology, as in his identification of "the national 'spirit'" with the Spirit of God in "revivalist" thinking (p. 207), or in his way of describing the opposition as "mad."

For Professor Shils "the scientific community is the epitome of the free society" (p. 190). Now no one needs to be told that science at its best should not take orders from the populist mob at its worst; but never in this book is there the slightest indication that science is ever at anything but its best. For Professor Shils it is all black and white.

Having given a first-rate description of the disease, Professor Shils can think of no better cure than Good Health. "More reasonableness and common sense" are indicated in a pluralistic system in which everyone tolerates everyone else. Professor Shils is against any strong feeling—except where it is desirable; secrecy and publicity are alike vicious—except when "properly practiced"; extremism is the root of all evil—except "in a small quantity" (p. 237). The small quantity is everything; "respectable" is a favorite word; Professor Shils yearns for a tepid academic world based on "the belief . . . that there is a sacred element in law"—only that belief must never be carried to the point of enthusiasm or passion (pp. 160 f). Like Bottom, Professor Shils will "roar you as gently as any sucking dove," and the result is neither a good roar nor a convincing plea for moderation.—HUGH NIBLEY, *Brigham Young University.*

The Right to Read: The Battle Against Censorship. BY PAUL BLANSHARD. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1955. Pp. 339. $3.50.)

An examination of literary censorship in all its forms and for all types of printed matter, with conclusions that the picture in this country though "not altogether pleasing . . . is far from helpless," is "gratifying" when looked at in the perspective of history, and is cause for being "cautiously cheerful" when comparison is made with other countries. It is a plea for an open society but with moderate conclusions on removal of existing legal restraints.

Case Studies in Personnel Security. COLLECTED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ADAM YARMOLINSKY. (Washington, D. C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1955. Pp. x, 310.)

A collection of fifty personnel security cases based on information from the files of lawyers who advised or represented the employees involved. In each case the following information is given: the employment status of the individual concerned, the charges against the employee, the employee's response, a summary of the hearing or hearings, and the result. Thirty-one of the fifty cases involve government civilian employees; fifteen, industrial employees; two, military personnel; one, a seaman; and one, an employee of a United Nations agency abroad.

Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York Politics, 1850–1887. BY LEE BENSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. x, 310. $5.50.)

This is a significant addition to the literature on the movement for railroad regulation in this country. It traces from the so-called Free Railroad Law of 1850 to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 the influence of New York interests toward railroad regulation. Its theme is that the merchants and farmers of the Empire State, rather than the agrarians of the West, took the lead in this important movement. It argues incidentally that the theoretical bases for American railroad reform came from abroad (pp. 204–207) and that leading railroad officials had come to favor regulation (though not the long-short haul and anti-pooling provisions) by the middle eighties (pp. 242–246). And behind the movement from *laissez faire* to national regulation was a "Communications [Transportation] Revolution." The account is thoroughly documented and spiced with plentiful references to the individuals and events of the period.

Natural Resources and the Political Struggle. BY NORMAN WENGERT. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1955. Pp. 71. $.95.)

This little study sketches the problem of decision-making by government in one field. Its theses are that the political process is pluralistic, that "policy itself is pluralistic" (p. 13), that struggle by groups must be accepted as an ingredient of the political process, that "operational goals and functional definitions may be most useful as criteria for social policy and action" (p. 65). "But what is important, even indispensable, is the *constant,* unrelenting search for the public interest and a dedication to furthering programs and policies which on the basis of the best judgments at the time of decision will advance the public good" (p. 66, author's italics). There is thoughtful, refreshing discussion of the roots of resource policy, of factors and alternatives in future resource policy development, of intergovernmental relations, and of the search for criteria for resource policy.

Monopoly in America: The Government as Promoter. By Walter Adams and Horace M. Gray. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1955. Pp. xv, 221. $2.75.)

Through chapters on "Regulation and Public Utilities," "Tax and Expenditure Policies," "Procurement for Defense," "Disposal of Surplus Property," and "Legislation and Atomic Energy," a friend of competition as the regulator in the economy shows the effects of government policy toward growth of "monopoly" and how a "subtle transformation in the power structure of society" has been accepted as "natural" and "inevitable."

Congress and Parliament: Their Organization and Operation in the U.S. and the U.K. By George B. Galloway. (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association. 1955. Pp. ix, 105. $1.50.)

A brief but excellent comparative survey of the American and British parliamentary practices made by the well-known Senior Specialist in American Government of the Library of Congress, financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation, and published under the auspices of the NPA Special Project Committee for the Study of Congress and Parliament.

The Political Process: Executive Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations. By J. Leiper Freeman. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1955. Pp. vii, 72. 95¢.)

An analysis of the interactions of the three key participants—congressional committees, executive bureaus, and interest groups—in the making of policy in the "crucial sub-systems of the larger political system." Reference is made particularly to an illustrative case, that of policy-making on Indian affairs.

Rural Versus Urban Political Power: The Nature and Consequences of Unbalanced Representation. By Gordon E. Baker. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company Inc. 1955. Pp. viii, 70. 95¢.)

A concise discussion of the growth and effects of unbalanced representation of urban and rural areas in American government.

Report of The Commission on Inter-Governmental Relations: Federal-State Relations. Submitted to the Governor and to the Legislature. (Trenton, N.J.: State of New Jersey. 1955. Pp. vi, 200.)

A statement of policy with recommendations concerning Federal grants-in-aid and certain related tax matters with particular reference to the State of New Jersey.

Federal Control of Public Education: A Critical Appraisal. By Dawson Hales. (New York: Columbia University, Teachers College, Bureau of Publications. 1954. Pp. xiii, 144. $3.75.)

A critical appraisal of the traditional principle of local control of public education in the United States in the light of vast changes in our society, with recommendations for joint federal, state, and local action "to meet the demands of contemporary conditions."

Western Massachusetts in the Revolution. By Robert J. Taylor. (Providence: Brown University Press. 1954. Pp. viii, 227. $4.00.)

A study of the significance of Western Massachusetts, politically and economically, in the history of that state during and after the American Revolution. The account ends with the ratification of the Federal Constitution by the Massachusetts ratifying convention.

The Founding Fathers. By Nathan Schachner. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1954. Pp. x, 630. $6.00.)

A readable account of the men and the events that shaped the course of American history during the administrations of George Washington and John Adams.

County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia; 1632–1640. By Susie M. Ames with a Prefatory Note by Francis S. Philbrick. (Washington: The American Historical Association. 1954. Pp. lxix, 189.)

This collection of the "oldest continuous county court records in America" should be of great interest to students of early American legal and local government institutions. An informative introduction by the editor supplies the necessary background for an understanding of the early settlement that produced these records.

Ogg and Ray's Introduction to American Government. By William H. Young. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1956. 11th Ed. Pp. x, 953. $6.30.)

The new revised edition of a standard text.

The organization and comprehensive character of the earlier work are retained. Emphasis is on institutional and legal description, but a chapter on public opinion and interest groups is included. Footnote references to documentary sources are valuable. Extensive bibliography.

Ogg and Ray's Introduction to American Government. The National Government. By William H. Young. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1956. 11th Ed. Pp. x, 719. $6.00.)

This book is identical with the complete eleventh edition of Ogg and Ray with the exception that the chapters dealing with state and local government are omitted.

Government in the United States. By Claudius O. Johnson. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1956. Pp. viii, 999. $6.50.)

A new edition of this text. The style and general plan of presentation are like those of earlier editions. Recent material is added, and some sections have been revised.

The American System of Government. By John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry. (New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1956. Pp. x, 757. $6.75.)

A new edition of this text. Manner of presentation and organization are similar to earlier editions. Numerous illustrations, review questions, topics for discussion, and lists of graphic aids are included. A workbook is available for use with this text.

The American Social System: Social Control, Personal Choice, and Public Decision. By Stuart A. Queen, William N. Chambers and Charles M. Winston. Under the Editorship of M. F. Nimkoff. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1956. Pp. x, 494. $5.75.)

A new social science text. Material from anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology organized around the themes stated in the sub-title.

American Government Under the Constitution. By Paul C. Bartholomew. (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company. 1956. Pp. xii, 342. $3.75.)

A new edition of this text. Provisions of the Constitution annotated by reference to judicial decisions, law, and practice.

A Preface to the Social Sciences. By Raymond F. Bellamy, Harrison V. Chase, Vincent V. Thursby, and Sadie G. Young. (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1956. Pp. vi, 532. $6.50.)

A new social science text. Successive sections deal with geography, economics, society, and government.

State Government and Administration: A Bibliography. By Dorothy C. Tompkins. (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California, Bureau of Public Administration. 1954. Pp. vii, 269. $6.00.)

A well arranged and carefully prepared bibliography of primary sources of information, issued primarily since 1930, on state government and administration. Annotations where deemed necessary and an excellent index are most helpful in using this bibliography.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

deFuria, Guy G. The McCarthy Censure Case: Some Legal Aspects. *American Bar Association Journal.* April, 1956.

Martin, John M., Jr. Proposed Federal Highway Legislation in 1955: A Case Study in the Legislative Process. *Georgetown Law Journal.* January, 1956.

Maslow, Will. Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform. *Columbia Law Review.* March, 1956.

Morris, Richard B. The Confederation Period and the American Historian. *William and Mary Quarterly.* April, 1956.

Private Bills and the Immigration Law. *Harvard Law Review.* April, 1956.

Rossiter, Clinton. The Presidents and the Presidency. *American Heritage.* April, 1956.

State Government

Bebout, John E. Charter for Last Frontier [Alaska]. *National Municipal Review.* April, 1956.

Dishman, Robert B. A New Constitution for New Hampshire? Public Administration Service, Department of Government, University of New Hampshire. 1956.

Krebs, William A. W., Jr. What Are You Doing About Atomic Development? *State Government.* May, 1956.

Planning Services for State Government. *State Government.* April, 1956.

State Tax Rates and Collections, 1950 and 1955. The Tax Foundation. 1956.

Local Government

Bogue, Donald J. Metropolitan Growth and the Conversion of Land to Nonagricultural Uses. Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, Miami University, and Population Research and Training Center, University of Chicago. 1956.

Bollens, John C. Metropolitan Areas: Puzzle and Challenge. *Public Management.* May, 1956.

Cohn, Rubin G. Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home Rule. *Northwestern University Law Review.* March-April, 1956.

Fitch, Lyle C. Fiscal and Political Problems of Increasing Urbanization. *Political Science Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Gazzolo, Dorothy. Municipal Housing Codes. *Public Management.* May, 1956.

Kyle, Lyle C. County Problems in Woodbury County, Iowa—A Case Study. *County Officer.* April, 1956.

Merz, Robert C. Current Practices of Waste Water Reclamation and Utilization. *Western City.* April, 1956.

Municipal Housing Codes. *Harvard Law Review.* April, 1956.

Ross, Russell M. The Ultimate Salvation of the County. *County Officer.* April, 1956.

Wessel, Robert H. Cincinnati's Income Tax—An Emergency Financing Device. *National Tax Journal.* March, 1956.

Zuchelli, Hazel B. Tax Rates in Virginia Cities. League of Virginia Municipalities, and Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia. 1956.

Intergovernmental Relations

Farb, Peter. A Flood Prevention Plan. *National Municipal Review.* May, 1956.

Kaempfer, W. W. Federal Aid in West Virginia: Its Impact on State Government. Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University. 1956.

Kamins, Robert M. Federally-Based State Income Taxes. *National Tax Journal.* March, 1956.

Mason, Paul. Interstate Taxation of Commercial Vehicles in the West. *State Government.* April, 1956.

Maxwell, James A. The Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. *National Tax Journal.* March, 1956.

Scheffer, Walter F. Reciprocity in the Taxation of Interstate Trucks. *National Tax Journal.* March, 1956.

Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties

Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes. *Harvard Law Review.* May, 1956.

Aikin, Charles. *Stare Decisis*, Precedent, and the Constitution. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Berns, Walter. Freedom and Loyalty. *Journal of Politics.* February, 1956.

Byrnes, James F. "The Supreme Court Must Be Curbed." *U. S. News & World Report.* May 18, 1956.

Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. The Encroachments on Freedom. *The Atlantic.* May, 1956.

Chase, Harold W. The Libertarian Case for Making It a Crime to Be a Communist. *Temple Law Quarterly.* Winter, 1956.

Cook, Eugene, and William I. Potter. The School Segregation Cases: Opposing the Opinion of the Supreme Court. *American Bar Association Journal.* April, 1956.

Dickinson, Edwin D. The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* January, 1956.

Harris, Robert J. The Impact of the Cold War upon Civil Liberties. *Journal of Politics.* February, 1956.

Interim Hearings under Immunity Act—Congressional Power vs. Individual Rights. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Jaffe, Louis L. Judicial Review: Question of Fact. *Harvard Law Review.* April, 1956.

Kadish, Sanford H. A Case Study in the Signification of Procedural Due Process—Institutionalizing the Mentally Ill. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Mankiewicz, Frank F., John K. Mangum, and Graham B. Moody, Jr. The Federal Loyalty-Security Program: A Proposed Statute. *California Law Review.* March, 1956.

Mason, Alpheus Thomas. The Core of Free Government, 1938–40: Mr. Justice Stone and "Preferred Freedoms." *Yale Law Journal.* April, 1956.

———. Inter Arma Silent Leges: Chief Justice Stone's Views. *Harvard Law Review.* March, 1956.

Mr. Justice Black. [Symposium.] *Yale Law Journal.* February, 1956.

Race Relations Law Reporter. [Source Materials, May, 1954, to December, 1955.] Vanderbilt University School of Law. Vol. 1, No. 1. February, 1956.

The Rights of Aliens in Deportation Proceedings. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Roberts, W. Lewis. The Citizen's Obligations Under the Constitution. *Kentucky Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Segregation in Transportation: Substantive and Remedial Problems. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of Its Recent Developments. *Minnesota Law Review.* February, 1956.

State Sedition Laws: Their Scope and Misapplication. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Studies on Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. [Symposium.] *Kentucky Law Journal.* Spring, 1956.

Stumberg, George W. The School Segregation Cases: Supporting the Opinion of the Supreme Court. *American Bar Association Journal.* April, 1956.

Swisher, Carl Brent. The Delineation of Personal and Civil Rights. *Georgetown Law Journal.* March, 1956.

Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement

Cerny, Joe H. Court Reporting: Facts for Public Officials. *American Bar Association Journal.* May, 1956.

Coburn, Frank E., and Samuel M. Fahr. Amnesia and the Law. *Iowa Law Review.* Spring, 1956.

Currie, F. A. Small Claims Courts. *University of Florida Law Review.* Spring, 1956.

Doing Business as a Test of Venue and Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations in the Federal Courts. *Columbia Law Review.* March, 1956.

Hall, Jerome. Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1956.

Holme, Peter H., Jr. The System for Administration of Justice in Colorado. *Rocky Mountain Law Review.* April, 1956.

Jury Trial for Criminal Contempts: Restoring Criminal Contempt Power and Protecting Defendants' Rights. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1956.

Larson, Robert L. The Importance and Value of Attorney General Opinions. *Iowa Law Review.* Spring, 1956.

Leeper, Towner S. Proving Tax Evasion by the Net Worth Method. *Texas Law Review.* April, 1956.

Lipton, Paul P. The Taxpayer's Rights: Investigation of Tax Fraud Cases. *American Bar Association Journal.* April, 1956.

Millar, Robert Wyness. Judicial Sequestration in Louisiana: Some Account of Its Sources. *Tulane Law Review.* February, 1956.

Newman, Donald J. Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice. *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science.* March-April, 1956.

The Philadelphia Constable. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review.* January, 1956.

Prosser, William L. Insult and Outrage. *California Law Review.* March, 1956.

Psychological Tests and Standards of Competence for Selecting Jurors. *Yale Law Journal.* February, 1956.

Rose, Arnold M. The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness. *Minnesota Law Review.* February, 1956.

Sink, John M. The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witness. *Southern California Law Review.* February, 1956.

Slough, M. C., and J. William Knightly. Other Vices, Other Crimes. *Iowa Law Review.* Spring, 1956.

Smith, Margaret Chase. Fair Trial and Free Press: Pressures Exerted on Courts and Jurors. *American Bar Association Journal.* April, 1956.

Spingarn, Jerome H. Arthur T. Vanderbilt: Order in the Courtroom. *Harper's Magazine.* May, 1956.

Stayton, Robert W., Richard A. Hall, and Mary Joe Carroll. The Proposed Reorganization of the Supreme Court of Texas—Jurisdiction. *Texas Law Review.* April, 1956.

Steinhaus, Richard Z. Treason, A Brief History with Some Modern Applications. *Brooklyn Law Review.* April, 1956.

Sutherland, Arthur E. Crimes, Courts and Newspapers. *Nieman Reports.* April, 1956.

The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. *Harvard Law Review.* May, 1956.

Vitalization of the Indiana Coroner System—Channeling Medico-Legal Duties to the Technically Trained. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Weinstein, Jack B. Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction. *Columbia Law Review.* April, 1956.

Westley, William A. Secrecy and the Police. *Social Forces.* March, 1956.

Wright, Charles Alan. Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending the Federal Rules. *Harvard Law Review.* March, 1956.

Public Administration and Administrative Law

Adkins, Dorothy C. A Flexible "Rule of Three" for Public Personnel Selection. *Public Personnel Review.* April, 1956.

Bart, Peter, and Milton Cummings, Jr. The Transfer of the Kansas State Civil Service Department. Inter-University Case Program. University of Alabama Press. 1956.

Birnbaum, Owen. Government Contracts: The Role of the Comptroller General. *American Bar Association Journal.* May, 1956.

Campbell, Ernest H. Franchises in the State of Washington. Bureau of Governmental Research and Services, University of Washington. 1956.

Charlesworth, James C. Pennsylvania's High-Level Seminars in Administration. *State Government.* April, 1956.

The Federal False Claims Act: The Informer as Plaintiff. *Harvard Law Review.* April, 1956.

Federal Habeas Corpus Review of "Final" Administrative Decisions. *Columbia Law Review.* April, 1956.

Mark, Max. Social Determinants of the Role of a Civil Service. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Mitchell, James M., William F. Danielson, and Lida S. Stark. The Michigan Municipal Personnel Service. *Public Personnel Review.* April, 1956.

Mosher, Frederick C. The Reorganization of the California State Personnel Board. Inter-University Case Program. University of Alabama Press. 1956.

Postal Sanctions: A Study of the Summary Use of Administrative Power. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Recovery of Contingent Fees for the Procurement of Federal Government Contracts. *Harvard Law Review.* May, 1956.

Richardson, Ivor L. M. Incidents of the Government-Servant Relationship. *Michigan Law Review.* March, 1956.

The Role of Employer Practices in the Federal Industrial Personnel Security Program—A Field Study. *Stanford Law Review.* March, 1956.

Waldby, H. O. The Public Officer-Public Employee Distinction in Florida. *University of Florida Law Review.* Spring, 1956.

Whelan, John W. A Government Contractor's Remedies: Claims and Counterclaims. *Virginia Law Review.* April, 1956.

Youmans, E. Grant. Federal Management Intern Career Patterns. *Public Personnel Review.* April, 1956.

Political Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion

Beth, Loren P. McCarthyism. *South Atlantic Quarterly.* April, 1956.

Blake, Robert R., Jane S. Mouton, and Jack D. Hain. Social Forces in Petition-Signing. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Bone, Hugh A. Some Notes on the Congressional Campaign Committees. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

David, Paul T. Specifications for a Model State Presidential Primary Law. Brookings Institution. 1956.

Developments in the Law—Defamation. *Harvard Law Review.* March, 1956.

Electoral Revision. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest.* April, 1956.

Epstein, Leon D. Size of Place and the Division of the Two-Party Vote in Wisconsin. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Farris, Charles D. "Authoritarianism" as a Political Behavior Variable. *Journal of Politics.* February, 1956.

Friedman, Leonard M. Reflections Upon the Law of Political Parties. *California Law Review.* March, 1956.

Lubell, Samuel. The Politics of Revenge. *Harper's Magazine.* April, 1956.

Mather, George B. Voting in Iowa. Institute of Public Affairs, State University of Iowa. 1956.

McKenna, William J. The Changing Pattern of Philadelphia Politics, 1914–1955. *Economics and Business Bulletin.* Temple University. March, 1956.

Morgan, Robert J. Pressure Politics and Resources Administration. *Journal of Politics.* February, 1956.

Neuberger, Richard L. Who Should Pay for Political Campaigns? *New York Times Magazine.* June 3, 1956.

Norton-Taylor, Duncan. How to Give Money to Politicians. *Fortune.* May, 1956.

Rieff, Philip. The Origins of Freud's Political Psychology. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* April, 1956.

Strong, Donald S. Registration of Voters in Alabama. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama. 1956.

White, John P. The Role of Public Opinion Polls in the Study of Political Parties. Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan. 1956.

Economic and Social Functions

National Economy

Heim, Peggy. Financing the Federal Reclamation Program: Reimbursement Arrangements and Cost Allocations. *National Tax Journal.* March, 1956.

Kemp, Arthur. The Role of Government in Developing Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. American Enterprise Association, Washington. 1956.

Lynn, Robert J. Legal and Economic Implications of the Emergence of Quasi-Public Wealth. *Yale Law Journal.* May, 1956.

Miller, Helen Hill. The Economic Consequences of an Election Year. *Virginia Quarterly Review.* Spring, 1956.

The O. T. C. Controversy. [Symposium.] *Congressional Digest.* May, 1956.

Tariff Policy for the U. S. A., A Strong, Rich Country. [Symposium.] *Journal of Farm Economics.* May, 1956.

Business and Labor

The AFL-CIO Merger. [Symposium.] *Industrial and Labor Relations Review.* April, 1956.

Allen, Layman E. Games Bargaining: A Proposed Application of the Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining. *Yale Law Journal.* April, 1956.

Aranow, Edward Ross, and Herbert A. Einhorn. Corporate Proxy Contests: Enforcement of SEC Proxy Rules by the Commission and Private Parties. *New York University Law Review.* May, 1956.

Bickel, Alexander M. Strathearn S. S. Co. v. Dillon—An Unpublished Opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis. *Harvard Law Review.* May, 1956.

A Consideration of Legislative Problems in Automobile Dealer Franchises. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Constitutionality of Permissive Legislation: The Union Shop Provision of the Railway Labor Act v. State "Right to Work" Laws. *Yale Law Journal.* April, 1956.

Dailey, Richard R. Robinson-Patman Act—A Further Look at Functional Discounts. *Michigan Law Review.* March, 1956.

The Effect on Public Utility Rate Making of Liberalized Tax Depreciation Under Section 167. *Harvard Law Review.* April, 1956.

Feldman, Eddy S. Conformity in Unemployment Compensation Insurance Litigation. *Labor Law Journal.* April, 1956.

Frost, George E. Patent Office Performance in Perspective. *Michigan Law Review.* March, 1956.

Gilbert, Robert W. The International Union—A New Legal Entity. *Labor Law Journal.* May, 1956.

Herzog, Donald R. Labor Relations in the Maritime Industry. *Labor Law Journal.* May, 1956.

Isaacson, William J. Labor Relations Law: Federal versus State Jurisdiction. *American Bar Association Journal.* May, 1956.

———. A Partial Defense of the Uniform Arbitration Act. *Labor Law Journal.* May, 1956.

Jones, Francis E., Jr. Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! Amidst Confusion, a Consistent Principle. *Southern California Law Review.* February, 1956.

Judicially Protected Secondary Pressures Under the Taft-Hartley Act. *Virginia Law Review.* April, 1956.

Kovarsky, Irving. A Social and Legal Analysis of the Secondary Boycott. *Oregon Law Review.* February, 1956.

Linowitz, Sol M. The International Businessman Meets the Anti-Trust Laws. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Winter, 1956.

Marcus, Philip. An Antitrust Legislative Program. *Georgetown Law Journal.* March, 1956.

Meringolo, Louis M. Rent Control: What Remains and Its Future. *Brooklyn Law Review.* April, 1956.

Mitchell, Robert E. Increased Control Over Proxy Contests: The Proposed Amendment to Regulation X-14 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. *Georgetown Law Journal.* January, 1956.

Modification of Litigated Antitrust Decrees by the Supreme Court. *Columbia Law Review.* March, 1956.

Naumoff, Benjamin B. An Analysis of the Contract Bar Doctrine. *Labor Law Journal.* April, 1956.

Palfrey, John Gorham. Atomic Energy: A

New Experiment in Government-Industry Relations. *Columbia Law Review.* March, 1956.

Sammond, John S. A Study of the Wisconsin Blue Sky Law and Its Administration. *Wisconsin Law Review.* March, 1956.

A Symposium on Sales Taxation. *Vanderbilt Law Review.* February, 1956.

Upton, Arvin E. Licensing and Services to Licensees and Others Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. *George Washington Law Review.* April, 1956.

Validity of Minimum Wage Determinations and a Consideration of the Need for the Walsh-Healey Act. *Indiana Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Wickersham, Edward D. Legislative Implications of Recent Unemployment Benefits Agreements. *Labor Law Journal.* May, 1956.

Health, Education, and Welfare

Anderson, Oscar E., Jr. The Pure-Food Issue: A Republican Dilemma, 1906–1912. *American Historical Review.* April, 1956.

Freeman, Roger A. Crisis in School Finance. Part I: Rising School Needs. *National Tax Journal.* March, 1956.

Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools: The Contempt Power and the Civil Rights Acts. *Yale Law Journal.* April, 1956.

Mandelker, Daniel R. Family Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws: I. *Michigan Law Review.* February, 1956. II. *Ibid.* March, 1956.

State Governments and Educational Television. Illinois Legislative Council. 1956.

Military Affairs and National Security

Cates, Richard L. Relationship of the Military System of Justice to the Problem of Adjustment. *Wisconsin Law Review.* March, 1956.

Cutler, Robert. The Development of the National Security Council. *Foreign Affairs.* April, 1956.

Farrell, D. Ted. Trial of Civilians by Military Tribunal. *Southern California Law Review.* February, 1956.

Gardner, Edith Rose. Coerced Confessions of Prisoners of War. *George Washington Law Review.* April, 1956.

Huard, Leo Albert. The Status of National Internal Security during 1955. *Georgetown Law Journal.* January, 1956.

Orfield, Lester B. Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts over Crimes Committed Abroad by American Military Personnel. *South Carolina Law Quarterly.* Spring, 1956.

Government Documents

Congress

House. Committee on Agriculture. General Farm Legislation. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. 1956 Farm Bill. House Reports Nos. 2077 and 2197. Also House Doc. No. 380. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Defense Production Act—1956. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Education and Labor. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 2067. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Minimum Wages in Certain Territories, Possessions, and Oversea Areas of the United States. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mutual Security Act of 1956. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Civil Defense for National Survival. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Water Rights Settlement Act of 1956. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Advertising of Alcoholic Beverages. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Alcoholic Beverages on Airlines. Hearing before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Newsprint Study. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Non-Federal Health Research Facilities. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 2184. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Railroad Retirement Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Civil Rights. House Report No. 2187. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Establishing Rules of Interpretation Governing Questions of the Effect of Acts of Congress on State Laws. Hearing before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Federal Construction Contract Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Presidential Inability. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. To Amend Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Wildlife Refuge Disposal Policy. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Code of Ethics for Government Service. Hearing. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Postal Rate Revision. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Public Works. National Highway Program. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 2022. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Water Pollution Control Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also House Report No. 2190. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Un-American Activities. Investigation of Communist Activities in the North Carolina Area. Hearing. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Benefit Levels in Veterans' Programs. House Committee Print No. 243. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. The Historical Development of Veterans' Benefits in the United States. House Committee Print No. 244. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. State Veterans' Laws. House Committee Print No. 246. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Survivor Benefits for Service-Connected Deaths and Veterans' Insurance. House Committee Print No. 247. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Ways and Means. The Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. House Report No. 2007. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Public Assistance Titles of the Social Security Act. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Traffic in, and Control of, Narcotics, Barbiturates, and Amphetamines. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 1956.

———. Report Concerning the Nation's Rubber Requirements and Resources. House Doc. No. 391. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

House and Senate. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

Senate. Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Agricultural Act of 1956. Senate Report No. 1966. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Dependent Medical Care. Hearings. Also Senate Report No. 1878. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Medical and Dental Officer Career Incentive Act. Hearing. Also Senate Report No. 1756. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Study of Airpower. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1956. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956. Senate Report No. 1864. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Housing Amendments of 1956. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 2005. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Finance. Highway Revenue Act. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1956. Hearing before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1726. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. United States Information and Educational Exchange Act Amendments of 1956. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1959. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Communist Ownership of GI Schools. Hearing before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. East-West Trade. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies. Senate Report No. 1715. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Proposal to Create an Administrative Vice President. Senate Report No. 1960. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Alaska Mental Health. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Water Rights Settlement Act. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Alaska and West Coast Transportation Problems. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Fisheries Legislation. Hearings. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Freight Forwarder Legislation. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Amendment to Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Hearing before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Constitutional Amendment Relative to Treaties and Executive Agreements. Senate Report No. 1716. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Motion Pictures and Juvenile Delinquency. Senate Report No. 2055. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Narcotic Control Act of 1956. Senate Report No. 1997. Also Senate Doc. No. 120. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Treatment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Addicts. Senate Report No. 1850. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. A National Library of Medicine. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Welfare and Pension Plans Investigation. Senate Report No. 1734. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Civil Service Retirement. Hearings before Subcommittee. Also Senate Report No. 1787. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Committee on Public Works. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. Senate Report No. 1965. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Emergency Flood Control. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

——— ———. Power Rates—Southwestern Power Administration. Hearings before Subcommittee. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Election Law Guidebook, 1956. Senate Doc. No. 116. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

———. Secretary of the Senate. Factual Campaign Information. 1956.

———. Select Committee for Contribution Investigation. Hearings Relative to Senate Resolution 205. Also Senate Report No. 1724. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1956.

Other Federal

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Office of Education. The State and Publicly Supported Libraries. By Fred F. Beach, Ralph M. Dunbar, and Robert F. Will. 1956.

[Department of Justice.] Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee: Part I. April, 1956.

National Science Foundation. Scientific Research Expenditures by the Larger Private Foundations. By F. Emerson Andrews. 1956.

Small Business Administration. Management Aids for Small Business. Annual No. 2. Edited by Edward L. Anthony. 1956.

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Unrepentant Tory: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858–1923, Prime Minister of The United Kingdom. BY ROBERT BLAKE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1956. Pp. 556. $9.00.)

My Father: The True Story. BY A. W. BALDWIN. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, Inc. 1955. Pp. 360. $4.00.)

The appearance of a first-class biography of a British Prime Minister is always an important event; the near simultaneous appearance of two such volumes is an occasion indeed. All the more so because neither of the subjects of these biographies has been sufficiently understood by the general public, Baldwin because his career and character have been so much debated, Bonar Law because his have been so little discussed.

Mr. Blake's *Unrepentant Tory* appears to be a definitive work. It is the first biography to draw upon the Bonar Law papers and is based wherever possible upon other such papers and on information supplied by personal recollections of various contemporaries. His picture of the Conservative leader will make it impossible henceforth to describe him, as Asquith did, as the "unknown Prime Minister." Bonar Law was above all the leader of his party, perhaps to a fault. His achievement lay in the fact that it was his leadership that held the party together in the dark days from 1906 to 1922; his tragedy lay in the fact that death took him so quickly from the prime ministry after it had been at such pain achieved. Indeed one may attribute to his skill, character, and statesmanship the fact that, of the two war- and faction-torn parties, it was the Conservatives rather than the Liberals that were able to reconcile their differences and face united the post-war onslaught of Labour.

Bonar Law was neither brilliant nor personally ambitious. In Mr. Blake's words "he was the ordinary man writ large," and when the time came to pass on the leadership of the party—and with it the prime ministry—he was torn with indecision. One of the most important parts of the book is the author's new interpretation of those events that gave the succession to Baldwin instead of Curzon.

Which brings us to Mr. Baldwin's biography of his father—a very different sort of book. It is intended as a corrective rather than a full biography, which is a reasonable exercise in view of the far more ample treatment that historians have accorded his father. Stanley Baldwin, too, was a party man; he led the Conservatives, in a very different way, from Bonar Law's death to his own retirement fourteen years later. In his own time he was considered uncommunicative and stuffy; in later days he was denounced as inept and culpable. Thanks to Mr. Churchill and to Mr. G. M. Young, the authorized biographer, there are many even yet who believe that Baldwin put party above nation and concealed the facts of Hitler's aims to win the 1935 election.

His son has sought to correct this distorted image and has done a highly competent job of it. This is an ably argued, ably written book. It does not offer itself as a complete biography—there are important gaps in it—but it does remarkably well what it is intended to do: namely, to provide a clear picture of Baldwin the man and to supply an answer to his more extravagant critics. The definitive biography of Stanley Baldwin has yet to be written, but when it appears it will clearly depend to an important extent on the significant contribution here made by his son.

There exists no systematic study of the British Prime Ministry; even Mr. Byrum Carter's recent and useful volume makes no pretense at providing this. Our understanding of the office, and of the system that embraces it, must therefore depend in a large measure on the study of the prime ministers themselves. These two books offer valuable assistance in this task.—William S. Livingston, *The University of Texas.*

Die Verbände in der Bundesrepublik: Ihre Arten und ihre politische Wirkungsweise. By Rupert Breitling. (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain K.G. 1955. Pp. 303).

Except for some desultory or denunciatory treatment, scant attention had been paid in the German literature until recent years to the role of interest groups in German government and politics. This neglect has been mainly due to the near monopoly in governmental studies held so long by academic students of public law in Germany, with their primarily formal and ideological concerns. The postwar years have seen a marked growth of interest in these problems, both on the part of political scientists and sociologists, a development in which the stimulus of the newly discovered American literature may well claim some share.

As far as the reviewer is aware, the present study by Breitling, the latest volume in the important series edited by D. Sternberger in behalf of the new German Association for Political Science, is the first systematic inquiry into the forms and roles of interest groups on the Western German political scene. In this sense it may be considered the German counterpart of Pendleton Herring's pioneer study on *Group Representation Before Congress.* Like Herring's investigation of the American pattern, it is a deliberately factual, closely documented introduction to the structure and activities of the German *Verbände,* supported by useful charts and statistics. The emphasis is upon the ways of interest groups with and within the Bundestag and its parties. There is a suggestive scrutiny of committee composition and an appendix contains special studies of selected pressure groups, ranging from taxpayers to the Catholic labor movement. The author's classification of these groups may be questioned by some readers; he divides lobbying organizations into interest groups proper (with a dominantly economic interest), vocational, religious, and "political" organizations (such as states, municipalities—but also citizens' and public officials' associations).

Students of German politics will find in Breitling's work a valuable tool for understanding the dynamics of the Bonn democracy and a robust testimony to the developing German pragmatism in political science. The author's concluding observation provides food for thought: "In effect, the presence of fewer interest group-connected politicians in parliament means the increase of career officials or party functionaries in that body and vice versa. Yet a large-scale membership of career officials or party functionaries constitutes a greater threat to a balanced house than the presence of [a substantial number of] interest group specialists" (p. 138). May we hope that the author or his associates will in future studies delve into pressures upon German public administration and thus put us further into their debt?—Wolfgang H. Kraus, *George Washington University.*

Freedom of the Press in the German Republic, 1918–1933. By Peter J. Fliess. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1955. Pp. 147. $2.50.)

Brief and penetrating, this study of the German press under the Weimar Republic is also instructive and foreboding. Weaving together an acute analysis of Weimar political institutions and social dynamics with a perceptive study of the role of the mass media, Professor Fliess depicts the conflict of liberty and authority in a concrete and provocative setting. The perspective suggested is chilling to liberal optimism.

The German community—geographically balkanized, lacking firm libertarian traditions, fragmented by factional warfare, and beset by recurrent crisis—was not only a natural prey for mass radical movements, but inevitably generated them. The press, as mediator between power-hungry cliques and the masses, was a major variable in the political equation; and control of the press was a condition of survival for the Republic. Failures and blunders in this vital task, the author contends, reveal not so much official ineptitude, as the suicidal dangers of clinging to outmoded liberal instrumentalities when threatened by modern revolutionary tactics of propaganda, disruption, and "creeping revolution." Potent against Communists, traditional legal and administrative restrictions were largely ineffective against the more subtle techniques of the Right, were often as damaging to liberalism's friends as to its foes, and conspired to hasten ultimate disaster.

Although the Bonn government has demonstrated that democracy may learn much and learn effectively from its failures and that liberty can work for unity as well as division, Professor Fliess's contention that uniformity and cohesion rather than liberty are the necessary social cement of modern emerging democracies merits thoughtful consideration. His study of Weimar is a solid argument for that thesis.—David G. Smith, *Swarthmore College.*

Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945–1954. Selected and Edited by Beate Ruhm von Oppen. (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. xxvii, 660. $10.00.)

A collection of documents illustrative of the implementation of occupation policy in the four zones of Germany during the period 1945–1954. Many of the documents, especially those issued by the Russians, have been inaccessible to Western students and their publication at this time will be widely welcomed. An attractive feature of the collection is the publication at some length of the selected documents rather than the presentation of a collection of short excerpts. The work will be an important reference for all persons interested in the German problem and the relations between the USSR and the other occupying powers.

Race and Reich: The Story of an Epoch. By Joseph Tenenbaum. (New York: Twayne Publishers. 1956. Pp. xvi, 554. $7.50.)

In this work the Nazi racial theory and its implementation are indicted by a scholar whose previous publications on Hitler's regime have received favorable attention. The relation between Hitler's racial policies and the Nazi economy, concentration camps, deportation policies, and genocide are discussed. The work is concerned primarily with the Jewish Question and has made use of generally inaccessible German documents and sources. It should prove a useful reference work to be added to the growing literature devoted to the revelation of the bestial and cynical character of the Third Reich and those who carried out its fanatical policies.

Das Bundeshaus. Aus der Arbeit des Bundestages und des Bundesrates, mit einem Vorwort von Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, Präsident des Deutschen Bundestages. 3. Auflage. By

FRIEDRICH KARL SCHRAMM. (Bonn: E. Beinhauer. 1955. Pp. 32.)

A brief, illustrated description of the *Bundeshaus* at Bonn, of the West German Federal Parliament, of the deputies, of the legislative process, of the commissions, and of the sessions such as this would, if more generally available or available in English, have considerable interest as a factual statement about a new and rather important parliamentary body. It is published in connection with the Federal agency *Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst*, and was first issued under the title *Der Bundestag.*—J.B.C.

Der Bundesrat.. BY HANS SCHÄFER. (Köln, Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag K.-G. 1955. Pp. 137. DM 14.80.)

The treatment of the *Bundesrat*, the body representing the *Länder* in the legislation and administration of the Federal Government in the *Bundesrepublik*, is by one who has been closely connected with its work. It treats briefly of the predecessor bodies. In the bibliography, some reference to the debates and documents of the *Bundesrat* and those of the predecessor bodies would have been helpful to the non-German reader, to whom these are not always available.—J.B.C.

Merkbuch für die Mitarbeiter der staatlichen Organe, 1956. (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Zentralverlag. 1956. Pp. 118. Schriftenreihe Demokratischer Aufbau, Heft 16.)

The fourth annual edition of what appears to be an official manual for state employees in the *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* contains some brief unsigned articles on recent developments in governmental matters such as the *Abgeordnetengruppen*, or formal organization of deputies in the *Volkskammer* by *Bezirke*, for dealing with the local problems of the *Bezirke*, the *Ständige Kommissionen* in local governments, official travel regulations, etc. In addition, there is a 4-page directory of central state agencies, a list of political parties and *Massenorganisationen*, a listing of the principal central newspapers and magazines from the point of view of the government, a classified table of the principal laws and ordinances, a chronology of the main governmental events of the previous year, etc. The work, put out by the Central State Publishing House, seems intended mainly for official circulation, and is revealing as regards governmental attitudes and practices in the *Deutsche Demokratische Republik.*—J.B.C.

English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century. BY ROBERT WALCOTT, JR. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. 291. $3.50.)

This is a carefully documented analysis of parliamentary politics in the last days of William and the first days of Anne. The study is directed towards the election and composition of Parliament and its party composition; it draws primarily upon the parliamentary records themselves and upon the available biographical data on the members. The thesis is that Britain had no two-party system during this period (as Trevelyan and others have suggested) but had rather a multi-factional system in which government could be sustained only by a frequently shifting and always unstable coalition of factions. Thus Walcott tries to do for the early part of the 18th century what Namier has done for the later part . And he does it well; this is a piece of very competent research.

Ulster under Home Rule: A Study of the Political and Economic Problems of Northern Ireland. EDITED BY THOMAS WILSON. (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. xxiv, 229. $3.40.)

An important effort to provide a general description of the political and economic structure of Northern Ireland. Half a dozen contributors, mostly Ulstermen, provide data and comment on the constitutional system, the economy, defense, finance, party politics, and other matters. A major theme of the book is that Northern Ireland is a unique "nation," sharply distinct from the rest of Ireland as well as from the rest of the United Kingdom. The authors, while differing in particulars, agree that devolution has worked well in Northern Ireland, perhaps because it was really never needed there. This is a useful and important book, probably the most important general study since Mansergh.

The Rebuilding of Italy: Politics and Economics. 1945–1955. BY MURIEL GRINDROD. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1955. Pp. vii, 269. $4.00.)

The first English-language effort to deal comprehensively with Italian government since the war. Miss Grindrod, who is now editor of *The World Today*, published in 1947 an excellent short survey of *The New Italy*. The present volume is far more ambitious; it contains a brief history of political and constitutional development since 1945, a lengthy analysis of elections and party controversy, and a perceptive discussion of the problems of postwar Italian policy: foreign affairs, economic recovery and development, social welfare, land reform, etc. The able work of a competent student, this book is the best thing now available on postwar Italy.

La Regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Parte prima. Cenni sul problema regionale e proposta di statuto. By Diego de Castro. (Bologna: Cappelli. 1955. Pp. 165.)

The brief study of one of the autonomous regions of Italy under the 1946 Constitution is by one who has been closely associated with its problems. The second part is to take up the history and ethnic and economic considerations.—J.B.C.

The Struggle For Asia. By Sir Franicis Low. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1955. Pp. ix, 239. $3.50.)

The Struggle for Asia is a thoughtful and informative book, "for the average western citizen," by a journalist with long experience in Asia. After surveying the internal situations in various countries of Asia, the author considers the "struggle for Asia." This struggle is "not Asian nationalism *versus* the West; it is Asian nationalism *versus* Communism." While the author is able to discuss SEATO with admirable fairness, he is, nevertheless, more impressed with the contribution of the Colombo powers, whose most important spokesman is Nehru, to the nationalist, democratic cause.

The Control of Teachers in Communist China: A Socio-Political Study and Reactions in Communist China: An Analysis of Letters of Newspaper Editors. By Charles K. S. Wang; *Chinese Communist Anti-Americanism and the Resist-America Aid Korea Campaign and The Family Revolution in Communist China.* By Wen-Hui C. Chen, Chief Contributor. (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Air Research and Development Command, Technical Research Reports No. 36 and No. 33, Memoranda No. 36 and No. 35. 1955. Pp. x, 61; xi, 115; xiii, 22; xii, 65.)

Four volumes in the U. S. Air Force "Chinese Documents Project." The general project was under the direction of Professor T. H. E. Chen of the University of Southern California, and the reports are based primarily on research in Chinese sources.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

HIRAM M. STOUT

Naval War College

General

Riggs, F. W. Public Administration: A Neglected Factor in Economic Development. *The Annals.* May, 1956.

Thayer, J. R. The Contribution of Public Opinion Polls to the Understanding of the 1953 Elections in Italy, West Germany, and Japan. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Fall, 1955.

Tickner, F. J. Public Service Training in the Past Decade. *Public Administration.* Spring, 1956.

Ward R. E., and others. Village Government in Eastern and Southern Asia: Symposium. *Far Eastern Quarterly.* February, 1956.

Specific Areas

United Kingdom

Best, R. D. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. *Public Administration.* Spring, 1956.

Brady, A. The British Two-Party System. *Political Science.* March, 1956.

Chester, D. N. The Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries. *Public Administration.* Spring, 1956.

Curran, C. Liberty, Equality and Mr. Gaitskell. *Spectator.* April 6, 1956.

Epstein, L. D. British Mass Parties in Comparison with American Parties. *Political Science Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Finer, S. E. The Federation of British Industries. *Political Studies.* February, 1956.

Gaitskell, H. Socialism's Way: Gaitskell Defines It. *The New York Times Magazine.* April 8, 1956.

Great Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. The British Civil Service. London, 1955.

Green, F. H. W. Community of Interest and Local Government Areas. *Public Administration.* Spring, 1956.

Hacker, A. Original Sin vs. Utopia in British Socialism. *The Review of Politics.* April, 1956.

Lawrence, R. J. Devolution Reconsidered. *Political Studies.* February, 1956.

Lucas, K. B. Government of the County in England. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Marshall, G. The Courts, Ministers, and the Parliamentary Process. *Public Administration.* Spring, 1956.

Redbrick Universities. *Twentieth Century.* February, 1956.

Ross, W. A. Local Government Board and After: Retrospect. *Public Administration.* Spring, 1956.

Scammon, R. M. British By-Elections, 1951–1955. *Journal of Politics.* February, 1956.

Steiner, F. G. Eden in Trouble. *Harper's Magazine.* April, 1956.

Trotman-Dickenson, D. I. The British Taxes on Excess Profits. *Public Finance.* No. 1, 1956.

Walker, P. G. On Being a Cabinet Minister. *The New York Times Magazine.* June 3, 1956.

Wiseman, H. V. Parliament and the University Grants Committee. *Public Administration.* Spring, 1956.

Colonial Areas

Apter, D. E. Political Development in Uganda. *Current History.* May, 1956.

Communist Propaganda Activities in Cyprus in 1955. United States Information Agency. Washington, 1956.

Curtin, P. D. The Gold Coast: Five Years After. *Current History.* May, 1956.

East Africa: Scylla and Charybdis. *The Round Table.* March, 1956.

Erskine, G. Kenya-Mau Mau. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.* February, 1956.

Great Britain. Central Office of Information. Cyprus Today. London, 1955.

Irvine, K. The Central African Federation. *Current History.* May, 1956.

Swan, M. Politics and Pork-Knockers. *Encounter.* April, 1956.

Transition in South-East Asia: The Future of Malaya and Singapore. *The Round Table.* March, 1956.

Zeidenfelt, A. British West Indies Federation. *Social Science.* April, 1956.

Commonwealth of Nations

Belshaw, C. S. Canadian Policy and Asia Society. *International Journal.* Winter, 1955–56.

Blair, L. Arbitration in the Federal Public Service of Australia. *Public Administration.* Spring, 1956.

Boyd, M. Political Development in Western Samoa and Universal Suffrage. *Political Science.* March, 1956.

Callard, K. The Political Stability of Pakistan. *Pacific Affairs.* March, 1956.

Chari, A. Reorganizing Primary and Secondary Education in India. *Education.* February, 1956.

Crouch, W. W. Civil Service in India. *Public Personnel Review.* April, 1956.

Ghosh, K. P. The Principles and Outlines of India's Second Five-Year Plan. *Eastern World.* December, 1955.

Great Britain. Office of Commonwealth Relations. High Commission Territories: Economic Development and Social Services. London, H.M.S.O., 1955 (Cmd. 9580).

Hahn, E. "The Situation" in South Africa. *Encounter.* January, 1956.

Jamieson, D. P. The Legal Profession in Canada. *Canadian Bar Reivew.* March, 1956.

Jennings, I. Crown and Commonwealth in Asia. *International Affairs.* April, 1956.

Pakistan: Last Stage of Constitution-Making. *The Round Table.* March, 1956.

Pandit, V. L. India's Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs.* April, 1956.

Rydon, J. The Constitutional Crisis in South Africa. *Australian Quarterly.* March, 1956.

South Africa: The Constitutional Crisis. *The Round Table.* March, 1956.

Thorne, J. The Republic of India—Planning and Administration. *Bankers' Magazine.* May, 1956.

Weiner, M. Struggle Against Power: Notes on Indian Political Behavior. *World Politics.* April, 1956.

Westley, D. E. Economic Developments in Pakistan. Washington, G.P.O., 1956.

Western Europe

Barzini, L. Italy and its Aristocracy. *Encounter.* January, 1956.

Berlia, G. La Dissolution et le Régime des Pouvoirs Publics. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique.* January–February, 1956.

Blamont, E. La Mise en Oeuvre de la Dis-

solution. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. January–February, 1956.

Crabbe, V. Syndicalisme et Fonction Publique en Belgique. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*. No. 4, 1955.

Eastman, M. Norway: Case History in Socialism. *National Review*. April 18, 1956.

Foster, W. Legislative Research in Sweden. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1956.

Godard, J. Les Budgets Militaires Français. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. March, 1956.

Goguel, F. Les Elections Françaises du 2 Janvier 1956. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January–March, 1956.

Grosser, A. Rückblick auf die Wahlen in Frankreich. *Europa-Archiv*. March 5, 1956.

Ireland Today. *Spectator*. April 20, 1956.

Levy, D. Les Elections à la Présidence de la République Finlandaise. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January–March, 1956.

Luethy, H. The Crisis of French Colonialism. *Atlantic Monthly*. May, 1956.

Mangone, G. J. Sicilian Elections in Italy. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1956.

Matton, H. La Cour des Comptes de Belgique et le Droit Administratif. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*. No. 4, 1955.

McNee, R. B. Rural Development in the Italian South: a Geographic Case Study. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. June, 1955.

Morris, B. S. Some Perspectives on the Nature and Role of Western European Communist Parties. *Review of Politics*. April, 1956.

Owen, J. E. Social Welfare in Finland. *Social Science*. April, 1956.

Philip, D. L'Association Administrative des Pays Scandinaves. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*. No. 4, 1955.

Philip, D. La Structure des Partis et la Vie Politique en Norvège. *Revue Politique et Parliamentaire*. February, 1956.

Ruini, M. Il Bilancia dello Stato e l'art. 81 della Constituzione. *Rivista di Politica Economica*. December, 1955.

Santillana, G. de. Italy Changes Her Ways. *Harper's Magazine*. May, 1956.

Schwarz, U. Rivalries in Spain. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. March, 1956.

Siegfried, A. Stable Instability in France. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1956.

Sistach, R. Défense Nationale et Secrétariats d'Etat. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. March, 1956.

Steadman, M. S. Jr. French Elections of January 2, 1956. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1956.

Touchard, J. Bibliographie et Chronologie du Poujadisme. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January–March, 1956.

Turtledove, H. L. Why the French Act That Way. *Harper's Magazine*. May, 1956.

Vernant, J. La France et la Coopération Atomique Européenne. *Revue de Défense Nationale*. April, 1956.

Central Europe

Anthon, C. G. East Germany. *Current History*. April, 1956.

Anthon, C. G. East Germany After the June Revolts. *World Affairs Quarterly*. April, 1956.

Conant, J. B. Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Germany. *Department of State Bulletin*. April 9, 1956.

East German Economic Development Trends. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. March, 1956.

Erhard, L. Germany's Reconstruction. *Current History*. April, 1956.

Erler, F. The Struggle for German Reunification. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1956.

Fay, S. B. Leadership at Bonn. *Current History*. April, 1956.

Frei, O. The Remilitarization of Eastern Germany. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. April, 1956.

Gatzke, H. W. Reunification. *Current History*. April, 1956.

Heisenberg, W. Atomic Energy Development in Germany. *Atomics Engineering and Technology*. April, 1956.

Holleaux, A. La Décentralisation Administrative en Allemagne. *Revue de Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. January–February, 1956.

Kirchheimer, O. Germany Without Adenauer. *New Leader*. April 16, 1956.

Kohn, H. Nationalism. *Current History*. April, 1956.

Midgley, J. The Future of German Democracy. *Listener*. April 19, 1956.

Snell, J. L. Schumacher's Successors: The Personal Factor in the Shaping of Contemporary German Social Democracy. *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*. March, 1956.

Spencer, R. A. Germany and the "Long Haul." *International Journal*. Winter, 1955–56.

Thumm, G. W. The Saar. *Current History*. April, 1956.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Apremont, B. and Schram, S. Evolution Récente de l'U.S.S.R. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* January–March, 1956.

Armstrong, J. A. Administrative Apparatus in the Rural Ukraine. *The American Slavic and East European Review.* February, 1956.

Assembly of Captive European Nations. The Captive Nations—1956. *New Leader.* April 9, 1956.

Avtorkhanov, A. Social Differentiation and Contradictions in the Party. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* February, 1956.

Barghoorn, F. C. Cultural Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy. *World Politics.* April, 1956.

Bauer, R. A. Some Trends in Sources of Alienation from the Soviet System. *Public Opinion Quarterly.* Fall, 1955.

Burmeister, A. and others. The End of Forced Labour? *Encounter.* April, 1956.

The Communist Party and Parliamentarianism—from the Comintern Theses and Statutes of 1920 to the Soviet Party Congress of 1956. United States Information Agency. Washington, 1956.

Edgerton, W. B. Soviet Education Today. *Institute of International Education News Bulletin.* March, 1956.

Fainsod, M. Russia's 20th Party Congress. *Foreign Policy Bulletin.* May 1, 1956.

Galay, N. Military Representation in the Higher Party Echelons. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* April, 1956.

Granick, D. Economic Aspects of the Soviet "New Course." *World Politics.* April, 1956.

Halperin, E. An Analysis of the Recent Moscow Party Congress. *Swiss Review of World Affairs.* April, 1956.

Humphrey, A. H. Russian Dictatorship: The Firm Base of World Communism. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.* February, 1956.

Jurczenko, A. V. The Current Tactics of the Soviet Collective Leadership. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* April, 1956.

Lattimore, O. Satellite Politics: The Mongolian Prototype. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Martens, M. Providing for the Soviet Officer. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* February, 1956.

Polezhaev, A. Industry and the Sixth Five-Year Plan. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* March, 1956.

Posdeeff, E. The Legal Profession in the USSR. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* March, 1956.

Preliminary Report on 20th Party Congress, CPSU. United States Information Agency. Washington, 1956.

Recent Developments in Molotov's Career. United States Information Agency. Washington, 1956.

Ruslanov, P. Marshal Zuhkov. *Russian Review.* April, 1956.

U. S. Department of State. Religion in the Soviet Union. Washington, GPO, 1956.

Whitney, T. Aggression by Economic Planning—the Sixth Soviet Five-Year Plan. *New Leader.* March 26, 1956.

Middle East and Africa

Adams, D. G. Current Population Trends in Iraq. *Middle East Journal.* Spring, 1956.

Al-Habib, M. M. The Labor Movement in Iraq. *Middle Eastern Affairs.* April, 1956.

Aschinger, F. E. An Economic Report on Iraq. *Swiss Review of World Affairs.* April, 1956.

Conaway, O. B., Jr. Mobilizing Israel's Resources for Public Administration. *United Nations Review.* April, 1956.

Economic Challenge in Ruanda-Urundi. *United Nations Review.* April, 1956.

The Egyptian Constitution. *Middle Eastern Affairs.* February, 1956.

Fawzi, D. Transfer of Power in the Sudan. *Internationale Spectator.* March 8, 1956.

Hance, W. A. The Economic Potentials of Africa. *American Economic Review.* May, 1956.

Liebesny, H. J. Administration and Legal Development in Arabia. *The Middle East Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Marshall, A. D. Somalia: a United Nations Experiment. *Focus.* April, 1956.

Onar, S. S. Les Transformations de la Structure Administrative et Juridique de la Turquie et son État Actuel. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives.* No. 4, 1955.

Tannous, A. I. Dilemma of the Elite in Arab Society. *Human Organization.* Fall, 1955.

Woodhouse, C. M. Cyprus and the Middle Eastern Crisis. *International Journal.* Winter, 1955–56.

The Youngest Republic: Independence of the Sudan. *The Round Table.* March, 1956.

Southeast Asia

Benda, H. J. Communism in Southeast Asia. *Yale Review.* Spring, 1956.

Compton, B. R. Red Surabaya. New York,

Institute of Current World Affairs, 1956.

Indonesia. *Atlantic Monthly*. June, 1956.

Levi, W. Politics in Nepal. *Far Eastern Survey*. March, 1956.

Présence du Cambodge. *France-Asie*. November–December, 1955.

Salazar, O. Goa and the Indian Union. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1956.

Sheinbaum, S. K. Vietnam—a Study in Freedom. *Michigan State University Magazine*. February, 1956.

Thailand. United States Department of State. Washington, G.P.O., 1956.

Wint, G. Last Transfers in Asia. *Twentieth Century*. March, 1956.

Pacific and Far East

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Seoul, Office of Public Information, 1955.

Henderson, W. Communist China: An American Appraisal. *International Journal*. Spring, 1956.

Japanese Communist Party. United States Information Agency. Washington, 1956.

Kiuchi, N. False Assumptions About the Japanese Economy. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1956.

Li, T-T. The Legal Position of Tibet. *American Journal of International Law*. April, 1956.

Lorenzo, C. M. Foreign Investments in the Philippines. *Economic Research Journal*. March, 1956.

Maeda, H. A National Newspaper in Japan. *Nieman Reports*. April, 1956.

Mertsalov, V. S. Mao in Stalin's Footsteps. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*. February, 1956.

Murphey, R. China's Transport Problem, and Communist Planning. *Economic Geography*. January, 1956.

Neuvy, P. Regroupement des Forces Politiques au Japon. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January–March, 1956.

The Philippine Constitution as the Standard of Government Conduct in Theory and in Practice. A Symposium. *Philippine Law Journal*. December, 1955.

Shabad, T. Counting 600 Million Chinese. *Far Eastern Survey*. April, 1956.

Taeuber, I. B. Recent Population Developments in Japan: Some Facts and Reflections. *Pacific Affairs*. March, 1956.

Ward, R. E. The Constitution and Current Japanese Politics. *Far Eastern Survey*. April, 1956.

Latin America

Bouças, V. F. O Conselho Técnico de Economia e Finanças. *Revista do Serviço Público*. July, 1955.

Carlson, S. and others. The Economic Potentials of Latin America. *American Economic Review*. May, 1956.

Cubas, E. Recent Developments in Social Security in the Americas. *Bulletin of the International Social Security Association*. January–February, 1956.

Dallien, R. Les Elections Brésiliennes d'Octobre 1955. *Revue Française de Science Politique*. January–March, 1956.

Dyer, D. R. Sugar Regions of Cuba. *Economic Geography*. April, 1956.

Fox, J. S. Problems of Labour Administration in Latin America. *International Labor Review*. March, 1956.

Gillin, J. and Silvert, K. H. Ambiguities in Guatemala. *Foreign Affairs*. April, 1956.

Kling, M. Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1956.

Lens, S. Latin America: a Political Report. *Dissent*. Spring, 1956.

Mena, A. O. Recent Developments in the Field of Social Security in Mexico. *Bulletin of the International Social Security Association*. January–February, 1956.

Moitinho, A. P. L'Enseignement de l'Administration au Brésil. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*. No. 4, 1955.

Patterson, E. F. The Extent and Pattern of the Expenditures of the Argentine National Government. *Public Finance*. No. 1, 1956.

Pendle, G. Die Aera Perón. *Europa Archiv*. March 20, 1956.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

The European Coal and Steel Community: Experiment in Supranationalism. BY HENRY L. MASON. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1955. Pp. xi, 153.)

It was some eighty years ago that Bismarck commented tartly, "Whoever speaks of Europe is wrong." Certainly little has occurred since to prove his judgment false. Yet, between the two World Wars, Ortega y Gasset, in his *Revolt of the Masses*, could suggest that the idea of Europe was less unbelievable then than that of Spain had been in the eleventh century. Events of the last decade lend support to Ortega's optimism, although many, with good reason, remain skeptical.

Enthusiasm for European union has, in recent years, created many movements and institutions, public and private. Some have proved useful; others seem to be still-born. But, in its effective activity and in its promise, one has been outstanding: the European Coal and Steel Community, often called the "Schuman Plan." To this, as a "pilot experiment in supranational organization," Professor Mason has devoted an excellent little book. With recognition that neither municipal nor international law forms an entirely appropriate framework for analysis, the author endeavors to bring out the general political and constitutional aspects of the Community through a combination in interpretative analysis of the provisions of the treaty and conventions, the expressed opinions of those who have worked with those provisions, and the accomplishments of the organization through 1954. He concludes with a discussion of the nature of supranational organization, and with the prospects of the Coal and Steel Community in a more hostile world than that of its inception. The work is welcome, as there is relatively little analytical material on the subject in English, and not much in other languages.

Professor Mason's discussion brings out clearly that the institutions and procedures of the Schuman Plan refuse to be comprehended within the concepts to which we are generally accustomed. It is, in a sense, a new world in creation, and, if it survives, it will have its own appropriate concepts. Early in the book the author calls attention to the exceptional character of the Community by remarking the peculiar circumstances of its adoption, and in his final paragraph he observes the need for its own sustaining myth. Further evidence on this point is scattered throughout the work: the important role of the Court (p. 42), accompanied by an indication of its limitations in cases of conflict with national tribunals (p. 46); the extensive governmental powers of the High Authority (p. 74), combined with reluctance to exercise them in important issues (p. 92). It is perhaps regrettable that Professor Mason did not orient his analysis more specifically to this perspective.

The author notes that at the time of writing it was still too early to reach even tentative conclusions whether the Community had been able to live up to expectations. A year and a half later the same diffidence is appropriate. Critical conditions which would test it have not yet appeared, and the degree of support for it in member countries remains quite uncertain. A few years ago there were numerous proposals for similar "pools" in agriculture, transportation, and power. Of these one hears little today. Only Euratom and the recent proposal of the Spaak committee for a customs union along Schuman plan lines are still, in mid-1956, candidates for actuality. Yet, even if the Coal and Steel Community fails, so did many efforts at national unification. The experiment remains a valuable one.—William H. Harbold, *University of Washington.*

Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–1954: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc. By J. C. Kundra. (Groningen, Netherlands: J. B. Wolters; Bombay: Vora & Co., Publishers, Ltd. 1955. Pp. xi, 239. Rs. 16/–.)

In this study of India's relations with the United States and the Commonwealth countries, Dr. Kundra endeavors to go beyond a mere cataloguing of the moral principles which his country's foreign policy is declared to be pursuing and to explore the "background" of that policy. While he omits the function of various domestic forces (such as the legislature and bureaucracy, interest groups, media of communication), he undertakes an evaluation of geographical, historical, and ideological determinants. This is a formidable task and, if the analysis is not altogether informed by a consistent thesis, it at least penetrates frequently to the fundamental questions associated with India's view of world affairs. It gives proper attention, for example, to the subcontinent's geographic vulnerability to both blocs—to the Communist nations by land and to the Western powers by sea—and to the hypothesis of the "synthetic" quality of the Indian mind, as likely influences in the formation of policy.

Proceeding to an account of the major events of India's relations with the United States, Dr. Kundra provides a useful analysis of stages in the development of the Indian attitude. He defines the first period (1947–1949) as one of relative indifference and inaction on both sides. One does indeed observe, in reading Nehru's statements on foreign policy in these years, a tendency toward improvisation, toward postponing specific commitments rather than disavowing them. Such a tendency would naturally result not only from an absorption in internal problems, but also from an awareness that the domestic determinants of foreign policy had not assumed clear form, as well as from pride and the absence of rigid predispositions. The second period (1949–1950), Dr. Kundra states, was characterized by distinctly warmer relations and a tendency on India's part to seek a loose alignment with the West. The decision to remain within the Commonwealth, involving mutual consultation and various formal and informal types of cooperation in both the economic and military spheres, provided evidence of this tendency. Dr. Kundra gives appropriate emphasis to the Commonwealth connection, which signified a certain spirit of accommodation toward the Western powers, although it was defended in India mainly as an opportunity to influence them. The third period (1950–1954) was one of assertive non-alignment, in which that policy was elevated to the status of a fixed principle, arising out of India's interpretation of a number of critical events—notably the Chinese absorption of Tibet, the Korean war, and, ultimately, the American decision to grant military aid to Pakistan. The Indian leadership demonstrated then (as now) an apparent conviction that it must not and need not provoke either bloc, supported by a growing confidence that India could herself eventually occupy great-power status.

It should be added that the utility of this study would have been greater if it had been submitted to more careful editing, since stylistic errors abound.—GENE D. OVERSTREET, *Institute of East Asiatic Studies, University of California.*

The United Nations and Pakistan. BY MUSHTAQ AHMAD. (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs; Distributed in the U. S. by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. 1956. Pp. iii, 162. $2.00.)

In these days of giantism Mr. Ahmad's book is continuing proof that good things sometimes come in small packages. It also presents some evidence of the development of political science in Pakistan since 1947, and of the increasing vigor of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in promoting the study of international relations. The introductory chapters present a brief, textbook-styled discussion of the background to the United Nations, regional arrangements, and the roles of the major organs of the United Nations. The remainder is devoted to a problem approach to the major areas of conflict within and outside the Organization. Throughout, the Pakistan position is noted, but it is usually secondary to the expository presentation.

The chapter on "Revision of the Charter" is particularly lucid in its discussion of the weaknesses of the Organization and the difficulties faced in trying to overcome them. Mr. Ahmad concludes that "the paralysis that has afflicted the World Organization . . . arises out of disagreement and non-cooperation among the Great Powers and not because of any inherent defect in the Charter." It is toward an East-West rapprochement that the small states must exert their influence.

In the chapter, "Specific Situations and Disputes," Mr. Ahmad cushions his exposition with polemic. On the Palestine case, Pakistan's position that the "fatal step" of partition would make future reconciliation of Jew and Arab impossible is defended on the basis of post-partition developments. Mr. Ahmad also justifies Pakistan's policy favoring admission for Communist China on the grounds that Communist China, unlike the Nationalist government, is able to discharge Charter obligations. In analyzing the Kashmir dispute, he stresses the recalcitrance of India in refusing to agree to arbitration or the holding of a plebiscite. He concludes that the Security Council could and should have used "active intervention" to augment its pacific settlement procedures. India's claim to Kashmir is not discussed, nor is the paradox confronting the United Nations: viz., that the dispute constitutes a clash between law (India's position) and justice (Pakistan's position).

But the dominant theme of the book focuses on the cold war. Although the ramifications of the East-West struggle have played havoc with the new World Organization during its first ten years, Mr. Ahmad concludes, the peoples of the world stake their very lives on the hope that the Great Powers may recognize that the United Nations represents the only means of avoiding a civilization-destroying world war.

Mr. Ahmad has made competent use of both primary and secondary sources and has somewhat successfully tried to balance the legalistic, realistic, and moralistic approaches to major international problems. The student of international organization should welcome this book as a useful guide to the United Nations, as an accurate barometer of Pakistan's position on many world problems, and as a critical appraisal of the UN Organization and some of its Members by an Asian scholar.—JACK C. PLANO, *Western Michigan College.*

What the United States Can Do about India. BY EUSTACE SELIGMAN. (New York: New York University Press. 1956. Pp. 56. $2.95.)

A partner in the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, a man of wide international interests, explains briefly why the world looks different from the Indian and American viewpoints and why the interests of the United States are bound up in the Indian future.

Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen. BY DR. GÜNTER DECKER. (Göttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz. 1955. Pp. x, 435.)

A thorough and scholarly discussion of the historical and legal implications of the doctrine of self-determination. The author in addition to discussing the nature of self-determination and the various attempts which have been made to implement it from the eighteenth century to the present, also treats the problem of the nature of the nation and the nation state in contemporary political and legal theory. The work is comprehensive, covering the views of Russian, German and American theorists, the relation of self-determination to the League of Nations and the United Nations, and the specific manifestations of the problem not only in Europe but in Africa, Asia, and the Near East. A brief selection of key documents is appended to the book, which is made additionally valuable to students by the inclusion of a thorough and up to date bibliography.

Le Vatican et la seconde guerre mondiale: action doctrinale et diplomatique en faveur de la paix. BY PAUL DUCLOS. (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, Libraire de la Cour d'Appel et de l'Ordre des Avocats. 1955. Pp. 246.)

The author seeks to give a survey of the doctrinal and diplomatic attitude of the Holy See to the problems of the Second World War and the preservation of peace. The period surveyed is from 1939 to 1945 and the study is divided into a statement of the position of the Vatican as a moral and doctrinal force in international affairs and to a consideration of the actual diplomacy engaged in by the papacy first to prevent and later to mitigate the Second World War. A concluding chapter deals with the problem of the Just War. The author has succeeded in presenting an objective survey, relying for his facts upon official publications of the Holy See and allowing them to speak for themselves. The work is by no means exhaustive but will serve as a useful survey and introduction to the vast amount of material in the Vatican archives.

Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. Vol. II: Articles 23–54 of the Charter; Vol. III: Articles 55–72 of the Charter; Vol. IV: Articles 73–91 of the Charter. BY THE UNITED NATIONS. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1955, 1956. Pp. v, 457; v, 596; v, 461. $3.50 each vol.)

The second, third, and fourth volumes of the announced five-volume summary and analysis of the meaning and working of the United Nations Charter. Prepared by the U. N. Secretariat, these volumes fully redeem the promise of the first (noted in this REVIEW, vol. xlix, p. 1203) and carry the analysis through Article 72. The fifth volume is expected in 1956.

International Relations. BY M. MARGARET BALL AND HUGH B. KILLOUGH. (New York: The Ronald Press Co. 1956. Pp. viii, 667. $6.50.)

A detailed and fairly standard new text, with considerable historical underpinning, which describes the nature of the international community, the methods of national policy implementation, the role of international organization, the place of collective security arrangements, and, in a final section entitled "Schism," examines the policies of the major powers.

Principles of International Politics. BY CHARLES O. LERCHE, JR. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xi, 430.)

A new introductory text, but the approach and the ground covered are familiar. An investigation of the state system and the nature of national power precedes two sections dealing with "International Conflict and Its Resolution" and "Alternatives to Conflict." In a section headed "Contemporary Problems," the current political, economic, and psychological aspects of international politics are examined.

The Road to Peace and to Moral Democracy: An Encyclopedia of Peace. BY BORIS GOUREVITCH. (New York: International Universities Press, Inc. 1955. 2 Vols. Pp. xiv, 1083, xxvi, 1540. $20.00.)

The author—a Russian exile who is described as socialist, pacifist, and Christian—attempts to illuminate the nature and utter seriousness of the present world crisis by commenting on practically everything done, and everything said or thought by any person of near-prominence in the world in the last decade. A 79-page index may make it of some use as a reference work.

The Positive Contribution by Immigrants. A Symposium prepared for Unesco by the International Sociological Association and the International Economic Association. (Paris: Unesco. 1955. Pp. 199. $2.25.)

The third volume in Unesco's "Population and Culture" series, this contains studies on the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina, and a separate study on the economic aspects of immigration.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
Catholic University of America

ARTICLES

International Politics and National Policies

General

Gouvernement Affaires De la Conférence des Quatre Chefs de Gouvernement à la Conférence des Ministres des Affairs Étrangères. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère.* January, 1956.

Fraga Iribarne, M. La Diplomacia en el Siglo XX. *Cuadernos de Política Internacional.* July–September, 1955.

François-Poncet, A. Le Français, Langue Diplomatique. *Revue des Deux Mondes.* April 15, 1956.

Fuchs, L. H. Nations in the Future: Organization for Survival. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Gelbe-Haussen, E. Die Aussenminister-Konferenz von Genf. *Osteuropa.* February, 1956.

Healey, D. Neutralism. London, Ampersand, 1955.

Hislop, I. The Morality of Nuclear Warfare. *Blackfriars.* March, 1956.

Kennan, G. F. History and Diplomacy as Viewed by a Diplomatist. *Review of Politics.* April, 1956.

Kissinger, H. A. Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. *Foreign Affairs.* April, 1956.

Lee, L. T. Some New Features in the Consular Institution. *Georgetown Law Journal.* March, 1956.

Mayo, H. B. Coexistence. Is it Possible? *International Journal.* Summer, 1955.

Menken, J. Co-existence and Cold War. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Messineo, A. La Coesistenza nel Timore. *Civiltà Cattolica.* October 1, 1955.

Ramsey, J. H. A Decade of International Relations. Dillonvale, Community Press, 1956.

The Responsibility of Higher Education for Helping to Develop Understanding. Symposium. *Educational Record.* April, 1956.

Rubio García, L. Tras la Conferencia de Bandung: Euráfrica o Afrasia? *Cuadernos de Política Internacional.* July–September, 1955.

Schmitt, C. La Tensión Planetaria entre Oriente y Occidente y la Oposición entre Tierra y Mar. *Revista de Estudios Políticos.* June, 1955.

Schram, S. R. La Coexistence Hier et Aujourd'hui. *Christianisme Social.* July, 1955.

Scott, A. M. Challenge and Response: a Tool for the Analysis of International Affairs. *Review of Politics.* April, 1956.

Silvain, R. Les Conséquences Diplomatiques de la Bombe H. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* December, 1955.

Sontag, R. J. History and Diplomacy as Viewed by a Historian. *Review of Politics.* April, 1956.

Spaight, J. M. Balance of Power. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Thompson, K. W. Mr. Toynbee and World Politics; War and National Security. *World Politics.* April, 1956.

Van Loen, E. Geopolitik oder Imperialismus? *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik.* February, 1956.

Von Siegler, F. Grossmächte, Weltmächte, Mächteblocks. *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik.* April, 1956.

Von Studnitz, H. G. Reform der Diplomatischen Privilegien. *Aussenpolitik.* March, 1956.

Woodward, L. Science and the Relations between States. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* April, 1956.

Wyndham, E. H. The European Scene. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Military and Functional Questions

Alphandery, C. L'Énergie Nucléaire de Hiroshima à Genève. *Économie et Politique.* October, 1955.

Aron, R. A Half-century of Limited War? *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* April, 1956.

Baldwin, H. W. The New Face of War. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* May, 1956.

Beckett, P. Public Administration Training as Technical Assistance: Some Further Observations Based on Experience in Beirut. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Brodie, B. Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Buzzard, A. The H-Bomb: Massive Retaliation or Graduated Deterrence. *International Affairs.* April, 1956.

Cobb, E. H. Science and the Services. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Cockburn, R. Science in War. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.* February, 1956.

Ernle-Erle-Drax, R.A.R.P. Deterring Future Aggression. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.* February, 1956.

Maddox, J. G. Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America. Washington, National Planning Association, 1956.

Martin, P. Recent Developments in Disarmament. *International Journal.* Spring, 1956.

Miksche, F. O. Abrüstung oder Umrüstung? *Aussenpolitik.* April, 1956.

Moch, J. Towards a Disarmed Peace. *International Journal.* Spring, 1956.

———. Technology and the Future. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* April, 1956.

Müller, W. D. Atompremiere. *Gegenwart.* October 27, 1955.

The New Industrial Revolutions (I). *United Nations Review.* May, 1956.

Page, J. D. What is Air Power? *Air University Quarterly Review.* Summer, 1955.

Rickover, H. G. Lead Time and Military Strength. Our Margin of Survival. *Vital Speeches.* March 15, 1956.

Shepherd, E. C. The New Era in Air Warfare. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

"Spindrift." Foreign Navies. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Slessor, J. The Great Deterrent and its Limitations. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* May, 1956.

Torlesse, A. D. The Role of the Aircraft Carrier. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Toynbee, A. J. Abrüstung nach Genf. *Aussenpolitik.* March, 1956.

United States

American Assembly. The Representation of the United States Abroad. New York, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 1956.

American Enterprise Association. Analysis of Foreign Aid Issues. Washington, 1956.

Bowman, A. H. Jefferson, Hamilton and American Foreign Policy. *Political Science Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Dorsey, S. P. Technical Cooperation in the Near East and South Asia. *Department of State Bulletin.* May 14, 1956.

Drucker, P. F. America Becomes a "Have-not" Nation. *Harper's Magazine.* April, 1956.

Graebner, N. A. Foreign Policy in '52. *World Affairs Quarterly.* April, 1956.

Hollister, J. B. An Outline of the Mutual Security Program for 1957. *Department of State Bulletin.* April 9, 1956.

Howard, H. N. The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia and Africa during 1955. *Department of State Bulletin.* March 19, March 26, April 9, 1956.

Kennan, G. F. Can We Do Better than Coexist? *Harper's Magazine.* August, 1956.

Lans, A. B. États-Unis: une Étude Critique de la Politique Étrangère Américaine. *Documentation Française.* January 12, 1956.

Lepawsky, A. Technical Assistance: a Challenge to Public Administration. *Public Administration Review.* Winter, 1956.

Mann, G. Washington und Peking. *Deutsche Rundschau.* September, 1955.

Mosely, P. E. Die Sowjetunion und die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika; Probleme und Aussichten. *Europa Archiv.* May 5, 1956.

Nitze, P. H. United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1955. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1956 (Headline Series No. 116).

Peeters, P. La Stratégie Américaine. (I). *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* October, 1955.

Policy for the Cold War. *Economist.* April 28, 1956.

Problems of American Foreign Policy. *Current History.* March, 1956.

U.S. Information Agency. Peace—the U.S. Record. Washington, 1955.

Windmiller, M. America's Relations with India: a Re-appraisal. *Far Eastern Survey.* March, 1956.

Windmuller, J. P. Foreign Affairs and the AFL-CIO. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review.* April, 1956.

Yool, W. M. The Strategic Air Command, U.S. Air Force. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Latin America

González Ramírez, M. La Política Internacional de la Revolución Mexicana. *Cuadernos Americanos.* June–August, 1955.

La Politique Extérieure du Mexique en 1954. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère.* September, 1955.

U.S. Information Agency. Communist Propaganda Activities in Latin America 1955. Washington, 1956.

United Kingdom

Britain and Russia. Symposium. *Twentieth Century.* April, 1956.

Great Britain. Central Office of Information. Reference Division. The Frontier Dispute in South-East Arabia. London, 1956.

———. ———. ———. United Kingdom Statement on Defense, 1956. London, 1956.

Harvey, I. The Services from Parliament. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

———. Civil Defense—the Fourth Arm. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Hudson, G. F. Where does Britain Stand? *Twentieth Century.* April, 1956.

Philipps, T. British Influence as a Vehicle of European Civilisation in the Asian and African Tropics. *Civilisations.* No. 1, 1956.

Randall, A. The Organization of the British Foreign Service. *Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium.* No. 3, 1955.

Rothchild, D. C. British Labour and European Union. *Social Research.* Spring, 1956.

Saundby, R. H. M. The Royal Navy in the Atomic Age. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Yool, W. M. Royal Air Force Problems. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Western Europe

Fischer, G. Quelques Réflexions sur la Position de la France à l'O.N.U. *Politique Étrangère.* December, 1955.

Lapie, P.-O. Politique Coloniale et Politique Étrangère. *Revue des Deux Mondes.* May 1, 1956.

Netellus. Politique de la France au Proche-Orient. *Politique Étrangère.* December, 1955.

Weber, E. European Reactions to American Policies. *International Journal.* Spring, 1956.

Central Europe

Bergsträsser, A. Memorandum über die Eingliederung der Streitkräfte in das Staatswesen der Bundesrepublik. *Internationales Jahrbuch der Politik.* July, 1955.

Borries, K. Die Grossen Mächte und der Deutsche Osten (II). *Aussenpolitik.* February, 1956.

Dahmen, R. Wie Treibt die Bundesrepublik im Ausland Public Relations? *Politische Studien.* April, 1956.

La D.D.R.: Symbole et Pièce Maîtresse de la Nouvelle Diplomatie Soviétique. *Entreprise.* November 1, 1955.

Hermens, F. A. Bonn's Foreign Policy. *Current History.* April, 1956.

Indien und Deutschland. *Übersee Rundschau.* September, 1955.

Le Statut de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne de 1945 à 1955. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère.* September, 1955.

Wilson, B. T. Federal Germany and the Changing Face of War. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Barghoorn, F. C. Cultural Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy. *World Politics.* April, 1956.

Byrnes, R. F. Soviet Policy toward Western Europe since Stalin. *Annals.* January, 1956.

Chamberlin, W. H. Seven Phases of Soviet Foreign Policy. *Russian Review.* April, 1956.

Coexistence in the Kremlin. *Economist.* March 31, 1956.

Decier, M. Le Nouveau Style de la Guerre Froide. *Écrits de Paris.* January, 1956.

Dulles, A. W. The Purge of Stalinism. *Department of State Bulletin.* May 7, 1956.

Fainsod, M. Russia's 20th Party Congress. *Foreign Policy Bulletin.* May 1, 1956.

Popovic, K. Un Tour d'Horizon de la Politique Extérieure Yougoslave. *Documentation Française.* January 24, 1956.

Schapiro, L. The Future of Russia. London, Ampersand, 1955.

Il XX Congresso del PCUS a Mosca. La Politica Estera nella Relazione Krusciov. *Relazioni Internazionali.* February 25, 1956.

Wien, O. Transportation as a Strategic and Economic Problem of the Soviet Union. *Military Review.* April, 1956.

Middle East and Africa

Crocker, H. E. Russia and Afghanistan. *Contemporary Review.* February, 1956.

Dupree, L. Afghanistan between East and West. *Royal Central Asian Journal.* January, 1956.

Forster, K. Historical Evolution of Arab-Israeli Tensions. *Social Science.* April, 1956.

Galay, N. The Soviet Breakthrough in the Near East and Southern Asia. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.* March, 1956.

Israel and her Neighbours. *British Survey.* January, 1956.

Lewis, B. Middle Eastern Reaction to Soviet Pressures. *Middle East Journal.* Spring, 1956.

Marchand, J. Stratégie et Psychologie en Afrique Noire. *Revue de Défense Nationale.* February, 1956.

Martin, H. G. The Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. *Brassey's Annual,* 1955.

Mr. Hammarskjold's Mission. *United Nations Review.* May, 1956.

Nasser Imports Bandoengism. *Economist.* March 24, 1956.

Neuer Affront Gegen die Orthodoxie. *Herder Korrespondenz.* May, 1956.

O'Ballance, E. The Middle East Scene. *Army Quarterly.* April, 1956.

Rudin, H. R. Africa in a World Setting. *Current History.* May, 1956.

Smith, D. Anglo-American Co-operation in the Middle East. *National and English Review.* May, 1956.

South and Southeast Asia

Fischer, M. W. Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations. *Indian Press Digests* (Berkeley, Calif.), February, 1956.

Mehra, P. L. India, China and Tibet, 1950–1954. *India Quarterly.* January–March, 1956.

Tyson, G. India and the Russian Visitors. *International Affairs.* April, 1956.

Far East and Pacific

Barrett, R. H. Recent Domestic and International Politics in Australia. *Far Eastern Survey.* May, 1956.

Dix Années de Relations Sino-Soviétiques (1945–1955). *Notes et Études Documentaires.* August 18, 1955.

Hellner, M. M. Sea Power and the Struggle for Asia. *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.* April, 1956.

Hitschi, A. The Realities of Japan's Foreign Policy. *Japan Quarterly.* April–June, 1956.

I-Kua-Chou. Die Aussenpolitische Generallinie der K.P. China's. *Ost-Probleme.* August 26, 1955.

Langerhans, H. Fernöstliche Kriegsgefahr und Verhandlungen. *Aussenpolitik.* February, 1956.

Schwarz, U. Japan and her Neighbors. *Swiss Review of World Affairs.* May, 1956.

Seidensticker, E. G. Thoughts on Anti-American Sentiment in Japan. *Japan Quarterly.* April–June, 1956.

Tadataka, S. The Socialist View on Foreign Policy. *Japan Quarterly.* April–June, 1956.

Tammelo, I. Reflections on Some Problems of Australian Foreign Policy. *Australian Outlook.* March, 1956.

U.S. Information Agency. The Soviet Party Congress and a Possible "Evolutionary" Trend in Asian Communism. Washington, 1956.

International Economic Policy and Relations

Bresciani-Turroni, C. International Aspects of the Present Economic Situation. *Banco di Roma Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy.* January, 1956.

Butz, E. L. United Efforts to Meet the World Agricultural Situation. *Department of State Bulletin.* March 12, 1956.

Eckstein, A. Asia's Economic Development. *Foreign Policy Bulletin.* February 1, 1956.

Ellis, H. S. American Foreign Economic Policy in the Context of World Politics. (Review Article). *World Politics.* April, 1956.

Grosse, W. Die Weltrohstoff-Abkommen und Behörden. *Internationales Jahrbuch der Politik.* July, 1955.

Hoffman, M. L. The Present System of World Trade. *Lloyds Bank Review.* January, 1956.

Linowitz, S. M. The International Businessman Meets the Anti-Trust Laws. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Winter, 1956.

Papi, G. U. Théorie du Développement Économique et de la Formation des Zones Arriérées. *Civilisations.* No. 1, 1956.

Peters, K. Veränderungen der Interna-

tionalen Kapitalposition Grossbritanniens. *Europa Archiv.* March 20, 1956.

I Venticinque Anni della Banca dei Regolamenti Internazionali. *Quaderni di Studi e Notizie.* September 16, 1955.

Von Taubinger, L. M. Die Sowjetisch-Rumänischen Gesellschaften. *Osteuropa.* April, 1956.

Wemelsfelder, J. Benelux, an Experiment in Economic Integration. *Economia Internazionale.* August, 1955.

Wolf, C. Institutions and Economic Development. *American Economic Review.* December, 1955.

Woods, B. J. P. Economic Co-operation—a Contrast in Methods. London, Ampersand, 1955.

International Law

Barton, G. P. Foreign Armed Forces: Qualified Jurisdictional Immunity. *British Yearbook of International Law,* 1954.

Bastide, S. Les Conditions Juridiques de la Coexistence. *Politique Étrangère.* February, 1956.

Baxter, R. R. Passage of Ships through International Waterways in Time of War. *British Yearbook of International Law,* 1954.

Böhmert, V. Meeresfreiheit und Schelfproklamationen. *Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht.* Nos. 2/3, 1955.

Coblentz, W. K. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. *California Law Review.* March, 1956.

Dominedo, F. M. La Comunità Internazionale e la Lotta per il Diritto. *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali.* October–December, 1955.

Dulles, J. F. The Institutionalizing of Peace. *Department of State Bulletin.* May 7, 1956.

Efron, R. Supranationality in Recent International Agreements. *Kentucky Law Journal.* Winter, 1956.

Fitzmaurice, G. The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–54: Points of Substantive Law (I). *British Yearbook of International Law,* 1954.

Garcia-Mora, M. R. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and its Recent Modifications. *Virginia Law Review.* April, 1956.

Hakim, J. I. J. The International Character of the Airspace over the Suez Canal. *Southern California Law Review.* February, 1956.

Houston, O. R. Freedom of the Seas: the Present State of International Law. *American Bar Association Journal.* March, 1956.

J. S. C. Problèmes Juridiques de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. *Politique Étrangère.* December, 1955.

Jenks, C. W. The Scope of International Law. *British Yearbook of International Law,* 1954.

Johnson, D. H. N. The Legal Status of the Sea-bed and Subsoil. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht.* March, 1956.

Jones, J. M. The Nottebohm Case. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly.* April, 1956.

Khadduri, M. Islam and the Modern Law of Nations. *American Journal of International Law.* April, 1956.

Kunz, J. L. The Laws of War. *American Journal of International Law.* April, 1956.

———. Austria's Permanent Neutrality. *American Journal of International Law.* April, 1956.

Landheer, B. Sociological Aspects of International Law. *Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht.* Nos. 2/3, 1955.

Lederer, L. J. J. International Waterways —the Organizational Standard of the Enunciative Regime. *Revue de Droit International (Sotille-Genève).* January–March, 1956.

Li, Tieh-Tseng. The Legal Position of Tibet. *American Journal of International Law.* April, 1956.

MacGibbon, I. C. The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law. *British Yearbook of International Law,* 1954.

Malek, C. La Question de la Définition de l'Agression. *Revue de Droit International pour le Moyen-Orient.* August, 1955.

Mason, G. M. Toward Indivisible International Law? *Social Research.* Spring, 1956.

Matthies, H. Zur Nachprüfungsbefugnis des Gerichtshofs der Montanunion. *Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht.* March, 1956.

Moore, H. The Judicial Approach to International Affairs. *Grotius Society Transactions for the Year 1953.*

Mroz, M. E. La Place du Droit dans les Relations Internationales. *Revue Générale de Droit International Public.* No. 3, 1955.

Norris, G., Jr. International Aspects of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954. *Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht.* Nos. 2/3, 1955.

O'Connell, D. P. The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem. *Amer-*

ican Journal of International Law. April, 1956.

Phleger, H. Fifty Years of Progress in International Law. *Department of State Bulletin.* April 23, 1956.

Rice, W. G. Some Thoughts on the Binding Force of International Treaties. *Wisconsin Law Review.* March, 1956.

Robbins, T. H. International Law is no Dead Letter. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings.* May, 1956.

Rubashkin, M. Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crimes: U.S. Military Commission in Germany: Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany v. Hrnecek. *Cornell Law Quarterly.* Winter, 1956.

Rudolf, W. Informationsfreiheit und Rundfunk im Völkerrecht. *Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht.* Nos. 2/3, 1955.

Van Asbeck, F. M. International Law and Colonial Administration. *Grotius Society Transactions for the Year 1953.*

Waldock, C. H. M. The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction before International Legal Tribunals. *British Yearbook of International Law,* 1954.

Wehberg, H. Interdiction du Recours à la Force. *Recueil des Cours* (I), 1951.

Young, R. W. The Aerial Inspection Plan and Air Space Sovereignty. *George Washington Law Review.* April, 1956.

International Organization

United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Booth, D. A. The United Nations, The United States and the International Civil Service. *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives.* No. 4, 1955.

Cavers, D. F. Arms Control in the United Nations: a Decade of Disagreement. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* April, 1956.

Clark, G. Peace through Disarmament and Charter Revision. Dublin, N. H., 1956.

Erim, T. K. La Question de Chypre devant l'Organisation des Nations Unies. *Revue de Droit International pour le Moyen Orient.* August, 1955.

Giraud, E. Le Secrétariat des Institutions Internationales. *Recueil des Cours* (II), 1951.

Great Issues before the United Nations. New York, American Association for the United Nations, 1956.

Howell, J. M. French and South African Walkouts and Domestic Jurisdiction. *Journal of Politics.* February, 1956.

Hyde, J. N. United States Participation in the United Nations. *International Organization.* February, 1956.

Power, E. W. International Law—United Nations—Administrative Tribunals as Adjudicators of Disputes Arising out of Employment Contracts with International Organizations. *Michigan Law Review.* February, 1956.

Rossi, M. New Members Shift UN Balance. *Foreign Policy Bulletin.* January 15, 1956.

Schwelb, E. The Amending Procedure of Constitutions of International Organizations. *British Yearbook of International Law,* 1954.

Specialized Agencies at Work. *United Nations Review.* April, 1956.

Vallat, F. A. Voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations. *British Yearbook of International Law,* 1954.

Wilcox, F. O. The United Nations in the Mainstream of History. *Department of State Bulletin.* May 21, 1956.

Regional and Collective Security Organizations

Armament of N.A.T.O.—An Estimate of Defensive Strength. *Round Table.* March, 1956.

The Baghdad Pact. *British Survey.* April, 1956.

Caildea, B. La Communauté Politique Européenne. *European Yearbook,* 1955.

Coignard, M. Quelques Aspects Actuels du Contrôle des Armements à la Lumiére des Expériences Entreprises. *Politique Étrangère.* February, 1956.

The Colombo Plan. *Current Notes on International Affairs.* November, 1955.

Le Développement de la C.E.C.A. *Chronique de Politique Étrangère.* September, 1955.

Fenwick, C. G. Inter-American Regional Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes. *International Organization.* February, 1956.

First Annual Report of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. *Department of State Bulletin.* March 12, 1956.

Goodhart, A. L. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. *Recueil des Cours* (II), 1951.

Gordon L. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation. *International Organization.* February, 1956.

Great Britain. British Information Service. Reference Division. The Colombo Plan. New York, 1956.

———. ———. ———. International Colonial Cooperation. London, 1956.

———. ———. ———. Western Co-operation. London, 1955.

Jorrin, M. Das Amerikanische Regionalsystem. *Europa Archiv.* March 20, 1956.

Kogon, E. Mut zum Grösseren Konzept. *Frankfurter Hefte.* January, 1956.

Kordt, E. Der Europäische Beamte. Berlin, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1955.

Leifer, W. Der Vatikan und die Europafrage. *Stimmen der Zeit.* February, 1956.

Little, T. R. The Arab League: a Reassessment. *Middle East Journal.* Spring, 1956.

Looper, R. B. Two Approaches to European Economic Integration. *Occidente.* No. 3, 1955.

López Villamil, H. La Seguridad Colectiva en el Sistema Inter-Americano. *Cuadernos de Política Internacional.* July–September, 1955.

Mallet, D. The History and Structure of O.E.E.C. *European Yearbook,* 1955.

Marchal, L. Le Conseil de l'Europe. *European Yearbook,* 1955.

New Atlantis? *Economist.* May 5, 1956.

Pan American Union. Coordinating Committee on Technical Assistance. The Americas United for Progress. Washington, 1956.

Reading, Marquess of. Progress Report on the Colombo Plan. *World Affairs.* Spring, 1956.

Van der Goes van Naters, M. Le Développement de l'Intégration Économique de l'Europe. Luxembourg, Communauté Européene du Charbon et de l'Acier, 1955.

Van Kleffens, E. N. Unity and Diversity in Western Europe. *European Yearbook,* 1955.

Vegas, F. L'Unione Europea Occidentale. *La Communità Internazionale.* No. 4, 1955.

Wolff, S. The OEEC Project for the Peaceful Development of Atomic Energy. *Swiss Review of World Affairs.* February, 1956.

DOCUMENTS

United Nations

All entries under this heading bear the imprint of the United Nations (New York), 1956, unless a different place or date are shown.

ECOSOC. World Economic Situation. Full Employment. Replies of Governments. (Doc. E/2726/Add 11; November 16, 1955).

———. Economic Development of under-developed countries. Survey of the Work Currently Being Undertaken under the Aegis of the UN, . . . in Matters Relating to Industrial Development and the Improvement of Industrial Activity. (Doc. E/2816; March 2, 1956).

———. Commission on Human Rights. Report of the Eighth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the . . . , January 3–20, 1956. (Doc. E/CN.4/721, E/CN.4/Sub.2/177; January 31, 1956).

Secretariat. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women; History and Commentary. (Doc. ST/SOA/27; 1955).

Secretary-General. Forced Labour. Report by the . . . and the Director-General of the International Labour Office. (Doc. E/2815; December 15, 1955).

———. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted under Art. 73(e) of the Charter: Report of the . . . (Doc. A/3108; February 15, 1956).

UNREF. Executive Committee. Revised Plan of Operations (1956). (Doc. A/AC.79/21; November 28, 1955).

United States

Unless otherwise indicated, all entries under this heading bear the imprint: "Washington: Government Printing Office."

Congress

House. 15th Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities. H. Doc. 335. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President Transmitting the . . . , Covering its Operations from January 1 to June 30, 1955. H. Doc. 336. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Report on the Operations of the Department of State. H. Doc. 374. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on Appropriations. Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1957. Hearings before Subcommittee . . . U.S. Information Agency. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1957. Hearings before Subcommittee . . . Refugee Relief Program. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on Banking and Currency. Regulations of Exports. Hearings. February 23 . . . March 6, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Status of Forces Agreements. Hearings. Pt. 2. January 31–February 2, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Report on the Tenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Hon. Brooks Hays. . . . H. Rep 1980. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Mutual Security Act of 1956. Hearings. March 20 . . . May 10, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Report of the Special Study Mission to the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. H. Rep. 2147. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

——. Committee on Government Operations. United States Technical Assistance and Related Activities in Latin America. Hearings before Subcommittee. October 10–28, 1955. 84th Cong., 1st sess.

———. ———. United States Technical Assistance to Latin America. 14th Intermediate Report. H. Rep. 1985. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Establishing a Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. Report of . . . H. Rep. 1363. 84th Cong., 1st sess.

Senate. 19th Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 91. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on Appropriations. Financing of Aswan High Dam in Egypt. Hearing. January 26, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on Armed Services. Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Hearing before Subcommittee. February 9, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1956. Hearings before Subcommittee. March 21, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1956. Report to Accompany S. 3481. S. Rep. 1726. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Trends in Mutual Security, Fiscal Year 1948–49 to Fiscal Year 1957; Authorizations, Appropriations, Obligations and Expenditures. Committee Print. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956. Hearing. February 21, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. United States Information and Educational Exchange Act Amendments of 1956. Hearings before Subcommittee. July 20, 1955 and April 17, 1956. 84th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess.

———. ———. Subcommittee on Disarmament. Hearings. Pt. 2—February 29, 1956; Pt. 3—March 7, 1956; Pt. 4—March 15, 1956; Pt. 5—April 9, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. ———. Disarmament—a Selected Chronology—January 1, 1918–March 19, 1956. Staff Study No. 2. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Subcommittee on Technical Assistance. Technical Assistance Programs. Hearing. January 23, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. ———. Report of . . . S. Rep. 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter. Review of the United Nations Charter. Final Report of . . . S. Rep. 1797. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on Government Operations. Reorganization of the Passport Office. Hearings. April 13, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. ———. Subcommittee on Investigations. East-West Trade. Hearings. Pt. 1.—February 15–March 6, 1956. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

———. Committee on the Judiciary. Constitutional Amendment Relative to Treaties and Executive Agreements . . . Report together with Individual Views to Accompany S. J. Res. 1. S. Rep. 1716, pt. 1 and pt. 2. 84th Cong., 2nd sess.

Executive Departments

Department of State. Our Moral and Spiritual Resources for International Cooperation. (Pub. No. 6230).

———. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—First Annual Report of the Council Representatives, March 1956. (Pub. No. 6305.)

———. Draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. (*Department of State Bulletin.* May 21, 1956.)

POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Opinions and Personality. By M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White. With the Collaboration of David F. Aberle, Stanley G. Estes, Eugenia Hanfmann, and Sheldon J. Korchin. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd. 1956. Pp. vii, 294. $6.00.)

Roughly speaking, there are three important questions regarding a political opinion: (1)

What is its validity? (2) What are its social and historical causes and consequences? and (3) Of what use is it to those who hold it? In this thorough-going analysis of ten men's opinions about Russia, the last of these questions achieves the focus of attention. Through interviews, psychological tests, and biographical material, the authors explore the personal meanings, sources, and utilities of each man's opinions. The findings are presented largely through case studies, preceded by a very fine theoretical section.

Law as a Political Instrument. BY VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1955. Pp. vii, 88. 95¢.)

After a general statement on the interrelations of law and politics, the author analyzes judicial policy-making in two areas—economic regulation in the milk industry and segregation in public education. He concludes with an essay on the relation of judicial policy-making to democracy. "Unless and until a governmental system can be evolved that is more susceptible than the present one to direct and responsible popular control, policy-making by our courts within the context of checks and balances, the adversary process, and *stare decisis* will continue to be an essential part of the process of democratic government" (p. 82).

Six Books of the Commonwealth. BY JEAN BODIN. ABRIDGED AND TRANSLATED BY M. J. TOOLEY. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1955. Pp. xliii, 212. $2.50.)

Since no new English edition of the *Six Books of the Commonwealth* has been printed since the seventeenth century, this abridged and newly edited version will be welcomed. It is preceded by an introduction which provides a biographical sketch and a summary of the argument.

The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin. BY EUGENE PYZIUR. (Milwaukee, Wis.: The Marquette University Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 158.)

Michael A. Bakunin was one of the flamboyant figures of the revolutionary movement of the last century. Despite his temperamental and rather impractical nature he successfully contested with Karl Marx for the leadership of the Second International to the point that Marx was forced to transfer the headquarters of the movement to New York, preferring to see it die a silent death there rather than to allow it to be dominated by the Bakunin heresies. In this work the author presents a succinct summary of Bakunin's doctrine of anarchism. The author makes extensive use of quotations from Bakunin's writings and on the whole allows his subject to speak for himself. The result is the best general introduction to Bakunin's theoretical views now obtainable in English.

The French Faust: Henri de Saint-Simon. BY MATHURIN DONDO. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1955. Pp. 253. $3.75.)

Students of social movements will be interested in this biography of Henri de Saint-Simon, which is the most recent treatment of this subject in English. The author has made extensive use of French sources and has consulted the important secondary ones on the Saint Simonian movement. A compact, readable, and objective account of one of the leaders of Utopian Socialism.

Edward Bellamy: Selected Writings on Religion and Society. EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY JOSEPH SCHIFFMAN. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1955. Pp. xlix, 139. $.75.)

Edward Bellamy will be remembered as the author of *Looking Backward*, a Utopian phantasy of great popularity at the close of the last century. The present work endeavors to present Bellamy's general religious and social views in the form of excerpts from his writings. Unfortunately much of the excerpted material is from *Looking Backward*, which is still obtainable in cheap editions. The editor contributes a useful introduction to Bellamy's life and writings, but the book would have been of greater value had portions of Bellamy's unpublished and out-of-print works been included.

The Political Thought of the German Romantics, 1793–1815. EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY H. S. REISS. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1955. Pp. vii, 211. $2.50.)

Excerpts from the writings of Fichte, Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), Adam Müller, and Schleiermacher with introductory notes and attached bibliographies and an introductory chapter by the editor.

A Bibliography of the Works in English of Arnold Toynbee, 1910–1954. COMPILED BY MONICA POPPER. (London and New York:

Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1955. Pp. 59. $1.00.)

Students of the thought of Arnold J. Toynbee will welcome this bibliography. It is mimeographed; it includes an impressive array of publications, a fact which will be no surprise to those who have followed Toynbee's work in the theory of history.

Science, Democracy, and Islam; and Other Essays. By Humayun Kabir. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1955. Pp. 126. $3.00.)

A collection of essays, some previously unpublished, dealing with current problems of democracy, political and social theory, and the role of the state in the modern world. The book is of interest on two counts: first, as an expression of the point of view of a contemporary Indian scholar, and second, as an example of how western liberal ideas have been woven into the thought of the East. The author believes that the future of modern culture depends upon the creation of a religious foundation on which it can be anchored and sees the Islamic faith as an appropriate quarry from which such a foundation may be dug.

Confucius, His Life and Time. By Liu Wu-Chi. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1955. Pp. xv, 189. $3.75.)

Liu Wu-Chi has produced a very enthusiastic study of Confucius. A chronological account of Confucius's life is followed by a discussion of his ideas about education and the content of his teaching. The author of the study concludes that Confucius was more important as a teacher than as a moralist or statesman. The book will probably be more useful to the layman than to the specialist who is looking for new light on unresolved problems of scholarship.

The American Democrat: Or Hints on the Social and Civic Relations of the United States of America. By James Fenimore Cooper. (New York: Vintage Books. 3rd ed. 1956. Pp. xxviii, 190. $.95.)

The third edition of James Fenimore Cooper's well-known essay on American government and politics, with an introduction by Robert E. Spiller. Cooper's introduction to the first edition of 1838 and H. L. Mencken's introduction to the second edition of 1931 are also reproduced.

The New American Right. Edited by Daniel Bell. (New York: Criterion Books. 1955. Pp. xii, 239. $4.00.)

A series of essays, several of which have been previously published, by Daniel Bell (the editor), Richard Hofstadter, David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, Peter Viereck, Talcott Parsons, Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset, and Seymour Martin Lipset.

A Larger Concept of Community. By Jefferson B. Fordham. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press. 1956. Pp. 117. $3.00.)

An excellent little book presenting Dean Fordham's contribution to The Edward Douglas White Lectures on Citizenship. It is a vigorous presentation of views relating to the metropolitan community, the trans-state regional community, and the international community.

Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia. By Melford E. Spiro. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 266. $4.50.)

An anthropological study of a Marxist-oriented kibbutz of about 500 people founded by some disillusioned urban European Jews. The analysis of the kibbutz's moral postulates and social organization—particularly the unique marriage and family patterns as well as the political structure—points up the practical problems plaguing "utopians."

Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications. By Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1955. Pp. xx, 400. $6.00.)

New York State Library. Checklist of books and pamphlets in the social sciences including anthropology, economics, philosophy, political science, psychology, welfare, but not including education, history and law. (Albany: New York State Library. 1955. Pp. viii, 142.)

The alphabetical finding list giving author, brief title, publication date and call number is intended not only as an aid to users, especially for interlibrary loan, but as "a pilot project, a challenge to the hand-wringing school of librarians who view the rising flood of publications with gloom and panic, while they cite the lamentation of Ecclesiastes and seek to reduce or contain their collections in size." The work, including more than 40,000 titles, while not listing periodicals, newspapers, other types of serials and uncatalogued government documents, does take in many documents catalogued separately as well as a great many other titles likely to be of use to the political scientist.—J. B. C.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
POLITICAL THEORY

ARNAUD B. LEAVELLE
Stanford University

History and Criticism

Abbagnano, N. La Sociologie de la Liberté de Geroges Gurvitch. *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale.* January–March, 1956.

Abell, Aaron I. American Catholic Reaction to Industrial Conflict: The Arbitral Process, 1885–1900. *Catholic Historical Review.* January, 1956.

Barnwell, H. T. Saint Euremond and Pascal: A Note on the Question of *Le Divertissement. Studies in Philology.* January, 1956.

Branster, Gerhard. Zur Neuauflage der ästhetischen Vorlesungen Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels. *Aufbau.* March, 1956.

Brown, Theodore M. Greenough, Paine, Emerson, and the Organic Aesthetic. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.* March, 1956.

Bryant, Donald C. Burke's *Present Discontents:* The Rhetorical Genesis. *The Quarterly Journal of Speech.* April, 1956.

Budd, Louis J. Altruism Arrives in America. *American Quarterly.* Spring, 1956.

Burlingane, Roger. Zion in the Forest [Roger Williams]. *American Heritage.* June, 1956.

Carretero, Luis Abad. La Idea de Justicia en el Quijote. *Humanismo.* March–April, 1956.

Ceyssens, L. Jansenisme et Antijansénisme en Belgique au XVII^{e}S. *Revue D'Historie Ecclesiastique.* LI/1. 1956.

Cobban, Alfred. The Vocabulary of History. *Political Science Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Chamberlin, William Henry. Some Mistakes of Marx. *The Freeman.* May, 1956.

Conover, Milton. St. Thomas Aquinas in Some Recent Non-Scholastic Writers on Political Philosophy. *New Scholasticism.* January, 1956.

Daix, Alphonse, Faut-il récrire "Le Capital." *Esprit.* May, 1956.

DeConde, Alexander. William Vaus Murray on Freedom of Religion in the United States, 1787. *Maryland Historical Magazine.* December, 1955.

Dewart, Leslie. Existentialism and the Degrees of Knowledge. *The Thomist.* April, 1956.

Dillon, M. L. Captain Jason W. James, Frontier Anti-Democrat. *New Mexico Historical Review.* April, 1956.

Eros, J. The Positivist Generation of French Republicanism. *The Sociological Review.* December, 1955.

Fellows, Otis E. Voltaire and Buffon: Clash and Conciliation. *Symposium.* Fall, 1955.

Figueres, Leo. Sur la position de Jaures et du jauressism dans le mouvement ouvrier francais d'avant 1914. *Cahiers du Communisme.* January–February, 1956.

Fletcher, Joseph F. Christian Views on Human Labor, 1500–1860: From Martin Luther to Samuel Smiles. *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church.* April, 1956.

Franklin, Benjamin. [Various Articles.] *Pennsylvania Magazine.* January, 1956.

Freistadt, Hans. Dialectical Materialism: A Friendly Interpretation. *Philosophy of Science.* April, 1956.

Grange, H. Necker jugé par Karl Marx. *Annales Historiques De La Revolution Francaise.* January–March, 1956.

Griffith, Gwilym O. Professor Toynbee, Mazzini and the Future Faith. *The Hibbert Journal.* April, 1956.

Grossman, James. The Dreyfus Affair Fifty Years Later. *Commentary.* January, 1956.

Harris, Afram L. John Stuart Mill's Theory of Progress. *Ethics.* April, 1956.

Haywood, C. Robert. The Mind of the North Carolina Advocates of Mercantilism. *The North Carolina Historical Review.* April, 1956.

Hislop, Codman. A Loud and Awful Warning. *The New York Historical Society Quarterly.* January, 1956.

Hofstadter, Richard. The Myth of the Happy Yeoman. *American Heritage.* April, 1956.

Howe, Irving. Orwell: History as Nightmare. *The American Scholar.* Spring, 1956.

Hübner, Kurt. Fichte, Sartre und der Nihilismus. *Zeitschrift Für Philosophische Forschung.* X/1. 1956.

Hyde, William J. The Socialism of H. G. Wells. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* April, 1956.

Jemolo, A. C. La classe dirigente nel Mezzogiorno. *Occidente.* January–February, 1956.

Johnson, Humphrey J. T. The Roman Index of Prohibited Books. *Cross Currents.* Summer, 1955.

Laslett, Peter. The English Revolution and Locke's *Two Treatises of Government. The Cambridge Historical Journal.* No. 1, 1956.

Le Blond, J. M. Christianisme et Souffrance en Souvenir de S. Kierkegaard. *Études.* March, 1956.

Mackey, Louis. Kierkegaard and the Problem of Existential Philosophy. *Review of Metaphysics.* March, 1956.

Mann, Arthur. British Social Thought and American Reformers of the Progressive Era. *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review.* March, 1956.

Maravall, Jose Antonio. La historia del pensomiento político, la ciencia política y la Historia. *La Revista de Estudios Politicos.* November–December, 1955.

Marias, Julian. La Metafísica de Ortega. *Cuadernos.* May–June, 1956.

Marx, Werner. Heidegger's New Conception of Philosophy—The Second Phase of Existentialism. *Social Research.* Winter, 1955.

Maurer, Ormond A. The State of Historical Research in Liger of Brabant. *Speculum.* January, 1956.

Mora, Jose Ferrater. Ortega y la idea de la vida humana. *Cuadernos.* May–June, 1956.

Mueller, Gustav E. Hegel on the Values of Humanistic Education. *Educational Theory.* October, 1955.

Mullaney, James V. Developmental Thomism. *Thomist.* January, 1956.

Napolitano, Tomaso. La Ultime Assise di Mosca. *Nuovo Antologia.* April, 1956.

Nemetz, Anthony A. Logic and the Division of the Sciences in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. *Modern Schoolman.* January, 1956.

Noble, David W. The Religion of Progress in America, 1890–1914. *Social Research.* Winter, 1955.

Ostlund, Leonard A. Walter Bagehot—Pioneer Social Psychology Theorist. *Social Science.* April, 1956.

Pearsall, Robert. Carlyle and Emerson: Horses and Revolutions. *The South Atlantic Quarterly.* April, 1956.

Penna, Mario. El *"Principe"* según Diego de Volero y el *"Principe"* según Moquiavelo. *La Revista de Estudios Politicos.* November–December, 1955.

Powicke, Michael R. Edward II and Military Obligation. *Speculum.* January, 1956.

Reiss, H. S. Kant and the Right of Rebellion. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* April, 1956.

Rezneck, Samuel. Patterns of Thought and Action in An American Depression, 1882–1886. *American Historical Review.* January, 1956.

Rich, Audrey N. M. The Cynic Conception of Autarkeia. *Mnemosyne.* IV/IX/1. 1956.

Rovan, Joseph. Le Catholicisme Allemand au Temps d'Hitler (II). *Esprit.* January, 1956.

Royce, Josiah. [Various Articles.] *Journal of Philosophy.* February, 1956.

Ruiff, Philip. Origins of Freud's Political Psychology. *Journal of the History of Ideas.* April, 1956.

Schapiro, Leonard. The *Vekhi* Group and the Mystique of Revolution. *The Slavonic and East European Review.* December, 1955.

Seymour, Charles. Woodrow Wilson in Perspective. *Foreign Affairs.* January, 1956.

Snyder, Phil L. Carl L. Becker and the Great War: A Crisis for a Humane Intelligence. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Solmsen, Friedrich. Neglected Evidence for Cicero's *De re publica. Museum Helveticum.* January, 1956.

Stein, Jay W. Beginnings of "Ideology." *The South Atlantic Quarterly.* April, 1956.

Strauss, Leo. Kurt Riezler, 1882–1955. *Social Research.* Spring, 1956.

Teissedre, Jean. Actualité du Saint-Simonisme. *Revue D'Histoire Économique et Sociale.* Number 4, 1955.

Thompson, Kenneth W. Mr. Toynbee and World Politics. *World Politics.* April, 1956.

Tominioux, Jacques. De Bergson à la phénonénologie existentielle. *Revue Philosophique De Louvoin.* February, 1956.

Toynbee, Arnold J. The New Opportunity for Historians. Seymour Lecture. University of Minnesota, 1956.

Tugwell, R. G. The Fallow Years of Franklin D. Roosevelt. *Ethics.* January, 1956.

Weltsch, Felix. The Perennial Spinoza. *Commentary.* May, 1956.

Wheeler, Harvey. Calvin's Case (1608) and the McIlwain-Schuyler Debate. *The American Historical Review.* April, 1956.

Wolf, Edwin II. Franklin and His Friends Choose their Books. *The Pennsylvania Magazine.* January, 1956.

Wood, H. G. Marx and Science. *The Hibbert Journal.* April, 1956.

Woodruff, W. Capitalism and the Historians: A Contribution to the Discussion on the Industrial Revolution in England. *The Journal of Economic History.* March, 1956.

Zeller, Gaston. Le principe d'équilibre dans la politique internationale avant 1789. *Revue Historique.* January–March, 1956.

Legal Theory and Public Law Issues

Auerbach, Carl A. Communist Control Act of 1954, A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech. *University of Chicago Law Review*. Winter, 1956.

Baker, Roscoe. Equality and the Fourteenth Amendment. *Historia*. October, 1955.

Berns, Walter. Freedom and Loyalty. *The Journal of Politics*. February, 1956.

Brisbane, Robert. Interposition: Theory and Fact. *Phylon*. No. 1, 1956.

Burton, (Justice) Harold H. The Legal Tender Cases. *American Bar Association Journal*. March, 1956.

Call, Joseph L. Limited Government and the Welfare Clause. *Dickinson Law Review*. March, 1956.

DiRuffia, Paolo Biscaretti. La solución italiana al problema de lá "jurisdicción constiucional." *La Revista de Estudios Politicos*. November–December, 1955.

Drinnan, Robert F. The Right of Silence. *America*. April 28, 1956.

Dumbauld, Edward. John Marshall and Treaty Law. *American Journal of International Law*. January, 1956.

Hall, Jerome. American Tendencies in Legal Philosophy and the Definition of "Law." *Comparative Law Review of Japan*. Vol. 3, 1956.

Hall, Jerome. Plato's Legal Philosophy. *Indiana Law Journal*. Winter, 1956.

Hall, Jerome. Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility. *Yale Law Journal*. May, 1956.

Harris, Robert J. The Impact of the Cold War upon Civil Liberties. *The Journal of Politics*. February, 1956.

Hoffman, Stanley. L'anticommunisme dans le droit public de États-Unis. *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique*. January–February, 1956.

Jacobs, Paul. The Inalienable Right to Get Peacefully Sozzled. *The Reporter*. April 19, 1956.

Lacy, Creighton. Unequal but Together. *The Christian Century*. May 9, 1956.

LaFollette, Suzanne. Freedom to Join or Starve. *National Review*. June 13, 1956.

Mason, Alpheus T. The Core of Free Government, 1938–40: Mr. Justice Stone and "'Preferred Freedoms." *Yale Law Journal*. April, 1956.

Mason, Alpheus T. Inter Armas Silent Leges: Chief Justice Stone's Views. *Harvard Law Review*. March, 1956.

Natural Law Conference Papers. *Catholic Lawyer*. January, 1956.

Oulahan, Courts. Reforming the Administrative Process. *The Brief*. Winter, 1956.

Polak, M. V. Montesquieu et le Droit Public Néerlandais. *Revue du Droit Publique et de la Science Politique*. October–December, 1955.

Racial Desegregation and Integration. [Various Articles.] *Annals*. March, 1956.

Spann, Edwin R. The Freedom of the Church and the Freedom of the Citizen. *Religion in Life*. Spring, 1956.

Vouin, Robert. The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal Procedure. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. January, 1956.

Wu, John C. Jurisprudence as a Cultural Study. *University of Detroit Law Journal*. March, 1956.

Special Studies and Analysis

Albert, Ethel M. The Classification of Values. *American Anthropologist*. April, 1956.

Ames, Van Meter. Mead and Sartre on Man. *Journal of Philosophy*. March 15, 1956.

Anders, Gunther. The World as Phantom and as Matrix. *Dissent*. Winter, 1956.

Aron, Raymond. Le fanatisme, la prudence et la foi. *Prevues*. May, 1956.

Beer, James E. The Bible and Modern Religions: I The Seventh-Day Adventists. *Interpretation*. January, 1956.

Beth, Loren P. McCarthyism. *The South Atlantic Quarterly*. April, 1956.

Blackhurst, J. Herbert. Does the World View of John Dewey Support Creative Education? *Educational Theory*. October, 1955.

Boorstin, Daniel J. The Place of Thought in American Life. *The American Scholar*. Spring, 1956.

Chen, Theodore Hsi-en. Deviationism in Chinese Communism. *World Affairs Interpreter*. Winter. 1955.

Coblentz, William K., and Warshaw, Robert S. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. *California Law Review*. March, 1956.

Cole, G. H. D. Democratie a l'echelle humaine. *Esprit*. May, 1956.

Costanzo, Joseph F. Religion in Public School Education. *Thought*. Summer, 1956.

Cranston, Maurice. The Rights of Man. *The Listener*. April 26, 1956.

Dean, Howard E. Democracy, Loyalty, Disobedience: A Query: *Western Political Quarterly*. December, 1955.

DeParga, Manual Jiménez. La teoría y la realidad constitucional contemporáneas. *La*

Revista de Estudios Politicos. November–December, 1955.

Dettering, Richard W. Philosophic Idealism in Rogerian Psychology. *Educational Theory.* October, 1955.

Dewey, Robert E. The Future of Philosophy. *Journal of Philosophy.* March 1, 1956.

Dore, R. P. Left and Right in Japan. *International Affairs.* January, 1956.

Duclos, Jacques. Developper l'action des masses pour un nouveau Front Populaire. *Cahiers du Communisme.* January–February, 1956.

Eckstein, Harry. Planning: A Case Study. *Political Studies.* February, 1956.

Ey, Henri. La psychiatrie. *Esprit.* April, 1956.

Fainsod, Merle. The CPSU Takes Stock of Itself. *Problems of Communism.* May–June, 1956.

Farris, Charles D. Authoritarianism as a Political Behavior Variable. *The Journal of Politics.* February, 1956.

Finer, S. E. The Political Power of Private Capital. *The Sociological Review.* December, 1955.

Florin, Raymond. Les Bases D'une Démocratie Rationnelle. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* February, 1956.

Future of Liberalism [Various articles]. *The Reporter.* May 3, 31, 1956.

Gerard, R. W., *et al.* Biological and Cultural Evolution. *Behavioral Science.* January, 1956.

Glock, C. Y., Ringer, B. B. Church Policy and Attitudes on Social Issues. *American Sociological Review.* April, 1956.

Golightly, Cornelius L. Value as a Scientific Concept. *Journal of Philosophy.* March 29, 1956.

Grant, George. The Uses of Freedom. *Queen's Quarterly.* Winter, 1956.

Greene, Theodore M. Life, Value, Happiness. *Journal of Philosophy.* May 10, 1956.

Gross, Feliks. Le Pouvoir dans l'Histoire. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* January, 1956.

Guetzkow, Harold. Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization. Princeton University, 1955.

Gurvitch, Georges. Phénomènes sociaux totaux. *Esprit.* March, 1956.

Hacker, Andrew. Original Sin vs. Utopia in British Socialism. *The Review of Politics.* April, 1956.

Hems, John M. Reflecting on Morals. *Philosophy.* April, 1956.

Herberg, Will. Biblical Faith as *Heilsgeschichte. Christian Scholar.* March, 1956.

Hershberger, Guy F. The Modern Social Gospel and the Way of the Cross. *The Mennonite Review.* April, 1956.

Horowitz, Irving Louis. The New Conservatism. *Science and Society.* Winter, 1956.

Katz, Joseph. Ethics Without Morality. *Journal of Philosophy.* May 26, 1955.

Kirchheimer, Otto. Politics and Justice. *Social Research.* Winter, 1955.

Kirk, Russell. Return to Principle in Politics: Conservatives and Liberals Take Thought. *Southwest Review.* Spring, 1956.

Klain, Maurice. Politics—Still a Dirty Word. *Antioch Review.* Winter, 1955–1956.

Kling, Merle. Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America. *Western Political Quarterly.* March, 1956.

Krash, Otto. The Oppenheimer Film and Free Inquiry in the Arts and Sciences. *American Association of University Professors Bulletin.* Winter, 1956.

Lauvau, G. C. Sciences Politiques. *Esprit.* April, 1956.

Lauvau, G. C. Plantification et liberté. *Esprit.* May, 1956.

Levine, Solomon B. Interdisciplinary Approach in the Social Sciences. *Social Science.* April, 1956.

Lilge, Frederic. The Politicizing of Educational Theory. *Ethics.* April, 1956.

Lockwood, Theodore D. This Nation—Under God? *Christian Register.* April, 1956.

Lacroix, Jean. Eloge du positivisme. *Esprit.* March, 1956.

Lowrie, Donald A. Dialectic Morality. *Religion in Life.* Spring, 1956.

MacKinnon, William J. and Centers, Richard. Authoritarianism and Urban Stratification. *The American Journal of Sociology.* May, 1956.

Merrifield, Charles W. Current Controversies in the Theory of Leadership. *Western Speech.* Spring, 1956.

Meyer, Frank S. Principles and Heresies. *National Review.* June 6, 1956.

Moch, Jules. Political and Moral Aspects of the Atomic Revolution. *Confluence.* April, 1956.

Moore, Willis. Causal Factors in the Current Attack on Education. *American Association of University Professors Bulletin.* Winter, 1955.

Muelder, Walter G. Institutional Factors Affecting Unity and Disunity. *Ecumenical Review.* January, 1956.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. Literalism, Individualism, and Billy Graham. *The Christian Century.* May 23, 1956.

Olson, Robert G. The Three Theories of Motivation in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. *Ethics.* April, 1956.

Orrego, Antenor. Crisis y reconstrucción. *Humanismo.* March–April, 1956.

Pasch, Alan. Empiricism: One "Dogma" or Two. *Journal of Philosophy.* April 26, 1956.

Paul, William W. Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard and Modern Existentialism. *The Review of Religion.* March, 1956.

Pennate, E. La democrazia e la classe politica. *Occidente.* January-February, 1956.

Pierce, Albert. Empiricism and the Social Sciences. *American Sociological Review.* April, 1956.

Phillips, Norman R. The Conservative Implications of Skepticism. *The Journal of Politics.* February, 1956.

Qureshi, I. H. Relations Between Great Britain and the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent. *Confluence.* January, 1956.

Ricceur, Paul. Certitudes et Incertitudes d'une Révolution [China]. *Esprit.* January, 1956.

Rose, Arnold M. Sociology and the Study of Values. *The British Journal of Sociology.* March, 1956.

Rossiter, Clinton. The Presidents and the Presidency. *American Heritage.* April, 1956.

Roucek, Joseph S. Minority-Majority Relations in Their Power Aspects. *Phylon.* No. 1, 1956.

Scheffler, Israel. Science, Morals, and Educational Policy. *Harvard Educational Review.* Winter, 1956.

Schapiro, J. S. Revolutions, Digested and Undigested. *Social Studies.* May, 1956.

Science and World Politics [Various articles]. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* April, 1956.

Seeger, Raymond J. History and Philosophy of Science. *American Scientist.* April, 1956.

Seligman, Ben B. Keynsian Economics—A Critique. *Dissent.* Winter, 1956.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Soviet Ruling Class. *Problems of Communism.* May-June, 1956.

Siegfried, Andre. États-Unis, 1956. *La Revue de Paris.* May, 1956.

Stamps, Norman L. Relevance of Freud to the Study of Totalitarian Movements. *Social Science.* April, 1956.

Sulzbach, Walter. Demokratie und frei Marktwirtschaft. *Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft.* 112/1, 1956.

Taeuber, Walter. Kulturkrise und Wirtshaftsdenken. *Zeitschrift Für Geo-Politik.* March, 1956.

Thorndike, Lynn. Whatever Was, Was Right. *American Historical Review.* January, 1956.

Vedel, G. Crise de l'Autorité. *Études.* January, 1956.

Viereck, Peter. Vox Populi-Vox Dei or Vox Diaboli. *Southwest Review.* Spring, 1956.

Wendland, H. D. Social Humanism and Christian Care. *Ecumenical Review.* January, 1956.

Williams, Jay C., Jr. Philosophic Diversity and the Social Sciences, I. *Journal of General Education.* October, 1955.

Winch, Peter. Social Science. *The British Journal of Sociology.* March, 1956.

White, Morton. Original Sin, Natural Law, and Politics. *Partisan Review.* Spring, 1956.

Wrong, Dennis H. Riesman and the Age of Sociology. *Commentary.* April, 1956.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

HERBERT A. SIMON

Carnegie Institute of Technology

Philosophy of Social Science

Ashby, W. Ross. The Effect of Experience on a Determinate Dynamic System. *Behavioral Science.* January, 1956.

Easton, David. Limits of the Equilibrium Model in Social Research. *Behavioral Science.* April, 1956.

Hamburg, Carl H. Psychology and the Ethics of Survival. *Philosophy of Science.* April, 1956.

Simon, Herbert A. Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment. *Psychological Review.* March, 1956.

Winch, Peter. Social Science. *British Journal of Sociology.* March, 1956.

Motivation and Personality

Farris, Charles D. "Authoritarianism" as a Political Behavior Variable. *Journal of Politics*. February, 1956.

French, Elizabeth G.; and Chadwick, Irene. Some Characteristics of Affiliation Motivation. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. May, 1956.

Haythorn, William; Couch, Arthur; Haefner, Donald; Langham, Peter; and Carter, Launor F. The Behavior of Authoritarian and Equalitarian Personalities in Groups. *Human Relations*. 1956, #1.

Mack, Raymond W.; Murphy, Raymond J.; and Yellin, Seymour. The Protestant Ethic, Level of Aspiration, and Social Mobility. *American Sociological Review*. June, 1956.

MacKinnon, William J., and Centers, Richard. Authoritarianism and Urban Stratification. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1956.

Sewell, William H., and Haller, Archie O. Social Status and the Personality Adjustment of the Child. *Sociometry*. June, 1956.

Siegel, Saul M. The Relationship of Hostility to Authoritarianism. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. May, 1956.

Opinions and Attitudes

Baker, Bela O., and Sarbin, Theodore R. Differential Mediation of Social Perception as a Correlate of Social Adjustment. *Sociometry*. June, 1956.

Becker, Howard S., and Carper, James. The Elements of Identification With an Occupation. *American Sociological Review*. June, 1956.

Carlson, Earl R. Attitude Change Through Modification of Attitude Structure. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. March, 1956.

Cooper, Joseph B. Mobility Anticipation, Class Assignment and Authoritarianism as Field Determinants of Attitudes. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1956.

Fisher, Seymour; Rubinstein, Irving; and Freeman, Robert W. Intertrial Effects of Immediate Self-Committal in a Continuous Social Influence Situation. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. March, 1956.

Fishman, Joshua A. An Examination of the Process and Function of Social Stereotyping. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1956.

Graham, Saxon. Class and Conservatism in the Adoption of Innovations. *Human Relations*. 1956, #1.

Katz, Daniel; Sarnoff, Irving; and McClintock, Charles. Ego-Defense and Attitude Change. *Human Relations*. 1956, #1.

Mahoney, Gerald M. Unidimensional Scales for the Measurement of Morale in an Industrial Situation. *Human Relations*. 1956, #1.

Mellinger, Glen D. Interpersonal Trust as a Factor in Communicztion. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. May, 1956.

Perception of Persons: Report of the Inter-university Summer Research Seminar. *Items*. March, 1956.

Vinacke, W. Edgar. Explorations in the Dynamic Processes of Stereotyping. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1956.

Weinstein, Eugene A. Weights Assigned by Children to Criteria of Prestige. *Sociometry*. June, 1956.

Group Behavior, General

Blake, Robert R.; Rhead, Clifton C.; Wedge, Bryant; and Mouton, Jane Srygley. Housing Architecture and Social Interaction. *Sociometry*. June, 1956.

Brodbeck, May. The Role of Small Groups in Mediating the Effects of Propaganda. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. March, 1956.

French, John R. P., Jr. A Formal Theory of Social Power. *Psychological Review*. May, 1956.

Gerard, Harold B. Some Factors Affecting an Individual's Estimate of His Probable Success in a Group Situation. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. March, 1956.

Grossack, Martin M. Group Belongingness Among Negroes. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1956.

Jahoda, Marie. Psychological Issues in Civil Liberties. *American Psychologist*. May, 1956.

Lanzetta, John T., and Roby, Thornton B. Group Performance as a Function of Work-Distribution Patterns and Task Load. *Sociometry*. June, 1956.

Maloney, R. M. Group Learning Through Group Discussion. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1956.

Roby, Thornton B., and Lanzetta, John T. Work Group Structure, Communication, and Group Performance. *Sociometry*. June, 1956.

Salisbury, W. Steward. Faith, Ritualism, Charismatic Leadership and Religious Behavior. *Social Forces*. March, 1956.

Shaw, Marvin E., and Gilchrist, J. C. Inter-group Communication and Leader Choice. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1956.

Wolman, Benjamin. Leadership and Group Dynamics. *Journal of Social Psychology*. February, 1956.

Organizational Behavior

Brown, Julia S. Union Size as a Function of Intra-Union Conflict. *Human Relations*. 1956, #1.

Clark, Burton R. Organizational Adaptation and Precarious Values. *American Sociological Review*. June, 1956.

Coleman, John R. The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy in Unionism. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1956.

Dalton, Melville. Managing the Managers. *Human Organization*. Fall, 1955.

Kennedy, John L. A "Transition Model" Laboratory for Research on Cultural Change. *Human Organization*. Fall, 1955.

Luce, R. Duncan, and Rogow, Arnold A. A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distributions for a Two-Party System. *Behavioral Science*. April, 1956.

Martin, Norman H., and Strauss, Anselm L. Patterns of Mobility Within Industrial Organizations. *Journal of Business*. April, 1956.

Strauss, George. Control by the Membership in Building Trades Unions. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1956.

Tannenbaum, Arnold S. Control Structure and Union Functions. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1956.

Voting Behavior

Eldersveld, Samuel J. Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior. *American Political Science Review*. March, 1956.

Epstein, Leon D. Size of Place and the Division of the Two-Party Vote in Wisconsin. *Western Political Quarterly*. March, 1956.

Farquharson, Robin. Straightforwardness in Voting Procedures. *Oxford Economic Papers*. February, 1956.

Culture and Institutions

Albert, Ethel M. The Classification of Values. *American Anthropologist*. April, 1956.

Anastasi, Anne. Intelligence and Family Size. *Psychological Bulletin*. May, 1956.

Clarke, Alfred C. The Use of Leisure and its Relation to Levels of Occupational Prestige. *American Sociological Review*, June, 1956.

Marsh, C. Paul, and Coleman, A. Lee. Group Influences and Agricultural Innovations. *American Journal of Sociology*. May, 1956.

Meier, Richard L. Communications and Social Change. *Behavioral Science*. January, 1956.

Westley, William A. Secrecy and the Police. *Social Forces*. March, 1956.

Value Theory and Social Policy

Smith, Nicholas M., Jr. A Calculus for Ethics: A Theory of the Structure of Value. Part I. *Behavior Science*. April, 1956.

The Climate of Opinion and the State of Academic Freedom. *American Sociological Review*. June, 1956.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

Abels, Jules. *The Truman Scandals*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1956. Pp. v, 329. $3.75.

Barton, Rebecca Chalmers. *Our Human Rights: A Study in the Art of Persuasion*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1956. Pp. vii, 102. $2.00.

Brissenden, Paul F. *The Labor Injunction in Hawaii*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1956. Pp. 68. $1.00.

Brook, David. *The U. N. and the China Dilemma*. New York: Vantage Press. 1956. Pp. 87. $2.50.

Buckingham, Clyde E. *Red Cross Disaster Relief: Its Origin and Development*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1956. Pp. 47. $1.00.

Callison, I. P. *Courts of Injustice: The Failure of Justice in the State Courts*. New York: Twayne Publishers. 1956. Pp. 775. $6.00.

Christie, Robert A. *Empire in Wood: A History of the Carpenters' Union*. Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. 1956. Pp. xvii, 356. $4.50. paper; $5.50, cloth.

Colm, Gerhard (Ed.). *The Employment Act, Past and Future: A Tenth Anniversary Symposium*. Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association. 1956. Pp. xii, 203. $2.75.

Dennis, Eugene. *Letters From Prison*. New York: International Publishers. 1956. Pp. 157. $2.00.

Du Bois, Cora. *Foreign Students and Higher Education in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education. 1956. Pp. xviii, 221. $3.50.

Farmer, Frances. *The Wilson Reader*. New

York: Oceana Publications. 1956. Pp. 286. $1.00.

FISHWICK, MARSHALL W. *The Virginia Tradition.* Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1956. Pp. vi, 111. $2.50.

GARCIA, ANTONIO. *La Rebelión de Los Pueblos Débiles: Nacionalismo Popular y Anti-Imperialismo.* La Paz, Bolivia: Liberia-Editorial "Juventud." 1955. Pp. 135.

GUETZKOW, HAROLD. *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization.* Princeton, N.J.: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University. 1955. Pp. 62.

HILL, J. W. F. *Tudor and Stuart Lincoln.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1956. Pp. xiv, 254. $6.00.

HOLAND, HJALMER R. *Exploration in America Before Columbus.* New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1956. Pp. 381. $6.00.

KEOGH, JAMES. *This is Nixon: The Man and His Work.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1956. Pp. 191. $2.75.

KOCHNEFF, BILL. *Let's Fight Communism a New Way.* New York: Vantage Press. 1956. Pp. 56. $2.00.

KRATZ, WALTER. *American Labor and the Intellectual.* New York: Vantage Press. 1956. Pp. 83. $2.50.

LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY (CHARLES WHEELER, RESEARCH EDITOR). *Water Rights Law in Kentucky.* Frankfort: Commonwealth of Kentucky. 1956. Pp. 75.

LEVINSON, EDWARD. *Labor on the March.* New York: University Books, Inc., 1956. Pp. xxii, 325. $3.50.

MARCANTONIO, VITO (SELECTED AND EDITED BY RUBINSTEIN, ANNETTE T.). *I Vote My Conscience: Debates, Speeches and Writings of Vito Marcantonio, 1935–1950.* New York: Vito Marcantonio Memorial. 1956. Pp. 494. $5.00.

DA SILVA, MELLO, A. *Man: His Life, His Education, His Happiness.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1956. Pp. 729. $6.00.

MYERS, HENRY ALONZO. *Are Men Equal? An Inquiry into the Meaning of American Democracy.* Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1955. Pp. iv. 188. $1.45.

PALMER, GLADYS L. *Philadelphia Workers in a Changing Economy.* Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1956. Pp. xiv, 189. $6.00.

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMATION BY JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, DONALD P. CAMPBELL, WALTER P. RUETHER, JAMES B. CAREY, JACK CONWAY, NAT GOLDFINGER, WALTER BUCKINGHAM, JOHN DIEBOLD, JOSEPH A. BIERNE, ADAM ABRUZZI, AND I. W. ABEL. *The Challenge of Automation.* Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1956. Pp. 77. $2.00.

RANSOM, HARRY. *The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning," 1710.* Austin: University of Texas Press. 1956. Pp. xiv, 145. $3.75.

RUDOLPH, FREDERICK. *Mark Hopkins and the Log: Williams College, 1836–1872.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1956. Pp. ix, 267. $4.75.

WALKER, KENNETH F. *Industrial Relations in Australia.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. xvii, 389. $7.50.

WHEELER-BENNET, J. W. *Three Episodes in the Life of Kaiser Wilhelm II: The Leslie Stephen Lecture, 1955.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1956. Pp. 27. $.75.

YOUTSLER, JAMES S. *Labor's Wage Policies in the Twentieth Century.* New York: Twayne Publishers. 1956. Pp. 344. $5.00.

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The fourteenth annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists was held May 3–5 at Marquette University with 225 persons in attendance. Featured speakers were Denis W. Brogan of Cambridge University who spoke on "The Prospects of Political Science in Europe," Harold Lasswell whose topic was "The Professional Problems of Political Scientists," and Gerhart Niemeyer whose subject was "General Assumptions Concerning Soviet-American Relations." Round table discussions were conducted on the following topics: "Midwest Political Parties," "The Role of Political Theory in Political Science," "Woodrow Wilson as Domestic and Foreign Policy Leader," "Civil Liberties and National Security," "Political Implications of Land Reform in Asia and Latin America," and "National and International Implications of the Twentieth Party Congress."

The most important decision of the business meeting was the action to establish a *Midwest Political Science Journal* in cooperation with the Wayne University Press.

The officers elected by the Conference for 1956–1957 were Wilfred Binkley, Ohio Northern University, President; Marshall Knappen, University of Michigan, Vice President; Reginald Laing, Carleton College and Ivan Stone, Beloit College, members of the Executive Council for three year terms.

The 1957 meeting of the conference will be held in Springfield, Illinois on May 2–4. The program chairman is Ralph Straetz of Miami University. Co-chairmen of the Committee on Local Arrangements are Jack Isakoff of the Illinois Legislative Council and Philip Monypenny of the University of Illinois.

The Northern California Political Science Association held its annual meeting on May 5 at Stanford University. There were papers delivered and panel discussions held on "Pre-Convention Politics" in general and on the election issue politics of civil rights, foreign policy, farm and conservation. Professor Henry Ehrmann of the University of Colorado addressed the luncheon session on "Pressure Groups in France and Great Britain." Officers elected for 1956–57 were: President Arnaud B. Leavelle, Stanford University; Vice-President, Earl C. Segrets, Sacramento State College; Secretary-Treasurer, Rev. Richard J. Roberts, University of Santa Clara. The following were named members of the council: Norman Jacobson, University of California (Berkeley); Hyman Palais, Humboldt State College; Vernon Puryear, University of California (Davis); Roy Archibald, College of San Mateo; Dean R. Cresap, San Jose State College; Robert L. Johnston, Mills College.

The Pacific Northwest Political Science Association held its Ninth Annual Meeting at Willamette University April 20–21. The following officers were elected: John Swarthout, President; George Wolfe, College of Idaho, Vice-President; Donald Balmer, Lewis and Clark College, Secretary-Treasurer; Board Members: Rev. Richard Twohy, S. J., Gonzaga University, and David Corbett, University of British Columbia.

The 1955–56 Annual Meeting of the New England Political Science Association was held on May 5th at the University of Connecticut. Four papers were presented: "Egypt in Transition," by Walter Sharp of Yale University; "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," by David Easton of the University of Chicago; "The Presidential Press Conference," by Elmer Cornwell, Jr., of Brown University; and "The NAACP and the Courts" by Clement Vose of Bowdoin.

At the business meeting the following officers were elected for the coming year: Athern Daggett, Bowdoin College, President; Guy H. Dodge of Brown University, Vice President; and George Goodwin, Jr., University of Massachusetts, Secretary-Treasurer. Elected to the executive committee were: Gwendolyn Carter, Smith College; James W. Fesler, Yale University and Andrew Gyorgy, Boston University.

The Eighth Annual Conference on American Foreign Policy was held at Colgate University July 2–6. The conference theme was "Waging Peace for Freedom." Approximately 50 outstanding speakers and discussion leaders participated in the conference.

The Committee on East European Studies

of the University of Texas will hold a three-day conference on "The Present Political State of East Europe" in Austin, October 11–13, 1956. The conference is being financed by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. Discussion leaders include Professor John Hazard of Columbia University; Professor Andrei Lobonov-Rostovsky of the University of Michigan; John Morrison, Geographic Consultant on the U.S.S.R.; Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times;* and Professor Donald Hodgman of the University of California.

The Second Conference on Democratic Theory was held at Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania, June 11–19. Directed by William S. Stokes the conference was sponsored by The Foundation for American Studies which is financed by the William Volker Fund. Formal papers were given by Dwight Waldo, William McGovern, Eric Voegelin, Felix Morley, Henry S. Kariel, Alfred de Grazia, William S. Stokes, Willmoore Kendall, Herbert Butterfield.

On March 7–8 the Ninth Annual Conference of the William Edgar Borah Outlawry of War Foundation was held on the campus of the University of Idaho. The series of conferences is devoted to the general theme "The Causes and the Conditions of Peace." This year the specific theme was "Cultural Diversity and World Peace." Major addresses on this theme were delivered by Melville J. Herskovits, Northwestern University, George H. T. Kimple, Director of the African Survey of the Twentieth Century Fund; Harold H. Fisher, Director Emeritus, Hoover Institute and Library, and Boyd A. Martin, University of Idaho.

The Eighth Annual Workshop in Problems of State and Local Government was held at Indiana University, June 18–July 6, under the joint sponsorship of the department of government and the school of education. Louis E. Lambert of the department of government was chairman.

The World Affairs Council of Northern California held a conference on April 13–15. Among the speakers at the various sessions were Allan Dulles of the C.I.A., Carl Marcy, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Edwin Wright of the State Department and Morton A. Kaplan of the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences.

A workshop entitled "Germany: United or Divided" was sponsored by the department of political science, Marshall College, June 2–21. Visiting lecturers were Taylor Cole, Duke University, Herbert Weil, German Embassy, Conley H. Dillon, head of the department of political science, Marshall College. Carl Leiden of Marshall College directed the workshop.

The Seventh Annual Conference on Problems of American Foreign Policy was held at Indiana University June 29 and 30. The topic was "The Russian Enigma and Western Response." Professor Edward H. Buehrig served as Chairman. Speakers included Harry Schwartz of *The New York Times;* C. Burke Elbrick, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel III, Department of Defense; Mr. Nugroho, Minister Counselor of the Indonesian Embassy; Mr. Mahmood Shafqat, First Secretary of the Pakistan Mission to the United Nations; Mr. J. O. Udoji, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health, Eastern Region, Nigeria; and a panel consisting of Messrs. Robert Strausz-Hupe, Norman Palmer, Gerhart Niemeyer, and Colonel William R. Kintner.

The Third Mid-West Seminar on U. S. Foreign Policy will be held on the campus of the University of Wisconsin September 9–14, 1956. The Seminar is one of a series jointly sponsored by four midwest universities: Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin and financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

The final conference held by the Northwestern University department of political science in connection with its Curriculum Development Project (supported by the Carnegie Corporation) met March 15–17, 1956 and was concerned with the Study of the Community. Papers prepared in advance and discussed at the Conference were: "The Nature of Community and Methods of Community Analysis," by Gordon W. Blackwell, University of North Carolina; "The Political Implications of Community Identification," by Angus Campbell, University of Michigan; "Studying Associations and Organization Structure," by Peter H. Rossi, University of Chicago; and "Individual Participation in Mass Society," by Scott Greer, Occidental College. A limited number of copies of the above papers are available for distribution (as are a few copies of papers read at earlier conferences) from the Curriculum Development

Project, Northwestern University, Evanston Illinois.

The department of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles, in cooperation with the American Institute of Planners, sponsored a Planning Institute June 8 and 9 on the subject: Transportation and Metropolitan Planning. Professor Ernest A. Engelbert served as director of the Institute, and the research papers presented will be published.

The Public Administration Service of the department of government, University of New Hampshire, conducted a Public Affairs Institute on the revision of the New Hampshire Constitution on April 7, 1956.

The American University's department of government and public administration during the Summer Session sponsored again its regularly scheduled Public Affairs Laboratory. The Laboratory was under the direction of Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, chairman of the department of government and public administration, Charles M. Hersh, associate professor of government and public administration, and Royce Hanson, lecturer in government and public administration.

The District of Columbia Political Science Association (DCPSA) held its fourth meeting of the current year in the Lounge of the Brookings Institution, May 31, 1956. Sidney Hyman, author of *The American President*, delivered an address on "The Presidency and the Party System."

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Ford Foundation has given $1,275,000 to Columbia University to further its work in international affairs. The grant will be used for three main purposes: to expand the Columbia staff in various fields of foreign policy; to develop and strengthen the work of the Near and Middle East Institute, and to produce a greater degree of integration in the teaching of law, business, economics and foreign problems.

The Fund for the Advancement of Education has granted $13,950 to Fordham University's department of political philosophy and the social sciences for research and experimentation on the relationship of class size to the effective teaching of politics, economics and sociology.

The Claremont Graduate School has recently established the Story Program in Public Affairs leading to the Master of Arts degree. This program honors the late Russell McCulloch Story, former President of Claremont College and Professor of government. Concentrations are offered in business economics, government administration and international relations. The Story Program is designed to help prepare young men and women for responsible positions in business and government, at home and abroad.

A new program in natural resources administration is being offered on the graduate level by the Institute of Public Administration and the School of Natural Resources at the University of Michigan. The program combines the fields of public administration and conservation and leads to the degree of Master of Science in the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies.

The Social Science Research Council has recently announced three new programs of grants for research in fields of special interest to political scientists, as well as to other social scientists. The Committee on Comparative Politics will administer a program of grants for field studies of political groups in areas outside the United States. The Committee on National Security Policy Research will administer a program of grants for research on problems of national defense in the period 1939–1955; this program complements that for research on the history of American military policy, which will again be offered in 1956–57. The Committee on Political Behavior will administer a program of grants to individuals for research on American governmental processes; the program of grants for research on state politics in the United States will again be administered by this Committee in 1956–57. Awards are made under these programs on a competitive basis to individuals possessing the Ph.D. or its equivalent. Application forms and information about these programs may be obtained by writing to the Social Science Research Council, 726 Jackson Place N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

The Institute of Public Administration of the University of Michigan completed on June 15, 1956 a four year pioneering project to establish an Institute of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines in Manila. The project was financed with U. S. government and Philippine counterpart funds under the Point IV program. Originally the project was staffed entirely by Americans, with John W. Lederle as director and chief advisor. During the course of the project, a number of Filipinos were trained in the United States, and Filipinos have gradually assumed full responsibility for the new organization.

A program of Fulbright Predoctoral Fellowships providing interneships at the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Brussels and the International Union of Local Authorities, The Hague is available for the year 1957–58. Application forms and further information can be obtained from the Institute of International Education at 1 East 67 St., New York 21, New York.

A new publication, the *Journal of Administrative Affairs* appeared this year under the sponsorship of the Institute of Administrative Affairs, University of Tehran. Published in Persian, several hundred copies are mimeographed in English. Inquiries should be directed to the Institute for Administrative Affairs, USOM/Iran, APO 205, New York, New York.

The Brookings Institution has announced the appointment of six Research Fellows, three in economics and three in government for the academic year 1956–57. Those in government are Frank B. Cliffe, Jr., Staff Assistant, Public Administration Clearing House; Lester W. Milbrath, instructor in political science, University of North Carolina; and Merton L. Reichler, instructor in government, Columbia University. Laurin L. Henry, formerly of the Washington office of the Public Administration Clearing House, has been appointed a research associate, and Stanley Kelley, Jr., one of the 1955–56 research fellows, has been appointed to the staff for the year 1956–57. Roy B. Eastin, executive officer and formerly superintendent of documents of the Government Printing Office has contracted to prepare a third edition of Schmeckebier's *Government Publications and Their Use*, first published in 1936.

Charles Adrian has resumed his teaching duties at Michigan State University this fall after acting as administrative assistant to Governor G. Mennen Williams from January to September 1956.

Charles S. Ascher, of Brooklyn College, attended congresses of the non-governmental organizations which he represents at the United Nations: the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning in Vienna in July, and the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Madrid in September. He also attended the first Congress of the International Association of Legal Science in Barcelona.

William B. Ballis, of the University of Washington, was visiting professor at the University of Michigan in the 1956 summer session.

Willard F. Barber is now counsellor of Embassy in Warsaw, Poland.

Erwin W. Bard, of Brooklyn College, will spend a sabbatical year in Europe in 1956–57, based largely at the College of Europe in Bruges.

Loren P. Beth, of the University of Florida, taught at the summer session at Boston University.

Hugh A. Bone, of the University of Washington, directed the national workshop of the Citizenship Clearing House at Bedford, Pennsylvania in September.

Bernard Brown, of Michigan State University, has been awarded a post-doctoral Fulbright Research Scholarship for 1956–57 to Study in France.

Ben G. Burnett, of Whittier College, has received a Haynes Foundation grant for research in Latin America.

John C. Bollens, University of California (Los Angeles), is executive officer and research director of the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey, for 1956–57.

Herbert W. Briggs, of Cornell University, was elected Associe de l'Institut de Droit International at its meeting in Granada, Spain in April.

Henry L. Bretton, of the University of Michigan, spent the summer in the Gold Coast under a Rackham grant. He will spend the academic year, 1956–57, in Austria at the

University of Innsbruck under a Fulbright Fellowship.

Philip W. Buck resumes his teaching duties at Stanford after a year's leave in England.

Robert K. Carr, of Dartmouth College has been elected to membership in the American Academies of Arts and Sciences.

William S. Carpenter, of Princeton University, is consultant to the Law Revision and Legislative Services Commission in New Jersey and has served as acting director of its Division of Legislative Services and Research.

James C. Charlesworth has had his leave of absence from the University of Pennsylvania extended in order to permit him to continue as Secretary of Administration in the cabinet of Governor George M. Leader.

Edward K. T. Chen, of the University of Houston, is on a year's leave of absence engaged in research in Washington.

James Coleman, University of California at Los Angeles, is spending the year 1956–57 on leave in Africa.

Cornelius P. Cotter has been elected president of the Bay Area chapter of the American Society for Public Administration.

Hoyt Crider is returning to the United States this summer after a two year hitch with the Tehran group of the University of Southern California. He will serve as lecturer in the Civic Center division of the University and will be employed with the Office of the Administrative Officer of Los Angeles County.

Royden Dangerfield, of the University of Illinois, was a visiting lecturer at the summer school of Utah State Agricultural College.

Robert B. Dishman, of the University of New Hampshire, has been appointed by Governor Dwinell to serve a three-year appointment on the Legislative Council.

John Dorsey has returned to Michigan State University after a year with the University Technical Assistance Mission to the Vietnamese government.

Alex N. Dragnich, of Vanderbuilt University, lectured at the Army War College February 5–10, 1956, on the future of United States policy toward Yugoslavia, and served as consultant to the Study Group on South-eastern Europe.

David Easton of the University of Chicago, will deliver a paper entitled "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems" at the International Political Science Association Conference in Geneva, Switzerland.

William Ebenstein, of Princeton University, was a visiting lecturer at the University of Wisconsin during the summer of 1956.

John H. Ferguson, of The Pennsylvania State University, has been granted a second year's leave of absence to continue his work as Director of Program Evaluation in the Office of Administration of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

LeRoy Ferguson, of Michigan State University, is the recipient of a grant from the Social Science Research Council for 1956–57.

Houston I. Fournoy, who recently received his Ph.D. degree from Princeton, is now serving as legislative assistant to United States Senator H. Alexander Smith.

Russell H. Fifield, of the University of Michigan, spent the summer in Southeast Asia under a Horace H. Rackham grant.

Russell Fitzgibbon, University of California at Los Angeles, has been elected president of the Western Political Science Association, 1956–57.

Harry J. Friedman, of the University of Pittsburgh, will spend next year doing research in India and Pakistan.

William J. Gore served as a project director for one of the seven research teams working for the Federal Civil Defense Agency during the summer of 1956.

George A. Graham, of Princeton University, will be on a leave of absence during the academic year 1956–57 to serve as director of the public affairs program for the Ford Foundation.

J. A. C. Grant, of the University of California at Los Angeles, has accepted an invitation of the Republic of Vietnam to spend the summer in Saigon as advisor on constitutional law and judicial and legal reform. He recently returned from a year's leave in Spain and will resume his duties at Los Angeles in mid-September.

Elmer D. Graper, former head of the department of political science of the University of Pittsburgh, has been appointed chairman of the Civil Service Commission of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Andrew Gyorgy, of Boston University, delivered the last of the 1956 Marshall Woods lectures at Brown University.

John H. Hallowell will return to Duke University in September, 1956 after a year's sabbatical leave in Germany.

Ferrel Heady, of the University of Michigan, attended the International Congress of Administrative Sciences in Madrid September 2–8, 1956.

Dell G. Hitchner, University of Washington, has received a U. S. Specialists grant from the State Department.

Edward W. Hughes, lecturer in politics at Kings College, New Castle, England, will spend 1956–57 as visiting lecturer at the University of Michigan under a Fulbright grant.

Harry V. Jaffa will be on leave of absence from Ohio State University for the year 1956–57, doing research under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Thomas Jenkins of the University of California at Los Angeles, will be on leave for the academic year 1956–57.

Raymond A. Jolly returns from a two and a half year appointment with the Tehran unit of the University of Southern California. He will continue as a lecturer with the School of Public Administration.

John H. Kautsky, of Washington University, taught at the summer session of the University of Rochester.

William J. Keefe, of Chatham College, has been appointed to the Pennsylvania Commission on Governmental Reorganization which will report to the 1957 session of the legislature.

Richard J. Kozicki, research fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, has received a Ford Foundation fellowship for 1956–57.

Robert S. Lancaster is returning to the University of the South after a year spent as Fulbright exchange professor at the University of Bagdad.

George A. Lanyi returns to Oberlin College in September after spending a year in London on a Ford Faculty Fellowship.

Donald R. Larson, of the University of Miami, is on leave of absence working with the Public Administration Service on various projects throughout the United States and Alaska.

Walter H. C. Laves, of Indiana University, attended a UNESCO Conference on Evaluation of Technical Assistance projects at McGill University, May 29-June 1, 1956. He has been appointed a member of a Special Joint Committee of the American Council on Education Commission on Education and International Affairs and the Committee on Institutional Projects Abroad.

Leo Lott, of Ohio State University, was a visiting lecturer in the summer session at the University of Wisconsin.

Harry A. Marlow, formerly Director, the Civic Center Division, School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, and for the past two years Chief of Party of the faculty at the Institute for Administrative Affairs, University of Tehran, is on home leave this summer prior to his return to Tehran for another two year hitch as Chief of Party.

Hubert Marshall, of Stanford University, is serving as associate director of the Stanford Committee on Undergraduate Education.

Albert B. Martin of The Pennsylvania State University has been engaged as a consultant to the Reorganization Commission of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Charles E. Martin, of the University of Washington, has been appointed director of the World Affairs Symposium to be held at Riverside, California in December.

M. Nelson McGeary, of The Pennsylvania State University, served during the summer as research consultant to the Commission on Government Reorganization of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Peter Odegard will be on leave from the University of California for the 1956–57 academic year.

Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., of the State College of Washington, will be on sabbatical leave in 1956–57 and will spend the year in Washington, D. C.

Felix Oppenheim, of the University of Delaware, has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship for the academic year 1956–57.

Vincent Ostrom will return to the University of Oregon after occupying a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He will serve as director of research for the Northwest Cooperative Project in Educational Administration financed by the Kellogg Foundation.

James K. Pollock, president of the International Political Science Association, presided over a meeting of the executive committee of that organization and a round table following immediately afterward. Edward H. Litchfield, the American member of the executive committee and Evron Kirkpatrick, executive director of the American Political Science Association were in attendance. The sessions were held in Montreux, Switzerland, September 10–14.

Rollin B. Posey, of Northwestern University, will be on leave for the year 1956–57.

Constantine Rackauskas will be on leave from Fordham University during the Fall semester of 1956.

Martin R. Ream, of the University of Southern California, is returning to the faculty of the Institute of Administrative Affairs of the University of Tehran.

Emmette S. Redford, of the University of Texas, has been granted a leave of absence for the fall semester 1956–57.

Neal Riemer, of The Pennsylvania State University, taught at the summer School at Cornell University.

Benjamin Rivlin, of Brooklyn College, has been granted a Fulbright fellowship for research in North Africa.

Victor Rosenblum is on semi-sabbatical leave of absence from the University of California for the fall semester.

Ernest E. Rossi, of the University of Pittsburgh, has been granted an Italian Ministry Foreign Affairs fellowship at the Bologna Center of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.

Richard F. Schier, of Franklin and Marshall College, was retained for the past summer by the Bureau of Municipal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Robert Scott, of the University of Illinois, has returned from a year's sabbatical leave, most of which was spent in Spain.

H. P. Secher, of Western Reserve University, has been awarded a Fulbright Grant for 1956–57 as an Advanced Research Scholar.

Lester G. Seligman, of the University of Oregon, has been awarded a two year grant-in-aid by the Social Science Research Council. He will be on leave during 1956–57.

Chandler Shaw, of Bethany College, taught at the summer school of West Virginia University.

William Shepherd, of Beloit College, has resigned to enter the field of radio communications.

Foster Sherwood, of the University of California at Los Angeles, is on sabbatical leave for the academic year 1956–57 to engage in research under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

H. Gordon Skilling, of Dartmouth College, taught at the summer session of the University of Vermont.

Rhoten A. Smith has returned to the University of Kansas after completing a year's leave of absence to serve as Associate Director of the National Citizenship Clearing House, Law Center, New York University.

Richard Snyder, of Northwestern University, will be on leave during 1956–57.

George Stambuk, of Indiana University, has received a John Hay Whitney Foundation fellowship grant.

Richard W. Sterling, of Dartmouth, has been awarded a Rockefeller Foundation grant for the year 1956–57.

Paul D. Stewart, of Marshall College, has been serving as research director of the All Huntington Association for a City Manager Form of Government and was elected to the Charter Board in the May primary.

Ivan M. Stone, of Beloit College, was recently elected vice president of the North Central Association of Academic Deans.

William Bruce Storm, of the University of Southern California, will be with the Tehran group during 1956–57.

Thor Swanson, of the State College of Washington taught at the Syracuse University summer session. He will be on leave during 1956–57, having been awarded the Staff Fellowship of the National Municipal League.

Eduard Taborsky, of the University of Texas, has returned after holding a visiting professorship at the University of Tennessee.

Hans B. Thorelli has been awarded the annual prize of the Fahlbeck Foundation. He recently resigned as Director of the Industrial Council for Social and Economic Studies, Stockholm, Sweden to become an associate of the new Marketing Research Service of the General Electric Company, New York City.

Wayne Untereiner, of the University of Southern California, will be with the Tehran group during 1956–57.

Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. of the University of Miami, is spending the summer touring the Middle East and Europe.

John Vanderzell has resumed his duties at Franklin and Marshall College after a one year leave of absence to serve as director of research, Bureau of Municipal Affairs, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

William Verhage, of Boston University, has returned from a Fulbright lectureship at the International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan.

S. Sidney Ulmer has been teaching at the summer session of the University of Houston.

Harvey Walker, of Ohio State University, has started a one year assignment as a member of a technical assistance team for the United Nations, teaching public administration in a United Nations specialized school in San Jose, Costa Rica.

Robert E. Ward, of the University of Michigan, is spending his sabbatical year, 1956–57, in Japan under the auspices of a Fulbright grant and a Rackham Fund grant.

James T. Watkins IV, of Stanford, served during the past year as chairman of the regional committee of the National Woodrow Wilson Fellowship Program.

Edward Weidner, of Michigan State University, was Public Administration Specialist of a Michigan State University Ford Foundation mission to the government of Pakistan during most of June and July. He also spent several weeks in Saigon in his capacity as coordinator of the Michigan State University Technical Assistance Mission to the government of Vietnam.

Egbert S. Wengert, of the University of Oregon, will spend the major portion of his sabbatical leave during 1956–57 as visiting professor of public administration in the Institute of Public Administration in Manila.

Allen Whiting, of Michigan State University, served as a consultant to the Rand Corporation during the past summer.

York Willbern, of the University of Alabama, taught at the first summer session of Duke University.

Philip Williams, of Jesus College, Oxford, was a visiting lecturer at the University of Wisconsin summer session.

Arthur M. Wilson, of Dartmouth, has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship.

The Woodrow Wilson Centennial Commission is anxious to receive information about all 1956 Wilson literature and all Centennial activities and programs. Information about and copies of all addresses, papers and sermons would be appreciated. Readers are asked to send in notices about all programs and activities, lecture series, discussion forums, library and school exhibits, TV or radio programs, musical or dramatic presentations, and to include the date, place, sponsoring group and participants. Communications should be sent to The Woodrow Wilson Centennial Commission, Interior Building, Washington 25, D.C.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Gilbert Abcarian, of Sacramento State College, has been appointed visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Tulsa.

Emile B. Ader is on leave of absence from the University of Tulsa to work with the United States Information Agency.

Charles Aiken has been appointed chairman of the political science department at the University of California.

Elton Atwater, associate professor of political science, has been appointed head of the department of political science at The Pennsylvania State University replacing Harold F. Alderfer.

Hans Baerwald, doctoral candidate at the University of California, has become assistant professor of government at Miami University (Ohio).

Chester W. Bain has been appointed assistant director of the bureau of public administration, University of Virginia. He continues as assistant professor of political science.

Sidney Baldwin, of Northwestern University, has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at San Diego State College.

Joseph W. Ballantine, formerly director of Far Eastern affairs in the Department of State, will serve as visiting professor at the University of Miami during 1956–57.

Donald G. Balmer has returned as assistant professor at Lewis and Clark College following completion of his doctorate at the University of Washington.

Edward C. Banfield has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

William M. Beaney, Jr. has been promoted to associate professor in the department of politics at Princeton University.

George Belknap of Michigan State University will be a visiting professor at the University of California for the year 1956–57.

Oliver T. Benson of the University of Oklahoma will serve as visiting professor of government at the University of Texas during the fall semester, 1956–57.

G. Robert Blackburn has been appointed visiting assistant professor of political science at Washington University, St. Louis, for 1956–57.

George S. Blair has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also chief educational associate at the University's Institute of Local and State Government.

George I. Blanksten, associate professor of political science, has become chairman of the department of political science at Northwestern University.

Virgil C. Blum, S.J., formerly of Creighton University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

Wilmer L. Bohlmann, doctoral candidate at the University of Washington, will be acting instructor at the State College of Washington during 1956–57.

Kenneth P. Borgen has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the department of government and public administration at The American University

Cecil C. Brett has been appointed instructor in government at Indiana University.

Louis Brownlow has been appointed visiting professor of political science at Washington University, St. Louis, for the spring semester of 1957.

William Buchanan, formerly of the faculty of Mississippi State College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern California.

Ronald J. Bunn, formerly of Duke University, has been appointed instructor in government at the University of Texas.

John A. Bunzel has been appointed instructor of political science at Michigan State University.

George P. Bush has retired with the rank of professor emeritus of government and public administration at The American University

Robert O. Byrd has become associate professor and occupies the Hugh S. Magill chair of the history and science of government at Illinois Wesleyan University.

Lynton Keith Caldwell has been appointed visiting professor of government and coordinator of the Thailand Public Administration program at Indiana University.

Byrum E. Carter has been promoted to associate professor in the department of government at Indiana University.

Reo M. Christenson of the editorial staff of the *Toledo Blade* has joined the department of government at Miami University (Ohio).

Wesley Chumlea, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted appointment as instructor in government at Texas A. and M. College.

John M. Clarke has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the department of government and public administration at The American University.

I. L. Claude, Jr., has accepted an associate professorship at the University of Delaware.

James Coke has been promoted to the rank of Assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Vernon F. Cook of Ohio State University has been appointed as instructor in the department of political science at Western Reserve.

Edward F. Cooke, formerly of Knox College, has been appointed assistant professor in the department of political science of the University of Pittsburgh.

Joseph D. Cooper has been promoted to the rank of adjunct professor of government and public administration in the department of government and public administration at The American University.

Robert W. Cox has been promoted to the rank of professiorial lecturer in the department of government and public administration at The American University.

Michael Curtis has been appointed an instructor in political science at Yale University.

Martin Diamond has become assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Robert T. Daland of the University of Alabama has become assistant professor in the department of government and international relations of the University of Connecticut.

Thomas J. Davy has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Howard E. Dean, who returns to the University of Oregon from his sabbatical leave in the fall, has been advanced to an associate professorship.

Herbert S. Dinerstein has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the department of government and public administration at The American University.

Paul Dolan, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Delaware, has a Fulbright lectureship at the College of Political Science, Wilhelmshaven, Germany, for the academic year 1956–57.

James R. Donoghue, director of the bureau of government at the University of Wisconsin, has been promoted to full professor.

Harold M. Dorr, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has been named dean of state-wide education.

Cecil H. Driver has been appointed chairman of the department of political science, Yale University.

Eugene P. Dvorin has been appointed instructor at Michigan State University.

Clyde Eagleton, professor of international law at New York University, has retired.

Professor Rowland A. Egger has been appointed the new director of the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. He has served for two years as the Near East representative of the Ford Foundation.

William C. Ellet, formerly of the State University of Iowa, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Virginia.

Garland Fothergill has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Wisconsin State College.

William O. Farber, professor of government at the University of South Dakota, has accepted a one year appointment in the department of political science at Northwestern University.

Herman Finer will be Walker Ames professor at the University of Washington during the winter quarter, 1957.

Ralph S. Fjelstad has been promoted to Congdon professor of government and international relations at Carleton College.

Vernon L. Fluharty has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Robert Y. Fluno has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at Whitman College.

Daryll Forde, of University College, London, has been appointed visiting professor of political science and anthropology for the fall semester at the University of California.

William R. Gable, formerly of the Georgia Institute of Technology has accepted appointment as a research associate at the Institute of Public Administration of the University of Michigan.

William Howard Gammon, Project Coördinator, Accounting Policy Division Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, has been appointed to the faculty of the department of government and public administration of The American University.

John Gange, director of the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs has resigned from the University of Virginia. In June and July he will direct a Research Training Institute in International Relations for the Social Science Research Council at the University of Denver. In August he will go to Germany as a guest of the German government in Bonn and in October he will take up a Fulbright lectureship in American Studies at the University of Heidelberg.

Hubert S. Gibbs has been promoted to associate professor and chairman of the department of government at Boston University. Former chairman Lashley G. Harvey, remains as director of the bureau of public administration.

Gilbert F. Gilchrist resumes his duties as assistant professor of political science and history at the University of the South after a two year Fulbright scholarship at the University of London.

Ralph Goldman has been appointed assistant professor at Michigan State University.

Merrill R. Goodall has been appointed to the position of associate professor of Asian studies and government at the Claremont Graduate School.

Charles H. Goodman has been appointed to the faculty of the department of government and public administration as professor of government and public administration at The American University.

William Gore, formerly of the University of Washington, has joined the faculty at the University of Kansas as assistant professor of political science and will direct the expanded M.P.A. program in state administration.

John Grumm has joined the faculty at the University of Kansas as assistant professor of political science.

Andrew Gyorgy will be on leave for the first semester 1956–57 from Boston University to lecture on Russian foreign policy at the Navy Staff College, Newport, R.I.

Andrew Hacker has been promoted to assistant professor of government at Cornell University.

Myron Q. Hale, formerly of Columbia University, has been appointed instructor in government at the University of Texas.

Louis J. Halle of the University of Virginia is on leave during 1956–57 and will be on the faculty of the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, Switzerland.

Samuel Halperin, who received his Ph.D. at Washington University in 1956, has been appointed instructor in political science at Wayne University.

Paul Y. Hammond will join the staff of the Institute of War and Peace at Columbia in September, 1956 and will serve as lecturer in government in Columbia College.

Frederick H. Harris, who has been visiting professor at the University of the South, is rejoining the department of political science at the University of North Carolina.

Joseph P. Harris of the University of California will spend the fall in England as a Fulbright professor at the London School of Economics.

Louis K. Harris was promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Kent State University.

Guy B. Hathorn has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Sherman S. Hayden has become professor of international relations at Clark University.

Donald E. Hayhurst of the University of Pittsburgh has been appointed assistant professor in the department of political science at West Virginia University.

Joseph A. Hearst of Barnard College has joined the department of political science at Idaho State College.

John J. Hebal, doctoral candidate at the University of Minnesota, will be acting instructor at the State College of Washington during 1956–57.

Robert S. Hill has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at the University of North Dakota.

Edward H. Hobbs has been promoted to professor of political science at the University of Mississippi.

Robert T. Holt has been appointed to an instructorship in political science at the University of Minnesota.

Robert A. Horn has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Stanford University.

Fred Horrigan of Indiana University has been appointed research associate at the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Thammasat, Bangkok, Thailand.

Robert Horwitz has been appointed assistant professor at Michigan State University.

Thomas Hovet, Jr., formerly visiting assistant professor at Miami University, has been appointed assistant professor in the department of government of New York University.

Howard K. Hyde has been promoted to adjunct professor of government and public administration in the department of government and public administration at The American University.

Walter O. Jacobson has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the department of government and public administration at The American University.

G. Edward Janosik has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

John E. Johns has joined the department of history and political science at Stetson University.

Scott D. Johnston has been promoted to professor of political science and head of a new department of political science at Hamline University. During 1955–56 his duties included serving as coordinator of the Hill Foundation Four College Area Study Program on the Far East.

Ralph G. Jones, associate professor of government at the University of Arkansas, has completed a year at the University of Minnesota as visiting professor of political science. During 1956–57 he will occupy the chair of international law at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

Conrad F. Joyner of the University of Florida has been named instructor in the department of political science at West Virginia University.

Claudius Johnson of the State College of Washington will serve as visiting professor at the University of California during the fall semester.

Eldon L. Johnson, former member of the political science faculty and dean of the graduate school of the University of Oregon has been inducted as the 13th president of the University of New Hampshire.

Morton A. Kaplan has been appointed assistant professor at the University of Chicago.

John K. King of the University of Virginia has resigned to accept a government position in Washington.

Henry A. Kissinger, formerly of the Council on Foreign Relations, has become assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

James R. Klonoski, formerly of the University of Michigan, has been appointed to the faculty of St. Olaf's College.

Kenneth Kofmehl will serve as visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Kansas.

James L. Kunen has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the department of government and public administration at The American University.

John Larson, formerly instructor in political science at the University of Michigan, has been appointed assistant professor of business administration at Northwestern University.

Richard H. Leach, who served as visiting lecturer in political science at Duke University during 1955–56, has joined the department of political science as assistant professor.

Luke T. Lee, formerly assistant professor of history and government at St. Lawrence University, has been appointed visiting assistant professor of political science at The Pennsylvania State University.

Shao Chuan Leng will be on leave from the University of Virginia during 1956–57 to lecture at Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan.

J. G. Liebenow has been appointed assistant professor of government at the University of Texas.

Roy C. Macridis has been appointed associate professor of political science at Washington University, St. Louis.

Joseph F. Maloney has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at Fordham University.

D. Bruce Marshall has been appointed an instructor in political science at Ohio State University.

Eugene A. Mawhinney, recently promoted to associate professor of political science at Elmira College, has been appointed chairman of the division of social science for a three year term.

Jaro Mayda, assistant professor of law at the University of Wisconsin, has become associate professor of comparative law at Louisiana State University.

Richard McCleery has become instructor of political science at Michigan State University.

Charles H. McLaughlin has been promoted to a full professorship at the University of Minnesota and will continue as director of the programs in international relations and area studies.

Daniel S. McHargue of the University of Michigan has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science.

James H. Meisel of the University of Michigan has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science.

Louis Menand III, of Dartmouth College has accepted the position of dean of faculty at Bradford Junior College, Bradford, Massachusetts.

August C. Miller Jr. of Wheaton College has been granted leave to serve as visiting professor of government at the Naval War College for the year 1956–57.

Warren E. Miller, formerly of the University of California has been appointed assistant professor of political science and research associate in the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.

Hans J. Morgenthau has been appointed visiting professor of government at Columbia University and visiting lecturer in government at Yale University for the first semester of the academic year 1956–57.

Robert L. Morlan has been promoted to professor of government at the University of Redlands. During 1956–57 he will serve as visiting lecturer in political science at the Municipal University of Amsterdam.

Donald Mundinger, who received his Ph.D. at Washington University in 1956, has been appointed assistant professor of government and economics at Augustana College.

Lloyd D. Musolf, associate professor of political science at Vassar College, has been elected chairman of the department for a two-year term.

Earl A. Nehring of the University of California (Los Angeles), has been appointed lecturer in government at Indiana University.

Benjamin Nelson has accepted appointment as professor of History and Social Science at Hofstra College.

Arthur A. North, S.J., of Fordham University has been advanced to an associate professorship.

Robert M. Northrop, formerly of the University of Michigan, has accepted an assistant professorship at Allegheny College.

Alfred G. Obern has been made assistant professor of public administration in George Washington University's new department of business and public administration. He will also supervise the governmental intern program.

Edward O'Connor has resigned as instructor in government at the University of Texas to accept appointment to the United States Foreign Service.

Robert Osgood has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago jointly with the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy.

John R. Owens, formerly of Wesleyan University, has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Michigan.

Charles A. Phillips has been appointed to the faculty of the department of government and public administration at The American University.

Roy Pierce, formerly of Smith College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Jack C. Plano has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Western Michigan College. During the 1956 summer session he served as acting departmental chairman.

Charles Press has become an instructor in the department at Michigan State University.

Ralph Purcell, of Sweet Briar College, has been appointed visiting professor in the department of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia for 1956–57.

Michael D. Reagan, of the department of politics at Princeton, has accepted a position as instructor in Williams College.

John S. Reshetar, Jr., has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science, Yale University, for the next academic year.

Channing B. Richardson has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Hamilton College.

Bennett M. Rich has been promoted to a professorship at Rutgers University.

Clarence W. Rife, head of the department of history and political science at Hamline University since 1929, retired in June after 34 years of service.

William Ritchie, formerly of the University of Michigan, has been appointed to an instructorship at the University of Delaware.

James S. Roberts, formerly visiting assistant professor at the University of Minnesota, has accepted an assistant professorship in political science at the University of Nevada.

William Robson, of the London School of Economics and Political Science, will be at the University of California as a visiting professor during the spring, 1957 semester.

John P. Roche, who joins the staff of the department of political science at Brandeis University in September, will serve at Columbia as visiting professor of government for the academic year 1956–57.

Roland Robinson has been appointed as Research Associate and In-Service Training Officer at the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Thammasat, Bangkok, Thailand under the Indiana University department of government's ICA contract.

John H. Romani has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Western Michigan College.

Clinton Rossiter has succeeded Mario Einaudi as chairman of the department of government at Cornell University.

Stanley Rothman, formerly of Harvard University, has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Smith College.

Edward J. Rozek has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado.

Robert A. Rupen has received an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College.

Elie Salem, formerly of the department of public administration in the American University of Beirut, will return to the School for Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University as assistant professor.

Bernard Schechterman joins the department of government, University of Miami, in September as instructor of government.

Joseph Schlesinger has been promoted to an assistant professorship at Michigan State University.

Waldo Schumacher will serve as acting head of the political science department at the University of Oregon during 1956–57.

Paul Seabury of the University of California will teach at Hamline University during the Spring, 1957.

Edgar L. Shor of Indiana University has been promoted to assistant professor. He will serve two years as visiting professor and research director at the Institute of Public Administration, University of Thammasat, Bangkok, Thailand.

David G. Smith has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Stanford University.

Edward C. Smith, professor of political science and chairman of the social science group in the University College of Arts and Science, has retired from New York University.

Donald E. Smith, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, will be an instructor in political science at the University of Rhode Island.

Ralph Smuckler has been promoted to an associate professorship at Michigan State University.

Russell A. Snook has been promoted to the rank of professorial lecturer in the department of government and public administration at The American University.

Herman Somers of Haverford College will be at the University of California as visiting professor for the 1956–57 academic year.

Frank Sorauf has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor of political science at The Pennsylvania State University.

James R. Soukup, formerly of the University of Michigan, has been appointed instructor in government at the University of Texas.

Harold J. Spaeth, formerly of the University of Cincinnati, has accepted a position as instructor at the University of Detroit.

Cummins E. Speakman, Jr. has resigned from the University of Virginia and continues to teach at the American University, Beirut, Lebanon.

Philip S. Spoerry, a doctoral candidate at Harvard, has been appointed an acting instructor at the State College of Washington.

Normal L. Stamps, Rutgers University, has been promoted to associate professor.

W. J. Stankiewicz, formerly of Princeton University, has been serving with the department of economics, the Government of Ontario.

Wesley A. St. John has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Hamline University.

Herbert J. Storing has been appointed assistant professor at the University of Chicago.

Owen S. Stratton has been elected chairman of the Wellesley College department of political science for the term 1956–59.

Hobart P. Sturm of Idaho State College has resigned to become executive secretary of the Idaho Municipal League.

Ross B. Talbot, assistant professor of political science at the University of North Dakota, has accepted an appointment in the Carnegie internship program at Columbia University for 1956–57.

Howard Taubenfeld, of Golden Gate College in San Francisco, will serve as lecturer in political science at the University of California during the Fall semester.

Nelson E. Taylor, Jr., has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at Vassar College.

Richard W. Taylor, of Wisconsin State College, Stevens Point, will be visiting assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University for 1956–57.

Harold S. Thames, has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at East Central State Teachers College.

James F. Tierney has been promoted to assistant professor at Dartmouth College.

James E. Titus, of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment as instructor of government at Texas Technological College.

Henry J. Tomasek has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of North Dakota.

Maurice K. Townsend, of the Public Administration Clearing House, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Virginia.

Martin B. Travis, Jr. has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Stanford University. During 1956–57 he will be on leave while serving as research fellow at Columbia University.

David B. Truman has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science, Yale University for the fall term 1956–57.

Shirley S. Ullmer has been appointed an instructor at Michigan State University.

Donald W. Urquidi has been appointed instructor at the University of Miami.

Charles W. Van Cleve has been appointed instructor of government at the University of Texas.

Julius van der Kroef has joined the department of political science at the University of Bridgeport.

P. J. Vatikiotis has returned to the department of government at Indiana University as instructor in government.

Robert S. Walker, formerly of the University of California (Los Angeles), has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Michigan.

Clarence C. Walton has left the University of Scranton to become dean of the School of Business at Duquesne University.

Frederick M. Watkins, professor of political science, Yale University, has been appointed Director of Graduate Studies.

Myron Weiner, formerly of Princeton, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Ruth G. Weintraub has been made director of program of graduate study in the Arts and Sciences at Hunter College.

Norman Wengert has completed his one-year tenure with the Resources for the Future, Inc., and begins his appointment as Professor of Government and politics at the University of Maryland in September.

H. Bradford Westerfield, formerly of Harvard, has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of Chicago.

Alan F. Westin, formerly a teaching fellow at Harvard, has been appointed senior fellow at Yale University Law School for 1956–57.

Sidney Wise has been appointed chairman of the department of government at Franklin and Marshall College for the academic years 1956–58.

Daniel Wit has joined the staff of Indiana University's public administration program in Thailand as a visiting professor of public administration.

Leonard White has become emeritus professor at the University of Chicago.

J. Roffe Wike has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Coleman Woodbury of Yale University has been appointed visiting professor in political science, public health, and city and regional planning at the University of California for the Spring, 1957 semester.

Dell S. Wright, formerly of the University of Michigan, has accepted an instructorship in political science at Wayne University.

Quincy Wright has become emeritus professor at the University of Chicago.

Malcolm M. Wynn rejoins the department of history and political science at Stetson University.

Ira W. Zartman has been appointed an instructor in political science at Yale University.

IN MEMORIAM

Arthur Fordyce Gamber, associate professor of history and political science at Stetson University since 1948, died June 5, 1956.

Born February 10, 1888 in Norwalk, Ohio, he was educated in the Ohio public schools, Oberlin College, Columbia University and the University of Florida. He taught in public schools in Ohio and North Dakota and entered the college field in 1924. Before joining the Stetson Faculty he had taught at North Dakota Agricultural College, teachers colleges in Dickinson, N. D., Moorhead, Minn., and Valley City, N. D., and the University of Florida.

W. Leon Godshall, head of the department of international relations at Lehigh University, died suddenly on June 1, 1956 at the age of 61. He received his B.S. degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1919, the M.A. in 1920 and the Ph.D. in 1923. Professor Godshall served as instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania from 1919–23 and as professor of political science at Union College from 1923–1934. He joined the Lehigh faculty in 1939 as a member of the department of history and government. In 1947 he was appointed chairman of the newly established department of international relations.

In addition to rendering distinguished service at Union College and Lehigh University Professor Godshall accepted invitations as visiting professor at many of our foremost institutions here and abroad. His teaching assignments in Chinese universities reflected his enthusiastic interest in Far Eastern international relations. In 1924–25 and again in 1931–32 he held Penfield traveling scholarships for study in Asia. In 1952–53 he served as the first executive secretary for the Fulbright program in Japan.

Professor Godshall's interest in international relations went far beyond the academic halls. He was a very effective and popular lecturer who spoke to audiences throughout the United States. He served on the national board of directors of the Foreign Policy Association and organized its Lehigh Valley Branch. His work in Rotary International contributed significantly to international understanding. He was very active in the Middle Atlantic States Model United Nations and founded the Model Security Council of Pennsylvania colleges and universities. At the time of his death Professor Godshall was national president of both Pi Gamma Mu and the International Platform Association. He had just received a year's appointment to the Chester W. Nimitz chair of political and social science at the Naval War College.

Professor Godshall's students and colleagues will always remember his stimulating lectures, his careful scholarship, his dynamic ability as an administrator and his leadership in university and community affairs. Above all they will cherish the memory of a man of high character who took time from a very busy life to befriend and encourage young people who shared his enthusiasm for international relations.—EUGENE H. MILLER, *Visiting Professor, Department of International Relations, Lehigh University.*

Friends of the College of Wooster were grieved to learn this year of the death of Mary Z. Johnson, chairman of the department of political science. Miss Johnson served the college for twenty-eight years and her death culminated a two year illness.

Lawrence Preuss, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, died of a heart attack on July 7, 1956. An alumnus of the University of Michigan, Professor Preuss had served as a member of the faculty since 1928. He was widely known as a scholar and teacher of international law, and on numerous occasions had rendered valuable service to the United States government.

He was associate editor of the *Annual Digest* and *Reports of Public International Law Cases* from 1933 to 1942, and a member of the executive council of the American Society of International Law from 1937 to 1940 and from 1943 to 1946. He had been a member of the board of editors of the *American Journal of International Law* since 1946.

During World War II he was assistant and associate chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs in the Department of State, and was a deputy U. S. representative to the U. N. War Crimes Commission. Subsequently, he served the American delegation to the San Francisco conference as a technical expert.

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President

E. E. Schattschneider
Wesleyan University

President Elect

V. O. Key
Harvard University

Vice Presidents

Carl Brent Swisher
Johns Hopkins University

Wilfred Binkley
Ohio Northern University

Albert Lepawsky
University of California
(Berkeley)

Secretary

Gladys Kammerer
University of Kentucky

Treasurer

Max M. Kampelman
Washington, D. C.

Executive Director

Evron M. Kirkpatrick
1726 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Managing Editor
The American Political Science Review

Harvey C. Mansfield
The Ohio State University

Associate Director
Wilson Gaddis

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

Weldon Cooper
University of Virginia
Paul T. David
The Brookings Institution
Herbert Emmerich
Public Administration Clearing House
Claude E. Hawley
United States Information Agency
Norman L. Hill
University of Nebraska
Thomas P. Jenkin
University of California (Los Angeles)
Louise Overacker
Wellesley College
Charles B. Robson
University of North Carolina

William T. R. Fox
Columbia University
Ruth Weintraub
Hunter College
John D. Lewis
Oberlin College
Thomas H. Eliot
Washington University, St. Louis
York Willbern
University of Alabama
Allan Saunders
University of Hawaii
Christian Larsen
Sacramento State College

FORMER PRESIDENTS

Frank J. Goodnow
Albert Shaw
Frederic N. Judson
James Bryce
A. Lawrence Lowell
Woodrow Wilson
Simeon E. Baldwin
Albert Bushnell Hart
W. W. Willoughby
John Bassett Moore
Ernst Freund
Jesse Macy
Munroe Smith
Henry Jones Ford
Paul S. Reinsch
Leo S. Rowe
William A. Dunning

Harry A. Garfield
James W. Garner
Charles E. Merriam
Charles A. Beard
William B. Munro
Jesse S. Reeves
John A. Fairlie
Benjamin F. Shambaugh
Edward S. Corwin
William F. Willoughby
Isidor Loeb
Walter J. Shepard
Francis W. Coker
Arthur N. Holcombe
Thomas Reed Powell
Clarence A. Dykstra
Charles Grove Haines

Robert C. Brooks
Frederic A. Ogg
William Anderson
Robert E. Cushman
Leonard D. White
John M. Gaus
Walter F. Dodd
Arthur W. Macmahon
Henry R. Spencer
Quincy Wright
James K. Pollock
Peter H. Odegard
Luther H. Gulick
Pendleton Herring
Ralph J. Bunche
Charles McKinley
Harold D. Lasswell